{ "id": 3633212, "name": "HELEN ULDRYCH, Indiv. and as Special Adm'r of the Estate of Rudolph Uldrych, Deceased, v. VHS OF ILLINOIS, INC., d/b/a MacNeal Hospital, Appellant (Christopher D. Joyce et al., Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "Uldrych v. VHS of Illinois, Inc.", "decision_date": "2011-01-21", "docket_number": "No. 110170", "first_page": "532", "last_page": "548", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "239 Ill. 2d 532" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602236 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777551 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602061 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820635 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2606657 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604629 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610828 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450970 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3597890 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3615002 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "473-74" }, { "page": "466-67" }, { "page": "466-67" }, { "page": "473-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/229/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 Ill. App. 3d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4295533 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696-700" }, { "page": "700-01" }, { "page": "699-700" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/398/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5211602 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "516-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255119 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460-61" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458-59" }, { "page": "458-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0450-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 937, "char_count": 28961, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.770496540649735e-08, "percentile": 0.4093866090262405 }, "sha256": "439ea9b1ffb8381d9622126e999ba6f6b221dc5d394308519f3eeae1d1cd0471", "simhash": "1:14bb3736cd60d8f5", "word_count": 4571 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:42:29.667104+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HELEN ULDRYCH, Indiv. and as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Rudolph Uldrych, Deceased, v. VHS OF ILLINOIS, INC., d/b/a MacNeal Hospital, Appellant (Christopher D. Joyce et al., Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustice Theis took no part in the decision.\nOPINION\nIn this appeal, the parties, who were all named as defendants in an underlying medical malpractice action, argue over the proper statute of repose to be applied to the defendant hospital\u2019s implied indemnity claim against the defendant doctors and their employer. In accord with the determinations made by the circuit and appellate courts, we hold that section 13 \u2014 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(a) (West 2002) (medical malpractice statute of repose)) applies to the hospital\u2019s implied indemnity claim and, consequently, the claim was untimely filed. We set forth hereafter only those facts necessary to provide a framework for our disposition.\nBACKGROUND\nOn February 10, 2003, Rudolph Uldrych underwent gastric bypass surgery at MacNeal Hospital. In February of 2005, Rudolph and his wife, Helen, timely filed a medical malpractice action against, inter alia, the physicians who performed the surgery \u2014 Drs. Christopher Joyce and Jeffrey Zawacki \u2014 and the physicians\u2019 alleged employers \u2014 Suburban Surgical Associates, Ltd., and MacNeal Hospital. Rudolph subsequently died, and Helen was appointed special administrator of his estate. On August 26, 2005, Helen filed, in the circuit court of Cook County, a second-amended complaint setting forth claims for survival and wrongful death. In that four-count complaint, plaintiff alleged, in counts I and III, that Drs. Joyce and Zawacki were negligent in creating and/or failing to diagnose Rudolph\u2019s misconstructed bowel segment. Those counts further alleged that Suburban Surgical was one of the physicians\u2019 employers and, therefore, vicariously liable. Counts II and IV alleged that Drs. Joyce and Zawacki were MacNeal Hospital\u2019s actual or apparent agents and that MacNeal Hospital was vicariously liable for the physicians\u2019 negligent acts and omissions.\nOn August 27, 2008, VHS of Illinois, Inc., d/b/a MacNeal Hospital, filed a counterclaim against Joyce, Zawacki, and Suburban Surgical. In its counterclaim, MacNeal alleged that it had agreed to pay $1 million to settle the underlying malpractice action, and it sought indemnification.\nOn September 19, 2008, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the underlying medical malpractice action pursuant to a settlement; however, the order specifically stated that MacNeal Hospital\u2019s counterclaim would remain pending. On that same day, MacNeal Hospital filed an amended counterclaim, alleging that Drs. Joyce and Zawacki were the actual employees or agents of Suburban Surgical at the time the gastric bypass surgery was performed. The amended counterclaim further alleged that Dr. Joyce, Dr. Zawacki, and Suburban Surgical owed MacNeal Hospital an implied, quasi-contractual obligation for indemnification based on the assertions contained in the second-amended complaint that Drs. Joyce and Zawacki were the actual or apparent agents of MacNeal Hospital. The amended counterclaim again sought indemnification for the $1 million that MacNeal Hospital had agreed to pay to settle the underlying action.\nIn response, Joyce, Zawacki, and Suburban Surgical filed section 2 \u2014 619 motions to dismiss MacNeal\u2019s amended counterclaim, arguing that the four-year limitation period of the medical malpractice statute of repose (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(a) (West 2002)) applied to MacNeal\u2019s counterclaim for implied indemnification and that the counterclaim was not timely filed within the applicable four-year period. On November 7, 2008, the court granted the motions and dismissed the counterclaim as time-barred pursuant to section 13 \u2014 212(a).\nThe appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that section 13\u2014212(a) applied, and citing, as supporting authority, this court\u2019s opinion in Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450 (1990), and the appellate court\u2019s decision in Ashley v. Evangelical Hospitals Corp., 230 Ill. App. 3d 513 (1992). 398 Ill. App. 3d 696, 696-700. In so holding, the appellate court distinguished this court\u2019s decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bowman, 229 Ill. 2d 461 (2008). 398 Ill. App. 3d at 700-01.\nAs the appellate court noted, this court, in Hayes, held that third-party actions for contribution are subject to the four-year statute of repose set forth in section 13\u2014212(a). 398 Ill. App. 3d at 699 (citing Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 460-61). As the appellate court observed, in Hayes, this court discussed the \u201cperceived medical malpractice insurance crisis\u201d that prompted enactment of the medical malpractice statute of repose and concluded, \u201c \u2018[bjecause a suit for contribution against an insured for damages arising out of patient care exposes insurance companies to the same liability as if the patient were to have brought a direct action against the insured, we believe that the term \u201cor otherwise\u201d in the medical malpractice statute of repose includes actions for contribution against a physician for injuries arising out of patient care.\u2019 \u201d 398 Ill. App. 3d at 699-700 (quoting Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 458).\nThe appellate panel in this case next cited, and concurred with, the reasoning of the appellate court in Ashley, wherein that court extended the reasoning of Hayes to third-party actions for implied indemnity. Discussing Ashley, the appellate court noted:\n\u201cThe Ashley court observed that, much like the relationship between a third-party plaintiff and a third-party defendant in an action for contribution, the indemnitee in an implied indemnity claim seeks from the indemnitor those damages caused by the indemnitor in the underlying suit. Ashley, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 518. This court also noted that, similar to a suit for contribution, a claim for indemnification exposes an insurance company to the same liability as if the patient had brought a direct action against the insured. Ashley, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 521. Accordingly, the Ashley court concluded that the inclusion of third-party actions for implied indemnity within the ambit of the medical malpractice period of repose furthers the statute\u2019s legislative intent of enabling insurance companies to better predict future liability by reducing the extended exposure of physicians and hospitals to medical malpractice liability. Ashley, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 521.\u201d 398 Ill. App. 3d at 700.\nThe appellate panel in this case distinguished Travelers by emphasizing the medical malpractice context that engendered MacNeal\u2019s third-party claim for implied indemnity:\n\u201cUnlike the statutes of limitations at issue in Travelers, the medical malpractice statute of repose expressly states that it applies to actions \u2018arising out of patient care.\u2019 Compare 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 206, 13 \u2014 214(a) (West 2002), with 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(a) (West 2002).\u201d 398 Ill. App. 3d at 701.\nThe appellate court observed that the medical malpractice statute of repose \u201cemploys a much broader and different test than most statutes of limitations,\u201d including section 13 \u2014 206 \u2014 governing actions on bonds and written contracts \u2014 and section 13 \u2014 214(a) \u2014 prescribing the repose period applicable to actions for an act or omission in design and construction \u2014 both of which were at issue in Travelers. The appellate court opined:\n\u201c[T]he language in Travelers setting forth what courts should generally consider when determining which limitations period governs is wholly inapplicable. Rather, to determine whether an injury has its origin in or is incidental to a patient\u2019s medical care and treatment and, thus, falls within the scope of the medical malpractice statute of repose, courts must look past the nature of the injury itself and, instead, examine the facts from which the injury arose.\u201d 398 Ill. App. 3d at 701.\nIn light of the holdings and reasoning of Hayes and Ashley, and the appellate court\u2019s distinguishing analysis of Travelers, the court concluded that section 13 \u2014 212(a) applied to MacNeal\u2019s claim for implied indemnity, and the counterclaim, filed IV2 years after the expiration of the period of repose, was thus untimely and properly dismissed. 398 Ill. App. 3d at 702.\nPRINCIPAL STATUTES INVOLVED\nWe believe three principal statutes merit discussion: section 13 \u2014 204 (contribution and indemnity); section 13 \u2014 205 (the provision which MacNeal argues applies; a \u201ccatchall\u201d statute that also specifically addresses \u201cactions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied\u201d); and section 13 \u2014 212(a) (the medical malpractice statute of repose).\nSection 13 \u2014 204 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204 (West 2002)) \u2014 the statute designated by the legislature to govern actions for contribution and indemnity unless otherwise specified \u2014 provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cContribution and indemnity.\n(a) In instances where no underlying action seeking recovery for injury to or death of a person or injury or damage to property has been filed by a claimant, no action for contribution or indemnity may be commenced with respect to any payment made to that claimant more than 2 years after the party seeking contribution or indemnity has made the payment in discharge of his or her liability to the claimant.\n(b) In instances where an underlying action has been filed by a claimant, no action for contribution or indemnity may be commenced more than 2 years after the party seeking contribution or indemnity has been served with process in the underlying action or more than 2 years from the time the party, or his or her privy, knew or should reasonably have known of an act or omission giving rise to the action for contribution or indemnity, whichever period expires later.\n(c) The applicable limitations period contained in subsection (a) or (b) shall apply to all actions for contribution or indemnity and shall preempt, as to contribution and indemnity actions only, all other statutes of limitation or repose ***.\n(e) The provisions of this Section shall not apply to any action for damages in which contribution or indemnification is sought from a party who is alleged to have been negligent and whose negligence has been alleged to have resulted in injuries or death by reason of medical or other healing art malpractice.\u201d\nSection 13 \u2014 205 (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 205 (West 2002)) \u2014 the statute that MacNeal sirgues is applicable \u2014 provides in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201c[Ajctions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, *** and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued.\u201d\nSection 13 \u2014 212(a) (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(a) (West 2002)) \u2014 the medical malpractice statute of repose, which this court in Hayes held applicable to contribution actions \u201carising out of patient care\u201d \u2014 provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) Except as provided in Section 13 \u2014 215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.\u201d\nANALYSIS\nThe applicability of a statute of limitation or repose to a cause of action presents a legal question subject to de novo review. Travelers, 229 Ill. 2d at 466. Our \u201csingular concern\u201d in determining which statute of limitation or repose applies is \u201cto ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 488 (2006). When the spirit and intent of the legislature are clearly expressed and the objects and purposes of a statute are clearly set forth, courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause of the statute that might defeat such clearly expressed legislative intent. In re Application of the County Treasurer, 214 Ill. 2d 253, 259 (2005). We must presume that several statutes relating to the same subject \u2014 in this case periods of repose \u2014 are governed by one spirit and a single policy, and that the legislature intended the several statutes to be consistent and harmonious. See Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 512 (2007); DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 60 (2006).\nThe legislature clearly intended that section 13 \u2014 204 apply to actions for \u201ccontribution and indemnity\u201d where the underlying action seeks \u201crecovery for injury to or death of a person\u201d (735 ILCS 5/13\u2014204(a), (b) (West 2002)), the very situation with which we are confronted here. In fact, the legislature was so adamant that this section control that it inserted preemptive language into the statute to ensure that result: \u201cThe applicable limitations period contained in subsection (a) or (b) shall apply to all actions for contribution or indemnity and shall preempt, as to contribution and indemnity actions only, all other statutes of limitation or repose ***.\u201d See 735 ILCS 5/13\u2014204(c) (West 2002). This court has in fact acknowledged \u201cboth sections 13\u2014204(a) and 13\u2014204(b) apply *** when the action involves allocation of damages for implied indemnification\u201d in connection with \u201can underlying tort claim for injury to person or property.\u201d Travelers, 229 Ill. 2d at 473-74.\nNotwithstanding the legislature\u2019s clearly expressed intent to bestow preeminent effect upon section 13 \u2014 204 with regard to this particular class of claims, the legislature nonetheless chose to exempt \u201cany action for damages in which contribution or indemnification is sought from a party who is alleged to have been negligent and whose negligence has been alleged to have resulted in injuries or death by reason of medical or other healing art malpractice\u201d (see 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(e) (West 2002)) \u2014 again, the very situation at hand. The inescapable inference to be drawn is that those actions, i.e., ones arising \u201cby reason of medical or other healing art malpractice,\u201d present policy considerations so important that the legislature chose to deal with them elsewhere, in a provision that specifically addresses medical malpractice. The obvious place for that treatment is the medical malpractice statute of repose, which applies to actions for \u201cdamages for injury or death against any physician *** or hospital *** whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(a) (West 2002). This court, in Hayes, has already held that third-party contribution actions are subject to the four-year statute of repose set forth in section 13 \u2014 212(a).\nMacNeal argues that section 13 \u2014 205 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 205 (West 2002)) should apply \u2014 the provision that addresses \u201cactions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, *** and all civil actions not otherwise provided for.\u201d If we were to accept MacNeal\u2019s argument, we would have to conclude that the legislature took care to specifically exempt implied indemnity actions, arising out of \u201chealing art malpractice,\u201d from a provision that would otherwise control them, only to dump them into what is essentially a generic, catchall provision. That conclusion is simply inconsistent with the legislature\u2019s statutory scheme.\nIt is irreconcilable with the aim and purpose of the medical malpractice statute of repose, which this court addressed at length in Hayes. As this court noted in Hayes, the medical malpractice statute of repose was the legislature\u2019s response to a perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis. Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 457. In an effort to address the problem, the legislature enacted the medical malpractice statute of repose, which ultimately imposed an outside time limit of four years in which an action could be brought against physicians and hospitals for actions arising out of patient care. Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 457. That definitive period for the filing of actions was viewed as necessary to prevent extended exposure of physicians and other hospital personnel to potential liability for their care and treatment of patients, thereby increasing an insurance company\u2019s ability to predict future liabilities. Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 458. As noted, this court, in Hayes, determined that a suit for contribution would fall within the purview of the statute\u2019s broad language and treatment therein would be consistent with the legislature\u2019s goals:\n\u201cBecause a suit for contribution against the insured for damages arising out of patient care exposes insurance companies to the same liability as if the patient were to have brought a direct action against the insured, we believe that the term \u2018or otherwise\u2019 in the medical malpractice statute of repose includes actions for contribution against a physician for injuries arising out of patient care. *** The inclusion of the term \u2018or otherwise\u2019 following more restrictive language in the statute seems to us to indicate that the legislature intended the term to be all-inclusive. We believe that the term demonstrates the General Assembly\u2019s desire at the time it originally enacted the statute to limit a physician\u2019s exposure to liability for damages for injury or death arising out of patient care under all theories of liability ***.\u201d Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 458-59.\nWithin two years of this court\u2019s decision in Hayes, the appellate court, in Roberson v. Belleville Anesthesia Associates, Ltd., 213 Ill. App. 3d 47, 51 (1991), and Ashley, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 516-22, held that the reasoning employed by this court in Hayes supports the inclusion of third-party actions for implied indemnity, arising out of patient care, within the scope of section 13\u2014212(a). The legislature appears to have confirmed that the decisions in Hayes, Roberson, and Ashley reflected its intent and furthered its aims when it subsequently amended section 13 \u2014 204 of the Code in a manner consistent with those authorities.\nIn Public Act 88 \u2014 538, effective January 1, 1995, the legislature significantly expanded the text and scope of section 13 \u2014 204, while refining its language in such a way as to more clearly express its intent. See Pub. Act 88 \u2014 538 (eff. Jan. 1, 1995). First, the legislature evinced its intent to treat actions for contribution and indemnity in the same manner for purposes of the applicable period of repose. The legislature took a one-sentence statute, that had addressed only \u201ccontribution among tortfeasors\u201d (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 204), and transformed it into a five-subsection provision that encompassed both \u201ccontribution and indemnity\u201d and contained specific language meant to guarantee its preemptive effect over \u201call other statutes of limitation or repose\u201d (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(c) (West 2002)) \u2014 with one important exception. The legislature chose to exempt from the statute\u2019s coverage \u201cany action for damages in which contribution or indemnification is sought from a party who is alleged to have been negligent and whose negligence has been alleged to have resulted in injuries or death by reason of medical or other healing art malpractice.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(e) (West 2002). Given the legislature\u2019s insistence upon the preemptive effect of section 13 \u2014 204 in actions for contribution and indemnity, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from this one exemption is that the legislature intended that the provisions of section 13 \u2014 204 yield, in this one instance, to those of a limitations statute that advances even more important policy considerations, considerations expressly related to \u201chealing art malpractice.\u201d The only such limitations provision is found in section 13 \u2014 212, the medical malpractice statute of repose. The legislature obviously did not feel the need to specify section 13\u2014 212(a) as the alternate applicable provision by naming it because the legislature assumed that actions for contribution and indemnity \u201carising out of patient care\u201d were already covered there under the \u201cor otherwise\u201d language contained in that provision. Why? Courts of review in Hayes, Roberson, and Ashley had so held. There was no reason for legislators to think otherwise. We find the legislature\u2019s intent clear and unmistakable: it meant for all actions for damages \u201carising out of patient care\u201d to be subject to the limitations of section 13 \u2014 212, including contribution and indemnity claims \u2014 otherwise falling within the preemptive scope of section 13 \u2014 204 \u2014 where the \u201caction for damages in which contribution or indemnification is sought\u201d is filed against \u201ca party who is alleged to have been negligent and whose negligence has been alleged to have resulted in injuries or death by reason of medical or other healing art malpractice.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(e) (West 2002).\nMacNeal\u2019s briefs offer no reasonable explanation why \u2014 despite the obvious applicability and interrelationship of sections 13 \u2014 204(e) (contribution and indemnity) and 13 \u2014 212(a) (medical malpractice), given these facts\u2014 the legislature might have intended to exempt only contribution and indemnification actions involving alleged medical malpractice from the purview of section 13 \u2014 204 and then subject them to a limitations statute (section 13 \u2014 205) that has nothing to do with medical malpractice, the very basis for their exemption.\nCiting, selectively, our decision in Travelers, in an effort to persuade us that section 13\u2014205 should apply, MacNeal would have us focus on \u201cthe nature of the liability\u201d involved in its implied indemnification claim to determine the applicable statute of limitations or repose. See Travelers, 229 Ill. 2d at 466-67. Citing this court\u2019s decision in American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 154 Ill. 2d 347 (1992), MacNeal\u2014suggesting it is a \u201cblameless principal\u201d\u2014argues that the nature of the liability here is quasi-contractual and thus subject to the coverage of section 13\u2014205. In the end, MacNeal\u2019s argument goes something like this: (1) section 13\u2014204\u2014the provision designated by the legislature to apply, generally, to indemnity claims\u2014does not apply to its implied indemnity claim because the claim seeks indemnification from a party whose alleged negligence resulted in injuries or death by reason of medical malpractice; (2) the medical malpractice statute of repose\u2014which applies to \u201caction[s] for damages for injury or death *** whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care\u201d\u2014does not apply because MacNeal\u2019s action for damages is not one for injury or death, but rather a quasi-contractual claim for indemnification. Thus, section 13\u2014205 would apply by default.\nIt is debatable whether, hypothetically, a hospital whose reputation induces a patient to seek treatment therein from a doctor with the apparent authority of the institution can be deemed a \u201cblameless principal\u201d when the doctor ultimately commits malpractice. See generally York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Medical Center, 222 Ill. 2d 147, 184-85 (2006); Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 524-25 (1993). However, resolution of MacNeal\u2019s culpability is not of direct concern here. The issue of MacNeal\u2019s \u201cculpability\u201d arises in this instance as a result of MacNeal\u2019s convoluted attempt to distinguish Hayes. MacNeal argues that the action for contribution in Hayes involved \u201cthe apportionment of damages among culpable parties,\u201d whereas, MacNeal\u2019s action is one of a \u201cblameless principal\u201d seeking indemnification. Assuming, arguendo, that MacNeal is a \u201cblameless principal,\u201d we find its blamelessness irrelevant for purposes of the pertinent analysis. The aim of the legislature in enacting any statute of repose is to preclude the filing of actions after a specified number of years and, in the case of the medical malpractice statute of repose, the legislature meant to prohibit all actions \u201carising out of patient care\u201d that are brought more than four years after the date of the alleged malpractice. We again quote from Hayes, wherein this court held that contribution actions arising from medical malpractice actions were governed by the limitations of section 13 \u2014 212:\n\u201cThe inclusion of the term \u2018or otherwise\u2019 following more restrictive language in the statute seems to us to indicate that the legislature intended the term to be all-inclusive. We believe that the term demonstrates the General Assembly\u2019s desire at the time it originally enacted the statute to limit a physician\u2019s exposure to liability for damages for injury or death arising out of patient care under all theories of liability ***.\u201d Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 458-59.\nImplied indemnity claims arising out of medical malpractice actions are governed by the same reasoning whether or not the party seeking indemnity is \u201cculpable.\u201d Indeed, the legislature does not differentiate in the treatment of contribution and indemnity actions under the limitation provisions in section 13 \u2014 204; there is no plausible basis for doing so once a contribution or indemnity action is removed from the purview of section 13 \u2014 204 \u201cby reason of medical or other healing art malpractice.\u201d See 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(e) (West 2002).\nCiting this court\u2019s decisions in American National Bank and Travelers, MacNeal opines that we must focus on the \u201cnature of the liability\u201d involved here \u2014 characterized as quasi-contractual \u2014 to determine the applicable statute of limitations or repose. MacNeal ignores the fact that that inquiry is merely a means to an end: the ascertainment of the applicable statute of repose. See Travelers, 229 Ill. 2d at 466-67. The principal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. People v. Grever, 222 Ill. 2d 321, 328 (2006). We are confident that we have ascertained the legislature\u2019s intent in this regard and have expressed the same in our foregoing analysis. However, we would note that application of Travelers\u2019 analysis to MacNeal\u2019s claim would not bring that claim within the purview of section 13\u2014205. Travelers unequivocally states that implied indemnity actions are subject to the provisions of section 13\u2014204. See Travelers, 229 Ill. 2d at 473-74.\nNor do we find it particularly significant, in light of our observations and findings heretofore, that this court in Hayes construed the phrase \u201cor otherwise\u201d more broadly and inclusively in the context of the medical malpractice statute of repose than did this court, implicitly, in Travelers in the context of the construction statute of repose. See 735 ILCS 5/13\u2014214(a) (West 2002). First, we note that the phrase, \u201cor otherwise,\u201d appears in two different statutes, with differing aims and origins, in the midst of differing text. Moreover, one statute \u2014 the medical malpractice statute of repose \u2014 is, as we have found, the legislature\u2019s choice of statutes of repose to apply where a contribution or implied indemnity claim arises \u201cby reason of medical or other healing art malpractice.\u201d See 735 ILCS 5/13\u2014204(e) (West 2002). The legislature has expressed no such statutory interrelationship with respect to section 13\u2014214(a). Furthermore, this court, in Hayes, has already construed the phrase \u201cor otherwise\u201d in the context of the medical malpractice statute of repose, and has found it to include related actions for contribution. This court, in Travelers, did not find it necessary to construe the phrase \u201cor otherwise\u201d in rendering its decision. The medical malpractice statute of repose \u2014 by its text and interrelationship with other limitations statutes, i.e., section 13 \u2014 204 \u2014 clearly subsumes the type of action in question here, and that is the sole question to be answered. We find that MacNeal\u2019s counterclaim was properly dismissed as untimely filed pursuant to the provisions of section 13\u2014212(a) of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 212(a) (West 2002).\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nAffirmed.\nJUSTICE THEIS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Carmel M. Cosgrave, Michael Resis and Ellen L. Green, of SmithAmundsen LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC, of Chicago (Mark M. Burden, Karen Kies DeGrand and Edward E. Fu, of counsel), for appellee Christopher D. Joyce.", "Cassiday Schade LLR of Chicago (Julie A. Teuscher and Richard A. Barrett, Jr., of counsel), for appellees Jeffrey Zawacki and Suburban Surgical Associates, Ltd." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 110170.\nHELEN ULDRYCH, Indiv. and as Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Rudolph Uldrych, Deceased, v. VHS OF ILLINOIS, INC., d/b/a MacNeal Hospital, Appellant (Christopher D. Joyce et al., Appellees).\nOpinion filed January 21, 2011.\nCarmel M. Cosgrave, Michael Resis and Ellen L. Green, of SmithAmundsen LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.\nDonohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC, of Chicago (Mark M. Burden, Karen Kies DeGrand and Edward E. Fu, of counsel), for appellee Christopher D. Joyce.\nCassiday Schade LLR of Chicago (Julie A. Teuscher and Richard A. Barrett, Jr., of counsel), for appellees Jeffrey Zawacki and Suburban Surgical Associates, Ltd." }, "file_name": "0532-01", "first_page_order": 546, "last_page_order": 562 }