{ "id": 3630475, "name": "TERRY E. READY, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Michael P. Ready, Deceased, Appellant, v. UNITED/GOEDECKE SERVICES, INC., et al. (United/Goedecke Services, Inc., Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Ready v. United/Goedecke Services Inc.", "decision_date": "2010-10-21", "docket_number": "No. 108910", "first_page": "582", "last_page": "597", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 582" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265347 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619618 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "plurality op." }, { "page": "385" }, { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4289440 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58-59" }, { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621380 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307264 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" }, { "page": "101" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "101" }, { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2896545 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453262 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706284 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602559 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621380 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619618 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Ready I" }, { "page": "405", "parenthetical": "Garman, J., dissenting, joined by Karmeier, J." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0369-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 962, "char_count": 26447, "ocr_confidence": 0.844, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.337254458130298e-08, "percentile": 0.4806226154497811 }, "sha256": "d696bdd0c6effd8cefb86abc09bac58f671f39a1f7437e6a0598df69bcec70ee", "simhash": "1:cbacdd0e7b0d547b", "word_count": 4318 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:45:32.940545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TERRY E. READY, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Michael P. Ready, Deceased, Appellant, v. UNITED/GOEDECKE SERVICES, INC., et al. (United/Goedecke Services, Inc., Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE FITZGERALD\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nJustices Freeman and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Kilbride specially concurred, with opinion.\nJustice Garman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Karmeier.\nJustice Thomas took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nThis case returns to this court for a second time. The issues before us are whether the appellate court followed the instructions of this court on remand and whether its decision on the sole proximate cause issue was correct. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the appellate court.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 1999, Michael Ready (Michael) was killed in an accident at the power plant where he worked when, during a pipe-refitting project, a scaffolding truss fell eight stories and struck him in the shoulder. His wife, Terry Ready (Terry), as administrator of his estate, filed wrongful-death claims in the circuit court of Cook County against the general contractor on the project, BMW Constructors, Inc. (BMW), and the scaffolding subcontractor on the project, United/Goedecke Services, Inc. (United). Those defendants filed third-party contribution complaints against Michael\u2019s employer, Midwest Generation EME, L.L.C. (Midwest), and Terry amended her complaint to add Midwest as a defendant. United filed an affirmative defense, claiming that the accident \u201cwas caused either in whole, or in part, by and through the action or inactions of a third party or parties\u201d for which United is not responsible. Terry entered settlement agreements with Midwest and BMW and proceeded to trial against United.\nPrior to trial, Terry filed motions in limine to exclude evidence regarding the conduct of Midwest and BMW Regarding Midwest, Terry argued that her good-faith settlement with that company prevented the jury from apportioning fault to it. She further argued that United employees James Talley, Jeffrey Talley, and Troy Burzawa made judicial admissions in their discovery depositions that United was in charge of the project. Regarding BMW, Terry similarly argued again that her good-faith settlement with BMW prevented the jury from apportioning fault to BMW. She further argued that United\u2019s expert Ralph Barnett stated in his deposition that an alternative means of lifting the trusses \u2014 an external crane that BMW may have been responsible, as general contractor, to provide \u2014 was not necessarily less dangerous than the internal crane that was actually used.\nIn response to Terry\u2019s motion about Midwest\u2019s conduct, United argued, in part, \u201cthe issue of whether [Midwest\u2019s] conduct is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s [decedent\u2019s] death is still at issue and paramount in this case.\u201d The record does not contain a response to Terry\u2019s motion in limine about BMW\u2019s conduct, but in the hearing on Terry\u2019s motions, United indicated that its response would be the same concerning both settling defendants: \u201cIn this case there is plenty of evidence that the jury could decide that BMW\u2019s or Midwestf\u2019s] conduct was the sole proximate cause of Mr. Ready\u2019s death, and by eliminating our ability to bring in the conduct of Midwest *** or BMW you would preclude the defense from making that case and establishing that theory.\u201d\nThe trial court decided that section 2 \u2014 1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1117 (West 2002)) does not permit apportionment of fault to settling defendants, making evidence of their conduct irrelevant, but the court also disagreed with United on the sole proximate cause issue, stating:\n\u201cI think it\u2019s clear that in [United job supervisor] Jim Talley\u2019s deposition, he does make admissions that United/ Goedecke was in charge of the work.\nNow, he also says that Michael Ready or Midwest *** was as much in charge as United was.\nAnd while that may affect one of the other motions in limine, it does not change the fact that Mr. Talley has admitted that United was in charge of the work. And so the argument of the sole proximate cause simply wouldn\u2019t be borne out by the evidence.\u201d\nUnited filed a motion to reconsider this ruling, arguing almost exclusively that the trial court erred in barring evidence of the settling defendants\u2019 conduct under section 2 \u2014 1117. The final paragraph of the motion stated that the trial court\u2019s ruling was incorrect \u201cfor a reason unrelated to section 2 \u2014 1117,\u201d namely, \u201cthe evidence [of negligence by BMW and Midwest] is relevant to the issue of whether those entities were the sole proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\u201d At the hearing on this motion, United stated, \u201c[Y]our honor, we feel that you should respectfully reconsider your ruling with regard to not allowing the defendant to introduce and argue to the jury that other parties, such as BMW and [Midwest] are the sole proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s [decedent\u2019s] death in this case.\u201d The trial court returned to Talley\u2019s deposition testimony and denied United\u2019s motion to reconsider.\nAt the end of Terry\u2019s case and at the close of the evidence, United moved for a directed verdict, asserting that the negligence of BMW and Midwest was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The trial court denied those motions. United then tendered a sole proximate cause jury instruction \u2014 the so-called long form of Illinois Pattern Instructions (Civil) No. 12.04. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 12.04 (2000) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.04). The trial court declined to use this instruction, stating: \u201cAs I had ruled earlier, I think case law prohibits me from admitting evidence of BMW and Midwest\u2019s negligence in this case since they have settled in good faith, and so far as I know there *** shouldn\u2019t be any evidence in the record of Midwest and BMW\u2019s negligence.\u201d\nThe jury returned a verdict in Terry\u2019s favor, and the trial court entered judgment on that verdict. In its post-trial motion, United argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding the conduct of BMW and Midwest as the sole proximate cause of the accident. United also argued that the trial court erred in refusing its sole proximate cause jury instruction. The trial court denied United\u2019s posttrial motion. United appealed.\nThe appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d 272 (2006). The appellate court held that under section 2 \u2014 1117 a nonsettling defendant\u2019s fault should be assessed relative to the fault of all defendants, including those who have settled in good faith. Ready, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 278. Consequently, the appellate court further held that Midwest and BMW should have been included on the verdict form for purposes of fault apportionment. Ready, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 278. Because it reversed and remanded on the statutory issue, the appellate court did not reach the sole proximate cause issue. Ready, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 280.\nThis court reversed the appellate court, holding that section 2 \u2014 1117 did not permit apportionment of fault to settling defendants. Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d 369 (2008) (plurality op.). The plurality opinion was modified on denial of rehearing, and closed with this paragraph:\n\u201cIn its petition for rehearing, United argues that this court, in light of its resolution of the section 2 \u2014 1117 question, should address United\u2019s concern that it was deprived of a sole proximate cause defense when the trial court refused its request for an instruction on sole proximate cause. We note that the issue was raised in the appellate court, but that court concluded that, because it was remanding for a new trial, it \u2018need not now address United\u2019s contention.\u2019 [Ready,] 367 Ill. App. 3d at 279. Because our opinion today reverses the appellate court\u2019s judgment ordering a new trial, we remand the cause to the appellate court for a decision on United\u2019s claim that the jury should have been instructed on sole proximate cause.\u201d Ready, 232 Ill. 2d at 385.\nOn remand, the appellate court, in a footnote, initially noted,\n\u201c[T]he supreme court\u2019s opinion framed the issue that we should address on remand as \u2018United\u2019s concern that it was deprived of a sole proximate cause defense when the trial court refused its request for an instruction on sole proximate cause.\u2019 Ready, 232 Ill. 2d at 385. After reviewing the briefs submitted to this court in the original appeal, it is abundantly clear that United\u2019s sole proximate cause defense argument had two components: the circuit court\u2019s exclusion of evidence regarding the conduct of the settling defendants, and the circuit court\u2019s refusal to instruct the jury on sole proximate cause. Therefore, we address both of United\u2019s arguments regarding its sole proximate cause defense.\u201d 393 Ill. App. 3d 56, 57 n.2.\nThe appellate court then discussed Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 233 Ill. 2d 416 (2009), and Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83 (1995), and decided that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the settling defendants\u2019 conduct. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, adding, \u201cwe need not address United\u2019s contention that the circuit court erred when it refused United\u2019s jury instruction on sole proximate cause.\u201d 393 Ill. App. 3d at 60. This court allowed Terry\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nANALYSIS\nThe first issue before us is simple: Did the appellate court follow the mandate of this court? We directed the appellate court to decide whether the jury should have been instructed on sole proximate cause, but we also referred to \u201cUnited\u2019s concern that it was deprived of a sole proximate cause defense.\u201d That defense included both the jury instruction issue and a related evidentiary issue, namely, whether there was evidence to support a sole proximate cause jury instruction. Resolution of both those issues, then, required the appellate court to determine whether the trial court erred by excluding such evidence in its ruling on Terry\u2019s motions in limine. This is exactly what the appellate court did. We turn to the second issue before us: Was the appellate court\u2019s decision on the sole proximate cause issue correct?\nLike the appellate court, we begin with Leonardi. In Leonordi, the plaintiffs decedent suffered irreversible brain damage shortly after giving birth and died several years later. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the hospital where the decedent received treatment and against several doctors who treated her. The plaintiff settled with one of them, Dr. Tierney, prior to trial. The plaintiff then filed a motion in limine seeking to bar evidence regarding the alleged negligence of any person other than the remaining defendants. The trial court denied the motion, and at trial allowed the defendants to question several witnesses regarding Dr. Tierney\u2019s conduct. The jury found in favor of the defendants, and the trial court entered judgment on that verdict. The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.\nBefore this court, the plaintiff argued that the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion in limine was erroneous, and as a result of that ruling, its decision to instruct the jury on sole proximate cause was also erroneous. We held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion in limine (Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 95) and further did not err instructing the jury on sole proximate cause (Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 101). We stated that \u201c \u2018an answer which denies that an injury was the result of or caused by the defendant\u2019s conduct is sufficient to permit the defendant in support of his position to present evidence that the injury was the result of another cause.\u2019 \u201d Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 94, quoting Simpson v. Johnson, 45 Ill. App. 3d 789, 795 (1977). We later explained, \u201cA defendant has the right not only to rebut evidence tending to show that defendant\u2019s acts are negligent and the proximate cause of claimed injuries, but also has the right to endeavor to establish by competent evidence that the conduct of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.\u201d Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 101. Accord McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 520-21 (2000).\nLast year, we reiterated that a defendant has a right to introduce evidence that some other person or entity was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 233 Ill. 2d 416 (2009). In Nolan, the plaintiff filed a negligence complaint against various companies, alleging that her decedent developed asbestos-related cancer after being negligently exposed to certain products over his career. All the defendants except one settled with the plaintiff before trial. The nonsettling defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to present evidence at trial that the sole proximate cause of the decedent\u2019s death was his exposure to products made by nonparty entities. The plaintiff filed her own motion in limine, seeking to bar such evidence. The trial court allowed the plaintiffs motion, and ultimately entered judgment on the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.\nWe reversed and remanded for a new trial. We held that \u201cour well-settled rules of tort law\u201d provide that \u201cthe plaintiff exclusively bears the burden of proof to establish the element of causation through competent evidence, and that a defendant has the right to rebut such evidence and to also establish that the conduct of another causative factor is the sole proximate cause of the injury.\u201d Nolan, 233 Ill. 2d at 444. Thus, the trial court erred in preventing the nonsettling defendant from presenting evidence in support of its sole proximate cause defense. Nolan, 233 Ill. 2d at 445.\nLike the trial court in Nolan, the trial court here erred in excluding evidence that would have supported the defendant\u2019s sole proximate cause defense. United was entitled to present evidence to support a sole proximate cause jury instruction, and the question becomes whether that evidence would have entitled United to such an instruction. \u201cInstructions convey the legal rules applicable to the evidence presented at trial and thus guide the jury\u2019s deliberations toward a proper verdict.\u201d People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (2008), citing People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392, 399 (2006). There must be some evidence in the record to justify an instruction, and the second paragraph of IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.04 should be given where there is evidence, albeit slight and unpersuasive, tending to show that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the conduct of a party other than the defendant. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 101.\nRegarding BMW, United indicates that the evidence excluded by the trial court would have shown that BMW should have provided an external crane to lift the scaffolding and that such a crane would have eliminated the need for Michael to work on the project and, thus, would have prevented the accident. Regarding Midwest, United indicates that the evidence excluded by the trial court would have shown that Midwest forced United to accept additional workers on the project, including the tugger operator and Michael, who had little or no rigging experience; decided how the signaling would be done and who would do it; and failed to abide by its own safety manual. This evidence would have tended to show that the settling defendants\u2019 conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and Michael\u2019s death, and the trial court erred in excluding it and refusing to give the second paragraph of IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.04.\nHaving decided that the trial court committed an error, we must decide whether that error was of sufficient magnitude to require a new trial, that is, whether the error was \u201charmless.\u201d See Nolan, 233 Ill. 2d at 445. We conclude that it was, and that even a properly instructed jury would not have reached a different verdict because there was significant evidence that United was a proximate cause of the accident.\nThe subcontract stated, \u201cCrane and Operator to be furnished by [BMW] as United/Goedecke requires,\u201d but the record does not show that United ever requested one. In fact, during the in limine conference United conceded that there was \u201cno evidence either way.\u201d In a discovery deposition, Jeffrey Talley (Jeffrey), United\u2019s construction manager for the project, testified that BMW told him in a bid meeting and during a walk around the job site that it would provide an external crane. At trial, Terry called Jeffrey as her first witness. When asked on cross-examination by United\u2019s attorney whether there were discussions between United and BMW as to how the scaffolding would be lifted, Jeffrey answered, \u201cWe were supposed to use a crane.\u201d Pursuant to its ruling on Terry\u2019s motion in limine, the trial court sustained an objection and struck this testimony, but allowed it to stand as an offer of proof.\nTerry also called Jeffrey\u2019s brother James Talley, United\u2019s job supervisor on the project, as a witness. On direct examination, James testified that he walked around the factory with Jeffrey. James recalled walking by an internal crane or tugger, and he stated he and Jeffrey mentioned the \u201cpossibility we could use that [tugger] being the [external] crane wasn\u2019t on site yet.\u201d James stated that Jeffrey ordered him to check into that possibility because it was the only logical way of lifting the trusses. James added that the \u201coriginal plan\u201d was to use a crane, but the crane was not available, so they \u201clooked at alternative options\u201d for raising the trusses.\nAt trial, Anthony Fanega, a Midwest employee, testified that Midwest had a rule prohibiting its employees from standing under material or machinery being lifted by a crane unless their work required it. United attempted to introduce Midwest\u2019s safety manual containing this rule into evidence. The trial court barred it, and United made the manual part of an offer of proof.\nJames agreed that it was his responsibility as United\u2019s safety representative to ensure that United\u2019s employees and any other persons assisting them complied with United\u2019s safety manual. James further agreed that it was his responsibility, with respect to the scaffolding work, to supply a safe working environment for United\u2019s employees and any other persons assisting them. James testified that a Midwest employee operated the tugger, and Michael did the signaling from the tugger bay, but only after a \u201csafety meeting\u201d with James. According to James, Michael learned of United\u2019s plan to lift the trusses, and they reached an understanding about how the work would be done. But the import of James\u2019 trial testimony was that United indeed remained in charge of the scaffolding work, even if United collaborated with Midwest employees on some aspects of how to accomplish it. James even stated that he could have ordered the work done in a different, safer manner.\nThe work was done pursuant to a plan that James devised with Jeffrey. According to James, Jeffrey chose not only the materials for this job, but also the manner in which they would be rigged and elevated. James stated that on the day before the scaffolding work began, he and his brother walked through the factory. They discussed where the scaffolding would be built and different ways to build it. James stated that United did not control who operated the tugger, but agreed that United controlled everything else, including \u201csignaling and things of that nature.\u201d In fact, it was James who decided where the trusses would be tied to the tugger in order to lift them.\nOn cross-examination, Jeffrey testified that United was not solely responsible for lifting the scaffolding because it had to use Midwest\u2019s tugger and three Midwest employees, who were \u201cin control of the lift.\u201d Jeffrey, however, agreed that James was responsible for rigging the job and, further, that United was \u201cin charge of\u2019 elevating the scaffolding in a safe manner.\nThe appellate court was incorrect in stating that if the jury had heard the whole story, it may have reached a different verdict. No reasonable jury would have concluded that United was not a proximate cause of the accident, and if United was a proximate cause, the settling defendants could not have been the sole proximate cause. United may have expected to use an external crane, but the subcontract required it to request one, and the record does not show that it ever did. Additionally, United may have used a Midwest tugger operator and two other Midwest employees, including Michael, for this project, but the record shows that United retained significant control over the work and the safety of the people doing it. We conclude that the trial court\u2019s error in refusing to instruct the jury on sole proximate cause was harmless.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons that we have stated, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the trial court\u2019s judgment on the jury\u2019s verdict is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nJUSTICE THOMAS\ntook no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "CHIEF JUSTICE FITZGERALD JUSTICE THOMAS" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE,\nspecially concurring:\nI specially concur only because the majority opinion contains a harmless-error discussion of Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 233 Ill. 2d 416 (2009), that is inconsistent with my prior position in that small portion of Nolan. I acknowledge, however, that the harmless-error ruling in Nolan represents this court\u2019s holding. Moreover, I completely agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion in the present appeal that the trial court\u2019s error was harmless and does not require a remand for a new trial. Thus, I specially concur only to explain my current acceptance of the majority analysis of Nolan in light of my prior separate writing.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE KILBRIDE," }, { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the plurality that United presented insufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction that the settling defendants were the sole proximate cause of the accident that resulted in Michael Ready\u2019s death. I write separately, however, to express my continued disagreement with the holding of this court\u2019s decision in Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d 369 (2008) (Ready I) that section 2 \u2014 1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1117) prohibits the jury from apportioning fault to settling defendants. Contrary to the plurality\u2019s holding in that case, section 2 \u2014 1117 unambiguously includes those defendants by providing that \u201c[a]ny defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be jointly and severally liable for all other damages.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1117. As I stated in my dissent in Ready I, the plain language of section 2 \u2014 1117 requires that fault must be allocated among all defendants, settling and nonsettling alike. This reading of the statute comports with and furthers the legislature\u2019s \u201cgoal of protecting minimally responsible tortfeasors from excessive liability.\u201d Ready, 232 Ill. 2d at 405 (Garman, J., dissenting, joined by Karmeier, J.).\nThe Ready I plurality\u2019s interpretation of the statute rewards settling defendants, no matter the degree of their culpability, and punishes nonsettling defendants. In cases where a defendant may have deep pockets, a plaintiff is encouraged not to settle, knowing that a jury, lacking knowledge of any fault of the settling defendants, may hold the nonsettling defendant solely liable for the injury, absent any comparative negligence on the plaintiffs part. Thus, a nonsettling defendant who may have a lesser degree of fault than the settling defendants ends up paying most of the damages. This is not only unfair to the nonsettling defendant, it may also hurt the plaintiff. If the evidence at trial shows that the only defendant in the case has limited responsibility for the plaintiff\u2019s injury, the jury, faced with the necessity of assigning 100% of the fault to someone, may be tempted to assign greater fault to the plaintiff. In contrast, if a jury is able to consider the fault of settling defendants, a greater share of the fault may be assigned to those defendants and the degree of the plaintiffs fault reduced.\nIn the instant case, the jury found United to be 65% liable for the accident and Michael Ready\u2019s fault was assessed at 35%. If the jury had been allowed to consider the fault of Midwest and BMW, the degree of Michael\u2019s fault may have been reduced because the jury would have had the full picture of the respective liability of all defendants sued by plaintiff. This is not mere speculation. Plaintiff herself apparently believed that BMW had a significant degree of liability for the accident. In her response to BMW\u2019s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argued that BMW had the responsibility under its contract with United to provide an external crane to lift the trusses. It was undisputed that no crane was provided. Plaintiff argued that had BMW provided the external crane, the accident would not have happened. Whatever the actual degree of fault of BMW and Midwest, the jury should have been able to hear evidence on that issue. That was the only way to properly allocate the damages for the accident. But, because of the plurality\u2019s interpretation of section 2 \u2014 1117, the jury only heard part of the story of what happened on the day of Michael\u2019s death.\nAs I stated in my dissent in Ready I, the plurality\u2019s reading of section 2 \u2014 1117 upsets the balance struck by the legislature between the goals of full compensation for injured plaintiffs and imposition of liability on defendants commensurate with their fault. That erroneous reading of the statute has had and will continue to have unfortunate consequences for both plaintiffs and defendants.\nJUSTICE KARMEIER joins in this special concurrence.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph A. Power, Jr., and Devon C. Bruce, of Power, Rogers & Smith, PC., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edward M. Kay and Paul V. Esposito, of Clausen Miller, PC., and John W. Patton, Jr., of Patton & Ryan, all of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 108910.\nTERRY E. READY, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Michael P. Ready, Deceased, Appellant, v. UNITED/GOEDECKE SERVICES, INC., et al. (United/Goedecke Services, Inc., Appellee).\nOpinion filed October 21, 2010.\nJoseph A. Power, Jr., and Devon C. Bruce, of Power, Rogers & Smith, PC., of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward M. Kay and Paul V. Esposito, of Clausen Miller, PC., and John W. Patton, Jr., of Patton & Ryan, all of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0582-01", "first_page_order": 594, "last_page_order": 609 }