{ "id": 3630788, "name": "In re I.H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jacqueline M., Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jacqueline M.", "decision_date": "2010-10-21", "docket_number": "No. 107002", "first_page": "430", "last_page": "455", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 430" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 1093", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277081 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1102" }, { "page": "1100" }, { "page": "1098-99" }, { "page": "1099" }, { "page": "1099" }, { "page": "1101" }, { "page": "1101" }, { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2435767 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "706" }, { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3616988 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/231/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706340 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5730452 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" }, { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2678494 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "referring to the temporary custody hearing as a \"probable cause hearing\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2605151 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444184 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "\"Following placement of a child in temporary custody, the circuit court must make a finding of abuse, neglect or dependence before it conducts an adjudication of wardship\"" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444318 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2628995 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701-02" }, { "page": "702-03" }, { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450528 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621306 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 1093", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4277081 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1101" }, { "page": "1100" }, { "page": "1099" }, { "page": "1101-02" }, { "page": "1100" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/382/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2435767 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442049 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477003 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462782 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477642 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 2d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705724 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/227/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 157", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1107919 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where the named respondent declined to respond to the petitioner's petition for certiorari, and where that petition was granted, the Court appointed counsel to serve as amicus curiae in support of the judgment of the Court of Appeals below" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 S. Ct. 2197", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6507468, 1107919 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where the named respondent declined to respond to the petitioner's petition for certiorari, and where that petition was granted, the Court appointed counsel to serve as amicus curiae in support of the judgment of the Court of Appeals below" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/br/127/2197-01", "/us/501/0157-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1307, "char_count": 44931, "ocr_confidence": 0.836, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10440608699580554 }, "sha256": "2f650932bd12c5db40d2da4761211d4e537e94e80b6f06ebc4a7fda721124e8d", "simhash": "1:2baf7f97461961f0", "word_count": 7404 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:45:32.940545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re I.H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jacqueline M., Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Freeman dissented, with opinion.\nOPINION\nSection 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 requires corroboration and cross-examination of a minor\u2019s previous statements relating to allegations of abuse or neglect. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(c) (West 2006). At issue in this appeal is whether this provision applies to temporary custody hearings. The appellate court determined that it does and ultimately reversed the trial court\u2019s adjudication of neglect, concluding it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 382 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1102.\nWe reject the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) of the Act applies to temporary custody hearings. However, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court on other grounds.\nBACKGROUND\nRespondent Jacqueline M. is the mother of the minors I.H. and M.H. In September 2006, the minors\u2019 maternal grandmother brought four-year-old M.H. to the Mundelein police department to report that Jorge G., Jacqueline\u2019s live-in boyfriend, had sexually abused M.H. Law enforcement officials reported M.H.\u2019s allegations to the telephone hotline of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Three days later, DCFS took the minors into temporary custody.\nThe State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship as to both minors alleging that the minors were neglected because they had been exposed to an injurious environment (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(b) (West 2006)) and that they were abused because they faced a substantial risk of physical injury (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(2)(ii) (West 2006)). The petition related to M.H. additionally alleged that she was abused because she had been physically injured (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(2)(i) (West 2006)) and because her mother had allowed a sex offense to be committed against her (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(2)(iii) (West 2006)).\nAt the temporary custody hearing, the State presented the testimony of Robert Musial, the DCFS caseworker assigned to the family. According to Musial, a Mundelein police department report stated that Detective Katie Smith interviewed M.H. at the police station. In that interview, M.H. stated that on four separate occasions Jorge had touched or penetrated her \u201cpochita,\u201d identified by M.H. on a body chart as her vaginal area. M.H. reported that Jorge\u2019s actions were painful and that she saw something red in her underwear after one of the incidents. In addition, M.H. described an incident when Jorge came up from behind her and whispered into her ear, \u201cWhere\u2019s your pochita?\u201d Law enforcement officials reported M.H.\u2019s allegations to the DCFS hotline, and DCFS opened an investigation.\nMusial further testified based on notes prepared by DCFS investigator Robert Schnabel. Schnabel spoke to Jacqueline through a Spanish interpreter at a hospital where I.H. was receiving medical care for an injured arm. Schnabel informed Jacqueline of M.H.\u2019s sexual abuse allegations and instructed her that Jorge should not have any contact with M.H. or I.H. Schnabel\u2019s report indicated that Jacqueline agreed to the safety plan to keep the children from having contact with Jorge during the investigation.\nMusial later learned from a hospital worker that Jacqueline, Jorge, and M.H. were visiting I.H. at the hospital. Musial contacted the police department, then called the hospital and learned that Jacqueline, Jorge, and M.H. had left. The next day, Musial received a call from the hospital reporting that Jacqueline, Jorge, and M.H. were at the hospital. Musial went to the hospital and spoke to Jacqueline. The conversation was interpreted through a hospital interpreter who was available through a telephone conference call. Jacqueline initially acted surprised when Musial questioned her about M.H.\u2019s allegations. After Musial explained the nature of the allegations and mentioned Jacqueline\u2019s previous discussion with Schnabel, Jacqueline gave Musial her attorney\u2019s business card and told Musial she would not talk to him without her attorney present. Musial then contacted Jacqueline\u2019s attorney, who declined to advise Jacqueline to prevent Jorge from having contact with her children.\nMusial again spoke to Jacqueline. This second conversation was interpreted by Jacqueline\u2019s friend Rosa. Jacqueline told Musial she was taking her children to Jorge\u2019s apartment. Musial admonished her not to take her children to Jorge\u2019s apartment while the investigation was pending. Jacqueline could not provide an exact street address where she would be staying with her children and refused to provide Musial with a contact telephone number. Musial asked her if she would agree to place M.H. and I.H. with a family member, but Jacqueline said she did not want her children to stay with any family member. According to Musial, Jacqueline did not believe that M.H.\u2019s allegations were truthful and, instead, believed that the grandmother had fabricated the allegations. On cross-examination, Musial acknowledged that M.H. had reported that Jorge sexually abused her in January 2006, but that those allegations were ultimately determined to be \u201cunfounded.\u201d Musial testified that M.H. was currently scheduled to undergo a sexual abuse examination.\nFollowing closing arguments, the trial court found probable cause to believe that M.H. and I.H. were abused and neglected, finding that M.H. had alleged that Jorge sexually abused her on four separate occasions, her allegations were specific, I.H. lived in the same home, and Jacqueline refused to cooperate with the safety plan. The court further found that immediate and urgent necessity existed to remove the minors from their home and place them in shelter care, that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent their removal, and that shelter care was consistent with the minors\u2019 health, safety, and best interests. The court granted temporary guardianship to DCFS and temporary custody to the minors\u2019 grandmother.\nThe State later amended the petitions for adjudication of wardship to include an additional allegation that the minors were neglected based on an injurious environment in that the mother violated the safety plan by allowing contact between the minors and Jorge.\nPrior to the adjudicatory hearing, Jacqueline filed a motion in limine to exclude any out-of-court statements made by M.H. to Detective Smith on the basis that those statements alone, absent corroboration or being subject to cross-examination, were insufficient to support a finding of neglect or abuse. The trial court denied Jacqueline\u2019s motion.\nAt the adjudicatory hearing, Detective Smith, DCFS investigator Schnabel, and DCFS caseworker Musial testified for the State. Their testimony was consistent with the evidence presented at the temporary custody hearing. In addition, Musial testified that a medical examination of M.H. did not indicate sexual abuse. Both Schnabel and Musial testified that the DCFS file contained a written safety plan. However, although the record contains a DCFS report describing the safety plan and indicating that Jacqueline agreed to the plan, there is no written safety plan with Jacqueline\u2019s signature in the record.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case in chief, the trial court granted Jacqueline\u2019s motion for a directed finding that the State had failed to prove the underlying sexual abuse allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the counts in both petitions that alleged the minors were neglected and abused based on the sexual abuse allegations. The court entered an order adjudicating the minors neglected, however, on the ground that Jacqueline failed to abide by the terms of the safety plan. The trial court subsequently entered a dispositional order adjudicating M.H. and I.H. neglected, making them wards of the court, and naming DCFS as their legal guardian.\nOn appeal, Jacqueline challenged the trial court\u2019s findings at the temporary custody hearing, arguing that the State failed to establish probable cause for the implementation of a safety plan. She argued that the safety plan was based solely on M.H.\u2019s statements, which were neither corroborated nor subject to cross-examination, in violation of section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(c) (West 2006)). Jacqueline also challenged the adjudication of neglect on the grounds that the State failed to prove the existence of a safety plan, that Jacqueline understood the plan, or that she violated the safety plan.\nThe appellate court rejected the State\u2019s argument that the sufficiency of the evidence at the temporary custody hearing was moot because there was no relief available to the mother regarding the temporary custody hearing. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1100. The court held that the appeal was not moot because the mother had identified the reversal of the adjudication of neglect as the effectual relief that would cure error in the temporary custody hearing. On the merits, the appellate court concluded that the probable cause determination at the temporary custody hearing was not supported by the evidence. Specifically, M.H.\u2019s statements were uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1098-99. In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court relied on section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c), requiring that a minor\u2019s statements alleging sexual abuse be subject to cross-examination and corroboration if used to support a finding of abuse or neglect. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(c) (West 2006). The court noted that the court in In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d 697, 706 (1992), applied section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c)\u2019s evidentiary requirement to a temporary custody hearing. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1099.\nNext, the appellate court reversed the order adjudicating the minors neglected, finding that \u201cthe [trial] court\u2019s adjudication of neglect was based entirely on a finding that respondent had failed to keep the minors away from Jorge as directed by the safety plan, even though the defects in the shelter-care hearing meant that there was insufficient evidence of sexual abuse to warrant imposing the plan in the first place.\u201d 382 111. App. 3d at 1101-02. The court did not address the remaining arguments raised by Jacqueline challenging the adjudication of neglect.\nWe allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. We granted leave for the Cook County public guardian and Cook County State\u2019s Attorney to file amicus curiae briefs. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.\nANALYSIS\nThe issue in this case is whether the evidentiary limitation in section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) of the Act applies to temporary custody hearings. This issue presents a question of statutory construction, which we review de novo. Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 231 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2008). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Abruzzo, 231 Ill. 2d at 332. The legislature\u2019s intent is best indicated by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. Abruzzo, 231 Ill. 2d at 332. To determine the plain meaning, we must consider the statute in its entirety and be mindful of the subject it addresses, as well as the legislature\u2019s intent in enacting the statute. Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2007).\nThe State contends the evidentiary limitation in section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) applies to adjudicatory hearings but not to temporary custody hearings. The State\u2019s construction of the statute is supported by the plain language of the statute as well as the overall framework of article II of the Act. Sections 2 \u2014 18(2), (3), (5), (6) of the Act list various types of evidence that are admissible or that constitute prima facie evidence of abuse or neglect \u201c[i]n any hearing under this Act.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(2), (3), (5), (6) (West 2006). By contrast, section 2 \u2014 18(4) describes evidence that is admissible but does not specify the type of hearing at which that evidence is applicable. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4) (West 2006). Section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c), the provision at issue in this case, provides:\n\u201cPrevious statements made by the minor relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence. However, no such statement, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(c) (West 2006).\nThe plain and ordinary meaning of the language in section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) requires corroboration and cross-examination of a minor\u2019s previous statements alleging abuse or neglect only when those statements are used as the sole basis for a finding of abuse or neglect. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(c) (West 2006). A trial court does not, however, make a finding of abuse or neglect at a temporary custody hearing.\nSection 2 \u2014 10 governs temporary custody hearings, which must take place within 48 hours of the minor\u2019s protective custody. At the hearing, \u201call witnesses present shall he examined before the court in relation to any matter connected with the allegations made in the petition.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10 (West 2006). Unlike section 2 \u2014 18, there is no language in section 2 \u2014 10 restricting the testimony of the witnesses to require corroboration or cross-examination. The trial court must determine whether there is \u201cprobable cause to believe that the minor is abused, neglected or dependent.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10 (West 2006). If the court finds no probable cause, the court shall release the minor and dismiss the petition. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10(1) (West 2006). If the court finds probable cause, it must hear evidence and determine whether it is consistent with the health, safety, or best interests of the minor that the minor be released to his parents or placed in shelter care. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10(2) (West 2006). The court may place the minor in shelter care if the court finds it \u201ca matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the safety and protection of the minor\u201d and that \u201creasonable efforts have been made or that, consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor, no efforts reasonably can be made to prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor from his or her home.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10(2) (West 2006). A temporary custody hearing is similar to both a probable cause hearing and a temporary detention hearing under section 5 \u2014 501(2) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 501(2) (West 2002)). In re Austin D., 358 Ill. App. 3d 794, 801 (2005), citing In re L.M., 189 Ill. App. 3d 392, 395 (1989) (referring to the temporary custody hearing as a \u201cprobable cause hearing\u201d). Essentially, the purpose of the hearing is to determine whether a minor requires temporary placement outside the home. Austin D., 358 Ill. App. 3d at 801, citing In re W.B., 213 Ill. App. 3d 274, 283 (1991).\nIt is not until the adjudicatory hearing that the trial court makes an actual \u201cfinding\u201d of abuse or neglect. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21 (West 2006); In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 462 (2004) (\u201cFollowing placement of a child in temporary custody, the circuit court must make a finding of abuse, neglect or dependence before it conducts an adjudication of wardship\u201d). The State has the burden of proving the allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464.\nIn our view, this distinction is dispositive of the issue on appeal. A finding of probable cause is not equivalent to a \u201cfinding\u201d on the merits of abuse, neglect, or dependency. The trial court issues no finding of abuse or neglect at a temporary custody hearing, and section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c)\u2019s evidentiary limitation applies only when the minor\u2019s statements alone are used to support a finding of neglect or abuse. At a temporary custody hearing, the trial court only considers whether probable cause exists to believe the minor is abused or neglected. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10 (West 2006). Simply put, section 2 \u2014 10 of the Act governs temporary custody hearings and does not require the trial court to make a finding of abuse or neglect. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10 et seq. (West 2006) (detailing requirements for temporary custody hearings). Consequently, we find that the evidentiary limitation of section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) is inapplicable to temporary custody hearings.\nThe framework for juvenile court proceedings in the Act further supports our conclusion. We construe statutes as a whole, evaluating each provision in connection with every other section of the statute. People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Smith, 212 Ill. 2d 389, 404 (2004). Article II of the Act sets forth the procedures for proceedings concerning abused, neglected, or dependent minors. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 1 (West 2006). Upon the filing of a petition for wardship from the State, a minor who has been taken into temporary protective custody must be brought before a judicial officer within 48 hours for a temporary custody hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 9(1) (West 2006). If the minor is not brought before a judicial officer within the 48-hour period, the minor must be released from temporary custody at the expiration of the 48-hour period. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 9(3) (West 2006).\nWithin 90 days of service of an abuse or neglect petition under the Act, the trial court must conduct an adjudicatory hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 14(b) (West 2006). \u201cAt the adjudicatory hearing, the court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is abused, neglected or dependent.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(1) (West 2006). If the trial court makes a finding that the minor is abused or neglected, it then must hold a dispositional hearing within 30 days to determine whether it is consistent with the health, safety, and best interests of the minor and the public that the minor be made a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(1), (2) (West 2006).\nWe agree with the State that this framework demonstrates the legislature intended the temporary custody hearing as preliminary in nature with a focus on the necessity of removal for the immediate protection of the minor. Because the temporary custody hearing must occur within 48 hours of a minor being taken into protective custody, little time is available for obtaining corroborating evidence of the minor\u2019s statements. The statute does not allow a continuation of the hearing, unlike section 2 \u2014 14(c) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 14(c) (West 2006)), which provides for a continuation of the adjudicatory hearing under certain circumstances. Based on the plain language of the statute, the legislature did not intend to extend section 2 \u2014 18(4)\u2019s corroboration and cross-examination requirement to temporary custody hearings under section 2 \u2014 10. Under the express language of section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c), those additional evidentiary requirements apply only at the later adjudicatory hearing when making abuse and neglect findings.\nDespite the plain language of the statute, the appellate court in the case at bar relied on the holding in In re M.B. to conclude that section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) applies to temporary custody hearings. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1099, citing In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d 697 (1992). That reliance is misplaced because the holding in In re M.B. is based on a flawed analysis of the statute. Moreover, no other court has relied on In re M.B. for that conclusion.\nIn In re M.B., DCFS filed petitions for adjudication of wardship alleging that the minors, S.B., M.B., and J.B., were neglected due to an injurious environment. The petition concerning S.B. also contained allegations of sexual abuse, and the petition concerning J.B. contained additional allegations of physical abuse. In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d at 699. At the temporary custody hearing, Diane Phillips, a DCFS child welfare supervisor, testified that she had spoken with Dr. Antonio Blanco, a psychiatrist who treated J.B. According to Blanco, J.B. told him about instances of physical and sexual abuse perpetrated by his father against all three children. Philips further testified that J.B.\u2019s counselor, Jerome Anderson, told her that J.B. had spoken of his father\u2019s membership in a cult, whose members \u201cmade him do things.\u201d At the hearing, the trial court allowed S.B. and J.B. to be questioned, in camera, by their guardian ad litem. The minors denied being physically or sexually abused. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that no probable cause existed to warrant the minors\u2019 placement in temporary custody and dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the mother argued that the finding of no probable cause was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed. In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d at 699. The court held that J.B.\u2019s previous statements to Dr. Blanco and to Anderson did not constitute sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The court found that, under section 2 \u2014 18(4) (c), the statements were not corroborated and neither Blanco nor Anderson was subject to cross-examination. In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d at 706.\nThe In re M.B. court\u2019s conclusion is not supported by the language in section 2 \u2014 18(4) (c) of the Act. The court applied the statute to the doctor\u2019s and counselor\u2019s statements rather than to the minor\u2019s statements. The statute applies to the statement of the minor and whether that statement is corroborated or the minor is present to testify. Indeed, the minor did testify at the hearing through an in camera interview.\nFurthermore, the In re M.B. court did not analyze the propriety of applying section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c)\u2019s evidentiary limitation to temporary custody hearings, instead simply citing to In re Marcus E., 183 Ill. App. 3d 693 (1989). In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d at 706. In re Marcus E., however, was an appeal solely from an adjudication hearing and made no mention of the admissibility of a minor\u2019s prior statement at the temporary custody hearing. See In re Marcus E., 183 Ill. App. 3d at 701-02. In In re Marcus E., the parents challenged the evidence supporting the trial court\u2019s finding after an adjudicatory hearing that their two children had been abused and subjected to an injurious environment. In re Marcus E., 183 Ill. App. 3d at 702-03. The appellate court concluded that \u201c[o]n its face the statute provides that out-of-court statements will not support a finding of abuse if \u2018uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination. \u2019 \u201d In re Marcus E., 183 Ill. App. 3d at 704, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 704 \u2014 6(4)(c) (now 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(c) (West 2008)). Noting that the statute did not allow a minor\u2019s hearsay statements to be the sole basis for a finding of abuse, the court concluded that \u201cthe children\u2019s out-of-court statements may be used only in conjunction with corroborative evidence to support a finding of abuse.\u201d In re Marcus E., 183 111. App. 3d at 705.\nThe conclusion in In re Marcus E. that the statutory evidentiary limitation applies to a finding of abuse after an adjudication hearing is consistent with our interpretation of section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c). Consequently, we find that In re Marcus E. does not support the appellate court\u2019s decision in this case or in In re M.B., to apply section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c)\u2019s evidentiary limitation to temporary custody hearings. Therefore, we overrule In re M.B. \u2019s application of section 2 \u2014 18(4) (c) to temporary custody hearings.\nWe recognize the appellate court\u2019s concern that, without the evidentiary safeguard in section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c), \u201ca flimsy allegation of abuse could be the basis for instituting an onerous safety plan, the noncompliance with which could trigger an adjudication of neglect, which is very serious.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. We disagree, however, with the appellate court\u2019s related conclusion that the \u201ctrial court\u2019s probable cause determination [at the temporary custody hearing] was the foundation on which any safety plan could be built.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. Section 2 \u2014 10 requires the trial court to determine not only probable cause, but also whether removal is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity and whether DCFS made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child or whether no efforts reasonably could be made to prevent the child\u2019s removal. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10(2) (West 2006). Thus, the trial court must consider whether implementing a reasonable safety plan could eliminate the need to remove a child from the parent. Contrary to the appellate court\u2019s suggestion, if a proposed safety plan is unreasonable or unduly onerous, the trial court may refuse to remove the child from the home whether or not the parent agrees to comply with the plan.\nWe are ever mindful that under the Act, \u201c[t]he best interests of the child is the paramount consideration to which no other takes precedence.\u201d In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 46 (2005). Even though this approach may result in removal of the minor at the onset of an investigation, as here, it is certainly reasonable for the legislature to err on the side of protecting minors from abuse and neglect during the preliminary stages of an investigation. This is particularly true when the Act mandates a temporary custody hearing within only 48 hours of taking a minor into protective custody following an allegation of abuse or neglect.\nFinally, we note that the State, in its brief to this court, has stated that it is seeking \u201creversal only of the appellate court\u2019s legal holding that the evidentiary Umitation in section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) of the Act applies to temporary custody hearings, and does not challenge the appellate court\u2019s decision to vacate the adjudication of neglect based upon the facts of this specific case.\u201d Because the State is challenging the sole rationale relied upon by the appellate court in reaching its judgment and, at the same time, asserting that the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed, we construe the State\u2019s position as a concession of error with respect to other arguments that were raised by the mother before the appellate court but not reached in the appellate court\u2019s opinion. Specifically, we understand the State\u2019s position to be a concession that \u201cthe State failed to prove that a safety plan existed, that respondent understood it, or that respondent violated it.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1098. Based on our review of the record, we agree with and accept the State\u2019s concession. Our acceptance of the State\u2019s concession means that the judgment of the appellate court must be affirmed. See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 233 Ill. 2d 146, 157 (2009).\nCONCLUSION\nWe hold that section 2 \u2014 18(4) (c) of the Act, requiring corroboration and cross-examination of a minor\u2019s previous statements relating to allegations of abuse or neglect, does not apply to temporary custody hearings. To the extent the appellate court applied section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) to a temporary custody hearing, we overrule that portion of In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d 697 (1992).\nThe judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nFor purposes of this appeal, the term \u201ctemporary custody hearing\u201d is synonymous with the term \u201cshelter care hearing.\u201d Because the Act identifies this proceeding as a temporary custody hearing (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10 (West 2006)), we use that term here.\nThe State does not argue this point on appeal to this court.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\ndissenting:\nThe majority holds that the provision contained in section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(c) (West 2006)) requiring a minor\u2019s statements to be corroborated and cross-examined is inapplicable to temporary custody proceedings. I believe that my colleagues have improperly reached this issue. It is my view that leave to appeal in this matter was improvidently granted, and that this appeal should be dismissed.\nIn order to fully grasp the error of the majority, focus must be directed to the procedural history of this case. At the close of the State\u2019s case in chief at the adjudicatory hearing, counsel for the minors\u2019 mother \u2014 Jacqueline M. \u2014 moved for a directed finding that the State had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that M.H. had been a victim of sexual abuse. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the counts in the petitions for adjudication of wardship that alleged the minors were neglected and abused based upon the sexual abuse allegations. The circuit court, however, entered an order adjudicating the minors neglected based upon Jacqueline\u2019s alleged failure to comply with the directive to keep the minors away from Jacqueline\u2019s live-in boyfriend, Jorge G. Jacqueline thereafter filed a motion to reconsider. The circuit court denied that motion and subsequently entered a dispositional order, making the minors wards of the court and awarding DCFS legal guardianship.\nOn appeal, Jacqueline challenged the adjudication of neglect on two grounds. First, she asserted that the temporary custody order on which the adjudication was based was improper because M.H\u2019s out-of-court statements were not subject to cross-examination and the State failed to present evidence to corroborate the report of abuse. Accordingly, she asserted that there was no probable cause to grant temporary custody to DCFS and to implement a safety plan. Second, Jacqueline argued that the circuit court erred in adjudicating the minors neglected based upon her alleged violation of a DCFS safety plan, as the State failed to prove that a safety plan existed, that she understood it, or that it was violated.\nThe appellate court agreed with Jacqueline and reversed the judgment of the circuit court. The court held that the State failed to prove at the adjudicatory hearing that Jacqueline neglected the minors by violating the DCFS no-contact directive. The court noted that the sole basis for implementing that directive was the allegation, based upon M.H.\u2019s out-of-court statements, that Jorge sexually abused her, \u201ceven though the defects in the shelter-care hearing meant that there was insufficient evidence of sexual abuse to warrant imposing the plan in the first place.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. The court explained that because M.H.\u2019s hearsay statements introduced at the temporary custody hearing were neither corroborated nor subject to cross-examination pursuant to section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act, they were insufficient to support the probable cause finding of abuse and neglect. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1100. The court further noted that its ruling was consistent with the 1992 decision in In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d 697 (1992), which held that section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act applied to temporary custody hearings as well as adjudicatory hearings. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1099.\nIn addition, the appellate court observed that, in finding neglect, the circuit court focused solely upon Jacqueline\u2019s noncompliance with the plan, regardless of the reasons for instituting it. The appellate court concluded:\n\u201cIf we were to adopt the State\u2019s position [that the statute did not apply], a flimsy allegation of abuse could be the basis for instituting an onerous safety plan, the noncompliance with which would trigger an adjudication of neglect, which is very serious. While the best interests of the minors is paramount, adjudicating [the minors] neglected based on respondent\u2019s noncompliance with an unfounded safety plan prejudiced respondent and the family as a whole.\u201d 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1101-02.\nAlthough the State took the position before the appellate court that the issue of awarding DCFS temporary custody was moot, the court disagreed, and, in any event, believed that the issue could be reached under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 1100. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s order adjudicating the minors neglected.\nIn its petition for leave to appeal to this court, the State asserted that while it did \u201cnot seek a reversal of the appellate court\u2019s judgment in this case,\u201d it nevertheless sought review of the court\u2019s reasoning \u201cbecause the appellate court reached a moot issue under the public interest exception and, in so doing, misguided the lower courts in their application of section 2 \u2014 18(4) (c) of the Act.\u201d The State\u2019s petition then listed two points for reversal: (1) that the appellate court\u2019s application of section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) to a temporary custody hearing was contrary to the language and purpose of the Juvenile Court Act; and (2) that the appellate court\u2019s ruling that the neglect adjudication did not render the temporary custody hearing moot was erroneous. In addition to reversal of that portion of the appellate opinion which discussed section 2 \u2014 18(4) (c), the State also requested, in the alternative, that this court exercise its supervisory authority to vacate that portion of the appellate court\u2019s opinion.\nAfter we granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal, the State\u2019s subsequent brief to this court again asserted that it was \u201cseek[ing] reversal only of the appellate court\u2019s legal holding that the evidentiary limitation in section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) of the [Juvenile Court] Act applies to temporary custody hearings,\u201d and that \u201c[t]he People do not challenge the rest of the appellate court\u2019s decision, which vacated the finding of neglect for [I.H.] and [M.H.].\u201d I further note, however, that although the State raised the issue of mootness in its petition for leave to appeal in relation to its challenge of the appellate court\u2019s reasoning, in its brief to this court the State does not argue \u2014 much less mention \u2014 mootness in any context. In addition, the State abandoned its call for the alternative relief requested in its petition, and now asks that the holding of the appellate court regarding section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) be vacated.\nAs a direct result of the State\u2019s unorthodox position in this appeal, i.e., that it is not challenging the judgment of the appellate court, Jacqueline has not participated in the instant action. Subsequent to the State\u2019s filing of its brief, Jacqueline\u2019s counsel informed this court, in a letter dated December 23, 2008, that \u201c[bjecause the State is not challenging the status of my client in the appeal, she has chosen not to proceed with arguments in this cause.\u201d I note that this critical fact is conspicuously absent from the majority opinion.\nAlthough we granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal, my colleagues do not consider the fundamental threshold issue of whether this appeal has been improvidently granted. The position taken by the State is in direct conflict with the long-settled principle that we review the judgment of the appellate court, regardless of its rationale. People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 296 (2005). In addition, because the State as appellant is not challenging the judgment of the appellate court \u2014 the only proper subject of our review \u2014 we cannot provide meaningful relief, and any decision rendered in this matter is essentially advisory in nature. See In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 401 (2002). Traditionally, this court avoids rendering advisory opinions. Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill. 2d 134, 157 (2002).\nThe majority\u2019s acceptance of the State\u2019s challenge solely to the rationale underlying the judgment of the appellate court and not to the judgment itself is a dramatic departure from our well-settled procedure, which not only draws into question the appropriate manner in which to petition for leave to appeal to this court, but also invites an element of gamesmanship to be injected into this process by allowing an appellant to pursue a strategy whereby that party does not contest the judgment below, but, for whatever hidden reason, seeks only to overturn a rationale within the case.\nThe potentially negative results flowing from the majority\u2019s acceptance of this approach are evident in the instant appeal. The majority\u2019s opinion on this important issue of statutory construction is based upon its consideration of the arguments of only one side in this case, which is a direct result of the State\u2019s decision to divorce the appellate court\u2019s judgment from its reasoning, and to challenge only the latter, not the former. I submit that one-sided arguments are an inevitable outgrowth of the majority\u2019s endorsement of the State\u2019s departure from conventional procedure. Accepting a petition for leave to appeal from a party seeking only review of a rationale and not a reversal of a judgment could lead the opposing party to reasonably decide \u2014 as Jacqueline did here \u2014 to forgo involvement in the appeal. Indeed, the investment of time and resources to counter an appeal that will not alter the outcome of a judgment which was in that party\u2019s favor makes little sense, particularly if that party has no concern regarding the rationale supporting the judgment. Acceptance of such a practice will engender gamesmanship, as parties attempt to gain strategic advantage through the use of the appellate process. With today\u2019s opinion, the majority places its imprimatur on this practice.\nAs a result of allowing this appeal to proceed, the majority fully adopts the arguments advanced by the State without the benefit of hearing arguments for a different construction of this statute from the other side. In our courtroom in Springfield, the motto \u201cAudi Alteram Partem\u201d is inscribed over the entrance, which reminds us to \u201cHear the other side\u201d to ensure fairness in judicial matters. I fear that my colleagues have forgotten this principle in deciding this matter, by overruling case law that has not been contested in nearly 20 years, based upon a single-sided argument. Although there has been no adversarial testing of the State\u2019s arguments due to the manner in which it has proceeded in this case, we are nevertheless binding later courts which may have the opportunity to fully hear and test the opposing views on this issue.\nThe concerns I have set forth regarding my colleagues\u2019 zeal to render an opinion in this case are further supported by the fact that the majority states that it \u201caffirm [s] the judgment of the appellate court,\u201d but \u201creject[s] its conclusion that section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) of the Act applies to temporary custody hearings.\u201d 238 Ill. 2d at 433. As stated, a fundamental principle of appellate law is that when an appeal is taken from a judgment of a lower court, \u201c \u2018[t]he question before [the] reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the lower court and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached.\u2019 \u201d People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003), quoting People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994). In the instant matter, this usual procedure is turned on its head, with no reasoned basis for doing so. Further, by \u201creject[ing]\u201d the appellate court\u2019s \u201cconclusion\u201d that the provisions in section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) of the Juvenile Court Act apply to temporary custody hearings, the majority has stripped away the sole legal basis for the appellate court\u2019s reversal of the circuit court\u2019s judgment. As a result, the majority has performed the unprecedented feat of overturning a judgment of the circuit court absent any legal rationale for doing so.\nMoreover, although I am in complete agreement with the majority\u2019s assertion that the paramount concern in these proceedings is the best interests of the children to assure that they are safe and secure in all instances, I note that by their opinion today, my colleagues do nothing to protect I.H. and M.H., the two minors involved in this proceeding. The majority determines that the appellate court\u2019s reasoning was erroneous in interpreting section 2 \u2014 18 (4) (c) and sets forth a new interpretation of this statutory provision which supports the judgment of the circuit court. However, by virtue of the unconventional procedural posture of this case, the majority\u2019s opinion nevertheless affirms the judgment of the appellate court, which reverses the circuit court. In other words, the majority\u2019s opinion overturns a judgment of the circuit court which, under the analysis and reasoning contained within that same opinion, should be affirmed. The internal inconsistency and confusion within the majority opinion, coupled with its affirmance of a reversal of a judgment of the circuit court without any stated legal rationale which is in direct contradiction to its own holding in its opinion, further supports my decision to dissent.\nIt is only in the penultimate paragraph of its opinion that the majority briefly acknowledges the difficulty created by the State\u2019s position \u201cchallenging the sole rationale relied upon by the appellate court in reaching its judgment and, at the same time, asserting that the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed.\u201d 238 Ill. 2d at 446. The majority, however, quickly and unconvincingly dismisses any concerns by characterizing the State\u2019s position as a \u201cconcession of error with respect to other arguments that were raised by the mother before the appellate court but not reached in the appellate court\u2019s opinion.\u201d 238 Ill. 2d at 446. Specifically, the majority \u201cunderstand[s]\u201d the State\u2019s position \u201cto be a concession that \u2018the State failed to prove that a safety plan existed, that respondent understood it, or that respondent violated it.\u2019 \u201d 238 Ill. 2d at 446. Absent analysis or explanation, my colleagues \u201cagree with and accept the State\u2019s concession\u201d and conclude on that basis that \u201cthe judgment of the appellate court must be affirmed.\u201d 238 Ill. 2d at 446.\nI submit that by remodeling the arguments made by the State, the majority is treading dangerously close to acting as an advocate for the State, a role which is inappropriate for an appellate court to assume. Illinois Department of Healthcare & Family Services v. Warner, 227 Ill. 2d 223, 234 n.2 (2008). At no time during the course of these proceedings has the State ever \u201cconceded error\u201d on a point in this appeal, and this characterization of the State\u2019s position does not accurately reflect the manner in which it has litigated this case.\nAccordingly, for the above reasons, I cannot join the majority opinion.\nIn contrast, I note that the United States Supreme Court does not entertain one-sided argument in cases wherein it has granted certiorari. Pursuant to its custom and practice, the Court appoints attorneys to act as amicus curiae to brief and argue a case pending before it to ensure that both sides of a case are represented and that both sides of the argument are heard. See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160 n.4, 115 L. Ed. 2d 145, 150 n.4, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2199 n.4 (1991) (where the named respondent declined to respond to the petitioner\u2019s petition for certiorari, and where that petition was granted, the Court appointed counsel to serve as amicus curiae in support of the judgment of the Court of Appeals below); R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice \u00a713.14, at 743 (9th ed. 2007) (it is the custom of the Court to \u201cinvite[ ] the amicus to present an argument because for some reason no other counsel would have represented that side of the case\u201d). It is my view that such an approach is preferable over a court of permissive review entertaining argument as to only one side of a case. Indeed, adopting a custom and practice similar to that of the Supreme Court would fit well with this court\u2019s encouragement of pro bono service (see 210 Ill. 2d R. 756(f)).\nIn fact, nowhere in the majority opinion is it acknowledged that this case is being decided upon a one-sided argument.\nAs a further example of the conundrum in which the majority finds itself, the \u201cConclusion\u201d section of its opinion states that the majority \u201caffirms\u201d the judgment of the appellate court, but that \u201c[t]o the extent the appellate court applied section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c)\u2019s evidentiary limitation to a temporary custody hearing, we overrule that portion of In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d 697 (1992).\u201d 238 Ill. 2d. at 446. Note, the majority is affirming a judgment which is grounded in a case which it has now overruled.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Edward R. Psenicka, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "No appearance for appellee.", "Robert E Harris, Kass A. Plain and Janet L. Barnes, of the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Cook County Public Guardian.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Nancy Kisicki and Nancy Faulls, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for amicus curiae Cook County State\u2019s Attorney." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 107002.\nIn re I.H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jacqueline M., Appellee).\nOpinion filed October 21, 2010.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Edward R. Psenicka, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nNo appearance for appellee.\nRobert E Harris, Kass A. Plain and Janet L. Barnes, of the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Cook County Public Guardian.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Nancy Kisicki and Nancy Faulls, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for amicus curiae Cook County State\u2019s Attorney." }, "file_name": "0430-01", "first_page_order": 442, "last_page_order": 467 }