{ "id": 4288863, "name": "WILLIAM R. HILL, Appellant, v. ROGER E. WALKER, JR., Director of Corrections, et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Hill v. Walker", "decision_date": "2011-03-24", "docket_number": "No. 110215", "first_page": "479", "last_page": "495", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "241 Ill. 2d 479" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "397 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4294047 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/397/1090-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073237 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467", "parenthetical": "citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 - 1" }, { "page": "469-74" }, { "page": "474-76" }, { "page": "474-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621680 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1532158 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 577 (1972)" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782964 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570-71, 577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475860 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "quoting Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 77 Ill. 2d 287, 293-94 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5489662 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 F.3d 832", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3707430 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835-36" }, { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/501/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 F.3d 1025", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11786835 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1026" }, { "page": "1026" }, { "page": "1027" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/163/1025-01" ] }, { "cite": "482 U.S. 369", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6213709 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/482/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782797 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "Douglas, J., dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 F.3d 442", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 6047173 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/453/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223625 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933217 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2896755 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2725309 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3621558 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/233/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 478033 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 499", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1339457 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "511-13" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 37", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212725 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448502 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "citing Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-41 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11595864 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 244", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9508391 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "256-57" }, { "page": "256" }, { "parenthetical": "explaining Garner" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801342 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229-30" }, { "page": "234-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 1174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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HILL, Appellant, v. ROGER E. WALKER, JR., Director of Corrections, et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nOPINION\nPlaintiff, William R. Hill, an inmate at Tamms Correctional Center, brought an action in the circuit court of Alexander County seeking declaratory and mandamus relief against defendants, Roger E. Walker, Jr., Director of Corrections, and the members of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (Board). The circuit court dismissed plaintiffs second amended complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2006)). The appellate court upheld the dismissal. 397 Ill. App. 3d 1090. We allowed plaintiffs petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.\nI. BACKGROUND\nHill was hired to kill Robert Fields. In August 1974, Hill fatally shot Allen Zipperstein, whom Hill mistook for Fields. In January 1975, Hill fatally shot Fields. Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Hill was convicted of two counts of murder and, at the close of a separate sentencing hearing before the same jury, the court sentenced Hill to death. People v. Hill, 78 Ill. 2d 465, 467 (1980) (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1). On direct review, this court held that the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence inculpatory statements that Hill had made during plea negotiations, and further held that the error was so prejudicial as to require reversal of Hill\u2019s convictions. Hill, 78 Ill. 2d at 469-74. This court also held that, if Hill were convicted of murder on remand, he could not be sentenced to death because he committed the crimes prior to the enactment of the then-existing death penalty statute. Id. at 474-76.\nOn remand, Hill pled guilty to two counts of murder and was sentenced in 1981 to two concurrent prison terms of 30 to 90 years. Under the then-existing sentencing laws, Hill became eligible for parole in 1983. The Board held parole hearings for Hill in May 1983, March 1984, January 1985, April 1986, and April 1987. At the close of each hearing, the Board denied parole based on the seriousness of the offenses.\nEffective January 1988, the legislature amended the law governing parole. As amended, the statute allows the Board to set parole hearings as much as three years apart, so long as the Board finds that it is not reasonably likely to grant parole prior to that time. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1003 \u2014 3\u20145(f). Subsequent to this amendment, the Board held parole hearings for Hill in February 1988, February 1991, February 1992, May 1993, May 1994, May 1995, May 1996, November 1997, November 1998, October 1999, December 2002, and January 2006. The Board denied parole each time based primarily on the seriousness of the offenses. In the 2002 and 2006 decisions, the Board additionally noted several prison disciplinary infractions that had occurred in 2000.\nOn December 8, 2006, Hill, pro se, filed his second-amended complaint for declaratory and mandamus relief. Hill claimed that the parole process, as applied by the Board to him, was unconstitutional because it violated both procedural due process and the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Hill sought a declaration to that effect and a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to provide Hill with parole hearings in accordance with the statutory and regulatory criteria in effect when he committed the murders. The circuit court granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed. 397 Ill. App. 3d 1090. We subsequently allowed Hill\u2019s pro se petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)), and appointed counsel to represent him during these proceedings.\nII. ANALYSIS\nHill argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his causes of action. Reviewing de novo the circuit court\u2019s dismissal (Turner v. Memorial Medical Center, 233 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (2009)), we hold that the circuit court did not err.\nA. Due Process\nHill claims that two procedural defects in his parole hearings deprived him of due process of law. First, Hill noted that in all but three of its many decisions denying parole, the Board referenced Hill\u2019s original death sentence. Hill alleged that the Board continued to consider his initial death sentence in determining his eligibility for parole, although this court overturned it. See Hill, 78 Ill. 2d at 474-76. Second, Hill alleged that the Board considered prison disciplinary infractions that had occurred in 2000 in denying parole in 2002 and 2006. Hill alleged that these infractions were based on false accusations made by a biased Department of Corrections official who was himself under the influence of drugs. Hill contends that the Board\u2019s consideration of these two pieces of information rendered his parole hearings fundamentally unfair.\nWe reject these contentions. The due process clauses of the federal and Illinois Constitutions protect against the deprivation of liberty or property -without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a72. Procedural due process protections are triggered only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake, to which a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 577 (1972)). \u201c \u2018Therefore, the starting point in any procedural due process analysis is a determination of whether one of those protectable interests is present, for if there is not, no process is due.\u2019 \u201d Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364, 368 (1980) (quoting Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 77 Ill. 2d 287, 293-94 (1979)).\nThere is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released from confinement prior to the expiration of a valid sentence. The natural desire of an individual to be released is no different from the initial resistance to being confined. However, the conviction, with all of its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right. A valid conviction constitutionally deprives a criminal defendant of his or her liberty. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7; see Thompson v. Veach, 501 F.3d 832, 835-36 (7th Cir. 2007); Heidelberg v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 163 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 1998). However, a state may create a protected liberty interest in parole through its statutes and regulations governing the parole decisionmaking process. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Thompson, 501 F.3d at 836. A state creates this liberty interest if its parole system requires release whenever the parole authority determines that the necessary prerequisites exist. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376 (1987); Heidelberg, 163 F.3d at 1026.\nBefore this court, Hill argues that \u201ca person is entitled to due process protection against \u2018arbitrary action\u2019 in parole revocation hearings,\u201d citing the partial dissent in Morrissey u. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 499 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). However, in Greenholtz, the United States Supreme Court distinguished Morris-sey based on the context of parole revocation, at issue in Morrissey, and parole release, at issue in Greenholtz and the present case. \u201cThere is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires.\u201d Green-holtz, 442 U.S. at 9. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained, in a procedural due process analysis, \u201cthe framework of Greenholtz (and our holding in Heidelberg) distinguishes between discretionary parole systems and those that establish legitimate claims of entitlement based on specific criteria.\u201d Gren-nier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 2006).\nIn Illinois, this court has consistently held that parole is not a right (Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 276 (1996)), but a matter of grace and executive clemency. People v. Hawkins, 54 Ill. 2d 247, 252 (1973); People ex rel. Jones v. Brantley, 45 Ill. 2d 335, 337-38 (1970); People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey, 10 Ill. 2d 586, 594 (1957). The Board is an administrative agency created by the legislature. Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d at 274. One of the Board\u2019s duties is to determine whether an eligible inmate should be granted or denied parole. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20141(a)(1), 3 \u2014 3\u20142(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2006). The legislature has set forth criteria under which the Board must deny parole:\n\u201c(c) The Board shall not parole a person eligible for parole if it determines that:\n(1) there is a substantial risk that he will not conform to reasonable conditions of parole; or\n(2) his release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law; or\n(3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u2014 5(c) (West 2006).\nFurther, the legislature has authorized the Board to promulgate its own rules regarding the conduct of its work and the exercise of its discretion in making parole determinations. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20142(d), 3 \u2014 3\u20145(h) (West 2006). According to its rules, \u201c[t]he Board grants parole as an exercise of grace and executive discretion as limited or defined by *** legislation,\u201d and the Board\u2019s \u201cparole release decision is a subjective determination based on available relevant information.\u201d 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a71610.50(a), (b). Although the rules provide lists of factors that the Board may consider in determining to grant or deny parole, the rules expressly provide that the parole decision is not limited to the consideration of only the listed factors. 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71610.50(b).\nIn Hctnrahan, this court explained that the parole statute provides criteria under which the Board must deny parole, and does not provide when the Board must grant parole. Further, the rules expressly provide that parole is granted as a matter of executive discretion and grace, based on available relevant information. Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d at 276. This court concluded:\n\u201cWe believe that Illinois\u2019 statutory criteria and the Board\u2019s rules do not provide standards for release on parole sufficiently objective to allow a court to evaluate the Board\u2019s decision to deny parole. We thus conclude that the legislature, in drafting the statutory language, intended the Board to have complete discretion in determining whether to grant parole when the denial of parole is not mandated by statute.\u201d Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d at 276.\nWe now conclude that the Illinois parole statute does not create a legitimate expectation of parole that rises to the level of a liberty interest protected by procedural due process. See Heidelberg, 163 F.3d at 1027. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in dismissing this claim.\nB. Ex Post Facto\nHill claims two violations of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Both the federal and Illinois Constitutions prohibit the General Assembly from enacting ex post facto laws. U.S. Const., art. I, \u00a710; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a716. This court, in interpreting the ex post facto prohibition in the Illinois Constitution, looks to the United States Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 209 (2009); Barger v. Peters, 163 Ill. 2d 357, 360 (1994). The ex post facto clauses prohibit laws that \u201c \u2018retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.\u2019 \u201d California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)); see People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 207 (2004) (citing Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439-41 (1997)). Retroactive changes in laws governing parole may, in some circumstances, violate the ex post facto prohibition. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000).\n1. Changed Discretionary Standard\nIn the present case, Hill contends that, after he committed the murders, the Board changed its interpretation of the \u201cseriousness of the offense\u201d criterion (see 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20145(c)(2) (West 2006)) to require murderers to serve more prison time before granting them parole. Hill argues that the Board\u2019s retroactive change to this standard for granting parole constitutes a violation of the ex post facto prohibition. We disagree.\nAlthough we earlier explained that the Board is vested with complete discretion in granting parole, this does not end our analysis. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned: \u201cThe presence of discretion does not displace the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause, however. [Citation.] The danger that legislatures might disfavor certain persons after the fact is present even in the parole context, and the Court has stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause guards against such abuse.\u201d Garner, 529 U.S. at 253; see Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 225, 229-30 (1997). Hill relies on Ganci v. Washington, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1174 (2001), in which the plaintiff made the same claim of ex post facto parole standards as does Hill, and whose complaint was likewise dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. However, citing the above-quoted caution from Garner (id. at 1186), the appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the cause for discovery on the claim. Id. at 1185-88.\nDespite the Court\u2019s cautionary note in Garner, that case nevertheless involved an amended parole board rule. Garner, 529 U.S. at 247. In the present case, however, Hill failed to allege that the Board based its latest denial of parole on a new or amended statute or rule. Rather, he alleged only that the Board is exercising its discretion more stringently. In Grennier, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this crucial distinction in a case involving a Wisconsin inmate who made nearly the same ex post facto argument as Hill. The court rejected the inmate\u2019s argument as follows:\n\u201cDefendants allow that Wisconsin has become less willing to release persons convicted of serious offenses and now demands assurance that interests in deterrence, desert, and public safety have been satisfied before a murderer will be let free. Neither the ex post facto clause nor the due process clause has anything to say about how discretion will be exercised under an open-ended system, however. [Citation.] Grennier has no more entitlement to a liberal release policy than he would have had to be sentenced by a judge who favored home confinement over prison. The constitutional interest is in the rules and statutes \u2014 the \u2018laws\u2019 to which it refers \u2014 rather than the attitudes of public officials who administer a discretionary system.\u201d Grennier, 453 F.3d at 445.\nAlthough Grennier is not binding on this court (see City of Chicago v. Groffman, 68 Ill. 2d 112, 118 (1977)), we believe that the Seventh Circuit\u2019s analysis is more faithful to the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Garner than our appellate court\u2019s analysis in Ganci. As the Court in Gamer recognized:\n\u201c[W]here parole is concerned discretion, by its very definition, is subject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and then exercised. The idea of discretion is that it has the capacity, and the obligation, to change and adapt based on experience. New insights into the accuracy of predictions about the offense and the risk of recidivism consequent upon the offender\u2019s release, along with a complex of other factors, will inform parole decisions.\u201d Garner, 529 U.S. at 253.\nWe agree and therefore overrule Ganci.\nHill does not allege a retroactive change in a parole statute or rule, but rather only a change in how the Board exercises its discretion. This does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Accordingly, this claim does not state a cause of action.\n2. Reduced Frequency of Parole Hearings Hill\u2019s second alleged violation of the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Illinois Constitutions does involve a \u201claw.\u201d Specifically, Hill notes that at the time he committed the murders section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections entitled him to annual parole hearings. Hill maintains that amendments to the statute over the years retroactively applied to him and that these retroactive laws imposed upon him a more onerous punishment than was in place when he committed the murders in 1974 and 1975. We disagree.\nSection 3 \u2014 3\u20145 of the Unified Code of Corrections provides for the hearing and evaluation of prisoners under consideration for parole. Subsection (f) governs the frequency with which parole hearings must be granted. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) (West 2006). At the time Hill committed the murders, the statute provided in pertinent part that \u201cif [the Board] denies parole it shall provide for a rehearing not more than 12 months from the date of denial.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1003\u2014 3 \u2014 5(f). Section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) was amended several times, in 1981, 1983, and 1988. The provision has provided since 1996 in relevant part:\n\u201c[I]f [the Board] denies parole it shall provide for a rehearing not less frequently than once every year, except that the Board may, after denying parole, schedule a rehearing no later than 3 years from the date of the parole denial, if the Board finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing prior to the scheduled rehearing date.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) (West 2006).\nHill argues that the amendments cannot constitutionally apply to him and that he is entitled to the annual parole hearings from the statute in effect at the time he committed the murders.\nHill is not the first inmate to so argue. This court, in Fletcher, 179 Ill. 2d 225, addressed a virtually identical argument concerning the effect of these amendments on parole hearings. In Fletcher, the plaintiffs contended that section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) violated the ex post facto clauses because at the time they committed their various crimes, the section provided for annual parole hearings, but was subsequently amended to permit the Board to schedule parole hearings up to three years apart. We rejected this contention, relying on the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Morales. We explained that under Morales-.\n\u201c[A] statute that decreases the frequency of parole hearings will violate the ex post facto prohibition only when \u2018it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.\u2019 This inquiry cannot he embraced within a formula or stated in a general proposition, but rather is a matter of degree. However, where the legislative adjustment creates only a \u2018speculative and attenuated possibility\u2019 of increasing punishment, it cannot be considered ex post facto. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 596, 115 S. Ct. at 1602.\u201d Fletcher, 179 Ill. 2d at 234-35.\nWe therefore concluded that, under Morales, the relevant inquiry is whether the section produced a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment. Fletcher, 179 Ill. 2d at 236 (citing Morales, 514 U.S. at 509).\nIn holding that section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) did not produce a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment, we identified several characteristics of the section that ameliorate against an increase of punishment. First, the statute itself is tailored to the determination of the likelihood that a prisoner would be released sooner than an extended parole hearing date. Second, the Board retains the authority to tailor the frequency of subsequent parole hearings to the particular circumstances of the individual prisoner. Third, the prisoner may seek a parole hearing at anytime based on new facts or extraordinary circumstances. Fletcher, 179 Ill. 2d at 237-38 (citing Morales, 514 U.S. at 511-13). We therefore concluded that amended section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections is not an ex post facto law.\nNotwithstanding the above, Hill contends that in Gamer, which postdates Fletcher, the Court \u201ccalled the breadth of Morales into question.\u201d Hill cites to a passage in Garner where the Court explains that when an amended statute or rule does not facially show a significant risk of increased punishment, a prisoner \u201cmust demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule\u2019s practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a longer period of incarceration than under the earlier rule.\u201d Garner, 529 U.S. at 255. Based on this language, Hill contends that an ex post facto claim always requires a \u201cfact intensive review\u201d and the admission of evidence. Thus, according to Hill, when this court in Fletcher determined whether section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) created a significant risk of increased punishment, the court should have considered evidence regarding how the Board actually interpreted the statute. Hill invites us to reconsider Fletcher in light of Garner.\nWe decline Hill\u2019s invitation because Garner does not change the reasoning or result in Fletcher. We earlier recited the statutory evolution of section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) from the time Hill committed the murders to the present day. The Court in Garner noted its observation in Morales that \u201cthe Ex Post Facto Clause should not be employed for \u2018the micromanagement of an endless array of legislative adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures.\u2019 [Morales, 514 U.S. at 508.] These remain important concerns. The States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedures and addressing problems associated with confinement and release.\u201d Garner, 529 U.S. at 252. The amendments to section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) represent the legislature\u2019s best efforts, in the exercise of its discretion, to fulfill its obligation to change and adapt parole laws based on experience. See id. at 253.\nFurther, Hill overstates the Court\u2019s holding in Garner, which does not require a \u201cfact intensive review\u201d in every ex post facto claim. Indeed, the passage from Garner, upon which Hill relies, ends with the observation that \u201cthe general operation of the Georgia parole system may produce relevant evidence and inform further analysis on the point.\u201d Garner, 529 U.S. at 255. Garner involved that parole board\u2019s nonbinding policy statement as to how it would enforce a rule. The lower court in that case failed to consider the effect thereof in its analysis. Id. at 256-57. \u201cFinding that the record was insufficient to show whether the change in parole law would lengthen the inmate\u2019s actual time in prison, the Court remanded the case for a determination of fact as to whether the new rule created a significant risk of increased punishment. Id. at 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362.\u201d Glascoe v. Bezy, 421 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining Garner).\nIn the present case, unlike in Garner, there is no question that section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) on its face, or in its operation pursuant to its binding regulation (see 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71610.100(a)(2)), does not create a significant risk of increasing Hill\u2019s incarceration. Fletcher correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that section 3 \u2014 3\u20145(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections does not violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Illinois Constitutions. Fletcher remains consistent with federal law. Accordingly, the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of Hill\u2019s ex post facto claims was not erroneous.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nIn 1981, the provision read in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn its decision, the Board shall set the person\u2019s time for parole, or if it denies parole it shall provide for a rehearing not more than 12 months from the date of denial, however, the Board, on its own motion, may provide for a rehearing for an individual more frequently than once every 12 months or less frequently than once every 12 months but no less frequently than once every 3 years.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1003 \u2014 3\u20145(1).\nIn 1983, the section provided in pertinent part: \u201c[I]f [the Board] denies parole it shall provide for a rehearing not less frequently them once every 3 years.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1003\u2014 3 \u2014 5(f). By 1988, the provision provided in pertinent part:\n\u201c[I]f [the Board] denies parole it shall provide for a rehearing not less frequently than once every 3 years. The Board may, after denying parole to a person originally sentenced or who became eligible for parole between January 1, 1973 and September 30, 1977, schedule a rehearing no later than 3 years from the date of the parole denial, if the Board finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing prior to the scheduled rehearing date.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1003 \u2014 3\u20145(f).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jerold S. Solovy, Michael T. Brody and Sarah S. An-sari, of Jenner & Block LLP, of Chicago, for appellant, and William R. Hill, of Menard, appellant pro se.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Timothy K. McPike, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 110215.\nWILLIAM R. HILL, Appellant, v. ROGER E. WALKER, JR., Director of Corrections, et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed March 24, 2011.\nJerold S. Solovy, Michael T. Brody and Sarah S. An-sari, of Jenner & Block LLP, of Chicago, for appellant, and William R. Hill, of Menard, appellant pro se.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Timothy K. McPike, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0479-01", "first_page_order": 489, "last_page_order": 505 }