{ "id": 3632999, "name": "In re VERONICA C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Veronica C., Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Veronica C.", "decision_date": "2010-09-23", "docket_number": "No. 108953", "first_page": "134", "last_page": "151", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "239 Ill. 2d 134" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596066 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092064 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127-28" }, { "page": "128" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" }, { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3623795 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/234/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906244 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3229329 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3161206 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096297 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "stating that the constitutionality of a criminal statute may be raised at any time" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610681 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0445-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1117, "char_count": 29647, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.409020608494133e-08, "percentile": 0.44319263401070874 }, "sha256": "a07d2732074ab831cfc222334ccf05582a43708276b6c6605072913382a76695", "simhash": "1:eb2be5424015c4ba", "word_count": 4862 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:42:29.667104+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re VERONICA C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Veronica C., Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nThe respondent-minor, Veronica C., was adjudicated a delinquent in the circuit court of Kane County, the court having found that she violated section 12 \u2014 3(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3(a)(2) (West 2006) (battery)). She was thereafter placed on probation for a period of one year with attendant conditions and fees. Respondent appealed, arguing that section 5 \u2014 615 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 615(1) (West 2006)) violates constitutional provisions pertaining to equal protection and separation of powers insofar as it prevents a minor from being placed on supervision without the consent of the State. The appellate court rejected those contentions. No. 2 \u2014 07 \u2014 1155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed respondent\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court without reaching the constitutional issues it addressed.\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 12, 2006, in the circuit court of Kane County, a petition was filed alleging that the minor-respondent was delinquent in that she had committed battery. In separate counts, the petition charged that respondent had violated section 12 \u2014 3(a)(1) of the Code, in that she had knowingly caused bodily harm to Krila Cortes, and section 12 \u2014 3(a)(2) of the Code, in that she had made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Cortes. Though the conduct in question occurred on the property of a public school, as the cited sections indicate, the State chose to pursue only misdemeanor charges. Acting in part upon defense representations that the minor had no criminal history, the court decided that the minor respondent would not be detained pending trial.\nThe matter was tried on May 22, 2007. After hearing the evidence, the court found respondent guilty of the second count of battery \u2014 charging physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature \u2014 but not guilty of the first count, as the State had adduced no evidence of bodily harm. As the details of the offense are peripheral to the issues raised by the parties, we will summarize the findings of the trial court, and the version of events those findings support.\nThe prevailing testimony indicated that the victim, another student at respondent\u2019s school, was pushed and punched by respondent and her friends, and that respondent initiated the attack. Respondent and her group first encircled the victim in the school\u2019s gymnasium after school. After the victim successfully extricated herself from that confrontation, and went down into the locker room, respondent and another girl proceeded to the locker room where the respondent and the victim \u201cbumped shoulders\u201d in passing, inciting an attack on the victim in the shower area, wherein respondent and three of her friends participated.\nIn announcing its guilty finding, the court singled out respondent\u2019s lack of credibility for comment:\n\u201c[T]he testimony is notable because the testimony of the minor respondent *** is actually contradicted by every other single witness who testified in this case, including the defense\u2019s witness.\nI don\u2019t think the testimony of the minor respondent *** and the teacher who testified can be reconciled. The teacher was very clear, the respondent said, it\u2019s on [meaning the attack on the other student]. That\u2019s what the minor said. So either Veronica is not telling the truth or the teacher is not telling the truth.\nKrila testified that when she went upstairs to the gym, she was surrounded by the minor respondent and her friends in the gym, they made a circle around her. I think that\u2019s how the testimony about her saying, it\u2019s on, is relevant. I think that\u2019s what it refers to.\u201d\nThe court also stated that it did not believe respondent when she testified she went to the locker room to get her gym uniform. The court concluded its comments on respondent\u2019s credibility by noting that \u201crespondent is the only one who testified that she both didn\u2019t push Krila first and also that she didn\u2019t hit Krila.\u201d As indicated, the court found the respondent \u201cguilty\u201d of battery and set the matter over for what the court referred to as a \u201csentencing hearing.\u201d\nAt that hearing, the minor respondent\u2019s mother, Saint, testified to the minor\u2019s domestic activities and her scholastic status. Further, the witness stated that the minor was seeing a psychiatrist at Streamwood Behavior Center and claimed that she had been diagnosed with \u201cADHD and impulse disorder.\u201d Saint testified that, subsequent to the coordinated attack on the victim at school, and during the time the minor respondent was awaiting sentencing, she had been in no trouble at school, no trouble with the law, no trouble at home, and no trouble with friends or neighbors. Asked about the possibility of community service, the witness responded: \u201cI really don\u2019t think that she would be able to do the community service because of her disability and no one being there to actually ***, can I say, certified, to handle a situation if there\u2019s like, you know, outbursts and whatever.\u201d\nUnder cross-examination by the State, respondent\u2019s mother reiterated her belief that community service would not be an option because the minor \u201chas an impulse disorder,\u201d \u201csomeone would have to watch her,\u201d and there would be problems \u201csending her out with other kids.\u201d The witness was then asked about supervision after school:\n\u201cTHE STATE: So what happens when school is over, who supervises her between her last class when the teacher sees her and when she makes it to your home?\nWITNESS: We live right next door to the school, we\u2019re right next door.\nTHE STATE: So you\u2019re saying she has constant supervision?\nWITNESS: Well, actually her sister was at school with her, so she walks right home everyday.\nTHE STATE: So why wasn\u2019t she being supervised on October 10th, 2006, when she was in a fight in a locker room?\nWITNESS: You know I can\u2019t answer that because I wasn\u2019t there at the school, so I don\u2019t know what happened that day or what triggered her to go downstairs. I can\u2019t answer that.\nTHE STATE: So there are times when she is not completely supervised?\nWITNESS: As far as like maybe standing with friends at school or something like that. I really don\u2019t know as far as with school, but I know at home she\u2019s supervised.\u201d\nAsked if her daughter \u201cshould have any consequence for her behavior on October 10th,\u201d the witness responded: \u201cAs far as writing an apology letter, I mean, this is her first time ever being in a situation like this.\u201d\nAfter respondent\u2019s mother testified, the court stated that it was prepared to hear argument, but first asked the State if it objected to court supervision. The State responded affirmatively, and was then directed to proceed.\nIn argument, the State urged the court to impose a term of 12 months\u2019 probation with appropriate conditions. In support of that position, the State observed that the minor respondent had incited the attack on the victim in the locker room, when respondent and her friends \u201cdid not have a reason to be in that locker room.\u201d Continuing, the State pointed out:\n\u201c[T]he purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to hold minors accountable for their unlawful behavior and not to allow them to think that their delinquent acts have no consequences for themselves.\nAnd the State believes at this time if you were simply to close this minor\u2019s case, she would believe that her acts have no consequences. The minor\u2019s mother stated that [the minor-respondent] has impulse disorder and that she has outbursts. And the State would submit she\u2019s not being properly supervised if this is the case and she has outbursts.\n*** She shouldn\u2019t think that her behavior was okay and that she\u2019s gonna get a pass on it.\u201d\nFor her part, respondent\u2019s attorney acknowledged testimony concerning the minor\u2019s \u201cimpulse disorder,\u201d but noted that the minor had not been in any trouble pending her sentencing, and referenced the mother\u2019s testimony that the minor had not been in trouble prior to this offense. Counsel argued that the minor\u2019s mother was \u201cvery concerned about her and her behavior\u201d and had \u201ctaken measures to improve the situation\u201d insofar as she had taken her daughter to see a psychiatrist and had gotten her daughter on appropriate medication. Counsel also argued, notwithstanding the incident in question, that the minor respondent was \u201cwell-supervised\u201d when at school. Counsel concluded:\n\u201cWe would ask, in light of this being her first case and her young age and the excellent care that her mother has taken to insure that this type of thing does not occur again, as well as Veronica making the choice to make sure that, in spite of struggling with some of these disabilities, making sure that this does not repeat itself, we would ask that you adjudicate and close this case.\u201d\nHaving heard arguments of counsel, the court announced its sentencing decision: \u201cShe\u2019s a first offender, I would give her court supervision if I could, but I\u2019m not allowed to if the State objects, so she\u2019s gonna be placed on a year of probation.\u201d\nOn August 23, 2007, the respondent filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that her sentence was excessive, that it violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711)\u2014 quoting from that provision, but citing the due process and equal protection clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a72)\u2014 and that, \u201cbased on the evidence presented and the law, the Court should have made a finding that adjudicating her a delinquent and closing the case was an appropriate punishment for the Minor.\u201d\nA hearing was held on the motion on October 10, 2007, in which counsel argued, inter alia, that respondent\u2019s sentence was excessive and disproportionate to that received by one of the other girls participating in the attack. Referring to that girl, counsel stated, \u201cin the end her case was adjudicated and closed.\u201d Counsel suggested \u201cthere should be some symmetry between\u201d the sentences. The State responded that \u201cthe sentence which is disproportionate to the crime is that of [the other offender].\u201d The assistant State\u2019s Attorney reiterated her position that both of the minors should have been placed on probation; however, she noted, in support of the disparity, that this respondent actually incited the attack. In the end, the court agreed with the State: \u201cVeronica is the one that started this. I think she deserves what I gave her, and the motion is denied.\u201d\nRespondent appealed, arguing, as she does here, that section 5 \u2014 615 of the Act \u201cis an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers and equal protection because it allows the State to prevent the juvenile court from placing a minor on supervision.\u201d Before reaching the merits, the appellate court first addressed and rejected the State\u2019s argument that the matter was moot because respondent\u2019s period of probation had ended, relying upon the collateral-legal-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine. Citing separate subsections of section 5 \u2014 915 of the Act, the court observed that a juvenile placed on court supervision would have been eligible to p\u00e9tition for expungement of her law enforcement and juvenile court records at the age of 17 (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 915(l)(c) (West 2006)); whereas, an offender, like the respondent, who was \u201ccharged with a Class A misdemeanor and [was] sentenced to probation, *** may not petition for expungement until the age of 21. See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014915(2)(a) (West 2006).\u201d No. 2\u201407\u20141155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Quoting from this court\u2019s decision in People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d 445 (2007), the appellate court noted that the extended preservation of juvenile records is one of \u201ca number of collateral ways that the public is protected by the finding of delinquency\u201d and the appellate court concluded \u201c[t]o hold that the distinction is not a collateral legal consequence in regard to mootness would essentially ignore that the legislature viewed the distinction as important to both the public and the juvenile.\u201d No. 2\u201407\u20141155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nThe appellate court also rejected the suggestion that respondent\u2019s constitutional contentions on appeal were forfeited, as they were not argued in the circuit court. The appellate court cited, inter alia, this court\u2019s holding in People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2000) (stating that the constitutionality of a criminal statute may be raised at any time). No. 2\u201407\u20141155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn the merits, the appellate court upheld the constitutionality of section 5 \u2014 615(1) against both separation of powers and equal protection challenges.\nWith respect to the former, the appellate court observed that this court, in In re T.W., 101 Ill. 2d 438 (1984), \u201cupheld a challenge on separation of powers grounds to the identical statutory predecessor to section 5 \u2014 615(1).\u201d The appellate court considered T.W. \u201cbinding precedent\u201d in this case. No. 2 \u2014 07 \u2014 1155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). As for more recent precedent, the appellate court went on to note that this court in Stralka, though it did not address the constitutionality of section 5\u2014615(1), nonetheless \u201cheld that a juvenile court could not place a minor on probation and later vacate the delinquency finding, in part because doing so is tantamount to granting supervision \u2018and it essentially circumvents the State\u2019s right to reject supervision.\u2019 \u201d No. 2 \u2014 07 \u2014 1155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), quoting in part Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 454. The appellate court again quoted from this court\u2019s disposition in Stralka, wherein this court concluded: \u201c \u2018[T]he statute simply does not give the [circuit] court authority to decide, in the face of an objection by the State, that even though a juvenile is guilty of a crime, the nature of the conduct does not warrant prosecution or a finding of guilt.\u2019 \u201d No. 2\u201407\u20141155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), quoting Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 455.\nAs for respondent\u2019s equal protection challenge, the appellate court relied upon its own decision in In re T.D., 81 Ill. App. 3d 369, 372 (1980), wherein it observed that adult offenders and juveniles adjudicated delinquent are not similarly situated. Citing this court\u2019s opinion in In re Presley, 47 Ill. 2d 50, 56 (1970), the appellate court observed: \u201cIndeed, the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to treat juveniles as differently situated, because the Juvenile Court Act has a legitimate and salutary goal to provide for the rehabilitation of delinquent minors before they have embarked upon the commission of substantive criminal offenses.\u201d No. 2\u201407\u20141155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court concluded that section 5\u2014615(1) does not violate principles of equal protection.\nANALYSIS\nOf the arguments advanced by the State in this appeal, we find one dispositive, obviating the need to address any other issues raised by the parties. The State submits that the respondent has no standing to challenge the \u201cconsent\u201d requirement of section 5 \u2014 615 because it was not the prosecutorial objection that deprived the respondent of the opportunity to have her case continued under supervision. According to the State, by the time the circuit court inquired as to the prosecutor\u2019s position on supervision, supervision was no longer an option under the procedural framework of the Act, as a finding of guilt had already been entered. In the State\u2019s view, the prosecutor\u2019s position on supervision was at that point irrelevant. We agree with the State.\nWe have repeatedly emphasized the distinct nature of the three phases of juvenile delinquency proceedings as outlined in the Juvenile Court Act: the findings phase, the adjudicatory phase, and the dispositional phase. See In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 365 (2009); Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 451. As we noted in Samantha V. and Stralka, the findings phase consists of a \u201ctrial\u201d\u2014previously referred to as an \u201cadjudicatory hearing\u201d (see 705 ILCS 405/5\u201419 (West 1996)) \u2014 in which the trial court applies the reasonable doubt standard of proof and the rules of evidence that would be followed in a criminal case, to determine whether the minor is guilty as charged and should thus be adjudged delinquent. Samantha V, 234 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014605(3)(a) (West 2004), and Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 452). In a juvenile delinquency case, a finding of guilt and a finding of delinquency are one and the same. Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 456. In the event a finding of delinquency is entered, the matter proceeds to sentencing. Samantha V, 234 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014620 (West 2004), and Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 452). The sentencing proceeding includes the adjudication phase, where the court determines whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public to make the minor a ward of the court. Samantha V, 234 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014705(1) (West 2004), and Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 453). If the minor is adjudged a ward of the court, the matter proceeds to the dispositional phase, where the court fashions an appropriate sentence that will best serve the minor and the public. Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014705(1) (West 2004), and Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 453). We reiterate the distinct phases of juvenile proceedings because important legal consequences attend each one, as this case amply demonstrates.\nSection 5 \u2014 615 of the Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision *** (a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate respondent or minor respondent of the facts supporting the petition and before proceeding to adjudication, or after hearing the evidence at the trial, and (b) in the absence of objection made in open court by the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor\u2019s attorney or the State\u2019s Attorney.\n(2) If the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor\u2019s attorney or State\u2019s Attorney objects in open court to any continuance and insists upon proceeding to findings and adjudication, the court shall so proceed.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 615(1), (2) (West 2006).\nThe clear intent of the legislature, as expressed in subsection (2) of section 5 \u2014 615, is that the possibility of supervision be broached and considered, if at all, before \u201cproceeding to findings and adjudication.\u201d At that juncture, if the court is so inclined, and barring objection by any of the parties listed in subsection (1), the court \u201cmay\u201d enter an order of supervision. We have found no statutory provision or rule that requires the court to raise the prospect of supervision sua sponte.\nHere, the court had already found respondent guilty and had set the cause over for adjudicatory and dispositional phases, inquiring, in the course of those proceedings whether the State objected to supervision. At that point, it no longer mattered whether the State or anyone else objected as the time for a continuance under supervision had passed, and the only dispositional alternatives remaining were those set forth in section 5 \u2014 710 of the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 710 (West 2006). A \u201ccontinuance under supervision\u201d is not listed among them.\nRespondent argues that \u201csection 5 \u2014 615 does not bar supervision for minors who are found guilty.\u201d She notes that an \u201cadmission in a juvenile delinquency case is the equivalent of a guilty plea in an adult criminal proceeding,\u201d and from that observation reasons that \u201cthe plain wording of section 5 \u2014 615 contemplates that a finding of guilt (delinquency in this case) does not preclude supervision.\u201d This line of reasoning, which is not even relevant here, where the matter proceeded to trial, ignores the distinction between a respondent\u2019s action in admitting or stipulating to the facts supporting a petition and the subsequent action of a court in entering a finding of guilt or an adjudication of delinquency on the basis of the admission. A similar error or unwarranted inferential leap in analysis is evident in respondent\u2019s contention that the statute\u2019s reference to a court considering supervision \u201cafter hearing the evidence at the trial\u201d necessarily encompasses a finding of guilt or delinquency thereafter. It does not. Where as here, the matter proceeds to trial, a court obviously would hear the evidence, and then, before entering a finding of guilt or delinquency, consider the option of a continuance under supervision. That is the procedural sequence the legislature intended. Any ambiguity that might result from the legislature\u2019s omission of the term \u201cfindings\u201d in subsection (1) of section 5 \u2014 615 is clarified in subsection (2), wherein the legislature specifies that supervision, and any objections thereto, must be considered before \u201cproceeding to findings and adjudication.\u201d\nIn this case, no one broached the possibility of a continuance under supervision prior to the court\u2019s finding of guilt. The State\u2019s objection thereto during the phases that followed was irrelevant and thus did not adversely affect respondent.\nA party may not raise a constitutional challenge to a provision of a statute that does not affect him or her. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 415, 425 (2000). Since respondent argues neither ineffective assistance of counsel, nor plain error, we are not compelled to consider whether trial counsel\u2019s failure to raise the possibility of supervision prejudiced respondent \u2014 if in fact we were to find the provision in question unconstitutional \u2014 or whether the trial court\u2019s failure to raise the option of supervision at an earlier stage in the proceedings affected the fairness of proceedings below and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.\nWe note in passing respondent\u2019s nominal argument\u2014 two pages of her brief \u2014 that \u201cthe Juvenile Court Act actually authorizes supervision despite a prosecutorial veto,\u201d and her related suggestion that our \u201ccase law recognizes that the restriction which the trial judge placed on his authority [to continue the matter under supervision] does not exist.\u201d In support of her skeletal contention, respondent quotes, partially, and out of context, somewhat imprecise language employed in this court\u2019s concluding remarks in T.W. We here quote the sentence in its entirety:\n\u201cWe held in In re J.N. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 122, 127-28, that section 5 \u2014 3(2)(o) (111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 705\u2014 3(2)(o)), which is a subsection of the statute dealing with juvenile probation, allows the court to impose conditions of supervision after findings and adjudication.\u201d T.W., 101 Ill. 2d at 442.\nOf course, respondent\u2019s proposed interpretation of this sentence is diametrically opposed to the clear statutory prescription that a case cannot be continued under supervision after findings and adjudication. Moreover, that interpretation would completely eviscerate this court\u2019s holdings in T.W. and Stralka. If there were an independent basis in the Act that would allow the circuit court to continue a case under supervision over the objection of the State, then the provision upheld in T.W. and essential to the result in Stralka would be meaningless. Clearly, T.W. did not intend such an interpretation and we find none such is warranted, as even a cursory examination of J.N. and T.W. will confirm.\nIn J.N. \u2014 a case which respondent understandably does not discuss or even mention \u2014 this court found, notwithstanding the circuit court\u2019s use of the term \u201csupervision\u201d in its orders, that the circuit court had, in substance, placed the minor respondent on \u201cprobation\u201d or \u201cconditional discharge.\u201d In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 128 (1982). This court came to that conclusion because the circuit court had previously entered a finding of guilt\u2014 the equivalent of a finding of delinquency \u2014 and had referenced as statutory authority section 5 \u2014 3 of the Act (now section 5 \u2014 715(u), upon which respondent relies), a provision which provides for dispositional orders of probation and conditional discharge. This court observed that the circuit court had not mentioned section 4 \u2014 7, the predecessor of section 5 \u2014 615, which allowed a continuance under supervision only before a finding of delinquency. See J.N., 91 Ill. 2d at 128; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 704\u20147. The minor in J.N. was placed on probation, not supervision, and the conditions ordered under section 5 \u2014 3 (now section 5 \u2014 715(u)) were conditions of probation, not supervision. Simply put, J.N. does not provide precedent for placing a minor on supervision under these circumstances.\nNor can we reasonably construe the single, enigmatic sentence at the end of this court\u2019s opinion in T.W. as the genesis of an independent basis for juvenile supervision. First, as previously noted, to do so would undermine the holding of that disposition, a result that was obviously not intended. Moreover, the sentence in question actually acknowledges that the subsection at issue is one appearing in a section pertaining to \u201cjuvenile probation.\u201d T.W., 101 Ill. 2d at 442. Section 5 \u2014 3(2)(o), now codified as section 5 \u2014 715(2)(u), is essentially a catchall provision in a list of permissible conditions that may be ordered in conjunction with \u201cprobation\u201d or \u201cconditional discharge.\u201d Section 5 \u2014 715(2)(u) does indeed allow a court to impose conditions consistent with court supervision after findings and adjudication, as T.W. suggests, but those conditions are ancillary to a disposition of probation or conditional discharge, not a continuance under supervision.\nWe acknowledge, in passing, respondent\u2019s contention that our literal reading of section 5 \u2014 615\u2019s sequencing scheme inhibits the ability of \u201cminor\u2019s counsel to freely argue that his client is not guilty without running the risk that the minor will lose the opportunity for court supervision,\u201d thus \u201crestraining] the minor from freely exercising his right to contest his guilt.\u201d Respondent\u2019s concern is surely more hyperbolic than real, for any party, or the court, can raise the prospect of a continuance under supervision at any time prior to the entry of a finding of guilt. If, for example, a minor respondent chooses to have his case tried, counsel is free, at the conclusion of the evidence, to argue his client\u2019s innocence, while suggesting that supervision would be appropriate should the court be inclined to find the State had proven its case. Alternatively, the court might share its view of the evidence with the parties and broach the possibility of supervision prior to entering a finding of delinquency. In fact, subsection (2) of section 5 \u2014 615 appears to assume consultation of the parties and the court after a trial, but prior to the entry of findings and adjudication, insofar as it states, upon an objection to a continuance under supervision by any party entitled to object, the court shall proceed \u201cto findings and adjudication.\u201d Clearly, consultation is envisioned after trial, but before there is a formal finding of delinquency. Indeed, it is not a novel mode of procedure for a court to signal its intentions to the parties under certain circumstances. Analogous \u201cwhat if\u201d discussions are commonplace between the parties and the court when tentative plea agreements are undertaken pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402(d) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)). We thus reject the respondent\u2019s claim that the sequencing mandates of section 5 \u2014 615 \u201crestrain\u201d the minor from freely exercising his right to contest his guilt.\nIn sum, respondent lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory provision in question because she was not adversely affected by its operation. See Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 425. Consequently, we will not address the constitutional claims she raises. We recognize that lack of standing was not raised by the State in the appellate court; however, an appellee may raise any argument or basis supported by the record to show the correctness of the judgment below, even though he had not previously advanced such an argument. People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 220 (1991). Moreover, this court, in determining the correctness of the result reached by the appellate court, is in no way constrained by the appellate court\u2019s reasoning and may affirm on any basis supported by the record. People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 296 (2005). Insofar as it affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, the result reached by the appellate court was correct. On that basis, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nAffirmed.\nFor purposes of clarification, we note that the \u201cadjudication\u201d to which the legislature refers in section 5 \u2014 615 is apparently an adjudication of delinquency, the formal culmination of first phase proceedings.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Steven E. Wiltgen, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.", ". Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John A. Barsanti, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 108953.\nIn re VERONICA C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Veronica C., Appellant).\nOpinion filed September 23, 2010.\nModified upon denial of rehearing November 22, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Steven E. Wiltgen, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.\n. Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John A. Barsanti, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0134-01", "first_page_order": 148, "last_page_order": 165 }