{ "id": 3633065, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIAM E. SARGENT, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sargent", "decision_date": "2010-11-18", "docket_number": "No. 108689", "first_page": "166", "last_page": "195", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "239 Ill. 2d 166" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252176 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4809979 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462052 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615113 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "year": 1856, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5573451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "corroboration rule applied to overturn conviction and sentence involving unlawful penis-to-vagina contact, notwithstanding defendant's confession, where corroborating evidence substantiated only penis-to-anus contact" }, { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57341 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059996 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092982 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29-30" }, { "page": "29-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493967 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-59" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777562 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" }, { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5315332 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146378 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "380-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. App. 3d 904", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4284462 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" }, { "page": "921" }, { "page": "921" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/389/0904-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1581, "char_count": 50822, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.669448404348896e-08, "percentile": 0.5288686714939751 }, "sha256": "4550bb72b9153859d10620022b3fffe5daddb12bc2247effc0e3def23fcda3db", "simhash": "1:8e227c677c1ba177", "word_count": 8465 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:42:29.667104+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIAM E. SARGENT, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of De Kalb County, defendant, William Sargent, was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault involving J.W., his minor stepson. In the same proceeding, he was also convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving J.W\u2019s younger brother, M.G.\nOn appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court committed reversible error when it failed to tender to the jury an instruction governing hearsay evidence as required by section 115 \u2014 10(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(c) (West 2006)). Defendant further asserted that four of his convictions should be reversed on the grounds that the State failed to offer proof of the corpus delicti of the crimes. Finally, defendant claimed that seven-year sentences he received on his aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions should have run concurrently rather than consecutively to the life sentence he received for his predatory criminal sexual assault convictions.\nThe State conceded the sentencing error, and the appellate court modified defendant\u2019s sentence so that his seven-year sentences would run concurrently with his life sentence. In all other respects, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s judgment. 389 Ill. App. 3d 904. We granted defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R 315. For the reasons that follow, we now affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court. We also affirm in part and reverse in part the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nBACKGROUND\nThe record before us shows that in December of 2004, defendant was charged with one count of predatory criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(a)(1) (West 2004)) for allegedly placing a part of his body in the anus of his minor stepson J.W. In a separate proceeding, he was also charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault for allegedly placing his finger in the anus of another minor stepson, M.G. In addition, he was charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 16(c)(l)(i) (West 2004)) for allegedly fondling the penis of M.G. for purposes of his own sexual gratification.\nPrior to trial, the State filed notice, in each case, of its intention to offer hearsay statements from M.G. and J.W. pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2006)), which permits, among other things, the admission of hearsay statements made by victims in cases involving sexual abuse of a child. The specific materials which the State sought to admit were a videotaped interview of M.G. conducted by a worker for the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on November 24, 2004; statements made by J.W to his guardian, a DCFS worker and a police detective in 2004; and separate videotaped interviews which the DCFS worker and the detective conducted with J.W on December 9, 14 and 29 of 2004.\nFollowing an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court determined that the boys\u2019 out-of-court statements were sufficiently reliable to render them admissible. At the same time, the court denied motions filed by defendant pursuant to section 114 \u2014 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 11 (West 2006)) to suppress an inculpatory statement defendant had given during an interview at police headquarters prior to his arrest.\nThe State subsequently filed a motion under section 114 \u2014 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 7 (West 2006)) asking that the two cases be tried together. The motion was granted by the court over defendant\u2019s objection. The court also granted a motion filed by the State under section 115 \u2014 7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7.3 (West 2006)) to permit evidence of defendant\u2019s criminal conduct with respect to each victim to be admitted in connection with both of the now joined prosecutions.\nThe matter ultimately proceeded to trial before a jury in February of 2007. The State\u2019s first witness was M.G. When M.G. was alleged to have been victimized, he was six years old. By the time trial commenced, he was eight.\nOn questioning by the State, M.G. testified that he currently lived with \u201cChad and Mindy.\u201d Mindy is his maternal aunt, Melinda. Chad is Mindy\u2019s husband. M.G. also stated that he had previously lived with Melissa, who \u201cused to be\u201d his mother, and that Melissa was married to a man named Bill. By Bill, M.G. meant defendant, whose first name is William.\nM.G. testified that when he lived with Melissa and Bill, it was in a brick building. The prosecuting attorney asked M.G. whether he remembered Bill \u201cdoing anything to [him] that [he] didn\u2019t like when [he] lived in that brick apartment.\u201d M.G. responded: \u201cI don\u2019t remember.\u201d With this, direct questioning of M.G. ended. He was not cross-examined.\nJoseph Veronda, an Illinois Department of Children and Family Services child protective investigator, was called to the stand next. He testified that he had been asked to interview M.G. in connection with \u201callegations of possible risk of harm to the child that he may have suffered while in the custody of his mother.\u201d During that interview, M.G. had stated that \u201che had a secret.\u201d At the hearing on the pretrial motion to admit the hearsay statements made by M.G. and J.W, Veronda testified that when he asked M.G. what the secret was, M.G. told him that \u201cBill had put his finger in [M.G.\u2019s] butt.\u201d At trial, Veronda recalled M.G. telling him that \u201cBill puts Bill\u2019s finger in [M.G.\u2019s] butt.\u201d\nVeronda later interviewed M.G. regarding the allegations, and the State submitted a video of the interview as evidence. In the video, Veronda asked M.G. to tell him about a secret that M.G. and Bill had. M.G. stated that Bill \u201cthought he put his finger in my butt,\u201d but that Bill \u201cdid not stick his finger in my butt,\u201d and that he had \u201cmade sure that Bill did not touch my butt.\u201d When Veronda asked him if anyone had ever put his finger in M.G.\u2019s butt, he said \u201cNo.\u201d Eventually M.G. wrote on an easel that Bill \u201cFoot his thigr in my but [sic].\u201d M.G. also stated that Bill put his finger in M.G.\u2019s butt and that the incident occurred at their old house, which was brick. Veronda then asked him how many times that had happened, to which he responded verbally and in writing, \u201cI don\u2019t know.\u201d Veronda asked M.G., \u201cDid it happen one time or more than one time?\u201d M.G. responded by writing the numeral one.\nThe video of M.G. was followed by testimony from Melissa Sargent, his biological mother. Melissa related that M.G. was born March 3, 1998. He was eventually adopted by her sister, Melinda, and her sister\u2019s husband, Chad. Melissa further testified that J.W was born January 15, 1992, and now lived with his aunt Robin. Melissa initially stated that both boys stopped living with her in March of 2003, when M.G. had just turned five, but admitted during cross-examination that she was not certain whether it was 2003 or 2004 when the boys went to live with their aunts. After the boys moved out, neither ever returned to live with her.\nAccording to Melissa, she married defendant in April of 2002. She was certain of the year because, she recalled, it was the same year her former husband drowned and her father was shot. Melissa recounted that the couple moved into a brick building in DeKalb in March or June of the same year. The couple lived together there until sometime in 2004. She stated that while she was at work during the day, the boys would be placed in day care or watched by defendant, who worked a night shift. She and defendant are now divorced.\nFollowing Melissa\u2019s testimony, the State called Melissa\u2019s sister Robin, who was serving as J.W.\u2019s guardian. Robin stated that she was employed as the alcohol, drug and early intervention coordinator for De Kalb County Youth Services, where she also conducted therapy for adolescents and their families. She testified that J.W. first began living with her on a permanent basis in March of 2004. After he moved in, he was diagnosed with Asperger\u2019s Syndrome, which she described as an autism spectrum disorder. Because of this condition, he has an extremely difficult time with social situations, does not know how to make friends, and finds it hard to communicate and express his emotions. He does, however, receive good grades in school.\nRobin recalled that in December of 2004, Melissa advised her that defendant had been arrested and was in the county jail for allegedly molesting M.G. and J.W. The same evening she received this news, Robin went for a walk with J.W. and the family\u2019s dog. During the walk, she asked J.W. if he knew what sexual abuse was. He replied that he did not. Robin then explained to him that \u201csexual abuse was when anybody touched him on his penis or his butt with their hands or their mouth or if that person had them touch them in those places.\u201d Robin recalled that J.W got quiet. After 5 or 10 minutes passed, she reassured him that \u201cit was okay to tell the truth because he was safe now and he wasn\u2019t going to be hurt anymore.\u201d J.W. then responded by telling her that defendant had tried to put his penis in J.W\u2019s \u201cbutt\u201d at least once a month, but that he had not touched him in any other way. The next day, Robin spoke with Melissa Garman from the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services about making arrangements for J.W to be interviewed at the Children\u2019s Advocacy Center.\nThe State next called J.W., who was then 15 and a freshman in high school. JW. told the jury that before he had gone to live with Robin, he had resided with his mother, Melissa, and defendant in two different places, first on First Street and then in an apartment on Kimberly Drive. JW stated that while living in the apartment with his mom and defendant, defendant would try to \u201cstick his penis in my butt.\u201d When the prosecuting attorney asked JW if defendant had been successful in doing so, J.W. stated that he had. According to J.W., this happened about once a month beginning when he was in fifth grade, after the family first moved into the Kimberly Drive apartment. The abuse ended when JW moved out to live with relatives.\nOn cross-examination, J.W stated that the abuse took place in a bedroom of the apartment during times when his mother was at home. He testified that his mother was not present in the room during the abuse, that he did not cry out, and that he could not recall whether he had told his mother about the incidents. He did not discuss the abuse with Robin until approximately a year after he moved in with her. He said he was too nervous to mention it earlier and that it all came out after Robin advised him that defendant had confessed.\nThe court next heard testimony from Tracy Mueller, a forensic interviewer for the Children\u2019s Advocacy Center. Mueller explained that forensic interviews are an investigative tool used to obtain information from children in cases of suspected child abuse. They are conducted in a \u201cchild-friendly\u201d environment following a standardized interview process. The interviews are videotaped, with representatives from the local State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, law enforcement, and the Department of Children and Family Services observing from another room.\nMueller stated that she conducted a forensic interview of J.W. in December of 2004. This was not the first time she had met him. She had previously interviewed him in connection with a matter unrelated to the events relevant to this case.\nA video of Mueller\u2019s December 2004 interview was played for the jury and included in the record. During the interview, J.W identified defendant as his stepfather and explained that he had previously lived with defendant. When Mueller asked J.W about defendant, J.W. told her that he would like to put a gun to defendant\u2019s head because defendant had abused him \u201cin a sexual way.\u201d J.W. recalled that during the first incident, defendant \u201ctried to have sex with him.\u201d His mother was not at home at the time, but his little brother, M.G., was.\nJ.W. stated that the abuse continued and that defendant would come into his bedroom and \u201ctr[y] to put his winkie [i.e., penis]\u201d in his butt. J.W. reported that defendant did this approximately once a month. Later in the interview, J.W told the interviewer that, when he said that his stepfather \u201ctried\u201d to abuse him, J.W was expressing what he wished had happened (i.e., that he had merely made the attempt but not been successful). J.W. initially denied that defendant had abused him in other ways and said that defendant had never made J.W. touch defendant\u2019s penis and that defendant had never touched J.W.\u2019s penis. J.W later claimed that defendant had, in fact, touched J.W\u2019s penis and that he had had to touch defendant\u2019s penis. J.W. reported that the incidents occurred in his bedroom. His little brother, M.G., was not involved and he never saw defendant touch M.G.\u2019s penis. He did, however, witness defendant strike M.G. on multiple occasions.\nAs the interview progressed, Mueller again asked J.W whether defendant had ever touched him on his butt using his penis. J.W. answered in the affirmative, stating that this had happened once. In describing the incident, J.W said that defendant removed J.W\u2019s pants, threw his underwear across the room, and put his \u201cprivate\u201d or \u201cwinkie\u201d in J.W\u2019s butt. According to J.W., defendant\u2019s penis touched his butt on the outside. It never touched the inside, but it hurt. J.W. said it was his dream that defendant would be put behind bars.\nDetective Mark Nachman of the DeKalb police department testified next. He stated that he had interviewed J.W. on December 29, 2004, and defendant on December 9, 2004. He recounted the circumstances leading to the interviews. With respect to the interview of defendant, Nachman testified that the morning of December 9, he drove to defendant\u2019s home and asked defendant to come to the police station to speak with him. Nachman then left, and defendant drove himself to the station.\nNachman stated that after an initial conversation with defendant lasting approximately one-half hour, he began the videotaped portion of the interview. Nachman verified the authenticity of that video recording. The recording was then admitted into evidence and played for the jury.\nAt the outset of the video, defendant consented to having the interview recorded, and Nachman explained to him that he was not under arrest. Defendant then told Nachman that he had placed his finger in M.G.\u2019s anus 50 to 70 times within the past year or year and a half, sometimes while wearing a condom on his finger. He said that the incidents usually occurred in the bathroom but that they sometimes happened in M.G.\u2019s bedroom. Defendant said he engaged in this conduct because his wife would not have anal sex with him. He admitted that it stimulated him sexually.\nDefendant told Nachman that there might have been a few times when he touched M.G.\u2019s penis, but that M.G. never touched defendant\u2019s penis. Defendant denied putting his penis in M.G.\u2019s butt. He claimed, however, that he had pushed M.G.\u2019s butt with a stick and put a toy car between the cheeks of M.G.\u2019s buttocks. Defendant also recalled that he caused M.G. to watch him masturbate.\nWith respect to J.W, defendant estimated that he had touched J.W.\u2019s anus with his finger 30 to 40 times, often in the shower, and that he masturbated J.W. 20 times, sometimes to the point of orgasm. Defendant also recalled that J.W. helped defendant masturbate several times. In addition, defendant told Nachman that there were about 20 incidents in which something of a sexual nature happened when J.W., M.G., and defendant were together at the same time. Defendant states that, during those incidents, he sometimes made J.W and M.G. touch each other\u2019s penises. When asked whether Melissa was aware of these activities, defendant responded \u201cmaybe,\u201d but said she never participated. Defendant denied that there was any oral contact between him and the boys, explaining that \u201cthat is going way too far.\u201d\nThe video shows that Nachman left the interview room for a brief period of time. When he returned, he asked defendant about the circumstances of the interview. Defendant stated that everything had been done voluntarily, that he had come to the police station on his own, and that he had understood what Nachman had said to him. After Nachman explained to defendant that he was taking the matter to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and that criminal charges would likely be filed, he gave defendant his telephone number and defendant left.\nWhen the videotape concluded, defendant\u2019s attorney cross-examined Nachman regarding the interviews with J.W and defendant. Nachman explained that the videotape of J.W. was actually the second interview J.W. had given. The initial interview was conducted on December 16, but when the interview ended, Nachman discovered that the recording equipment had not worked properly. Due to the Christmas holidays, they were not able to redo the interview for approximately two weeks. According to Nachman, the second interview was essentially the same as the first.\nWith respect to the December 9 interview of defendant, Nachman was cross-examined as to how and where the interview was conducted. Nachman explained that while the doors outside the interview room were locked, the door to the interview room itself was not locked. Nachman confirmed that he had told defendant \u201cat all times that he was free to leave,\u201d asserted that he would not have arrested defendant if defendant had told him he did not want to continue after their pretaping conversation, and stated that defendant was not, in fact, arrested until the following day.\nAfter Nachman\u2019s testimony and presentation of the videotaped interviews, the State called Jacqueline Weber, M.S., as an expert witness on the subject of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. According to Weber, the syndrome is a \u201crecognized form of post-traumatic stress disorder\u201d that affects \u201cthe typical response pattern of the typical child who has been sexually abused.\u201d Weber explained that children who are abused frequently keep the abuse secret. Most, in fact, will never tell at all. Feelings of helplessness are common. Victims are \u201cbasically entrapped\u201d by their abusers and are forced to \u201caccommodate in or to survive in that environment.\u201d When they do disclose the abuse, the disclosure is often delayed and embellished with unconvincing details, added to permit the child to save face. Weber testified that children who have been abused will also frequently recant their accusations.\nOn cross-examination, Weber clarified that she had never spoken with M.G. or J.W. and that when she gave her testimony, she was \u201conly talking [o]n a generalized basis.\u201d She stated that a diagnosis of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is predicated on the assumption that child abuse occurred and \u201cwas not developed as a means of detecting abuse.\u201d\nWith Weber\u2019s testimony, the State rested its case. Defendant\u2019s attorney moved for a directed verdict. When that motion was denied, defendant elected to testify on his own behalf.\nOn questioning from his attorney, defendant stated that he married Melissa on April 19, 2002, and lived with her and her two sons, M.G. and J.W., in an upstairs apartment on First Street in the City of DeKalb. They remained in the apartment for about six months, when a fire in a downstairs apartment forced them to move. After staying at an apartment temporarily, they moved into a new apartment on Kimberly Drive. Defendant recalled moving in there on the first of June 2003, and remaining there until the following October, when he \u201cgot kicked out for abuse of the kids.\u201d\nDefendant explained that by \u201cabuse of the kids,\u201d he was referring to accusations apparently initiated by his wife that he had been \u201cspanking them and stuff like that.\u201d Defendant testified that when he moved in with Melissa, her preferred form of disciplining the children was striking them with her hands and a belt. He told the jury he had simply adopted the same practices because \u201cat that time we wasn\u2019t married and it\u2019s her household so I was following her rules.\u201d\nAfter being kicked out of the apartment, defendant lived separately for a period of time before reconciling with Melissa. He remained with the family in the apartment on Kimberly Drive until April of 2004, when he split up with Melissa and moved elsewhere. While he was back at the Kimberly apartment, defendant was employed as a stock clerk at a discount store, a position he had held since November of 2002. He worked a night shift from 10 p.m. until 7 a.m. He said that he would return home from work around 7:30 or 8 in the morning and go to bed.\nAccording to defendant, the boys were not normally home during the day on weekdays. They were either at the babysitter\u2019s house or at school. Melissa would pick them up from the babysitter\u2019s on her way home from work. As a result, defendant had little contact with the boys during the day.\nOn weekends, J.W. spent most of his time at his Aunt Robin\u2019s. Defendant and M.G. would watch movies when defendant was not at work. Defendant stated that he did not have a close relationship with J.W, but was more like a dad to M.G. During the interval when he moved out, he had no contact with either child.\nDefendant was then questioned about the interview he had with Detective Nachman on December 9, 2004. Defendant recalled that Nachman appeared at his apartment before 9 a.m., shortly after defendant had returned from his overnight shift at work. Nachman requested that he come to the police department to answer a few questions, and defendant complied. Defendant stated that he had no clue what Nachman wanted to speak to him about, but suspected it might have to do with his spanking the boys. Nachman eventually told him, however, that the interview was related to allegations that something sexual had happened between defendant and M.G.\nDefendant testified that although Nachman told him he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time, he heard the door to the interview room lock when he entered and assumed that he would have to ask for help if he wanted to go back out. Defendant described the room as very tiny. He said he felt very uncomfortable and scared because he did not know what was going on.\nDefendant told the jury that he never placed his finger in M.G.\u2019s anus and that he told Detective Nachman that he had because he was frightened of and intimidated by authority. He said his claim that he had touched M.G. inappropriately 50 to 70 times was something he made up off the top of his head. He fabricated the story because Nachman had told him that \u201cif I would just tell him the truth, whatever, then at the end of the interview I could leave.\u201d He said he was scared of being arrested and was just putting on a show.\nDefendant denied that he ever touched M.G.\u2019s penis or did anything else with M.G. for purposes of sexual gratification. He said M.G. never watched him masturbate and never touched him while he masturbated. He stated that J.W would always ask him for soap or a towel while J.W. was in the shower and he would take those items to him. He denied watching J.W shower, manually stimulating J.W., masturbating in front of J.W., kissing J.W, putting his finger in J.W.\u2019s anus or engaging in any activities with J.W for purposes of sexual gratification. He also said he never watched pornography with the boys.\nThe defense concluded with brief testimony from one of defendant\u2019s siblings. The State then presented rebuttal testimony from Nachman to clarify a point concerning his interview of defendant in 2004. Following closing arguments, the case was submitted to the jury, which found defendant guilty on all counts. The case was then set for sentencing.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the court listened to a victim impact statement written by Robin, J.W.\u2019s aunt and guardian, and heard arguments in aggravation and mitigation by counsel. It then sentenced defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment for the predatory criminal sexual assault convictions pursuant to section 12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) (West 2006)). The trial court also imposed seven-year terms of imprisonment for the two aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions, which were to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to defendant\u2019s sentence of natural life.\nDefendant moved for a new trial, arguing that because of the brevity of its deliberations (under 45 minutes), the jury could not have given adequate consideration to the evidence. Defendant also argued that he was prejudiced by the refusal of jail personnel to permit him to get a haircut and shave prior to trial and by the decision of jailers to transport him to and from jail in a way which may have enabled jurors to see him wearing his orange jail jumpsuit.\nThe circuit court denied defendant\u2019s new trial motion. Defendant then appealed, raising the points noted earlier in this opinion. The State agreed with defendant\u2019s claim that his sentence should be modified, and the appellate court modified the sentence so that the two seven-year aggravated criminal sexual abuse sentences would run concurrently with the sentences for predatory criminal sexual assault. In all other respects, the circuit court\u2019s judgment was affirmed. 389 Ill. App. 3d 904. Defendant then petitioned this court for leave to appeal, which we allowed. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nANALYSIS\nAs grounds for his appeal, defendant first contends, as he did in the appellate court, that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on two of the three counts charging him with predatory criminal sexual assault of M.G. or on either of the two counts charging him with aggravated criminal sexual abuse of M.G. Specifically, defendant argues that the only evidence adduced by the State on those counts consisted of his own, uncorroborated confession (which he repudiated at trial), and that under established Illinois law, a defendant\u2019s confession, standing alone, is not sufficient to prove that a crime occurred.\nUnder the law of Illinois, proof of an offense requires proof of two distinct propositions or facts beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that a crime occurred, i.e., the corpus delicti-, and (2) that the crime was committed by the person charged. People v. Lambert, 104 Ill. 2d 375, 378 (1984), quoting People v. Kirilenko, 1 Ill. 2d 90, 94 (1953). In many cases, and this is one, a defendant\u2019s confession may be integral to proving the corpus delicti. It is well established, however, that proof of the corpus delicti may not rest exclusively on a defendant\u2019s extrajudicial confession, admission, or other statement. People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 446 (1990). Where a defendant\u2019s confession is part of the proof of the corpus delicti, the prosecution must also adduce corroborating evidence independent of the defendant\u2019s own statement. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 503 (1993). If a confession is not corroborated in this way, a conviction based on the confession cannot be sustained. People v. Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d 352, 358-59 (1982).\nThe corroboration requirement stems from an historical mistrust of extrajudicial confessions. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d at 447. Two reasons are commonly advanced for this mistrust: (1) confessions are unreliable if coerced, and (2) for various psychological reasons, persons \u201cconfess\u201d to crimes either that have never occurred or for which they are not legally responsible. People v. Dalton, 91 Ill. 2d 22, 29-30 (1982).\nAlthough the corroboration requirement demands that there be some evidence, independent of the confession, tending to show the crime did occur, that evidence need not, by itself, prove the existence of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defendant\u2019s confession is corroborated, the corroborating evidence may be considered together with the confession to determine whether the crime, and the fact the defendant committed it, have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Phillips, 215 Ill. 2d 554, 576 (2005).\nSome authorities have suggested that the corroboration requirement may be satisfied either by (1) evidence which substantiates that a crime took place or (2) evidence which corroborates material elements of the confession so as to satisfy the court that the confession was not simply a byproduct of the defendant\u2019s imagination. See, e.g., 3 Ill. Jur. Criminal Law & Procedure \u00a719:08 (1999). While acknowledging that this court has, itself, made statements in several cases to the effect that \u201cif there is corroborating evidence that tends to confirm the circumstances related in the confession, both can be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti is sufficiently proved in a given case,\u201d we have specifically held that such statements do \u201cnot obviate the requirement that either some independent evidence or the corroborating evidence tend to establish that a crime occurred.\u201d People v. Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d at 360.\nIn this case, there is no question that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of J.W. The only challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to certain of the charges involving M.G. As described earlier in this opinion, defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of M.G. based on allegations that he had intentionally fondled M.G.\u2019s penis for purposes of his own sexual gratification. Aside from defendant\u2019s confession, however, there was no evidence of any kind to corroborate that defendant had, in fact, ever touched M.G.\u2019s penis for any purpose. The only unlawful contact proven by the non-confession evidence involved defendant\u2019s insertion of his finger into M.G.\u2019s anus.\nThe State contends that evidence of defendant\u2019s penetration of M.G.\u2019s anus with his finger and of J.W\u2019s anus with his penis provides sufficient corroboration that defendant also fondled M.G.\u2019s penis. We note, however, that these were separate acts which gave rise to separate charges. Our precedent demonstrates that under the corroboration rule, the independent corroborating evidence must relate to the specific events on which the prosecution is predicated. Correspondingly, where a defendant confesses to multiple offenses, the corroboration rule requires that there be independent evidence tending to show that defendant committed each of the offenses for which he was convicted. See People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 42-46 (1995).\nSuch proof is lacking here. As we just noted, aside from defendant\u2019s confession, no evidence was adduced which tended to support the charges that defendant fondled M.G.\u2019s penis for purposes of his own sexual gratification. There may be circumstances where criminal activity of one type is so closely related to criminal activity of another type that corroboration of one may suffice to corroborate the other, but such circumstances are not present here. See People v. Richmond, 341 Ill. App. 3d 39, 46 (2003) (corroboration rule applied to overturn conviction and sentence involving unlawful penis-to-vagina contact, notwithstanding defendant\u2019s confession, where corroborating evidence substantiated only penis-to-anus contact). Defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences on the two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of M.G. must therefore be reversed.\nThe corroboration rule is similarly fatal to two of defendant\u2019s three convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault of M.G. During his interview with Detective Nachman, defendant confessed to penetrating M.G.\u2019s anus with his finger 50 to 70 times. At trial, however, defendant repudiated his confession, and M.G., himself, testified that he could not remember whether defendant had done anything to him he did not like.\nThe only corroboration that any anal penetration occurred came from extrajudicial statements made by M.G. to Joseph Veronda, the DCFS investigator. At trial Veronda recalled that M.G. had told him that \u201cBill [i.e., defendant] puts Bill\u2019s finger in [M.G.\u2019s] butt.\u201d The State suggests that the form of the verb \u201cput\u201d used by Veronda, a form which included the letter \u201cs,\u201d tends to confirm that the conduct occurred multiple times. We disagree for several reasons.\nFirst, adding an \u201cs\u201d to a noun makes the noun plural, but adding an \u201cs\u201d to a verb does not make the verb plural. Verbs do not have number. They have tense, mood and voice. See Warriner\u2019s English Grammar and Composition 143-61 (rev. ed. 1965). In this version of the statement recalled by Veronda, \u201cputs\u201d is the present indicative form of the verb. It describes something the subject, Bill, does. It does not tell us how often he does it.\nWhile the present indicative form may be employed to indicate habitual action, imputing such an intention to M.G. would be entirely speculative. M.G., after all, was under the age of seven at the time he allegedly made the statement in question. No special expertise is necessary to appreciate that the language skills of typical children that age are undeveloped and imperfect. Their word choices can be inventive and unorthodox as they struggle to express their thoughts using language tools they do not yet fully grasp. Their understanding of the nuances of English grammar may be many years away. Nothing in the record before us, including the materials M.G. wrote, his testimony at trial or his videotaped interview, suggest his language skills had progressed beyond this basic and formative level.\nSecond, while Veronda used the word \u201cputs\u201d rather than \u201cput\u201d in relating M.G.\u2019s statements, it is not even clear that his word choice was deliberate. We say this because it conflicts with Veronda\u2019s previous testimony in the case. At the pretrial hearing on admissibility of extrajudicial statements made by M.G. and J.W., where Veronda initially related, under oath, what M.G. had told him, Veronda testified that M.G. had said simply that \u201cBill had put his finger in [M.G.\u2019s] butt,\u201d using a form of the word put without an \u201cs.\u201d He further testified that after receiving this response, he asked M.G. again about the matter and that M.G. had repeated that \u201cBill had put his finger in his butt,\u201d again using a form of the word put without an \u201cs.\u201d\nThe statements made by M.G. himself during his videotaped interview, which was presented to the jury, corroborated this version of Veronda\u2019s testimony. As previously described in this opinion, during the course of the interview, M.G. wrote on an easel that Bill \u201cFoot his thigr in my but [sic]\u201d and then stated that \u201cBill put his finger in my butt,\u201d using a form of put without the \u201cs\u201d each time. In addition, when asked by Veronda how many times defendant had put his finger in M.G.\u2019s butt, M.G. responded by writing the numeral one.\nIn light of the foregoing, there can be no doubt that the evidence clearly corroborated that defendant had used his finger to penetrate M.G.\u2019s anus on one occasion. Equally clear, however, is that there was no actual corroboration for defendant\u2019s claim that he had used his finger to penetrate M.G.\u2019s anus more than once. Accordingly, only one of defendant\u2019s three convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault of M.G. may stand. The remaining two convictions must be reversed.\nThe State seeks to avoid this result by arguing that our court should put aside stare decisis considerations and abandon the principle that corroboration of a defendant\u2019s extrajudicial confession is necessary to prove that a criminal offense occurred. We have been invited to abandon the corroboration rule in the past and declined to do so. People v. Dalton, 91 Ill. 2d at 29-30; People v. Lambert, 104 Ill. 2d at 380-81. The rule has been recognized in this state since the mid-nineteenth century. See Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 425, 427-28 (1856). A hundred and fifty years later, our court has continued to apply it. See People v. Phillips, 215 Ill. 2d at 576. The State did not take issue with the validity of the corroboration rule when this case was pending in the appellate court, and it offers no persuasive reasons for why we should break with a century and a half of precedent and jettison the rule today.\nDefendant next argues that the circuit court committed reversible error when it failed to tender to the jury an instruction governing hearsay evidence as required by section 115 \u2014 10(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(c) (West 2006)). That statute provides:\n\u201cIf a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section [governing hearsay exceptions for out-of-court statements made by children or mentally retarded persons who were victims of physical or sexual acts in cases prosecuted under various enumerated statutes], the court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, or the intellectual capabilities of the *** retarded person, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factor.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(c) (West 2006).\nThere is no dispute that the case before us was subject to this provision and that the instruction specified by the statute was not given. The record also shows, however, that defense counsel did not ask the trial court to give such an instruction, nor did defense counsel raise the failure to give such an instruction in defendant\u2019s posttrial motion.\nSupreme Court Rule 366(b) (2) (i) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(b) (2) (i)) expressly provides that \u201c[n]o party may raise on appeal the failure to give an instruction unless the party shall have tendered it.\u201d In addition, our court has held that a defendant will be deemed to have procedurally defaulted his right to obtain review of any supposed jury instruction error if he failed to object to the instruction or offer an alternative at trial and did not raise the issue in a posttrial motion. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007).\nLimited relief from this principle is provided by Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (177 Ill. 2d R. 451(c)), which states that \u201csubstantial defects\u201d in criminal jury instructions \u201care not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interests of justice require.\u201d In our view, however, this exception is inapplicable to the case before us.\nThe purpose of Rule 451(c) is to permit correction of grave errors and errors in cases so factually close that fundamental fairness requires that the jury be properly instructed. The rule is coextensive with the plain-error clause of Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), which provides:\n\u201cAny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.\u201d\nSee People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564.\nThe plain-error doctrine is a familiar one. It permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565.\nAs a matter of convention, our court typically undertakes plain-error analysis by first determining whether error occurred at all. If error is found, the court then proceeds to consider whether either of the two prongs of the plain-error doctrine have been satisfied. Under both prongs, the burden of persuasion rests with the defendant. People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008).\nIn this case, there is no dispute that the jury should have been instructed in accordance with section 115\u2014 10(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(c) (West 2006)) and that sending the case to the jury without such an instruction was a clear and obvious error. The question we must therefore consider is whether either prong of the plain-error test has been satisfied so that we may overlook this procedural default and consider the error on this appeal.\nIn undertaking our analysis, we consider the error only as it pertains to defendant\u2019s conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault involving J.W and one of the three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault for which he was convicted in connection with M.G. That is so because, as we have just concluded, the remaining convictions, for two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and two of the three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault involving M.G., must be reversed. Regardless of instructional error, those convictions, and their corresponding sentences, cannot stand.\nWith respect to the first prong of the plain-error doctrine, namely, whether the evidence was \u201cso closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,\u201d we conclude, as did the appellate court, that the evidence was not closely balanced. Defendant\u2019s confession and the statements made by J.W. and M.G., when taken together, overwhelmingly established defendant\u2019s guilt for one count of predatory criminal sexual assault involving each of the two boys.\nThe second prong of the plain-error doctrine also offers no relief to defendant. The purpose of this prong of the doctrine is to guard against errors that erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial. Unlike the first prong, prejudice need not be established. Rather, because of the importance of the right involved, prejudice is presumed. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005).\nThe function of jury instructions is to convey to the jurors the law that applies to the facts so they can reach a correct conclusion. The erroneous omission of a jury instruction rises to the level of plain error only when the omission creates a serious risk that the jurors incorrectly convicted the defendant because they did not understand the applicable law, so as to severely threaten the fairness of the trial. People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2004). This standard is a difficult one to meet. We have noted, for example, that it is not necessarily plain error to omit the definition of a term used to instruct the jury on the essential issue in the case. Even an incorrect instruction on an element of the offense is not necessarily reversible error. People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d at 10.\nDefendant has failed to persuade us that the absence of the instruction required by section 115 \u2014 10(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115\u2014 10(c) (West 2006)) severely threatened the fairness of his trial. Defendant cites our decision in People v. Mitchell, 155 Ill. 2d 344 (1993), to support his position. In that case we did conclude that the failure to give an instruction pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure constituted plain error. As the appellate court in this case correctly observed, however, we found plain error in Mitchell based on the first prong of the plain-error doctrine. The evidence was closely balanced. See People v. Mitchell, 155 Ill. 2d at 354. We did not hold, directly or indirectly, that plain error would have existed under the doctrine\u2019s second prong had the evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt not been so close. See 389 Ill. App. 3d at 919.\nWe note, moreover, that the jury in this case was not left without direction regarding how it was to approach the victims\u2019 statements. Among the instructions it was given was the following:\n\u201cOnly you are the judges of the believability of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony of each of them. In considering the testimony of any witness you may take into account his ability and opportunity to observe, his age, his memory, his manner while testifying, any interest, bias or prejudice he may have, and the reasonableness of his testimony considered in the light of all the evidence in the case.\u201d\nIt is useful to compare this instruction, which was based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. ,1.02 (4th ed. 2000), with the pattern instruction adopted by the Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases for use where, as here, statements have been admitted under section 115 \u2014 10(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The pattern instruction states, in relevant part:\n\u201cIt is for you to determine [whether the statements were made and, if so,] what weight should be given to the statements. In making that determination, you should consider the age and maturity of [the alleged victim], [and] the nature of the statements, and the circumstances under which the statements were made [, and [insert any other relevant factor concerning the weight and credibility of the statements]].\u201d Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.66 (4th ed. 2000).\nWhile the language in these two instructions differs, they convey similar principles regarding the jury\u2019s role in assessing witness credibility and the various criteria jurors may consider when making that assessment. Under similar circumstances, where instructions based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02, have been given to the jury, our appellate court has held that the failure to also tender an instruction based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.66, was actually harmless and not even subject to the plain-error rule. See People v. Booker, 224 Ill. App. 3d 542, 556 (1992); People v. Richmond, 341 Ill. App. 3d 39, 50 (2003).\nDicta in our decision in People v. Mitchell, 155 Ill. 2d at 354-55, can be read to suggest that instructions similar to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02, may not be sufficient if they do not specifically reference \u201cthe weight and credibility to be given the child\u2019s statement or *** the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, or the circumstances under which the statement was made.\u201d In expressing our views in that case, however, we were concerned not merely by the failure to tender an instruction that followed Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.66, but also by the more fundamental failure of the trial court to conduct a hearing, as mandated by section 115 \u2014 10(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, to determine that the time, content, and circumstances of the victim\u2019s statement provided sufficient safeguards of reliability.\nThat circumstance is not present here. A hearing was conducted pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, before the jury was allowed to hear and see the victims\u2019 extrajudicial hearsay statements. In addition, as the appellate court here correctly pointed out, the jury in this case was specifically instructed to take into account the witnesses\u2019 ages. Moreover, the directive for the jury to take into account the nature of the statement, or the circumstances under which the statement was made, seems implicit in the instruction it did receive \u201cto take into account [the witnesses\u2019] ability and opportunity to observe *** and the reasonableness of his testimony considered in the light of all the evidence in the case.\u201d See 389 Ill. App. 3d at 921. We also agree with the appellate court that while the jury was not specifically instructed on the victims\u2019 videotaped statements, which were not technically testimony,\n\u201cthe statements were played for the jury during the testimonial portion of the trial (and as part of the testimony of the interviewers to whom the boys made the statements), and they had the same effect \u2014 allowing the jury to hear the [victims\u2019] accusations in their own words \u2014 as testimonial evidence.\u201d 389 Ill. App. 3d at 921.\nUnder these circumstances, it seems highly likely that the jury understood that the victims\u2019 videotaped statements fell within the terms of the instruction it received based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02.\nIn reaching this conclusion, we do not mean to suggest that courts have the discretion to tender instructions based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02, rather than Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.66, in cases where hearsay statements have been admitted pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 2006)) and defendant requests that the jury be instructed in the manner required by that statute. We hold simply that, under the facts of this case, the court\u2019s failure to instruct the jury as set forth in section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 did not constitute plain error.\nCONCLUSION\nDefendant was properly convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of J.W. and one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of M.G. No basis exists for disturbing the sentence of natural life imprisonment he received for those convictions pursuant to section 12\u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1(b)(1.2) (West 2006)). Defendant\u2019s convictions on the remaining charges against him cannot be sustained under the corroboration rule, which remains the law of Illinois. Those convictions and the corresponding sentences imposed for those convictions are therefore reversed.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the appellate court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.\nAppellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn and Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defenders, and Deborah K. Pugh, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Robert G. Matekaitis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Sycamore (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Sheri L. Wong, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 108689.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. WILLIAM E. SARGENT, Appellant.\nOpinion filed November 18, 2010.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn and Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defenders, and Deborah K. Pugh, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Robert G. Matekaitis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Sycamore (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Sheri L. Wong, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0166-01", "first_page_order": 180, "last_page_order": 209 }