{ "id": 4288773, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICKY KING, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. King", "decision_date": "2011-01-21", "docket_number": "No. 109581", "first_page": "374", "last_page": "387", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "241 Ill. 2d 374" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "395 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4291108 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "992" }, { "page": "994-95" }, { "page": "989", "parenthetical": "\"However, the statute provides if a defendant either pleads or is found guilty of only the non-section 5 - 130(l)(a" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/395/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ill. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3627517 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" }, { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/236/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4289733 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/393/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4136059 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472359 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487180 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 1230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096579 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/1230-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706686 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193", "parenthetical": "\"When the legislature uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another, we may assume different meanings were intended.\"" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152559 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0395-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 656, "char_count": 22597, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7515762501983706 }, "sha256": "2e551493335053e5acee236caab91b66d618a3619764dbd66bca379b259c2384", "simhash": "1:096667b0d0e5d011", "word_count": 3852 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:49:30.571673+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICKY KING, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARMEIER\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn 2002, defendant, Ricky King, was charged with five counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)), in connection with the August 8, 2002, beating death of Robert Nash. Defendant was 15 years of age at the time of the incident. On June 19, 2003, the State filed an additional count of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a), 9 \u2014 1(a) (West 2000)) arising out of the same incident. That same day, defendant entered a negotiated plea to the attempted murder charge in exchange for dismissal of the murder charges and a 15-year sentence in the Department of Corrections. The circuit court of Champaign County immediately entered judgment pursuant to the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon 15-year prison term, and dismissed the murder charges.\nOn October 10, 2008, defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006)), arguing that he was not properly admonished about mandatory supervised release. The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit.\nOn appeal, defendant argued for the first time that his sentence was void because the State failed to request a hearing under section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(ii) (West 2000)) to determine whether he should be sentenced as an adult. The appellate court agreed. 395 Ill. App. 3d 985, 992. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to vacate defendant\u2019s criminal conviction, enter an adjudication of delinquency, and enter an order sentencing him under the Act to time served as of his twenty-first birthday. Id. at 994-95.\nThe State sought review in this court, arguing that (1) defendant should be estopped from arguing that the sentencing provision of the fully negotiated plea agreement is void because he enjoyed the benefits of the plea agreement, including the dismissal of first degree murder charges; and (2) if the sentencing provision of the fully negotiated plea agreement is void, the plea should be vacated in its entirety, the murder charges reinstated, and the parties returned to the status quo ante for further plea proceedings or trial.\nOn this court\u2019s own motion, the parties were given leave to file supplemental briefs addressing the following two issues of statutory interpretation involving sections 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) through (l)(c) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 130(l)(a) through (l)(c) (West 2000)): (1) whether an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) includes only those charges \u201cspecified in\u201d that section or both charges \u201cspecified in\u201d that section and \u201call other charges arising out of the same incident\u201d; and (2) if an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) includes both charges \u201cspecified in\u201d that section and \u201call other charges arising out of the same incident,\u201d whether section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(ii) required the State to request a hearing to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as an adult or whether he was properly sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant to section 5 \u2014 130(1)(c)(i). Both parties have filed supplemental briefs.\nFor the following reasons, we conclude that an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(1) (a) includes both charges \u201cspecified in\u201d that section and \u201call other charges arising out of the same incident,\u201d that section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(ii) did not require the State to request a hearing to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as an adult, and that he was properly sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant to section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe dispositive issues on appeal are issues of statutory construction, which are questions of law subject to de novo review. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass\u2019n, Inc., 236 Ill. 2d 433, 439 (2010).\nOur primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. at 440. The best indicator of such intent is the language of the statute, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. Id.\nWith these principles in mind, we turn to the applicable statutory provision, section 5 \u2014 130 of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c(l)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5 \u2014 120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery with a firearm committed in a school, on the real property comprising a school, within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a school, at a school related activity, or on, boarding, or departing from any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school or school district to transport students to or from school or a school related activity regardless of the time of day or time of year that the offense was committed, armed robbery when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or aggravated vehicular hijacking when the hijacking was committed with a firearm.\nThese charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall he prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.\n;j\u00ed }\u00a1\u00ed ^\n(b) (i) If before trial or plea an information or indictment is filed that does not charge an offense specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) the State\u2019s Attorney may proceed on any lesser charge or charges, but only in Juvenile Court under the provisions of this Article. The State\u2019s Attorney may proceed under the Criminal Code of 1961 on a lesser charge if before trial the minor defendant knowingly and with advice of counsel waives, in writing, his or her right to have the matter proceed in Juvenile Court.\n(ii) If before trial or plea an information or indictment is filed that includes one or more charges specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and additional charges that are not specified in that paragraph, all of the charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961.\n(c) (i) If after trial or plea the minor is convicted of any offense covered by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), then, in sentencing the minor, the court shall have available any or all dispositions prescribed for that offense under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.\n(ii) If after trial or plea the court finds that the minor committed an offense not covered by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), that finding shall not invalidate the verdict or the prosecution of the minor under the criminal laws of the State; however, unless the State requests a hearing for the purpose of sentencing the minor under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections, the Court must proceed under Sections 5 \u2014 705 and 5 \u2014 710 of this Article. To request a hearing, the State must file a written motion within 10 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be given to the minor or his or her counsel. If the motion is made by the State, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the minor should he sentenced under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections. *** If after the hearing the court finds that the minor should he sentenced under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections, then the court shall sentence the minor accordingly having available to it any or all dispositions so prescribed.\u201d (Emphases added.) 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 130(l)(a) through (c)(ii) (West 2000).\nIn the present case, defendant was originally charged with five counts of first degree murder, an offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a). Exclusive jurisdiction for first degree murder when the accused is at least 15 years of age lies in criminal court, not juvenile court. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 130(l)(a) (West 2000). In addition, if \u201cother charges arising out of the same incident\u201d are alleged in an indictment, together with charges \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), the entire prosecution takes place in criminal court. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 130(l)(b)(ii) (West 2000). Here, the State added to the indictment an attempted first degree murder charge, which had to be prosecuted in criminal court with the first degree murder charges because it arose out of the same incident.\nUltimately, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder in exchange for dismissal of the first degree murder charges and a 15-year sentence. Therefore, he pleaded guilty only to the offense \u201carising out of the same incident\u201d as the offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(1)(a), which was first degree murder.\nSection 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i) of the Act governs sentencing of a minor convicted of any offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), while section 5 \u2014 130(1)(c)(ii) governs sentencing of a minor convicted of an offense \u201cnot covered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a). Section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) specifically lists several offenses, including first degree murder, and states that \u201c[tjhese charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 130(l)(a) (West 2000).\nBoth parties and the appellate court in this case assumed, without discussion or analysis, that an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), as used in sections 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i) and (l)(c)(ii), was synonymous with an offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), as used in section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b). See 395 Ill. App. 3d at 989 (\u201cHowever, the statute provides if a defendant either pleads or is found guilty of only the non-section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) charges, then a court is required to proceed under sections 5 \u2014 705 and 5 \u2014 710 of the Act, unless the State requests, within 10 days of the plea or trial, a hearing at which the court would determine whether to sentence the defendant as an adult.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)). In making this assumption, the appellate court cited prior appellate court opinions in which the parties and court had made the same assumption. See, e.g., People v. Jardon, 393 Ill. App. 3d 725 (2009); People v. Mathis, 357 Ill. App. 3d 45 (2005); People v. Champ, 329 Ill. App. 3d 127 (2002); People v. Brazee, 333 Ill. App. 3d 43 (2002); People v. Brazee, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1230 (2000).\nOn this court\u2019s own motion, the parties were given leave to file supplemental briefs addressing the following two issues of statutory interpretation involving sections 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) through (l)(c) of the Act: (1) whether an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) includes only those charges \u201cspecified in\u201d that section or both charges \u201cspecified in\u201d that section and \u201call other charges arising out of the same incident\u201d; and (2) if an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) includes both charges \u201cspecified in\u201d that section and \u201call other charges arising out of the same incident,\u201d whether section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(ii) required the State to request a hearing to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as an adult or whether he was properly sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant to section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i).\nIn their supplemental briefs, the parties agreed that an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(1) (a) includes both charges \u201cspecified in\u201d that section and \u201call other charges arising out of the same incident.\u201d The parties disagreed, however, as to whether section 5 \u2014 130(1) (c)(ii) required the State to request a hearing to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as an adult or whether he was properly sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant to section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i).\nPursuant to sections 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i) and (l)(c)(ii), whether defendant could be sentenced as an adult without a hearing depends on whether the offense to which he pleaded guilty (attempted first degree murder) is \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a). The dictionary definition of \u201ccover\u201d is \u201cto treat or deal with,\u201d as in \u201cmaterial covered in the first chapter.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 524 (1976). Accordingly, when section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i) discusses an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), it means an offense treated or dealt with in that section, which includes the offenses \u201cspecified in\u201d that section as well as \u201call other charges arising out of the same incident.\u201d See 705 ILCS 405/5\u2014 130(l)(a) (West 2000).\nThat interpretation is confirmed by the use of other terms in section 5 \u2014 130(1). For instance, section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b) addresses whether the prosecution should occur in juvenile or criminal court, and the answer hinges on whether the charging instrument includes any charge of an offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a). The plain meaning of \u201cspecify\u201d is \u201cto mention or name in a specific or explicit manner.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2187 (1976). Thus, when section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b) discusses an offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), it means the offenses explicitly named therein.\nMoreover, the Act itself demonstrates that offenses \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) does not mean offenses explicitly named in that section plus other charges arising out of the same incident. Section 5 \u2014 130(1) (b)(ii) mandates that when an information or indictment includes charges \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) \u201cand additional charges that are not specified in that paragraph, all of the charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961.\u201d In other words, the offenses \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) do not include \u201cother charges arising out of the same incident.\u201d\nThe legislature\u2019s decision to use \u201cspecified in\u201d in section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b) and \u201ccovered by\u201d in section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c) demonstrates that it intended different meanings for these terms. See People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 193 (2008) (\u201cWhen the legislature uses certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another, we may assume different meanings were intended.\u201d). Section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b) discusses those offenses \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), i.e., those offenses explicitly named in that section, whereas section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c) discusses those offenses \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), i.e., those offenses dealt with in that section, which includes those explicitly named in that section and those arising out of the same incident. The legislature repeated the paired use of both \u201ccovered by\u201d and \u201cspecified in\u201d throughout the Act \u2014 the distinction appears again in sections 5 \u2014 130(2)(b) and (2)(c) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 130(2)(b), (2)(c) (West 2000)), sections 5 \u2014 130(3)(b) and (3)(c) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 130(3)(b), (3)(c) (West 2000)), and sections 5 \u2014 130(5)(b) and (5)(c) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 130(5)(b), (5)(c) (West 2000)) \u2014 confirming that the use of the two distinct terms was intentional.\nMoreover, the Act as a whole, including its use of the term \u201cprosecute,\u201d confirms that the legislature intended \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) to include all charges arising out of the same incident. Section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) states that \u201c[tjhese charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.\u201d The Act does not define the term \u201cprosecute.\u201d However, section 2 \u2014 16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines \u201c[pjrosecution\u201d as \u201call legal proceedings by which a person\u2019s liability for an offense is determined, commencing with the return of the indictment or the issuance of the information, and including the final disposition of the case upon appeal.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 16 (West 2000). Thus, section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) mandates that charges of the \u201cspecified offenses\u201d as well as all other charges arising out of the same incident proceed as a criminal prosecution until final disposition on appeal.\nThe legislature\u2019s use of \u201cprosecute\u201d elsewhere in section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b) further demonstrates that offenses \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) include all charges arising out of the same incident as the specifically enumerated offenses. Section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b) addresses where trial and plea proceedings should occur. Section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b)(i) states that if the charges do not include an offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), the State\u2019s Attorney should \u201cproceed\u201d on the lesser charge or charges in juvenile court but \u201cmay proceed under the Criminal Code of 1961\u201d on a lesser charge not \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) if the minor waives in writing the right to proceed in juvenile court. See Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1807 (1976) (defining proceed as \u201cto carry on a legal action or process\u201d). On the other hand, section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b)(ii) states that if a minor is charged with an offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(1) (a) \u201cand additional charges that are not specified in that paragraph, all of the charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961.\u201d The legislature\u2019s decision to use \u201cproceed\u201d in the waiver context and \u201cprosecution\u201d in the context of other charges arising out of the same incident demonstrates its differing intent. See Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 194.\nThat distinction is farther reflected in section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c). Section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i) states that if the minor is convicted of any offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), \u201cthe court shall have available any or all dispositions prescribed for that offense under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.\u201d As discussed above, offenses \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) include the offenses \u201cspecified in\u201d that section as well as all charges arising out of the same incident. This is consistent with section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b)(ii)\u2019s mandate that the offenses \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) and \u201call of the charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961\u201d and with section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a)\u2019s directive that the charges specified therein and \u201call other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.\u201d\nOn the other hand, because a minor charged with only a lesser offense (of an offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a)) who waived the right to proceed in juvenile court would not be convicted of an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), the minor would not be subject to sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections unless the State requested a hearing under section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(ii). This is consistent with section 5 \u2014 130(l)(b)(i), which allows the State to proceed under the Criminal Code of 1961 only upon the minor\u2019s written waiver. Thus, if defendant had been charged only with attempted murder, both his written waiver and a hearing would have been required to proceed in criminal court and sentence him as an adult.\nThis construction is also consistent with the framework of the Act, which turns on the offenses in the charging instrument. This court has long recognized that the classification at issue in the Act is based on the minor\u2019s age and the type of offense charged. People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 403 (1984). Thus, it is the charging instrument that determines whether the minor has the right to have, the proceedings in juvenile court.\nAs discussed above, section 5 \u2014 130(l)(c)(i) states that if after trial or plea, a minor is convicted of an offense \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a), in sentencing the minor, the circuit court has available \u201cany or all dispositions prescribed for that offense under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.\u201d Offenses \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) include those \u201cspecified in\u201d that section as well as those arising out of the same incident.\nIn the present case, defendant was initially charged with first degree murder. The State subsequently filed an additional information, which added an additional count for attempted first degree murder arising out of the same incident. Thus, the attempted first degree murder charge was \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) (\u201cThese charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.\u201d). Defendant pleaded guilty to the attempted first degree murder charge that same day.\nDefendant argues that the attempted first degree murder charge was not \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) because the first degree murder charges were subsequently dismissed. We disagree.\nThe first degree murder charges were still pending when the circuit court accepted defendant\u2019s plea and sentenced him to the agreed-upon 15-year sentence. The circuit court thereafter dismissed the first degree murder charges pursuant to the plea agreement.\nTherefore, we find that defendant pleaded guilty to an offense (attempted first degree murder) \u201ccovered by\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(l)(a) because it arose out of the same incident as the charges pending against him for an offense \u201cspecified in\u201d section 5 \u2014 130(1)(a) (first degree murder). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant was properly sentenced without a hearing pursuant to section 5 \u2014 130(1) (c)(i) and that his sentence is therefore not void as prohibited by statute.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARMEIER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Julia Rietz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Michael A. Sco-dro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman and Anastacia R. Brooks, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Gary R. Peterson and Karen Munoz, Deputy Defenders, and Michael H. Vonnahmen, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 109581.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICKY KING, Appellee.\nOpinion filed January 21, 2011.\nRehearing denied March 28, 2011.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Julia Rietz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Michael A. Sco-dro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman and Anastacia R. Brooks, of the Office of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Gary R. Peterson and Karen Munoz, Deputy Defenders, and Michael H. Vonnahmen, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0374-01", "first_page_order": 384, "last_page_order": 397 }