{ "id": 3633171, "name": "In re LUIS R., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Luis R., Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Luis R.", "decision_date": "2010-12-23", "docket_number": "No. 108403", "first_page": "295", "last_page": "313", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "239 Ill. 2d 295" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799381 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he courts of Illinois do not issue advisory opinions to guide future litigation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073696 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3629533 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Garman, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/237/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434426 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577569 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "334-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619394 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3630496 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/238/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4282985 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732-33" }, { "page": "733" }, { "page": "738-39" }, { "page": "737-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/388/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. B.J. 8", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ill. B.J.", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477007 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578273 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725364 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415-17" }, { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604578 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619394 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas and Burke, JJ." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J." } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1044, "char_count": 32829, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0907994405837013e-07, "percentile": 0.5655814296509178 }, "sha256": "6d59f568cb038898c3986a327e093aa2bf4e27a17b80cd54c30c9a889699cfa0", "simhash": "1:8fadfdd902c6c075", "word_count": 5257 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:42:29.667104+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re LUIS R., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Luis R., Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Kilbride and Justices Garman, Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.\nJustice Burke dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Freeman.\nOPINION\nThe State filed a petition in the circuit court of Boone County alleging that respondent, Luis R., was a delinquent minor. The trial court dismissed that petition for a lack of jurisdiction. The issue before us is whether that dismissal was warranted. For the reasons that follow, we hold that it was not.\nBACKGROUND\nOn August 8, 2007, the State filed a petition in the circuit court of Boone County alleging that respondent was a delinquent minor and seeking to make him a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 520(2) (West 2008). The petition charged two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, arising from conduct that occurred \u201con or about June through August of 2000.\u201d Respondent immediately moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that, because he was now 21 years old, the trial court was \u201cwithout jurisdiction over [his] person.\u201d The State, in turn, moved to prosecute respondent under the criminal laws (see 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(3) (West 2008)) and, in a separate motion, asked the trial court to designate the proceedings as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution (see 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 810 (West 2008)). Without ruling on either of the State\u2019s motions, the trial court granted respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nThe State appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. 388 Ill. App. 3d 730. In so doing, the court began by examining section 5\u2014120 of the Juvenile Court Act, which states in relevant part:\n\u201cExclusive jurisdiction. Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning any minor who prior to the minor\u2019s 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate *** any federal or State law or municipal or county ordinance ***. *** Except as provided in [certain other sections of the Act], no minor who was under 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 120 (West 2008).\nThe court then noted that, under section 5 \u2014 105(10) of the Act, a \u201cminor\u201d is defined as \u201ca person under the age of 21 years subject to this Act.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 105(10) (West 2008). Thus, according to the plain language of the Act, the State may institute proceedings under the Act only against persons who (1) are under the age of 21 and (2) prior to turning 17, violated or attempted to violate the law. Here, although the State\u2019s petition alleged that respondent was younger than 17 when he committed the alleged crimes, respondent was no longer \u201cunder the age of 21\u201d at the time that petition was filed. Accordingly, the appellate court held that, \u201cread literally,\u201d section 5 \u2014 120 \u201cdoes not authorize the State to institute proceedings [against respondent] under the Act, even though respondent was under 17 years of age when he allegedly committed the crime.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) 388 Ill. App. 3d at 732-33. From there, the appellate court went on \u201cto consider whether there are any grounds for departing from the literal interpretation\u201d of the Act. 388 Ill. App. 3d at 733. Concluding that there were not, the appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the State\u2019s petition for lack of jurisdiction. 388 Ill. App. 3d at 738-39.\nWe allowed the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.\nANALYSIS\nThe issue before us is whether the trial court properly granted respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss the State\u2019s delinquency petition for lack of jurisdiction. The absence or presence of jurisdiction is a purely legal question, and our review therefore is de novo. In re Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 39 (2010).\nAt the outset, we note that there is some confusion in the record as to the exact basis for the trial court\u2019s decision to grant respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss. More precisely, it is not clear whether the trial court\u2019s decision was based upon a perceived lack of personal jurisdiction, or a perceived lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. On the one hand, the motion that respondent filed in the circuit court asserts that dismissal is warranted because the trial court \u201cis without jurisdiction over [respondent\u2019s person].\u201d Similarly, the trial court\u2019s written order granting that motion explicitly states that the basis for the trial court\u2019s ruling is that it \u201clacks jurisdiction over [respondent].\u201d This phrasing clearly indicates both that respondent was requesting and that the trial court was granting a dismissal based on the lack of personal jurisdiction, not on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On the other hand, the trial court concluded the hearing on respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss with the following oral pronouncement:\n\u201cI\u2019m just ruling that there is no jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court Act for this proceeding, and the motion is heard and granted.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn this context, the trial court\u2019s use of the word \u201cproceeding\u201d suggests that the trial court was concerned more with its subject matter jurisdiction than with its jurisdiction over respondent\u2019s person. Likewise, in this court, the parties have briefed and argued this case strictly in terms of the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction and have not raised any arguments either contesting or defending the court\u2019s jurisdiction over respondent\u2019s person. So from those standpoints, this appears to be a subject matter jurisdiction case. Given this confusion, and because it ultimately makes no difference to our disposition, we will address both questions \u2014 that is, whether the trial court had jurisdiction over respondent\u2019s person, and whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter.\nSubject Matter Jurisdiction\nWe begin with the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction. This court defines \u201csubject matter jurisdiction\u201d as a court\u2019s power \u201c \u2018to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.\u2019 \u201d In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 415 (2009), quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). With only one exception that is not relevant here, \u201c \u2018a circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution.\u2019 \u201d M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 424, quoting Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334. The relevant constitutional provision is section 9 of article VI, which states:\n\u201cCircuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office. Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a79.\nThus, except in the context of administrative review, an Illinois circuit court possesses subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law over all \u201cjusticiable matters\u201d brought before it. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 424.\nGenerally speaking, a \u201cjusticiable matter\u201d is \u201ca controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335. To invoke a circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction, a petition or complaint need only \u201calleg[e] the existence of a justiciable matter.\u201d M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426. Indeed, even a defectively stated claim is sufficient to invoke the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction, as \u201c[s]ubject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal sufficiency of the pleadings.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 340. In other words, the only consideration is whether the alleged claim falls within the general class of cases that the court has the inherent power to hear and determine. If it does, then subject matter jurisdiction is present.\nIn Belleville Toyota, for example, the issue was whether compliance with the statutory limitations period is a jurisdictional prerequisite to asserting a claim under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 333. The defendants in that case argued that, because the plaintiffs cause of action was purely statutory in origin, the circuit court\u2019s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction was conditioned upon the plaintiff\u2019s demonstrated complianee with all statutory conditions, including the limitations period. We rejected this argument, explaining that a circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction is defined not by the authorizing statute but by the state constitution, and therefore the only prerequisite to the court\u2019s exercise of that jurisdiction is that the asserted claim is \u201cjusticiable.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334-35. Moreover, we explained, even if it does so defectively, so long as the plaintiffs complaint alleges the existence of a justiciable matter, the trial court possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate that complaint, as \u201c[sjubject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal sufficiency of the pleadings.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 340. Therefore, we concluded, whether or not the plaintiff was in actual compliance with the statutory limitations period, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction \u201cto hear and determine plaintiff\u2019s claim because it was among the general class of cases \u2014 those presenting a claim under the [Motor Vehicle Franchise] Act, a justiciable matter \u2014 to which the court\u2019s constitutionally granted original jurisdiction extends.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 340.\nThe question in this case, then, is whether the State\u2019s delinquency petition alleges the existence of a justiciable matter to which the circuit court\u2019s constitutionally granted original jurisdiction extends. Clearly, it does. The State\u2019s petition asserts a claim under section 5\u2014520 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014520 (West 2008)). That section specifically authorizes the State to file in the circuit court petitions alleging that the respondent is a delinquent minor and praying that the minor be adjudged a ward of the court. The State\u2019s petition does this and it does so definitely and concretely, setting forth respondent\u2019s alleged offenses with detail and specifically requesting that respondent be adjudged a ward of the court. On its face, then, the State\u2019s petition alleges the existence of a justiciable matter, which is the only prerequisite to the trial court\u2019s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, to the extent that it was based upon a perceived lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the State\u2019s petition was in error.\nNow, in reaching this result, we recognize that there is a potentially fatal pleading defect in the delinquency petition that the State filed in this case. Even if that turns out to be the case, however, the trial court possessed the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that petition. This is because, and we wish to make this very clear, subject matter jurisdiction has nothing to do with the legal sufficiency of the asserted claim. Rather, the only consideration is whether the asserted claim, legally sufficient or not, was filed in the proper tribunal. If it was, subject matter jurisdiction is present, whether or not the claim is legally defective. The present case provides a perfect illustration of this principle. Respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss did not assert that Illinois circuit courts lack the inherent authority to adjudicate delinquency petitions, or that the State\u2019s petition should have been filed in a different tribunal, such as the Illinois Human Rights Commission or the Court of Claims. Such a motion would have been patently frivolous, as the circuit court\u2019s authority to adjudicate delinquency petitions is beyond dispute. Rather, respondent\u2019s motion asserted that this particular delinquency petition is legally defective in that respondent falls outside the class of persons against whom such petitions may lawfully be filed. While respondent may very well be correct, the fact remains that someone has to decide that question in the first instance. And the tribunal with the authority to make that decision is the tribunal with subject matter jurisdiction. Here, that tribunal is the circuit court.\nAdmittedly, the relevant statutory language is not helpful, as the inclusion of the phrase \u201cexclusive jurisdiction\u201d in section 5 \u2014 120\u2019s title creates the impression that section 5 \u2014 120 somehow grants authority to the circuit court to adjudicate juvenile delinquency petitions, and that the limitations contained within that section are therefore limitations on the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction. But as we already have seen, once the legislature creates a justiciable matter, the circuit court\u2019s authority to adjudicate that matter derives exclusively from the state constitution and therefore cannot be limited by the authorizing statute. Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334-35. That said, section 5\u2014120\u2019s title is misleading, as that section is not in fact a grant of authority to the circuit court. Rather, section 5\u2014120 is a grant of authority to the State, specifically defining the class of persons against whom the State may lawfully initiate juvenile delinquency petitions:\n\u201cProceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning any minor who prior to the minor\u2019s 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate *** any federal, State, county or municipal law ***.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 120 (West 2008).\nOf course, that the legislature restricts the class of persons against whom the State may initiate juvenile delinquency proceedings is no guarantee that the State will always abide by those restrictions. This is where the circuit court, and its inherent authority to adjudicate \u201call justiciable matters,\u201d comes in. By initiating juvenile delinquency proceedings \u2014 that is, by filing a petition alleging that the respondent is a delinquent minor and praying that the respondent be made a ward of the court \u2014 the State is alleging the existence of justiciable matter. At this point, the circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction is triggered, and it possesses all authority to adjudicate the merits of the State\u2019s claim, including whether that claim falls outside the grant of authority conferred in section 5 \u2014 120. That is effectively what the trial court was asked to do here, and it undeniably possessed the authority to do so.\nFor these reasons, we hold that the circuit court below possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the State\u2019s delinquency petition. Its dismissal of that petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was therefore erroneous.\nPersonal Jurisdiction\nWe now consider whether the circuit court possessed jurisdiction over respondent\u2019s person. Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which is invoked by the filing of a petition or complaint alleging the existence of a justiciable matter, personal jurisdiction is \u201c \u2018derived from the actions of the person sought to be bound.\u2019 \u201d M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426, quoting Meldoc Properties v. Prezell, 158 Ill. App. 3d 212, 216 (1987). Thus, a petitioner or plaintiff submits to the jurisdiction of the court by filing a petition or complaint, \u201c \u2018thereby seeking to be bound to the court\u2019s resolution\u2019 \u201d thereof. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426, quoting Owens v. Snyder, 349 Ill. App. 3d 35, 40 (2004). A respondent or defendant, by contrast, either has personal jurisdiction imposed upon him by the effective service of summons, or consents to personal jurisdiction by his appearance. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426; see also 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014525(4) (West 2008) (\u201c[t]he appearance of *** a person named as a respondent in a petition, in any proceeding under this Act shall constitute a waiver of service and submission to the jurisdiction of the court\u201d).\nHere, there is no question that the circuit court had jurisdiction over respondent\u2019s person. Although the initial summons issued to respondent was returned unserved, respondent nevertheless consented to the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction over his person on August 17, 2007, when his counsel filed a general appearance in this cause on his behalf. See M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 427-28; 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 525(4) (West 2008). Thus, to the extent that the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the State\u2019s delinquency petition was premised on the lack of jurisdiction over respondent\u2019s person, it likewise was in error.\nRemaining Issues\nAlthough it attempts to frame them in the context of the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction, the State raises two additional issues that extend beyond the pure jurisdictional questions discussed above. These issues are (1) whether the trial court should have granted the State\u2019s motion to transfer the proceedings to the criminal division for criminal prosecution; and (2) whether the State may prosecute respondent under the criminal law for offenses he allegedly committed as a minor. We decline to address these issues.\nIt is well settled that Illinois courts \u201c \u2018cannot pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events.\u2019 \u201d Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 266 (2010) (Karmeier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Garman, J.), quoting Stokes v. Pekin Insurance Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 278, 281 (1998). Yet this is exactly what the State is asking us to do here. Because it granted respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss, the circuit court never ruled upon the State\u2019s transfer motion. That motion therefore remains pending, and presumably the circuit court will take it up on remand. As it stands, there is simply nothing for this court to review on this question. As for the State\u2019s authority to prosecute respondent under the criminal law, the State has not yet filed any criminal charges against respondent, and for all this court knows it may never do so. Consequently, the State\u2019s request for a ruling on this question is nothing more than a solicitation of legal advice on how to proceed, something this court emphatically does not dispense. For these reasons, we decline to address the additional issues raised by the State.\nCONCLUSION\nThere is no question that the circuit court below possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter and over respondent\u2019s person, and the circuit court therefore erred in granting respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.\nJudgments reversed; cause remanded.\nThis portion of the appellate court\u2019s analysis includes an examination of whether respondent\u2019s age at the time of the alleged offenses insulates him from criminal prosecution for those crimes. 388 Ill. App. 3d at 737-38. Although the appellate court ultimately did not express an opinion on this question, the entire discussion was advisory and should have not been included in the court\u2019s disposition. See Golden Rule Insurance Co. v. Schwartz, 203 Ill. 2d 456, 469 (2003) (\u201c[t]he courts of Illinois do not issue advisory opinions to guide future litigation\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" }, { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN,\ndissenting:\nThe issue in this case is a relatively simple one. May a circuit court entertain a petition of juvenile delinquency when the subject of the petition is 21 years of age? The answer is simple: the court may not. For that reason, the circuit court correctly dismissed the delinquency petition filed in this case, and the appellate court\u2019s judgment should be affirmed. Instead of recognizing that the circuit court is powerless to grant the relief requested in the petition, i.e., the adjudication of the respondent as a delinquent and a ward of the court, the court instead insists on sending the case back to the circuit court \u201cfor further proceedings consistent with this decision.\u201d 239 Ill. 2d at 307. What further proceedings can occur, given the facts, is anybody\u2019s guess. I, therefore, write separately to set forth my views on why the State can no longer obtain relief from the circuit court on its petition for delinquency.\nArticle V of the Juvenile Court Act, which addresses delinquent minors, creates a special procedural and substantive enclave for minors accused of criminal acts. Not only is the purpose of this article to \u201c \u2018dealt 1 with the problem of juvenile delinquency\u2019 \u201d (In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d 526, 534 (2006), quoting 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 101(1) (West 1998)), but its \u201coverriding purpose\u201d is to \u201cdeal with delinquency in those \u2018under the age of 21.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d at 534, quoting 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 101(10) (West 1998).\nAccording to article V, a delinquent minor \u201cmeans any minor who prior to his or her 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal or State law, county or municipal ordinance.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 105(3) (West 2008). A minor is defined as a \u201cperson under the age of 21 years.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 105(10) (West 2008). In furtherance of its purpose, under article Y, a minor is to be accorded preferential and protective treatment not available to adults accused of committing crimes. For example, special obligations not applicable in adult criminal proceedings are imposed on the arresting officer (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 405 (West 2008)), pretrial judge (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 501 (West 2008)), the State\u2019s Attorney (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 415(2) (West 2008)), and trial judge (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 601 (West 2008)). The ultimate result of these special procedures differs, in substantial ways, from that of an adult criminal proceeding. Indeed, a successful prosecution under article V results not in a conviction of a crime, but rather in an adjudication of delinquency. Although a juvenile adjudged delinquent may be placed in detention, the detention cannot go beyond the attainment of the age of 21. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 750(3) (West 2008). Finally, by statute, all proceedings under the Act \u201cautomatically terminate upon [respondent\u2019s] attaining the age of 21 years.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 755(1) (West 2008).\nAccordingly, by definition, persons over the age of 21 are not entitled to the protections of the Act. There is no dispute in this case that defendant here was over 21 when the proceedings were instituted. The Act by its own language does not apply to him. More importantly, the circuit court could no longer enter a judgment of delinquency against him. By virtue of the State\u2019s delay, defendant has outgrown his status as a juvenile and the purposes and benefits of the Act. The circuit court does not have the authority to adjudicate the matter of respondent\u2019s delinquency. As such, the circuit court correctly dismissed the State\u2019s petition.\nRather than apply the statutory provisions, the court gets distracted by arguments regarding subject matter and personal jurisdiction, concepts that have nothing to do with the real issue: whether the circuit court has the authority under article V of the Juvenile Court Act to adjudicate a petition of delinquency filed against a 21-year-old. There is no question that the legislature made the adjudication of a minor\u2019s delinquency a \u201cjusticiable matter\u201d as that term is used in section 9 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution. In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 415-17 (2001); In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 444 (2009) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas and Burke, JJ.). The problem though remains that, because the respondent is 21 years old, the Act no longer applies to him, which renders the circuit court unable to grant relief under the Act. See In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 416; see also People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 564 (2003) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.). A court cannot enter a judgment unauthorized by law. People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill. 2d 552 (2002); People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). There was no action the circuit court could have taken in this case but to dismiss, again not for lack of jurisdiction, but more appropriately due to an inability to exercise jurisdiction given the parameters of the statute in question. See H. Fins, Re-Examination of \u201cJurisdiction\u201d in Light of New Illinois Judicial Article, 53 Ill. B.J. 8 (1964). Because this court can affirm for any reason apparent in the record, the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed.\nJUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN," }, { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE,\ndissenting:\nI cannot join the majority because it assigns to the circuit court a \u201cconfusion\u201d about jurisdiction that does not exist. The only confusion in this case is created by the majority, which chooses to interpret the circuit court\u2019s use of the term \u201cjurisdiction\u201d one way, while adopting a different interpretation of the term \u201cjurisdiction\u201d when that term is used by respondent and the legislature. I would interpret the term consistently. Doing so leads to the conclusion that the circuit court was correct when it dismissed the delinquency petition filed in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nOn August 8, 2007, the State filed a delinquency petition against respondent Luis R., charging him with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault allegedly committed between June and August of 2000. Because of the gap in time between the commission of the crimes and the filing of the petition, respondent, who had been a minor when the charged acts occurred, had reached the age of 21. Accordingly, Luis R. sought dismissal of the petition, arguing that the court did not have \u201cjurisdiction\u201d over him.\nThe circuit court granted respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss. In its order dismissing the State\u2019s delinquency petition, the circuit court agreed with respondent, indicating that the court \u201clacks jurisdiction over [respondent].\u201d In its oral pronouncements at the hearing on the motion, the court said, \u201cI\u2019m just ruling that there is no jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court Act for this proceeding.\u201d From these two statements, the majority concludes that the circuit court was \u201cconfused\u201d on the matter of jurisdiction. The majority then launches into a discussion on the constitutionally derived nature of a circuit court\u2019s subject-matter jurisdiction, reiterating what Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), made clear \u2014 that amendments to the judicial article of the 1870 constitution, enacted in 1964 and retained in our current article VI, section 9, created a single integrated court system with a unified circuit court which enjoys \u201c \u2018original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.\u2019 \u201d Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 337, quoting Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, \u00a79 (amended 1964). After this discussion, the majority then reaches the rather unremarkable determination that the circuit court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. What I find puzzling is why the majority finds it necessary to engage in this discussion.\nAs noted above, after the State filed its delinquency petition against respondent in the circuit court, respondent moved to have the petition dismissed, arguing that the circuit court had no jurisdiction over him. Interpreting respondent\u2019s use of the term \u201cjurisdiction,\u201d the majority does not conclude that respondent was contending that the circuit court lacked article VI jurisdiction. Rather, the majority states:\n\u201cRespondent\u2019s motion to dismiss did not assert that Illinois circuit courts lack the inherent authority to adjudicate delinquency petitions, or that the State\u2019s petition should have been filed in a different tribunal, such as the Illinois Human Rights Commission or the Court of Claims. Such a motion would have been patently frivolous, as the circuit court\u2019s authority to adjudicate delinquency petitions is beyond dispute. Rather, respondent\u2019s motion asserted that this particular delinquency petition is legally defective in that respondent falls outside the class of persons against whom such petitions may lawfully be filed.\u201d 239 Ill. 2d at 303.\nThe majority also discusses the statute, section 5 \u2014 120 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, which the circuit court applied in reaching its decision to grant dismissal. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 120 (West 2008). The majority notes that section 5\u2014120 of the Act is entitled \u201cexclusive jurisdiction,\u201d and finds this use of the term jurisdiction \u201cnot helpful.\u201d 239 Ill. 2d at 304. However, the majority again rejects the notion that the term \u201cjurisdiction,\u201d as used in this section, was intended to limit the scope of the court\u2019s authority in the article VI sense. Rather, harkening back to its earlier discussion of Belleville Toyota and article VI, the majority finds that section 5\u2014120 is simply \u201cmisleading, as that section is not in fact a grant of authority to the circuit court. Rather, section 5 \u2014 120 is a grant of authority to the State, specifically defining the class of persons against whom the State may lawfully initiate juvenile delinquency petitions.\u201d (Emphases in original.) 239 Ill. 2d at 304.\nIf the majority can interpret the term \u201cjurisdiction\u201d as used by respondent and by our legislature in such a way that does not offend our constitution, why should a different interpretation be assigned to the circuit court\u2019s ruling? Isn\u2019t it likely that the court, which is presumed to know the law, was not asserting \u201cthat Illinois circuit courts lack the inherent authority to adjudicate delinquency petitions, or that the State\u2019s petition should have been filed in a different tribunal\u201d? And isn\u2019t it more likely that when the circuit court ruled that it did not have \u201cjurisdiction\u201d it meant, like the respondent, that the petition was \u201clegally defective in that respondent falls outside the class of persons against whom such petitions may lawfully be filed\u201d?\nBy selectively assigning different meanings to the term \u201cjurisdiction,\u201d the majority blinds itself to the actual rationale behind the circuit court\u2019s order. When the circuit court granted respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss and said it lacked \u201cjurisdiction,\u201d it did not mean that, as a circuit court, it lacked authority to enter a ruling. Rather, just like respondent and section 5 \u2014 120 of the Act, the circuit court meant that the petition was legally defective. The correctness of that ruling is the issue that should be addressed. Instead, the majority concludes that the circuit court has article VI jurisdiction \u2014 a matter that no one actually disputes \u2014 and remands this matter to the circuit court for unspecified \u201cfurther proceedings,\u201d wasting the time and money of the State, as well as precious judicial resources. I can see no purpose to such a course of action.\nIn my view, the appellate court judgment should be affirmed. As Chief Justice Miller stated in his concurrence in In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.),\n\u201cThat a circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction over a certain matter is conferred by the constitution rather than by the legislature does not mean, however, that a court is free to act in ways inconsistent with controlling statutory law ***. Clearly, the constitutional source of a circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to disregard the language of a statute.\u201d\nThe circuit court properly dismissed the State\u2019s juvenile delinquency petition against respondent. To have done otherwise would have been \u201cinconsistent with controlling statutory law.\u201d The fact that the circuit court used the term \u201cjurisdiction\u201d \u2014 the same term used by respondent and the legislature \u2014 in its ruling should not distract us from the reality that dismissal of the petition was proper.\nJUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.\nThe majority also determines that the circuit court possessed personal jurisdiction over respondent, an issue that the parties do not dispute.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michelle Courier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Stephen M. Soltanzadeh, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer and Cynthia N. Schneider, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael W. Raridon, of Rockford, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 108403.\nIn re LUIS R., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Luis R., Appellee).\nOpinion filed December 23, 2010.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michelle Courier, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Stephen M. Soltanzadeh, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer and Cynthia N. Schneider, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael W. Raridon, of Rockford, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0295-01", "first_page_order": 309, "last_page_order": 327 }