{ "id": 3633096, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT JOCKO, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jocko", "decision_date": "2010-11-18", "docket_number": "No. 108465", "first_page": "87", "last_page": "94", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "239 Ill. 2d 87" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "466 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204502 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "complete deprivation of counsel" }, { "parenthetical": "complete deprivation of counsel" }, { "parenthetical": "complete deprivation of counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 475", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2258 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "when a potential conflict of interest is brought to the court's attention at an early stage, the court is obligated to either appoint separate counsel or take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of conflict is too remote to warrant separate counsel" }, { "parenthetical": "when a potential conflict of interest is brought to the court's attention at an early stage, the court is obligated to either appoint separate counsel or take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of conflict is too remote to warrant separate counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" }, { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974982 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-78" }, { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284663 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "266-67" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156888 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0181-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 566, "char_count": 11099, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.377278695392341e-08, "percentile": 0.3370003424910101 }, "sha256": "25800d79b6ad0d19d2674b0671b5c2cf99a7444691d2e964d0c15d58d6e81f13", "simhash": "1:83b358686e88eed0", "word_count": 1841 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:42:29.667104+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT JOCKO, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nAt issue in this appeal is whether a circuit court is required to conduct an inquiry, prior to trial, into allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel that are raised by a defendant pro se. Relying on People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), the appellate court concluded that such an inquiry is required and because the circuit court did not undertake one, the appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court for the limited purpose of conducting an inquiry into the defendant\u2019s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 389 Ill. App. 3d 247. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.\nBackground\nThe defendant, Robert Jocko, was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with burglary for having removed power tools valued at over $300 from a garage on July 6, 2005. At his arraignment on August 25, 2005, defendant was represented by Assistant Public Defender Rosenthal, who entered a plea of not guilty and filed a written motion for discovery on defendant\u2019s behalf. On November 17, 2005, Assistant Public Defender Mularski, who had been appointed to represent defendant, filed a motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence. The motion was heard on February 16, 2006, and denied.\nOn April 25, 2006, defendant filed a pro se \u201cMotion to Dismiss Based on Due Process Violation.\u201d Included among defendant\u2019s allegations in this motion was the claim that \u201cCounsel was not present during ARRAINMENT [sic] or BAIL HEARING.\u201d The motion alleged that defendant never spoke with an attorney during arraignment and that the arraignment judge \u201cdid not ask where my counsel was.\u201d Defendant\u2019s motion was placed on the circuit court\u2019s call for May 2, 2006, and then rescheduled for May 25, 2006. However, there was no discussion of the pro se motion on that date or any subsequent date.\nOn September 6, 2006, Assistant Public Defender Fadell, the attorney who ultimately represented defendant at trial, entered an appearance on defendant\u2019s behalf. In the record is a document titled \u201cAffidavit\u201d that is signed by defendant. The \u201caffidavit\u201d is not file-stamped but it bears a handwritten date of \u201c9-6-06.\u201d The \u201caffidavit\u201d states that it is submitted in support of a motion to suppress evidence and states that the police \u201cheld me in custody and brought me before an alleged victim with out [sic] affording me the right to have a lawyer present and depriving me of my other legal rights.\u201d There is no indication in the record that the circuit court addressed or was aware of this \u201caffidavit.\u201d\nThereafter, defendant sent an undated letter to the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, which was file-stamped on December 14, 2006. On the back of the accompanying envelope is a handwritten note that states \u201c12-20-06 opened.\u201d In the letter, the defendant asks that it be placed in his \u201cmaster file as a legal document in case I have to argue on appeal.\u201d The letter states that it is in regards to his counsel \u201cnot raissing [sic] certen [sic] issues in my case that is [sic] material and relevant evidence that pertain [sic] to my case.\u201d The letter goes on to claim that defendant has \u201crequested certain affidavits and subpoenas to be entered and my lawyer has advised me that it would notbe [sic] to my best interests, and I have also requested for the 911 Motor Rola [sic] conversation to be entered as evidence in my behave [sic] and his statement responce [sic] was that they do not hold them after thirty days.\u201d The defendant also wrote that Fadell was not \u201cfighting my case to the best of intrest [sic].\u201d There is no indication in the record that the circuit court addressed or was aware of this letter.\nThe defendant was convicted in March 2007 and sentenced on April 6, 2007.\nOn appeal, defendant alleged, among other things, that the circuit court should have conducted an inquiry into the various claims of deficient representation raised in his pro se documents. The appellate court agreed and, in so holding, concluded that this court\u2019s decision in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), \u201cshould be applied to pretrial claims.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 267. The appellate court explained that\n\u201cas a matter of judicial economy, it makes more sense to encourage defendants to bring their claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to a trial court\u2019s attention before trial, rather than after. If there is a problem, it can be cured, before all the parties and witnesses go through the time and expense of a trial that may later be overturned on a posttrial motion or on appeal.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 266-67.\nThe cause was remanded for the limited purpose of an inquiry into defendant\u2019s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 389 Ill. App. 3d at 268.\nWe granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nAnalysis\nIn People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), the defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. The defendant was denied new counsel to assist him in the motion. On appeal, this court remanded the cause for a new hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion, with instructions to have defendant represented by appointed counsel other than his trial counsel. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 189. Krankel thus adopted a procedure that encourages the circuit court to fully address a defendant\u2019s claims of ineffective assistance and thereby potentially narrow the issues that need to be addressed on appeal.\nCases subsequent to Krankel have made clear, however, that newly appointed counsel\n\u201cis not automatically required in every case in which a defendant presents a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, when a defendant presents a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant\u2019s claim. If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed.\u201d People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78 (2003).\nIn the present case, the State contends that the appellate court erred in holding that Krankel should be applied by a circuit court before trial because until the proceedings have concluded, there is no way to determine if counsel\u2019s errors affected the outcome and, therefore, no way of establishing prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The State does not dispute that there may be some instances when a circuit court is obligated to investigate potential sixth amendment violations prior to trial, but the State observes that these are instances where the circuit court is not required to consider the possible prejudicial effect on the outcome of the proceedings. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978) (when a potential conflict of interest is brought to the court\u2019s attention at an early stage, the court is obligated to either appoint separate counsel or take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of conflict is too remote to warrant separate counsel); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984) (complete deprivation of counsel). According to the State, because Strickland claims cannot be resolved prior to trial, Krankel is inapposite in that context. We agree.\nUnder Strickland, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate \u201ca reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. \u201cA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. The fundamental problem with addressing Strickland claims prior to trial is that the outcome of the proceeding has not yet been determined. Because there is no way to determine if counsel\u2019s errors have affected an outcome that has not yet occurred, the circuit court cannot engage in this analysis prior to trial. Accordingly, we reject the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that a circuit court is obligated to address a pro se defendant\u2019s Strickland claims prior to trial.\nThe appellate court in this case also expressed concern that defendant\u2019s claims in this case\n\u201cwere never heard. They were simply lost in a shuffle of changing attorneys and adjourned dates. Their loss makes the wheels of justice seem completely random, almost like a roulette wheel. This, we cannot tolerate.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 267.\nGenerally a pro se defendant is not obligated to renew claims of ineffective assistance once they are made known to the circuit court (see Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79), and there is, of course, nothing to prevent a circuit court from addressing, at the conclusion of trial, a pro se claim of ineffective assistance that was previously raised by the defendant. In this case, however, we cannot fault the circuit court for not pursuing defendant\u2019s pro se claims further. First, defendant\u2019s contention that he was not represented by counsel at arraignment is refuted by the record, which clearly indicates that counsel was present during that proceeding. With respect to defendant\u2019s letter and \u201caffidavit,\u201d defendant\u2019s only contention regarding the documents in this appeal is that the circuit court erred in failing to further inquire into the pro se contentions contained therein, and not that the contentions themselves have merit. However, it appears from the record that the circuit court, defendant\u2019s counsel, and the State were all unaware of these documents as no mention was made of them at any point in the proceedings by defendant or anyone else. We cannot criticize the circuit court for failing to take action on defendant\u2019s concerns when there is no indication that the court was ever made aware of them.\nConclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court remanding the cause to the circuit court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Omar Jaleel, Annette Collins and Eve Reilly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Katherine M. Donahoe, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 108465.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT JOCKO, Appellee.\nOpinion filed November 18, 2010.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Omar Jaleel, Annette Collins and Eve Reilly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, and Katherine M. Donahoe, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0087-01", "first_page_order": 101, "last_page_order": 108 }