{ "id": 3630803, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. SANDY WILLIAMS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "2010-07-15", "docket_number": "No. 107550", "first_page": "125", "last_page": "160", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 125" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280553 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "Cunningham, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256326 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265479 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 1000", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268235 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/1000-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735959 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 27, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "1365" }, { "page": "59" }, { "page": "197" }, { "page": "1369" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "1365" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "199" }, { "page": "1370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. 2d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3625076 ], "weight": 17, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141-42" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/235/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604853 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281" }, { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045513 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477035 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2890561 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 U.S. 305", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3657952 ], "weight": 31, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that it was not the case that \"anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case\"" }, { "parenthetical": "stating that it was not the case that \"anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case\"" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "2530" }, { "page": "319-20" }, { "page": "2530" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "2531" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "2531" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "2531" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "2532" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "2542" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "2532" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "2532" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "2537" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "2543", "parenthetical": "Thomas, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/557/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705152 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 409", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203741 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "2081-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284383 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610786 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34-35", "parenthetical": "vacating appellate court judgment and remanding with instructions to consider the hearsay exception first before proceeding to the sixth amendment issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302603 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602879 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 1027", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291375 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1034" }, { "page": "1034", "parenthetical": "\"The Cellmark report was not offered to prove the truth of its contents\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/1027-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 813", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275498 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "2278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "854 F.2d 244", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10527553 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/854/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 15", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196542 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20", "parenthetical": "the sixth amendment \"guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish\" (emphasis in original)" }, { "page": "19", "parenthetical": "the sixth amendment \"guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish\" (emphasis in original)" }, { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "the sixth amendment \"guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish\" (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629389 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604853 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280-81" }, { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045513 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284383 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626-27" }, { "page": "629-30" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. App. 3d 1027", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291375 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1040" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/394/1027-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 F.2d 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1465858 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02", "parenthetical": "allowing testifying psychiatrist to base opinion under Rule 703 on staff reports and defendant's interviews with other physicians" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/653/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 F.2d 1084", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 918172 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1089", "parenthetical": "allowing physician expert to testify under Rule 703 as to the patient's version of other doctors' opinion because expert had reports of two doctors as well as a hospital report" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/570/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Wash. U.L.Q. 19", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wash. U. L.Q.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121990 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. App. 3d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4280553 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/385/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735959 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629389 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0490-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1777, "char_count": 64331, "ocr_confidence": 0.845, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.274704161240721e-07, "percentile": 0.8702870321783239 }, "sha256": "15bb06db209bd7e0b5b7a7253613ebfcca33d943385d27d6ef9e4361096edc1c", "simhash": "1:f83ab7875ece04f1", "word_count": 10462 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:45:32.940545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. SANDY WILLIAMS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FITZGERALD\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Freeman specially concurred, with opinion.\nJustice Burke concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.\nOPINION\nAfter a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant, Sandy Williams, was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery of L.J. The appellate court affirmed the defendant\u2019s conviction, but reversed the trial court\u2019s imposition of a consecutive sentence. 385 Ill. App. 3d 359, 371. On appeal to this court, the defendant argues that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Alternatively, the defendant argues that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment confrontation clause right. The State cross-appeals, maintaining the appellate court improperly reversed the trial court\u2019s imposition of a consecutive sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.\nBACKGROUND\nThe State charged the defendant in a 17-count indictment with aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The cause proceeded to a bench trial. The counts that the State ultimately submitted to the judge were counts IV and VI (aggravated criminal sexual assault under 720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 14(a)(3) (West 2000)), count XV (aggravated kidnapping under 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 2(a)(3) (West 2000)) and count XVII (aggravated robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 5 (West 2000)). The State entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts. The following facts were adduced at trial.\nOn February 10, 2000, 22-year-old L.J. worked until 8 p.m. as a cashier at a clothing store in Chicago. On her way home to the south side of the city, she purchased items at the store for her mother and went toward her home. As she passed an alley, the defendant came up behind her and forced her to sit in the backseat of a beige station wagon, where he told her to take her clothes off. The defendant then vaginally penetrated L.J. The defendant also contacted L.J.\u2019s anus with his penis, but did not penetrate. He then pushed L.J. out of the car while keeping L.J.\u2019s coat, money, and other items. After L.J. ran home, her mother opened the door and saw her in tears, partially clothed with only one pant leg on. After L.J. went into the bathroom, her mother called the police.\nShortly after 9 p.m., Chicago police officers arrived at the home and found L.J. in the bathtub. She had not yet washed her vaginal area. After L.J. told the officers what had transpired, the officers issued a \u201cflash\u201d message for a black male, 5 foot, 8 inches tall, wearing a black skull cap, a black jacket and driving a beige station wagon. An ambulance transported L.J. and her mother to the emergency room. Dr. Nancy Schubert conducted a vaginal exam of L.J. and took vaginal swabs, which were then sealed and placed into a criminal sexual assault evidence collection kit along with L.J.\u2019s blood sample. The kit was sent to the Illinois State Police (ISP) Crime Lab for testing and analysis.\nOn February 15, 2000, forensic biologist Brian Ha-pack with the ISP Crime Lab received L.J.\u2019s sexual assault evidence collection kit and performed tests that confirmed the presence of semen. Hapack placed the swabs in a coin envelope, sealed the envelope, and placed the evidence in a secure freezer. Hapack guaranteed the accuracy of his results by working in a clean environment free from contamination and by ensuring that the tests functioned properly.\nOn August 3, 2000, police arrested the defendant for an unrelated offense and, pursuant to a court order, drew a blood sample from the defendant. On August 24, 2000, forensic scientist Karen Kooi performed an analysis on the sample that consisted of four quarter-sized bloodstains on a filter card. Kooi extracted a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile and entered it into the database at the ISP Crime Lab. Meanwhile, the samples from L.J.\u2019s sexual assault kit were sent to Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory in Germantown, Maryland, for DNA analysis on November 29, 2000. Cellmark returned L.J.\u2019s vaginal swabs and blood standard to the ISP Crime Lab on April 3, 2001. Cellmark derived a DNA profile for the person whose semen was recovered from L.J. According to ISP forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos, whose testimony will be set forth more fully below, the DNA profile received from Cellmark matched the defendant\u2019s DNA profile from the blood sample in the ISP database. L.J. identified the defendant in a line up on April 17, 2001. The defendant was then arrested for the instant offenses.\nAt the bench trial, Lambatos was accepted as an expert in forensic biology and forensic DNA analysis by the trial court. Lambatos began her testimony with a brief explanation of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. PCR testing, according to Lambatos, is one of the most modern types of DNA analysis available and is generally accepted in the scientific community. Lambatos explained how PCR analysis can be used to identify a male profile from a semen sample. First, an analyst conducts a procedure that isolates and extracts DNA from a sample that may include a mixture from a particular defendant and the victim. The DNA is not large enough to test at this point, and requires amplification to form a more workable sample. After amplification, an analyst can measure the length of an individual specific strand through a process called electrophoresis. A computer translates this measurement onto a graph called an electropherogram. The electropherogram is a representation of the individual\u2019s specified DNA data into a line with peaks representing the lengths of the DNA strands of the 13 STR regions. Reports generally also provide a \u201ctable of alleles\u201d showing the DNA profile of each sample. She also stated that the statistical probability of a match can also be determined by entering the alleles into a frequency database to learn how common they are in the general population.\nLambatos further testified that it is a commonly accepted practice in the scientific community for one DNA expert to rely on the records of another DNA analyst to complete her work. As mentioned, she used the DNA profile from Cellmark to match the DNA profile from the defendant\u2019s blood sample, which was contained in the ISP database. She stated that, because Cellmark was an accredited laboratory, it was required to meet \u201ccertain guidelines to perform DNA analysis for the Illinois State Police and so all those calibrations and internal proficiencies and controls [of the equipment used] would have had to have been in place for them to perform the DNA analysis.\u201d Cellmark\u2019s testing and analysis methods were generally accepted in the scientific community according to Lambatos. Lambatos, however, admitted that Cell-mark had different procedures and standards for results than the ISP Crime Lab. Nevertheless, Lambatos testified that she personally developed proficiency tests for Cellmark technicians to perform. She further testified that she routinely relied on results from Cellmark and she did not observe any chain of custody or contamination problems.\nThe prosecutor then asked her expert opinion regarding the DNA match. Defense counsel objected and asserted that Lambatos could not rely upon the testing performed by another lab. The trial court replied, \u201cWe will see. If she says that she didn\u2019t do her own testing and she relied on a test of another lab and she\u2019s testifying to that. We\u2019ll see what she\u2019s going to say.\u201d\nLambatos then testified that a match was generated of the male DNA profile found in the semen from L.J.\u2019s vaginal swabs to the defendant\u2019s male DNA profile from the defendant\u2019s blood standard. In response to defense questioning, Lambatos restated her interpretation of the alleles at each of the 13 locations. She testified about several locations where she visually filtered out spurious alleles and \u201cbackground noise\u201d and distinguished the defendant\u2019s profile. Lambatos concluded that in her expert opinion, the semen from L.J.\u2019s vaginal swab was a match to the defendant. Lambatos testified that the probability of this profile occurring in the general population was one in 8.7 quadrillion black, one in 390 quadrillion white, and one in 109 quadrillion Hispanic unrelated individuals. She did not observe any degradation or irregularities in the sample from L.J.\u2019s vaginal swab.\nShe stated that, in general, if \u201cthere was a question of a match, then we would investigate that further by looking at the electropherograms from all the cases involved and do some more comparisons on that.\u201d She explained that in looking at Cellmark\u2019s report, she interpreted it and \u201cI did review their data, and I did make my own interpretations so I looked at what *** they sent to me and did make my own determination, my own opinion.\u201d While Lambatos testified to her conclusion informed by Cellmark\u2019s report, Cellmark\u2019s report itself was not introduced into evidence. Also, while Lambatos referenced documents she reviewed in forming her own opinion, she did not read the contents of the Cell-mark report into evidence.\nAt the conclusion of Lambatos\u2019 testimony, the defendant moved to strike the evidence of testing completed by Cellmark based upon a violation of his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The defendant also objected on the grounds of foundation, citing People v. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 703 (2001), and argued insufficient evidence was presented regarding the calibration of the Cellmark equipment. The trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to strike. The trial court stated, \u201cI don\u2019t think this is a Crawford scenario, and I agree with the State that the evidence is \u2014 the issue is, you know, what weight do you give the test, not do you exclude it and accordingly your motion to exclude or strike the testimony of the last witness or opinions based on her own independent testing of the data received from Cellmark will be denied.\u201d\nFollowing this and other testimony concerning the incident, the State rested. The trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed finding. The defendant did not present any evidence in his defense. Thereafter, the trial court found the defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. The court denied the defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nA sentencing hearing was held. At the hearing, evidence was presented demonstrating the defendant was convicted and sentenced for the aggravated sexual assault, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnapping of G.M. in case number 84 \u2014 C\u201412720. The defendant was paroled in February 1997 and discharged from mandatory supervised release on February 4, 2000, six days prior to the instant crime. Following the hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to two concurrent terms of natural life imprisonment for the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts and a concurrent term of 15 years\u2019 imprisonment for the aggravated robbery count. The court also ordered that the defendant should serve a consecutive term of 60 years\u2019 imprisonment for the aggravated kidnapping count. The court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider his sentence.\nOn appeal, the appellate court rejected the defendant\u2019s contentions that the State failed to establish a sufficient foundation for Lambatos\u2019 opinion (385 Ill. App. 3d at 366); that the State failed to establish that Cellmark\u2019s equipment was adequately calibrated and properly functioning (385 Ill. App. 3d at 366); and that the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody based upon Cellmark\u2019s handling of the evidence (385 Ill. App. 3d at 367). The appellate court next rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that the results of Cellmark\u2019s testing and analysis were testimonial in nature and therefore Lambatos\u2019 expert testimony thereto violated the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to confrontation. 385 Ill. App. 3d at\n370. The court noted that the confrontation clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. The appellate court found that \u201cCellmark\u2019s report was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was offered to provide a basis for Lambatos\u2019 opinion.\u201d 385 Ill. App. 3d at 369. The court stated, \u201cOverall, defendant essentially requests that we require each and every individual involved in the testing and analysis of DNA to testify at trial. For obvious reasons in the abstract and for those provided in the case at bar, we decline to issue such a ruling.\u201d 385 Ill. App. 3d at 370. Lastly, the court addressed the sentencing issue. The appellate court, following the decisions of People v. Dixon, 366 Ill. App. 3d 848 (2006), and People v. Spears, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1000 (2007), and this court\u2019s decision in People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148 (2006), found that a term of years could not be served consecutive to a term of natural life. 385 Ill. App. 3d at\n371. The appellate court therefore vacated that portion of the circuit court\u2019s order imposing consecutive sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping, and instead modified the defendant\u2019s sentence to impose concurrent sentences for those convictions. 385 Ill. App. 3d at 371. Justice Cunningham filed a dissent, asserting that the prosecution failed to lay a sufficient foundation for Lambatos\u2019 testimony. 385 Ill. App. 3d at 371 (Cunningham, J., dissenting).\nThis court granted the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. The State has requested cross-relief concerning the appellate court\u2019s modification of the sentence.\nANALYSIS\nFoundational Challenge\nThe defendant argues generally before this court that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted Lambatos to testify that the defendant\u2019s DNA profile matched the male DNA profile of the semen in L.J.\u2019s vaginal swabs. The defendant specifically argues that the trial court erred in admitting Lambatos\u2019 testimony regarding the match because a sufficient foundation was not established. The defendant additionally argues that Lambatos\u2019 testimony violated his sixth amendment confrontation right under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). We begin with the foundational argument. We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant\u2019s foundational challenge to the trial court\u2019s admission of Lambatos\u2019 expert testimony. People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97, 141 (2009); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006).\nThe defendant contends that the trial court should not have permitted the State\u2019s forensic analyst to testify because of a lack of sufficient testimony that the Cell-mark report was reliable. According to the defendant, when expert testimony relies upon data obtained from electronic or mechanical equipment, the proponent of the testimony must offer foundational proof that the equipment was calibrated and functioning properly at the time the data was presented in order to establish that the expert\u2019s testimony is reliable. The State responds that Lambatos\u2019 testimony that Cellmark\u2019s testing was done according to valid scientific theory and reliable methodology provided a sound basis upon which Lambatos could formulate her opinion. Therefore, the State asserts that it was not obliged to present additional testimony regarding the calibration and functioning of Cellmark\u2019s equipment to admit Lambatos\u2019 expert opinion pursuant to Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981). We agree with the State.\nIn Wilson v. Clark, this court adopted Rules 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning an expert\u2019s testimony at trial. Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 196. Former Rule 703 states in part:\n\u201cThe facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.\u201d Fed. R. Evid. 703 (amended 2000).\nThe court in Wilson noted that, in a trial context, \u201c[b]oth Federal and State courts have interpreted Federal Rule 703 to allow opinions based on facts not in evidence.\u201d Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 193. Rule 705 states:\n\u201cThe expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.\u201d Fed. R. Evid. 705.\nFollowing Rule 705, we held in Wilson that, at trial, \u201can expert may give an opinion without disclosing the facts underlying that opinion.\u201d Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194. \u201cUnder Rule 705 the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion.\u201d Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194. Thus, an expert testifying at trial may offer an opinion based on facts not in evidence, and the expert is not required on direct examination to disclose the facts underlying the expert\u2019s opinion. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 334 (2002).\nThis court applied Wilson v. Clark to DNA evidence in People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187 (2006). There, the defendant filed a motion during trial to bar testimony from Terry Melton, the president of Mitotyping Technologies, concerning human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). Melton did not complete the actual laboratory \u201cbench work\u201d on the evidence. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 281. The defendant argued that, without the lab technician\u2019s testimony, Melton\u2019s testimony regarding the mtDNA results was improper. We rejected that argument, holding that it was enough that Melton relied upon data reasonably relied upon by other experts in her field. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 282.\nHere, the trial court correctly denied defense counsel\u2019s objection to the foundation for Lambatos\u2019 expert opinion. It is undisputed that Lambatos was qualified as an expert in forensic biology and DNA analysis; Lambatos testified that it is the commonly accepted practice in the scientific community for a forensic DNA analyst to rely on the work of other analysts to complete her own work; and Lambatos based her opinion on information reasonably relied upon by experts in her field.\nAs in Sutherland, Lambatos testified that Cellmark\u2019s work on the vaginal swabs in this case and the results of the PCR analysis conducted by Kooi are the types of data reasonably relied upon by experts in her field. Lambatos testified that, because Cellmark was an accredited laboratory, calibrations, internal proficiencies, and controls had to be in place for the DNA analysis to be completed in this case. These internal controls were, according to Lambatos\u2019 testimony, ones that she personally developed. Lambatos herself reviewed Cellmark\u2019s data, including the electropherogram, and did not have any question about the match. Rather, she used her own expertise to compare the two profiles before her. She also did not observe any problems in the chain of custody or any signs of contamination or degradation of the evidence. Lambatos ultimately agreed with Cellmark\u2019s results regarding the male DNA profile, and then made her own visual and interpretive comparisons of the peaks on the electropherogram and the table of alleles to conclude there was a match to the defendant\u2019s genetic profile. See E Gianelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence \u00a718.04(b), at 54 (4th ed. 2009) (\u201cin STR testing, the analyst can visually compare the two electropherograms or rely on a computerized comparison\u201d).\nWe also reject the defendant\u2019s specific complaint that there was no testimony that the instruments used by Cellmark were calibrated and functioning properly. The defendant principally relies on People v. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 703 (2001). Raney held that where the expert testimony is based upon an electronic or mechanical device, the expert must provide some foundational proof that the device was functioning properly at the time it was used. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710. The defendant there argued that the State failed to establish a proper foundation for the admission of scientific results from the gas chromotography mass spectrometer (GCMS) machine. The court agreed, finding that the record contained no evidence regarding whether the GCMS machine was functioning properly at the time it was used to analyze the substance. Further, the Raney court stated an expert should be able to explain how the GCMS machine was calibrated or why she knew the results were accurate. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710, citing People v. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d 502 (1994). Finding a lack of such an explanation, the court concluded that the State failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because of the lack of foundation. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 711. The Raney court acknowledged, however, that \u201c[i]t may not be feasible for each expert to personally test the instrument relied upon for purposes of determining what is a suspected controlled substance.\u201d Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710.\nWe find that the testing of narcotics using a GCMS machine is not comparable to the scientific process at issue in this case. At the defendant\u2019s bench trial, Lambatos did not merely regurgitate results generated by a machine, as the witness in Raney did. Lambatos conducted an independent evaluation of data related to samples of genetic material, including items processed at both Cellmark and the ISP Crime Lab. Lambatos used her expertise and professional judgment to compare the DNA profiles. Her examination of the different alleles from the blood sample and from the semen sample indicated a match with the defendant. She also determined the statistical probability of the match by examining the alleles and entering them into a frequency database to determine how common they are in the general population. Further, this case is distinguishable from Raney because Lambatos maintained that Cellmark necessarily met the threshold of proper DNA analysis because Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and followed guidelines that she had personally developed. We therefore do not accept the defendant\u2019s invitation to broadly interpret Raney to find an insufficient foundation where an analyst merely relies upon data obtained from electronic or mechanical equipment.\nFinally, under Wilson, the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-examination to elicit facts underlying the expert opinion. Wilson, 84 111. 2d at 194, citing Fed. R Evid. 705. The record reveals substantial cross-examination of Lambatos\u2019 comparison of the DNA profile from the database to the DNA profile from the sexual assault kit. The record also reveals that the trial court, sitting as a fact finder, appropriately weighed the testimony. It stated:\n\u201cThe DNA expert that testified, the last witness, was in my view the best DNA witness I have ever heard. Under detail [sic], lengthy complex cross-examination by the defense on every single part of her report she explains, she told what was the basis of her opinion, she was an outstanding witness in every respect. There is the issue of she didn\u2019t do the actual test. The testing is farmed out to other labs. Some did the testing, some are an accredited lab. That was part of the playback you might say of the Illinois state police forensic division at that time, and I agree with the State that there is no misidentification here. This is a match, this is 1 in 8.7 quadrillion, 50 times the population for the last 2000 years. It\u2019s an absolute match.\u201d\nAccordingly, the issue of Lambatos\u2019 reliance on Cell-mark\u2019s report went to the weight of her opinion and not its admissibility. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,_n.l, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314, 322 n.l, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.l (2009) (stating that it was not the case that \u201canyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution\u2019s case\u201d). The trial court assessed the weight of Lambatos\u2019 testimony and found it convincing.\nWe therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a sufficient foundation for Lambatos\u2019 testimony and therefore turn to the defendant\u2019s Crawford argument.\nSixth Amendment\nThe trial court rejected the defense objection that his sixth amendment right was violated by Lambatos\u2019 testimony concerning Cellmark\u2019s report. The appellate court affirmed this decision, finding that the complained-of statements regarding Cellmark\u2019s report by Lambatos were not used for the truth of the matter asserted and therefore the sixth amendment was not implicated. The defendant\u2019s claim that his sixth amendment confrontation right was violated involves a question of law, which we review de novo. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 141-42.\nThe sixth amendment guarantees that \u201c[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. VI. This part of the sixth amendment is called the confrontation clause and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 264 (2007). In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment\u2019s \u201cprimary object\u201d is with \u201ctestimonial hearsay.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 194, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. Accordingly, \u201c[tjestimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197, 124 S. Ct. at 1369. The Supreme Court added an explicit logical corollary to this statement by pointing out, in a footnote, that the confrontation clause does not bar the admission of testimonial statements that are admitted for purposes other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9, citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 85 L. Ed. 2d 425, 431, 105 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82 (1985); see also Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 142. Stated another way, we need only consider whether a statement was testimonial if the statements at issue were, in fact, hearsay statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9; see also Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 142; People v. Johnson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 618, 631-32 (2009); People v. Melchor, 226 Ill. 2d 24, 34-35 (2007) (vacating appellate court judgment and remanding with instructions to consider the hearsay exception first before proceeding to the sixth amendment issue).\nThe hearsay rule generally prohibits the introduction of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 145; People v. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d 411, 432-33 (2002). Underlying facts and data, however, may be disclosed by an expert, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but for the purpose of explaining the basis for his opinion. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143. Moreover, it is well established that an expert may testify about the findings and conclusions of a nontestifying expert that he used in forming his opinions. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143.\nThe defendant argues that the State introduced the Cellmark report to establish the truth of the matter asserted and it is therefore hearsay. Without Cellmark\u2019s report, according to the defendant, Lambatos could not have given her testimony that the defendant\u2019s DNA matched the profile deduced by Cellmark. The State counters that Lambatos testified about the Cellmark tests only to explain how she formed her own opinion. Therefore, the only statement that the prosecution offered for the truth of the matter asserted was Lambatos\u2019 own opinion. According to the State, presentation of the person who prepared the DNA profile at Cellmark was not necessary for confrontation purposes. We agree with the State.\nThis court has long held that prohibitions against the admission of hearsay do not apply when an expert testifies to underlying facts and data, not admitted into evidence, for the purpose of explaining the basis of his opinion. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 142. In Lovejoy, a medical examiner testified that another toxicologist detected six different types of drugs in the victim\u2019s body after conducting blood tests, indicating that poisoning caused the victim\u2019s death. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 141. The medical examiner testified that he was trained in toxicology interpretation and that the toxicology report showed lethal amounts of several medications in the victim\u2019s blood. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 141. He explained how the toxicology report added to his own physical observations during the autopsy and that it aided him in determining the cause of death. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 144. Following Wilson v. Clark and its progeny, we noted that experts may not only consider the reports commonly relied upon by experts in their particular field, but also to testify to the contents of the underlying records. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143, citing Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981), People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133 (1992). Quoting People v. Pasch, we explained:\n\u201c \u2018While the contents of reports relied upon by experts would clearly be inadmissible as hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted, an expert may disclose the underlying facts and conclusions for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for his opinion. [Citation.] By allowing an expert to reveal the information for this purpose alone, it will undoubtedly aid the jury in assessing the value of his opinion.\u2019 \u201d Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143, quoting Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 176.\nAccordingly, we held that the medical examiner\u2019s testimony repeating the nontestifying analyst\u2019s conclusions was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather was introduced \u201cto show the jury the steps [the examiner] took prior to rendering an expert opinion in this case.\u201d Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 144. Consequently, there was no confrontation clause violation. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 145.\nOur appellate court addressed a similar factual situation in People v. Johnson, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (2009). In Johnson, the defendant challenged an expert\u2019s testimony regarding DNA test results, arguing that he had no opportunity to cross-examine the analysts who conducted the testing. The court observed that experts are permitted to disclose underlying facts and data to the jury in order to explain the basis for their opinions. It concluded that the State offered the DNA report at issue as part of the basis for the expert opinion and no confrontation violation occurred. 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1034.\nLike Lovejoy and Johnson, Lambatos\u2019 testimony about Cellmark\u2019s report was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. The State introduced this testimony, rather, to show the underlying facts and data Lambatos used before rendering an expert opinion in this case. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 144. The evidence against the defendant was Lambatos\u2019 opinion, not Cellmark\u2019s report, and the testimony was introduced live on the witness stand. Indeed, the report was not admitted into evidence at all. Rather, Lambatos testified to her conclusion based upon her own subjective judgment about the comparison of the Cellmark report with the existing ISP profile. Cf. P. Gianelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence \u00a7 18.04(b), at 57 (4th ed. 2007) (\u201cwhen technical problems materialize, it can be very difficult to interpret the electropherograms. *** Thus, there is room for subjective judgment\u201d).\nFor instance, at trial, the defense attorney questioned her if she confused the defendant\u2019s DNA with L.J.\u2019s DNA. He asked Lambatos if the alleles were not more consistent with the victim than the defendant at several loci. When asked about a specific locus called \u201cT-POX,\u201d Lambatos responded:\n\u201cIn my opinion with this profile, it is a mixture so when we have a mixture you are looking at the profile as a whole *** and it\u2019s important to note that the alleles at each locus on a DNA molecule that we look at are very common. It is not uncommon for you and I to have the same alleles at a locus or you and I to have the same alleles. The power of this DNA comes with looking at all 13 areas of the DNA because it\u2019s that uniqueness looking at all 13 that\u2019s going to give us numbers. And here like a T-POX and in the other two that you mentioned, there are only two alleles and like I say in my opinion there are only two people in this profile and it just may so happen that they share an 8 or that they share an 11 or it may so happen that she is an 8 and 11 and he is just an 11, 11, or he is an 8, 11 and she is an 8, 8. There\u2019s only certain possibilities that can be attributed at each locus.\u201d\nAfter defense counsel stated that Lambatos\u2019 interpretation could have erred because of a degraded sample, she stated:\n\u201cYes, it\u2019s possible to have a degraded sample but if the sample was degraded, that would be known by our earlier examination of the evidence [by Hapack]. We determine the quantity and the DNA that we have and the quality of the DNA and also after we look at the electropherograms, you can see the degradation, their specific patterns, and the data looks a certain way when it is degraded. The peaks aren\u2019t as defined. They slope off missing here and there. Different things happen with degradation, and I didn\u2019t see any evidence of degradation in this particular fraction.\u201d The defendant\u2019s suggestion that Lambatos was\nmerely a \u201cconduit\u201d for Cellmark\u2019s report and that the report was entirely dispositive of Lambatos\u2019 opinion, and thus hearsay, is not compelling. Her testimony consisted of her expert comparison of the DNA profile in the ISP database with the DNA profile from the kit prepared by Cellmark. She used her own expertise to compare the two profiles before her: the blood sample prepared by Kooi and the semen sample prepared by Cellmark. She also did not observe any problems in the chain of custody or any signs of contamination or degradation of the evidence. Lambatos ultimately agreed with Cellmark\u2019s results regarding the male DNA profile. But Lambatos additionally made her own visual and interpretive comparisons of the peaks on the electropherogram and the table of alleles to make a conclusion on the critical issue: that there was a match to the defendant\u2019s genetic profile. Accordingly, Cellmark\u2019s report was not used for the truth of the matter asserted and was not hearsay.\nThe defendant further asserts that the instant matter is \u201cdirectly analogous\u201d to the United States Supreme Court\u2019s recent holding of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S._, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). In Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered whether a certification by a forensic lab analyst as to the nature and weight of a controlled substance was a testimonial statement, and thus its admission in lieu of live testimony by the analyst violated the sixth amendment right to confrontation. The defendant in that case, Luis Melendez-Diaz, was charged with cocaine trafficking in an amount between 14 and 28 grams. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. At trial, the prosecution placed into evidence white plastic bags containing a substance that resembled cocaine. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 319-20, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. It also submitted three \u201ccertificates of analysis\u201d showing the results of forensic analysis performed on the seized substances. The certificates reported the weight of the substances and stated that the bags \u201c \u2018[have] been examined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine.\u2019 \u201d Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. The certificates were sworn to before a notary public by analysts at the State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health as required by Massachusetts law. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. Massachusetts law permitted the use of such affidavits to provide prima facie evidence of the analyzed substance\u2019s composition, quality and net weight. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.\nIn a 5-4 decision, the Court held that, following Crawford, the analyst\u2019s certificates \u201cwere testimonial statements and the analysts were \u2018witnesses\u2019 for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to \u2018 \u201cbe confronted with\u201d \u2019 the analysts at trial.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 322, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 194, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. The Court found the \u201ccase involves little more than the application of our holding in Crawford\u201d Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 332, 129 S. Ct. at 2542, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354.\nThe Court based its holding on two rationales derived from Crawford. First, the forensic analyst\u2019s certificates were within the \u201ccore class of testimonial statements\u201d in Crawford. Because the critical issue was whether the substance was cocaine, the Supreme Court found that \u201c[t]he \u2018certificates\u2019 are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing \u2018precisely what a witness does on direct examination.\u2019 \u201d Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 321, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 242, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006). Second, the Court stated, \u201cnot only were the affidavits \u2018 \u201cmade under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,\u201d \u2019 [citation] but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide \u2018prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight\u2019 of the analyzed substance.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 321, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, quoting Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, \u00a713.\nThe majority explicitly rejected the suggestion that the prosecutors were required to call each person involved in the chain of custody to the witness stand. Responding to the dissent in a footnote, the majority stated:\n\u201c[We] do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution\u2019s case. *** \u2018[G]aps in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.\u2019 It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live. Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_n.l, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 322 n.l, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.l.\nAccordingly, the Court in Melendez-Diaz held that the defendant\u2019s confrontation clause right had been violated.\nWe find that Melendez-Diaz does not change our determination. In Melendez-Diaz, the disputed evidence was a \u201chare-bones statement\u201d that the substance was cocaine, and the defendant \u201cdid not know what tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not have possessed.\u201d Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 327, 129 S. Ct. at 2537. Here, Lambatos testified about her own expertise, judgment, and skill at interpretation of the specific alleles at the 13 loci, and confirmed her general knowledge of the protocols and procedures of Cellmark. Lambatos also conducted her own statistical analysis of the DNA match. She did not simply read to the judge, sitting as a fact finder, from Cellmark\u2019s report. This is in contrast to Cellmark\u2019s report, which did not include any comparative analysis of the electropherograms or DNA profiles and was not introduced into evidence. Cellmark\u2019s electropherogram, rather, was part of the process used by Lambatos in rendering her opinion concluding that the profiles matched. Thus, Lambatos\u2019 opinion is categorically different from the certificate in Melendez-Diaz.\nIn sum, the State did not offer Lambatos\u2019 testimony regarding the Cellmark report for the truth of the matter asserted and this testimony did not constitute \u201chearsay.\u201d Thus, the trial court and appellate court properly concluded that Crawford considerations did not apply here. Lambatos disclosed the underlying facts from Cellmark\u2019s report for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for her opinion on the critical issue concerning whether there was a DNA match between the defendant\u2019s blood sample and the semen sample recovered from L.J. By allowing the expert to reveal the information for this purpose alone, it undoubtedly aided the judge, sitting as the factfinder, in assessing the value of Lambatos\u2019 opinion. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143, quoting Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 176; see also Johnson, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1034 (\u201cThe Cellmark report was not offered to prove the truth of its contents\u201d). Finally, the record demonstrates that the gaps in the chain of custody went to the \u201c \u2018weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility\u2019 \u201d (Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_n.l, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 322 n.l, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.l, quoting United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)), and our review of the record shows that Lambatos\u2019 conclusion was tested \u201cin the crucible of cross-examination.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 199, 124 S. Ct. at 1370; see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 19, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1985) (the sixth amendment \u201cguarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish\u201d (emphasis in original)).\nSentencing\nWe note that the defendant was subject to two mandatory natural life sentences for his aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions and a concurrent term of 15 years for the aggravated robbery conviction. The defendant was also convicted of aggravated kidnapping, for which the trial court imposed an extended-term sentence of 60 years in prison. The trial court ordered that the 60-year sentence was to run consecutively to the end of his natural life sentences. The appellate court vacated that portion of the circuit court\u2019s order imposing the consecutive sentence, and instead modified the defendant\u2019s sentence to impose concurrent sentences for those convictions. 385 Ill. App. 3d at 371. This court recently held in People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490 (2010), that a sentence consecutive to a natural-life sentence was proper. We therefore reverse the appellate court on this issue and do not disturb the trial court\u2019s order.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nAppellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nWhen a DNA laboratory receives a sample of blood, the DNA is extracted from the fraction containing the nucleic material in the white blood cells. DNA is a tightly wound strand that measures approximately six feet in length. Uncoiled, DNA resembles a twisted ladder with rungs of the ladder made of chemicals called nucleotides. DNA has four different types of nucleotides (A: adenine, T: thymine, G: guanine, and C: cytosine) that form interlocking pairs. D. Kaye & G. Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 485, 491 (2d ed. 2000). It is the order (sequence) of these building blocks that determines each person\u2019s genetic characteristics. The great majority of DNA is identical from person to person but forensic scientists commonly examine 13 specific regions, or loci, where certain nucleotide patterns are repeated again and again. These patterns are called \u201cShort Tandem Repeats\u201d (STRs). The number of repeated sequences determines the length of an STR. This length of repeated sequences, often called an allele, may vary between people and is what analysts measure and use for comparison. D. Kaye & G. Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 485, 494 (2d ed. 2000).\nThe chain of custody issue is presently not before this court.\nAs we noted in Lovejoy, Federal Rule of Evidence 703, upon which the Wilson opinion was based, has been amended. Illinois has not adopted the amended version of Rule 703, and the defendant does not ask us to consider the amended version of the rule in this case.\nJustice Thomas, in providing the fifth vote, \u201cjoin[ed] the Court\u2019s opinion in this case because the documents at issue in this case \u2018are quite plainly affidavits,\u2019 [citation]. As such, they \u2018fall within the core class of testimonial statements\u2019 governed by the Confrontation Clause. [Citation.]\u201d Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 333, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FITZGERALD" }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree that defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences must be affirmed. With respect to defendant\u2019s appeal in which he raises several evidentiary challenges, I concur in the court\u2019s judgment for reasons other than those expressed in its opinion. With respect to the State\u2019s cross-appeal, I join in that portion of the opinion reversing the appellate court\u2019s modification of defendant\u2019s sentence.\nMy concerns in this case are based on the lack of foundation for Sandra Lambatos\u2019 testimony. Lambatos was employed at the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory at the time defendant\u2019s DNA was connected to the sexual assault at issue. Lambatos testified that the male DNA profile generated from the victim\u2019s vaginal swabs matched the DNA generated from a known sample of defendant\u2019s blood. Lambatos also testified that the statistical probabilities for such a match were astronomical. The crux of defendant\u2019s argument is that Lambatos\u2019 opinion was based on a DNA profile that was generated by Cellmark Laboratory. Due to backlogs at the Illinois State Police Lab at the time of the testing, that lab often sent blood and semen samples to Cellmark, located in Maryland, in order for DNA material to be extracted from the samples. Cellmark would then amplify the extracted DNA material in order to produce a profile. The profile is thereafter used to produce a chart for comparison purposes. As defendant correctly notes, Lambatos did not conduct any of the scientific procedures used at Cellmark to generate the male DNA profile from the victim\u2019s vaginal swabs and she had no personal knowledge of any of the conditions at the lab when the profile was generated.\nThe court dismisses defendant\u2019s contentions based on Lambatos\u2019 testimony that \u201cbecause Cellmark was an accredited laboratory, calibrations, internal proficiencies, and controls had to be in place for the DNA analysis to be completed in this case.\u201d 238 111. 2d at 138. The court concludes that because witnesses like Lambatos are permitted in Illinois to give an opinion without disclosing the facts or data upon which the expert bases her opinion, such testimony is sufficient. 238 111. 2d at 137. In other words, Lambatos\u2019 foundational testimony was based upon data reasonably relied upon by other experts in her field, and defendant\u2019s appellate concerns relate to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 238 Ill. 2d at 137.\nAn expert may certainly base her opinion on information reasonably relied upon by other experts in the field. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981). But that was not what occurred here. Strikingly absent from Lambatos\u2019 testimony is any information about Cellmark\u2019s extraction and amplification processes in generating the profile that was used to produce the data upon which she relied in her making comparisons. Lambatos\u2019 \u201ctesting\u201d in this case consisted of her own reading to match up the numbers generated on the computer charts, which was derived from Cellmark\u2019s underlying scientific processes. What Lambatos failed to testify to during her examination was what occurred at Cellmark beginning from when Cellmark received the package containing the victim\u2019s vaginal swabs and blood sample to when Cellmark analysts performed the extraction and amplification procedures. Instead, she speculated that because Cell-mark was accredited, \u201cthey would have to meet certain guidelines to perform DNA analysis for the Illinois State Police so all those calibrations and internal proficiencies and controls would have had to have been in place for them to perform the DNA analysis.\u201d\nLambatos\u2019 testimony on this point is insufficient. First, with respect to the fact of accreditation, Lambatos did not identify when or by whom Cellmark received its accreditation. Whether a laboratory is accredited is a fact that can be established without the need of an expert witness. Here, Lambatos\u2019 testimony does not establish that Cellmark was accredited; rather, it was her opinion that the laboratory was accredited at the time it ran the tests. Further, Lambatos did not base her assumption that \u201ccertain guidelines *** would have had to have been in place\u201d on sources such as the report of another expert, i.e., the written report of the technicians who generated the profile or even the lab\u2019s logbook at the time the profile was generated. See United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing testifying psychiatrist to base opinion under Rule 703 on staff reports and defendant\u2019s interviews with other physicians); O\u2019Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1978) (allowing physician expert to testify under Rule 703 as to the patient\u2019s version of other doctors\u2019 opinion because expert had reports of two doctors as well as a hospital report). Lambatos\u2019 opinion regarding whether Cellmark followed proper guidelines at the time the DNA material was extracted and amplified was not based on anything other than her rank speculation that it \u201chad to have been done\u201d solely because Cellmark was an accredited lab.\nWhile I do not believe that Lambatos is required to personally verify the protocols used by Cellmark to generate the DNA profile from the swab, she, at the very least, should be able to point to something concrete in order to give her opinion as to what protocols were used at the time the profile was generated. She did not. There was no testimony on which protocols were used. In fact, Lambatos admitted that Cellmark used procedures and standards that were different from those used by her own employer, the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory. Although Lambatos stated that she personally \u201chelped develop line proficiency tests to be administered to analysts at Cel[1]mark,\u201d nothing in her testimony revealed that the analysts who performed the DNA extraction and amplification in this case had taken, let alone passed, the tests she had developed or that, when the tests were run, they were run according to the standards preferred by the Illinois State Police Lab.\nThe lack of any information regarding Cellmark\u2019s generation of the male DNA profile from the victim\u2019s vaginal swabs contrasts sharply with the testimony the State produced with respect to the DNA profile generated from defendant\u2019s blood sample by Karen Kooi, upon which Lambatos also relied to read and match up the numbers on her chart. Kooi, an employee of the Illinois State Police Crime Lab at the time, testified as to the protocols she used to generate the DNA profile taken from defendant\u2019s blood. Kooi further stated that she utilized \u201cclean lab\u201d techniques when she generated the profile.\nThis case, therefore, differs from People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 3d 187 (2006), upon which the court primarily relies in reaching its conclusion today. There, the witness in question was an employee of the laboratory which did the DNA analysis, who not only testified at trial, but who had also testified at the Frye hearing. Moreover, the defendant had received from the State, pursuant to Rule 417(b), extensive information including records reflecting compliance with quality control guidelines. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 280-81. In fact, even the defendant\u2019s own DNA expert was able to testify from the records produced that the lab\u2019s results were \u201cclean.\u201d Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 282. These facts render Sutherland distinguishable.\nTwo cases from our appellate court support my point regarding foundation. In People v. Johnson, a panel of the First Division of the First District held that a sufficient foundation was established where the DNA expert, an actual employee of Cellmark, testified that although she did not personally perform any of the testing used to generate the male DNA profile from the sexual assault kit, she based her opinion on records used in the ordinary course of business. People v. Johnson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 618 (2009). In particular, the witness relied on a written Cellmark report, which indicated that 10 Cellmark analysts had been involved in the lab work in the case and that all the methods used, conclusions and results reached were to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Johnson, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 626-27. Another witness, who like Lambatos was employed by Illinois State Police, testified that he compared the Cellmark-generated male DNA profile to the DNA panel he had generated from saliva obtained from the defendant and concluded that they were a match. Like Lambatos, he testified as to the statistical probabilities of the match. In holding that an adequate foundation for Cellmark\u2019s work had been established for the Cellmark witness, the court found it significant that the witness actually worked for Cell-mark, which was the lab that generated the DNA profile from the victim\u2019s samples. Johnson, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 629-30. She also performed an independent review of the work to make sure all of the procedures done at the lab were followed correctly, which the court held was sufficient foundation upon which to partially base her assessment and conclusion. Johnson, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 630.1 note that the court stressed, in reaching its conclusion, that the foundational testimony was stronger than that in this case, specifically citing the Third Division\u2019s opinion in this case. Johnson, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 629.\nSimilarly, in People v. Johnson, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (2009), a panel from the Sixth Division of the First District held that a sufficient foundation was established where the DNA expert, again an actual employee of Cell-mark, testified not only about the proper procedures that were expected to be utilized at her lab, but that the case file indicated that those procedures had been followed with respect to the DNA profile in question. To reach this conclusion, the witness relied on the records of other Cellmark employees, which indicated that the proper procedures had been followed. Therefore, although the witness did not perform any of the testing, her testimony showed a sufficient foundation of Cellmark\u2019s procedures and specifications upon which to partially base her assessment and conclusion. Johnson, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1040. The court stressed that the foundation in the case was stronger than that found sufficient by the appellate court in this case.\nLambatos\u2019 testimony is demonstrably different from the testimony in either of the Johnson opinions. Lambatos\u2019 direct testimony was based on two documents offered into evidence by the State, which consisted of two shipping manifests from FedEx. One manifest showed that the victim\u2019s vaginal swabs and blood standards were sent to Cellmark from the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory on November 28, 2000, and were received by Cellmark on November 29, 2000. The second manifest showed that the victim\u2019s samples were \u201csent back from Celmark [sic]\u201d on April 3, 2001, along with samples from \u201cother cases\u201d that had nothing to do with the present case. Lambatos testified that she relied on these two pieces of evidence when she did the work in this case. I submit that these shipping manifests are not the kind of \u201cfacts or data\u201d contemplated by this court in Wilson. Unlike the witnesses in the Johnson cases, Lambatos was not a Cellmark employee. She did not rely on the detailed type of reports that those witnesses relied upon. She did not know who performed the tests at Cellmark nor could she testify as to what protocols, if any, they followed. The shipping manifests, which are not enough to even establish a proper chain of custody once the samples reached their destination at Cellmark, certainly cannot establish whether a laboratory was \u201cclean\u201d or whether Lambatos\u2019 protocols were actually followed.\nBy accepting Lambatos\u2019 assumption that because Cellmark was accredited, the protocols she had personally developed for the lab to use were, in fact, used to generate the DNA profile, the court errs in finding that an adequate foundation was laid. The court relies on the fact that Lambatos used her expertise and professional judgment to compare the DNA profiles in this case. But the problem with this is that there was no foundation established for the DNA profile generated by Cellmark. Lambatos\u2019 opinion that the DNA profile generated there matched defendant\u2019s DNA profile does not change that fact. It is certainly the law that alleged infirmities in the performance of a test usually go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. 238 Ill. 2d at 144. Courts should not automatically exclude scientific evidence whenever a forensic analyst deviates from a correct test protocol in minor respects; instead, the deviation would have to materially affect the outcome in order to warrant exclusion. E. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 Wash. U.L.Q. 19, 46 (1991). Here, however, Lambatos could not offer any testimony to establish any protocol. Contrary to what the court rests its analysis upon, there is simply no foundational evidence to \u201cweigh.\u201d\nLast, and of equal importance, the court today implies that the scientific process involved in DNA analysis is \u201cnot comparable\u201d to narcotics Gas Chromotography Mass Spectrometer (GCMS) testing because Lambatos did not \u201cregurgitate\u201d the results from Cellmark as experts do with respect to GCMS test results. 238 111. 2d at 141. Lambatos took on faith the DNA profile generated by Cellmark from the victim\u2019s samples, assuming that because the lab was accredited all quality controls were in place when the profile was created. This seems no different from how expert witnesses in drug cases view the results from the GCMS machine. Unfortunately, it has been well-documented in DNA cases that \u201c[quality control and quality assurances procedures that are followed religiously in some labs are ignored or followed intermittently in others.\u201d W Thompson, Tarnish on the \u201cGold Standard\u201d: Understanding Recent Problems in Forensic DNA Testing, 30 Champion 10, 11-12 (January-February 2006). The failure to employ quality control and quality assurance procedures can result in DNA matches in criminal cases that are wrong because of sample contamination or misconduct on the part of the technician. 30 Champion at 11-12. This explains why an adequate foundation is as essential in DNA cases as it is in drug cases. Given the impact a DNA match has on the trier of fact, courts must be vigilant in ensuring that DNA evidence is admitted with proper foundation. This is particularly so in jury cases where lay people might not be able to appreciate arguments which go to weight once they hear of a match that is one in a billion.\nBased on the foregoing, I would hold that the foundation for Lambatos\u2019 testimony was insufficient, and the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting it. Based on my resolution of defendant\u2019s foundational challenge, I need not reach defendant\u2019s sixth amendment confrontation clause argument.\nAlthough I believe the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting Lambatos\u2019 testimony without proper foundation, the error does not require a new trial. The testimony of a single witness, if it is positive and the witness credible, is sufficient to convict a defendant. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). In this case, the trial judge specifically found defendant guilty on the basis of the victim\u2019s testimony, which he characterized as \u201chighly credible.\u201d The trial judge also commented specifically on the strength of the victim\u2019s lineup identification and her in-court identification. The judge found the victim to be \u201can outstanding witness\u201d and believed her testimony \u201ca hundred percent.\u201d These findings indicate to me that the error in admitting Lambatos\u2019 testimony was harmless. On that basis, I would affirm the convictions.\nKooi identified the national guidelines that the Illinois State Police Crime Lab follows and testified that she followed the guidelines in this case.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," }, { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI join the part of Justice Freeman\u2019s special concurrence that concludes that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Lambatos\u2019 testimony. I write separately because I disagree with the majority\u2019s resolution of the consecutive-sentencing issue. The defendant was sentenced to two concurrent natural-life terms for the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts and a concurrent 15-year term for aggravated robbery. Defendant received an additional 60-year prison term for aggravated kidnapping, to be served consecutively to the natural-life terms. The appellate court held, pursuant to our decision in People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148 (2006), that a term of years could not be served consecutively to a term of natural life. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the circuit court\u2019s order imposing consecutive sentences and modified defendant\u2019s sentence to impose concurrent sentences. 385 Ill. App. 3d at 371. The majority now reverses the appellate court. Relying on People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490 (2010), which overruled Palmer on this point, the majority in the case at bar has held that a sentence consecutive to a natural-life sentence was proper. For the same reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in Petrenko, I do not believe that good cause exists to overrule Palmer. Therefore, I would affirm the appellate court below on the consecutive-sentencing issue.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn and Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defenders, and Brian Carroll, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant and cross-appellee.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E.", "Fitzgerald, Ashley Romito, Alan J. Spellberg and Amy Watroba Kern, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 107550.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. SANDY WILLIAMS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.\nOpinion filed July 15, 2010.\nRehearing denied September 27, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn and Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defenders, and Brian Carroll, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant and cross-appellee.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E.\nFitzgerald, Ashley Romito, Alan J. Spellberg and Amy Watroba Kern, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0125-01", "first_page_order": 137, "last_page_order": 172 }