{ "id": 4289084, "name": "WALTER P. MAKSYM et al., Appellees, v. THE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Maksym v. Board of Election Commissioners", "decision_date": "2011-01-27", "docket_number": "No. 111773", "first_page": "303", "last_page": "334", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "242 Ill. 2d 303" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "228 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5706718 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "210-11" }, { "page": "218-19" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/228/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4307014 ], "weight": 21, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17-18" }, { "page": "19-21" }, { "page": "21-23" }, { "page": "24-25", "parenthetical": "Lampkin, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "25-26", "parenthetical": "Lampkin, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "13-14", "parenthetical": "dismissing the foregoing authority in its entirety" }, { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "16" }, { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/406/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5223118 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1867, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "23-25" }, { "parenthetical": "eligibility to hold public office" }, { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/44/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2737676 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2599653 ], "year": 1901, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/100/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223609 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95", "parenthetical": "appellate court decisions filed prior to 1935 have no binding authority" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599005 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 Ill. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2561041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/370/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333096 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "976", "parenthetical": "whether candidate abandoned old residence in favor of new residence presents a question of intent, which is measured both by the \"surrounding circumstances\" and the candidate's declarations thereof" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2864374 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2937910 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1888, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "195" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/125/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229713 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58942 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424-25", "parenthetical": "Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875396 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12128412 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "citing voting cases" }, { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "eligibility for state public aid" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2546968 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/377/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2533209 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/374/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2855863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2537006 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/375/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3292639 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186-87", "parenthetical": "liability for inheritance tax" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/207/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592820 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ill. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3627496 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/236/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2533059 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566", "parenthetical": "eligibility for local public aid" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/374/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3356267 ], "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "eligibility to serve as executor of decedent's estate" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/217/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338-39" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141386 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286-87" }, { "page": "286-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2761285 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "\"where the same, or substantially the same, words or phrases appear in different parts of the same statute they will be given a generally accepted and consistent meaning\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3619580 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/232/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4307014 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "Lampkin, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/406/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5223118 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1867, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-25" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/44/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 Ill. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2561041 ], "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/370/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2546968 ], "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/377/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2533209 ], "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/374/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122203 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Vand. L. Rev. 561", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Vand. L. Rev.", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580", "parenthetical": "residence is \"one of the most nebulous terms in the legal dictionary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "255 F.2d 236", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 681898 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "\"The words 'resident' and 'residence' have no precise legal meaning although they are favorite words of legislators.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/255/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2704006 ], "year": 1874, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/74/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121977 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "Miller, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, C.J., and McMorrow, J." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3570558 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "access to the ballot \"is not to be prohibited or curtailed except by plain provisions of the law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0280-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1656, "char_count": 57702, "ocr_confidence": 0.823, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.52499850356696e-08, "percentile": 0.524437525122121 }, "sha256": "3650b43cd8e4efe751aafe4adde5088949227d2cd2a1aacddce388df4f6eb724", "simhash": "1:f7b7fcb27632a5fc", "word_count": 9571 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:25:04.106829+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WALTER P. MAKSYM et al., Appellees, v. THE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.\nChief Justice Kilbride and Justices Garman, Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.\nJustices Freeman and Burke specially concurred, with opinion.\nOPINION\nThe petitioners, Walter E Maksym, Jr., and Thomas L. McMahon, filed written objections to the candidacy of the respondent, Rahm Emanuel (the candidate), who seeks to be a candidate for mayor of the City of Chicago in the municipal general election to be held on February 22, 2011. After an evidentiary hearing, the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago (the Board) dismissed the objections and ruled that the candidate was entitled to have his name included on the ballot as a mayoral candidate. The petitioners sought judicial review in the circuit court of Cook County, which confirmed the decision of the Board. The petitioners appealed, and the appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s judgment, set aside the Board\u2019s decision, and ordered that the candidate\u2019s name be excluded (or, if necessary, removed) from the ballot for Chicago\u2019s February 22, 2011, mayoral election. No. 1 \u2014 11\u20140033. We allowed the candidate\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).\nAlthough the parties engaged in an extensive evidentiary hearing prior to the Board\u2019s decision, the pertinent facts are largely undisputed on appeal. The appellate court summarized and adopted the Board\u2019s factual findings. In doing so, the court concluded that the factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree with the appellate court that the Board\u2019s factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210 (2008). Accordingly, we set forth the facts largely as summarized in the appellate court opinion.\nThe candidate was born in Chicago and, in December 1998, purchased a Chicago home (the Hermitage House), which he still owns. The candidate lived with his family in that home from 1998 through January 2009. On January 2, 2009, the candidate, who had up to then served as a member of the United States House of Representatives elected from the district that included the Hermitage House, resigned his office in order to serve in Washington, D.C., as Chief of Staff to the President of the United States. After traveling to Washington, D.C., he and his spouse purchased additional land adjoining their Chicago property.\nFrom January through May 2009, the candidate lived in an \u201cin-law apartment\u201d in Washington, D.C., while his family remained in the Hermitage House. From June 2009 until October 1, 2010, the candidate, and his family, lived in a Washington, D.C., house (the Woodley House) that was leased for the term spanning June 1, 2009, through June 30, 2011. The family received their mail at the Woodley House and moved most of their clothes and personal belongings to Washington, D.C. They did, however, leave behind at the Hermitage House several larger household items, including televisions, a piano, and a bed, as well as several personal possessions such as family heirlooms and books. The candidate\u2019s Hermitage House was leased to another family for the term of September 1, 2009, through June 30, 2011.\nAt all relevant times, including the time he was in Washington, D.C., the candidate continued to pay property taxes for the Hermitage House, continued to hold an Illinois driver\u2019s license listing the Hermitage House as his address, continued to list the Hermitage House address on his personal checks, and continued to vote with the Hermitage House as his registered voting address. He did, however, pay income tax in 2009 and 2010 to both Washington, D.C., and Illinois.\nOn October 1, 2010, the candidate resigned his position of Chief of Staff to the President of the United States and entered into a lease to live in an apartment located on Milwaukee Avenue in Chicago from October 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011. He has lived in that apartment since October 1, 2010. In his testimony, the candidate explained that he had always expected to serve as Chief of Staff to the President for approximately 18 to 24 months before returning to Uve in the Hermitage House.\nFrom these facts, the Board concluded that the candidate met the qualification for candidacy, contained in subsection 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) of the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (65 ILCS 5/3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) (West 2008)), mandating that he had \u201cresided in\u201d Chicago for the one year preceding the February 22, 2011, mayoral election. The Board noted that the objectors and candidate agreed that \u201cresidence\u201d in this context means \u201cpermanent abode,\u201d and that two elements are required for a permanent abode: (1) physical presence; and (2) an intent to remain there as a permanent abode. The Board cited case law establishing that, once a permanent abode is established, residence continues until abandoned. The Board concluded that the objectors had failed to establish that the candidate abandoned his residence, basing its conclusion on the evidence that the candidate maintained significant contacts with Chicago, intended to return to Chicago and to the Hermitage House, and had lived in Washington, D.C., solely for the purpose of working for the President. Among the findings made by the Board were the following:\n\u2014\u201cThe preponderance of this evidence establishes that the Candidate never formed an intention to terminate his residence in Chicago; never formed an intention to establish his residence in Washington, D.C., or any place other than Chicago; and never formed an intention to change his residence.\u201d\n\u2014\u201cThe preponderance of this evidence further establishes that throughout the relevant period in 2009 and 2010 the Candidate maintained significant contacts in and with the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois, including continuing ownership of real estate; continuing ownership of valuable personal property of kinds that a reasonable person would store at the place he deemed to be his permanent residence and to which he planned to return.\u201d\n\u2014\u201cThe preponderance of this evidence, particularly including the coincidental terms of the leases and extensions of leases of the Hermitage House and the Woodley House compel the inference that the Candidate and his spouse intended to return to occupy the Hermitage House and abide there.\u201d\n\u2014\u201cThe preponderance of this evidence establishes that the Candidate intended his presence in Washington, D.C., solely for the purpose of permitting him to discharge what he perceived to be a duty to serve the United States in the capacity of the Chief of Staff to the President of the United States.\u201d\n\u2014\u201cThe weight of the evidence shows that the Objectors failed to bear their burdens of proof and persuasion that the Candidate intended, in 2009 or 2010, to effect any change in his residence or to be anything other than a resident of Chicago for electoral purposes.\u201d\nThe petitioners filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court, and the court confirmed the Board\u2019s decision. The circuit court agreed with the Board that the relevant question was whether the candidate abandoned his Chicago residence when he became Chief of Staff to the President of the United States. The court determined that the Board\u2019s finding that the objectors had failed to show that the candidate abandoned his Chicago residence was not clearly erroneous.\nThe objectors appealed, and the appellate court reversed the decision of the circuit court and set aside the decision of the Board. The court noted that the Board\u2019s factual findings are deemed prima facie true and correct and may be overturned only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Moreover, an electoral board\u2019s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact \u2014 questions on which the undisputed law is applied to the historical facts \u2014 are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 406 Ill. App. 3d 9, 12 (citing Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210-11). The court determined, however, that it first needed to resolve a question of statutory construction to which the de novo standard of review would apply: what is the meaning of the phrase \u201cresided in\u201d in the section of the Municipal Code requiring that a candidate must have \u201cresided in the municipality at least one year next preceding the election\u201d (65 ILCS 5/3.1\u2014 10 \u2014 5(a) (West 2008)). 406 Ill. App. 3d at 13.\nThe court noted that the Board had used the definition of residence that is used in voter qualification cases (permanent abode). Moreover, the court acknowledged that using the same definition for voter qualification and candidate qualification was an approach that was supported by all of the published appellate court case law on the issue. However, the court was unconvinced that this was the correct test because it could not find a published supreme court opinion ratifying, adopting, or directly addressing this approach. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 13. The court acknowledged that in Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867), this court used an intent-based approach in determining a candidate residency question, but found this unpersuasive because a different standard of proof was applicable in that case. The court also noted that Smith was a quo warranto action in which the candidate already held office and that there was a presumption that he was entitled to hold the office to which he had been appointed. The court stated that it was unaware of any \u201csimilar presumption applicable to this case.\u201d 406 Ill. App. 3d at 14.\nThe court also found unpersuasive the candidate\u2019s argument that the Election Code defines residence as \u201cpermanent abode\u201d (10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 2 (West 2008)) and that this court has expressly directed that the Municipal Code and the Election Code be construed in pari materia. See Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 218-19. The court determined that the in pari materia doctrine meant only that the statutes should be given a harmonious construction, not necessarily an identical one. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 14. The court found more relevant than Cinkus \u2014 a two-year-old case mandating in pari materia construction \u2014 a quote from a 1960 case, People ex rel. Moran v. Teolis, 20 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (1960), in which this court stated that the statute at issue \u201c \u2018differentiate^] between \u201celectors\u201d and those persons who may qualify for municipal office.\u2019 \u201d 406 Ill. App. 3d at 15.\nIn other words, the court determined that it was painting on a blank canvas, with no applicable authority to guide it other than the Moran quote. The court ultimately determined that, as used in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u2014 5(a), \u201cresided in\u201d does not refer to a permanent abode, but rather where a person \u201cactually live[s]\u201d or \u201cactually reside[s].\u201d 406 Ill. App. 3d at 21. However, the court never explained what it meant by these terms, other than to say that the candidate does not qualify as a resident if this definition is used.\nThe court arrived at this definition by employing the following reasoning. First, the court relied on People v. Ballhorn, 100 Ill. App. 571 (1901), a decision that it acknowledged had no precedential authority under Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 95 (1996) (appellate court decisions filed prior to 1935 have no binding authority), for the proposition that the purpose of candidate residency requirements is that candidates be component parts of the units they represent, and that this can be accomplished only by actual, rather than constructive, residency. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 17. Next, the court noted that section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145 of the Municipal Code sets forth two qualifications for candidates and that they are stated in the conjunctive: a candidate must be \u201ca qualified elector of the municipality and [must have] resided in the municipality at least one year next preceding the election.\u201d The court determined that the candidate was clearly a qualified elector because, without regard to whether the Hermitage House constituted the candidate\u2019s permanent place of abode while it was under lease, the candidate qualified for the exception set forth in section 3 \u2014 2(a) of the Election Code, which states that \u201cNo elector or spouse shall be deemed to have lost his or her residence in any precinct or election district in this State by reason of his or her absence on business of the United States, or of this State.\u201d The court held that the candidate was on the business of the United States when he was employed as Chief of Staff to the President of the United States. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 17-18.\nThe court next took up the meaning of \u201cresided in.\u201d The court acknowledged that section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) contains a residency requirement, but held that its use of the term \u201cresided in\u201d means something other than residency as that term is traditionally understood. The court supported this interpretation by contending that the verb \u201cresides\u201d and the noun \u201cresident\u201d are used to entirely different effect in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(d), which applies to people (or their spouses) on active military duty. The court believed that the terms \u201cresident\u201d and \u201cresides\u201d connote different meanings in this subsection, and thus must have different meanings elsewhere in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145. According to the court, \u201cresides\u201d in subsection (d) means \u201cactually live,\u201d so \u201cresided in\u201d in subsection (a) must also mean \u201cactually live.\u201d 406 Ill. App. 3d at 19-21. Finally, the court determined that the \u201cbusiness of the United States\u201d exception stated in section 3 \u2014 2 of the Election Code applied only to the qualification of electors and did not apply to the candidate qualifications set forth in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145 of the Municipal Code. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 21-23.\nAccordingly, although the appellate court found that the candidate unquestionably was a qualified elector, it concluded that he did not meet the residency requirement of section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145 because he did not \u201cactually reside\u201d or \u201cactually live\u201d in Chicago for the entire year next preceding the election. The court did so without ever explaining what it meant by the terms \u201cactually reside\u201d or \u201cactually live.\u201d The court ordered the candidate\u2019s name excluded or removed from the ballot.\nJustice Lampkin dissented. Justice Lampkin disagreed with nearly every aspect of the majority\u2019s decision and would have applied the traditional definition of residence that has been established in Illinois law. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 24-25 (Lampkin, J., dissenting). Applying this standard, the dissent would not have found the Board\u2019s decision clearly erroneous. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 25-26 (Lampkin, J., dissenting).\nWe allowed the candidate\u2019s petition for leave to appeal and stayed the appellate court\u2019s decision pending this appeal.\nANALYSIS\nBefore proceeding to the merits, we wish to emphasize that, until just a few days ago, the governing law on this question had been settled in this State for going on 150 years. In Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16, 24 (1867), this court was faced with a question remarkably similar to that which is before us today. Smith, a longtime resident of Illinois, had been appointed a circuit judge by the governor of Illinois, and a quo warranto action was brought to remove Smith from that office on the grounds that he had not been an Illinois resident \u201cfor at least five years next preceding *** his appointment,\u201d as the Illinois Constitution then required. In support of their action, the objectors pointed to the fact that Smith had moved with his family to Tennessee for eight months during the relevant five-year residency period.\nIn concluding that Smith\u2019s eight-month sojourn to Tennessee did not result in an abandonment of his established Illinois residency, this court explained that, once established, \u201cresidence is lost *** by a union of intention and acts\u201d and that \u201cthe intention in many cases will be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.\u201d Smith, 44 Ill. at 24. This court then examined the \u201csurrounding circumstances\u201d and found that (1) Smith frequently declared that his move to Tennessee was only an experiment; (2) just two months after arriving in Tennessee, Smith expressed a desire to return to Illinois as soon as became feasible; (3) Smith at no time expressed an unqualified intention to remain in Tennessee; (4) Smith declined to vote in a Tennessee election because \u201che desired to do no act by which he would lose his citizenship in [Illinois]\u201d; (5) he refused to sell his Illinois law books prior to his move, saying that \u201che would probably return, and would then need them in his [Illinois law] practice\u201d; and (6) he \u201conly rented his [Illinois] residence when he left.\u201d Smith, 44 Ill. at 24. This evidence, the court concluded, was insufficient to \u201cestablish a presumption of loss of residence.\u201d Smith, 44 Ill. at 25.\nSince Smith was decided, the principles established in it have been consistently and faithfully applied in the candidacy context by the appellate court of this state. See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner, 355 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847-48 (2005) (\u201c \u2018[W]here a person leaves his residence and goes to another place, even if it be another [s]tate, with an intention to return to his former abode, or with only a conditional intention of acquiring a new residence, he does not lose his former residence so long as his intention remains conditional. \u2019 \u201d (quoting Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196, 201 (1938))); Walsh v. County Officers Electoral Board, 267 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976 (1994) (whether candidate abandoned old residence in favor of new residence presents a question of intent, which is measured both by the \u201csurrounding circumstances\u201d and the candidate\u2019s declarations thereof); Dillavou v. County Officers Electoral Board, 260 Ill. App. 3d 127, 132 (1994) (whether candidate abandoned estabhshed residence is a question of intent, and \u201c \u2018an absence for months, or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment\u2019 \u201d (quoting Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195 (1888))). Moreover, the principles estabhshed in Smith and uniformly followed since were the very principles relied upon by the hearing officer, the Board, and the circuit court below.\nThus, from April 1867 through January 24 of this year, the principles governing the question before us were settled. Things changed, however, when the appellate court below issued its decision and announced that it was no longer bound by any of the law cited above, including this court\u2019s decision in Smith, but was instead free to craft its own original standard for determining a candidate\u2019s residency. See 406 Ill. App. 3d at 13-14 (dismissing the foregoing authority in its entirety). Thus, our review of the appellate court\u2019s decision in this case begins not where it should, with an assessment of whether the court accurately applied established Illinois law to the particular facts, but with an assessment of whether the appellate court was justified in tossing out 150 years of settled residency law in favor of its own preferred standard. We emphatically hold that it was not.\nThe Smith principles control this case, plain and simple. With the sole exception of the prescribed time period, the provision at issue in Smith is identical to the one at issue here. Both provide that, in order to be eligible for public office, a person must reside in the relevant jurisdiction for some period \u201cnext preceding the election or appointment.\u201d And in both cases, the sole issue presented is whether the person seeking to hold the office in question had abandoned his Illinois residency by virtue of an extended relocation to another part of the country. In answering that question in Smith, this court explained that, once established, \u201cresidence is lost *** by a union of intention and acts\u201d and that \u201cthe intention in many cases will be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.\u201d Smith, 44 Ill. at 25. The court then examined the surrounding circumstances, including both Smith\u2019s words and Smith\u2019s actions, to determine whether Smith had abandoned his Illinois residency. Ultimately, the court concluded that he had not. In every relevant way, the analysis that this court employed in Smith is the very analysis that the hearing officer, the Board, and the circuit court below employed, and they were correct in doing so. Smith has never been overruled, and it is directly on point.\nFor two reasons, the appellate court concluded that Smith was not controlling authority in this case. Neither of these reasons is convincing. First, the court noted that, because Smith involved a quo warranto action, the burden of proof on the objecting party was higher (clear and convincing) than it is for the objectors in this case (preponderance of the evidence). 406 Ill. App. 3d at 13-14. While this is undeniably true, we fail to see how it renders Smith\u2019s residency analysis irrelevant, as burden of proof does not impact what a party must prove, but only how well the party must prove it. The appellate court\u2019s other basis for rejecting Smith was its determination that, \u201calthough the supreme court\u2019s discussion in Smith was based nominally on principles of \u2018residence,\u2019 it appears from its analysis that it actually applied concepts of domicile.\u201d 406 Ill. App. 3d at 14. In other words, the appellate court concluded that Smith is not binding because this court did not know what it was talking about when it wrote it. Leaving to one side the propriety of such a determination, two things quickly belie the appellate court\u2019s conclusion on this point: (1) the issue in Smith arose under the Illinois Constitution\u2019s residency provision, and consequently anything this court said on this point was, by definition, in relation to residency; and (2) as will be demonstrated below, this court has applied similar principles in virtually every setting in which it has construed a legal residency requirement.\nAll of that said, and putting aside the appellate court\u2019s conclusion that Smith is not binding in this case, the appellate court\u2019s residency analysis remains fundamentally flawed. This is because, even under traditional principles of statutory analysis, the inevitable conclusion is that the residency analysis conducted by the hearing officer, the Board, and the circuit court was proper.\nThe issue in this case is whether the candidate met the statutory requirements to run for and hold elected municipal office, as set forth in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) (West 2008)). That section states, in relevant part:\n\u201cA person is not eligible for an elective municipal office unless that person is a qualified elector of the municipality and has resided in the municipality at least one year next preceding the election or appointment ***.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) (West 2008).\nFor present purposes, the critical question is what does this section mean by \u201creside[ ] in\u201d? This presents a question of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law subject to de novo review (In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000)) and the rules governing our inquiry are familiar. Our primary goal when interpreting the language of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Devoney v. Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 199 Ill. 2d 414, 424-25 (2002) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride, J.). The plain language of a statute is the best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 364 (2005). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we will enforce it as written and will not read into it exceptions, conditions, or limitations that the legislature did not express. In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 364.\nAs Smith demonstrates, this court very early on announced the principles that would inform residency analysis in the context of eligibility to hold public office. And since Smith, this court has consistently applied similar residency principles in a variety of other contexts, most especially in the context of voting. From these cases, several well-settled principles emerge. First, to establish residency, two elements are required: (1) physical presence, and (2) an intent to remain in that place as a permanent home. Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Comm\u2019n, 2 Ill. 2d 374, 380 (1954) (citing voting cases). Second, once residency is established, the test is no longer physical presence but rather abandonment. Indeed, once a person has established residence, he or she can be physically absent from that residence for months or even years without having abandoned it:\n\u201c[T]he shortest absence, if at the time intended as a permanent abandonment, is sufficient, although the party may soon afterwards change his intention; while, on the other hand, an absence for months, or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment.\u201d Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195 (1888).\nStated differently, a residence is not lost \u201cby temporary removal with the intention to return, or even with a conditional intention of acquiring a new residence, but when one abandons his home and takes up his residence in another county or election district.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark v. Quick, 377 Ill. 424, 427 (1941). Third, both the establishment and the abandonment of a residence is principally a question of intent. Park v. Hood, 374 Ill. 36, 43 (1940). And while \u201c[i]ntent is gathered primarily from the acts of a person\u201d (Stein v. County Board of School Trustees, 40 Ill. 2d 477, 480 (1968)), a voter is competent to testify as to his intention, though such testimony is not necessarily conclusive (Coffey v. Board of Election Commissioners, 375 Ill. 385, 387-88 (1940)). Fourth, and finally, once a residence has been established, the presumption is that it continues, and the burden of proof is on the contesting party to show that it has been abandoned. People v. Estate of Moir, 207 Ill. 180, 186 (1904).\nThe question, then, is whether there is any indication that, in enacting and amending section 3.1 \u2014 10\u2014 5(a) of the Municipal Code, the legislature intended residence to mean anything other than what it has meant in this state for well over a century. There is no such indication.\nThis court has held that \u201c[w]ords used in the Municipal Code, as in any other statute, are to be given their plain and commonly understood meaning in the absence of an indication of legislative intent to the contrary.\u201d In re Petition to Annex Certain Territory to the Village of North Barrington, 144 Ill. 2d 353, 362 (1991). And where a term has a settled legal meaning, this court will normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate that settled meaning. People v. Smith, 236 Ill. 2d 162, 167 (2010). In Illinois, the legal meaning of residence has been settled for well over 100 years, not only in the very context that section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) concerns (see Smith, 44 Ill. at 23-25), but in virtually every other setting in which this court has construed a legal residency requirement. See, e.g., Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Comm\u2019n, 2 Ill. 2d 374, 380 (1954) (eligibility for state public aid); People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 566 (1940) (eligibility for local public aid); In re Petition of Mulford, 217 Ill. 242, 249 (1905) (eligibility to serve as executor of decedent\u2019s estate); People v. Estate of Moir, 207 Ill. 180, 186-87 (1904) (liability for inheritance tax); Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867) (eligibility to hold public office). There is absolutely no indication anywhere in the Municipal Code that the legislature intended residency in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) to mean anything other than this well-settled meaning.\nSecond, this court has twice stated explicitly that related provisions of the Election Code and of the Illinois Municipal Code are to be considered in pari materia for purposes of statutory construction. See Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 218 (2008); United Citizens of Chicago & Illinois v. Coalition to Let the People Decide in 1989, 125 Ill. 2d 332, 338-39 (1988). The reason for this is that these two Codes are \u201c \u2018[gloverned by one spirit and a single policy.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 339 (quoting People v. Maya, 105 Ill. 2d 281, 286-87 (1985)). Consequently, this court must presume \u201c \u2018that the legislature intended the enactments to be consistent and harmonious.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Maya, 105 Ill. 2d at 286-87). Section 3 \u2014 1 of the Election Code provides, in relevant part, that \u201c[ejvery person (i) who has resided in this State and in the election district 30 days next preceding any election therein *** and who is a citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 or more years is entitled to vote at such election for all offices and on all propositions.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1 (West 2008). Section 3 \u2014 2(a) of the Election Code, in turn, provides that \u201c[a] permanent abode is necessary to constitute a residence within the meaning of Section 3 \u2014 1.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 2(a) (West 2008). Thus, under the voter-eligibility provisions of the Election Code, \u201cresidence\u201d and \u201cpermanent abode\u201d are synonymous (see Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196, 200 (1938)), and both are governed by the well-settled residency principles outlined above (see, e.g., id.). This, then, raises the question: How can this court best construe the residency requirement in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) of the Municipal Code as to render it consistent and in harmony with the residency requirement contained in section 3 \u2014 1 of the Election Code? The appellate court\u2019s answer was to assign them inconsistent and competing meanings. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 21-22. How, exactly, this fosters consistency and harmony is unclear, and the appellate court makes no effort to explain. The far better approach, we believe, and the one that vindicates our obligation to construe the provisions consistently and harmoniously, is to presume that they have the same meaning, that to \u201creside[ ] in\u201d means the same thing in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) of the Municipal Code as it does in section 3 \u2014 1 of the Election Code.\nThird, as helpful as the in pari materia doctrine is, it is not clear that it is necessary in this case, as we are faced not so much with related provisions of separate statutes as with a single statutory provision. Consequently, the more relevant canon of construction may be the one stating that \u201cwhere the same, or substantially the same, words or phrases appear in different parts of the same statute they will be given a generally accepted and consistent meaning, where the legislative intent is not clearly expressed to the contrary.\u201d Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1959). Again, section 3.1 \u2014 10\u2014 5(a) of the Municipal Code states, in relevant part:\n\u201cA person is not eligible for an elective municipal office unless that person is a qualified elector of the municipality and has resided in the municipality at least one year next preceding the election or appointment ***.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) (West 2008).\nAnd again, to determine whether one is a \u201cqualified elector of the municipality,\u201d article 3 of the Election Code must be consulted. Effectively, then, the voter eligibility standards from article 3 of the Election Code, including the residency standard, have been incorporated into section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) of the Municipal Code. Thus, were we to say that residency means one thing in article 3 of the Election Code and something altogether different in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) of the Municipal Code, we would be creating an inconsistency not only between the two codes, but within section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) itself \u2014 residency would mean one thing in the \u201cqualified elector\u201d clause, and something else just three words later in the one-year residency clause. There being no indication that the legislature intended any such inconsistency, we will not read it into section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a). Instead, we will presume that the legislature intended residency to mean the same thing each time it is referenced in section 3.1\u2014 10 \u2014 5(a).\nOf course, the appellate court did not see the statutory question this way. But its reasons for departing from over 100 years of settled residency law are hardly compelling and deserve only brief attention. First, as already noted, the appellate court asserts that this court \u201chas at least once noted the distinction between candidate and voter residency requirements.\u201d 406 Ill. App. 3d at 15. In support, the appellate court cites to this court\u2019s 1960 pronouncement that the residency requirements set forth in the Municipal Code \u201c \u2018differentiate[d] between \u201celectors\u201d and those persons who may qualify for municipal office.\u2019 \u201d 406 Ill. App. 3d at 15 (quoting People ex rel. Moran v. Teolis, 20 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (I960)). The intended implication, of course, is that this court has a history of defining residency differently as between candidates and electors. What the appellate court fails to mention is that the cited portion of Moran was referring solely to the statutory time periods in the respective local residency requirements (i.e., 30 days for electors, one year for candidates), a \u201cdistinction\u201d that appears on the face of the statute and says nothing about how, as opposed to how long, residency must be established.\nThe appellate court then spends five pages examining section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(d) of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(d) (West 2008)), which is somewhat mysterious given that this section in no way speaks to the definition of \u201cresidency.\u201d Enacted in 2007, section 3.1 \u2014 10\u2014 5(d) provides:\n\u201cIf a person (i) is a resident of a municipality immediately prior to the active duty military service of that person or that person\u2019s spouse, (ii) resides anywhere outside of the municipality during that active duty military service, and (iii) immediately upon completion of that active duty military service is again a resident of the municipality, then the time during which the person resides outside the municipality during the active duty military service is deemed to be time during which the person is a resident of the municipality for purposes of determining the residency requirement under subsection (a).\u201d 65 ILCS 5/3.1 \u2014 10\u2014 5(d) (West 2008).\nFar from resolving the question of what it means to \u201creside in\u201d or be \u201ca resident of\u201d a municipality for purposes of section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a), section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(d) begs that very same question. By its plain terms, section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(d) speaks of someone who, though once a \u201cresident,\u201d spent some amount of time \u201cresid[ing]\u201d somewhere else, and now is \u201cagain a resident.\u201d The only way to construe this provision in any meaningful way is to know what the Municipal Code means by residency, something section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(d) in no way speaks to. So rather than providing the elusive answer, this provision leaves us right back where we started: What does residency mean for purposes of section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145 of the Municipal Code?\nBy way of final thought on this question, we wish to point out that, while this court\u2019s traditional definition of residence may be plugged into the Municipal Code without creating any ambiguity or confusion, the appellate court\u2019s new and undefined standard promises just the opposite. Although adopting a previously unheard-of test for residency that would have applied to all future municipal elections, the court made no attempt to explain what its standard means. The only hint given by the appellate court is that, whatever its standard means, this candidate did not satisfy it. The appellate court never explained what it meant by \u201cactually reside\u201d or \u201cactually live.\u201d Indeed, as its discussion of section 3.1 \u2014 10\u2014 5(d) reflects, the entire appellate court opinion can be read as nothing more than an extended exercise in question begging, in which the appellate court sets forth the question to be answered as what it means to \u201creside\u201d (406 Ill. App. 3d at 16), and concludes that it means to have \u201cactually resided\u201d (406 Ill. App. 3d at 21).\nThe difficulty of applying such a standard is immediately apparent. For instance, consider a Chicago resident who owns a second home in Florida and typically spends a month there every winter. Where is that person \u201cactually living\u201d or \u201cactually residing\u201d during the month when he or she is at the second home? Is such a person ineligible for municipal office unless he or she sleeps at the Chicago house every night for the year preceding the election? Is there a time limit with this test? Would a week at the second home be short enough but two months be too long? What about a Chicago resident whose job requires him to spend extended periods of time out of the country every year? Where is such a person \u201cactually living\u201d or \u201cactually residing\u201d when out of the country? Assuming without deciding that the appellate court was correct that the government service exception does not apply to candidates, consider the example of Representatives in Congress who often spend four to five days a week in Washington, D.C. If a Representative from a Chicago congressional district owns a condominium in Washington, D.C., where is that representative \u201cactually living\u201d or \u201cactually residing\u201d when Congress is in session? Under the majority\u2019s test, would the candidate have been ineligible to run for mayor even during the time he was serving in Congress? The same confusion would arise with respect to State Representatives or State Senators who must spend considerable amounts of time in Springfield. Applying the traditional test of residency to all of the above examples leads to the commonsense conclusion that all would remain Chicago residents even when away. Under the appellate court\u2019s test, considerable doubt would arise as to whether any of these people could meet a residency test that requires one year of \u201cactually living\u201d or \u201cactually residing\u201d in the municipality. Once the practical implications of adopting a standard for residence that means \u201cactually lives\u201d or \u201cactually resides\u201d are considered, one can readily appreciate why such a standard has never been adopted and why the standard used in Illinois has endured for well over a century.\nSo where does all of this leave us? It leaves us convinced that, when determining whether a candidate for public office has \u201cresided in\u201d the municipality at least one year next preceding the election or appointment, the principles that govern are identical to those embodied in Smith and consistently applied in the context of determining whether a voter has \u201cresided in\u201d this state and in the election district 30 days next preceding any election. Thus, in assessing whether the candidate has established residency, the two required elements are: (1) physical presence, and (2) an intent to remain in that place as a permanent home. Once residency is established, the test is no longer physical presence but rather abandonment, the presumption is that residency continues, and the burden of proof is on the contesting party to show that residency has been abandoned. Both the establishment and abandonment of a residence is largely a question of intent, and while intent is shown primarily from a candidate\u2019s acts, a candidate is absolutely competent to testify as to his intention, though such testimony is not necessarily conclusive.\nWith these governing principles in mind, we now consider the Board\u2019s ruling. The first thing that must be observed is that the Board applied the very standard we prescribe above for determining residency. Given this, and given that we have already determined that the Board\u2019s factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we may immediately proceed to determining whether the Board\u2019s conclusion that the candidate met the residency requirement was clearly erroneous. A decision is \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d only when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Cook County Republican Party v. Elinois State Board of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 244 (2009). Having carefully reviewed the Board\u2019s decision, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\nAgain, because it is uncontested that the candidate was a Chicago resident at least until January 2, 2009, when he resigned his office as Representative from the Fifth Congressional District of Illinois, the Board correctly determined that the relevant question was not whether the candidate had established residency in Chicago, but rather whether the objectors had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the candidate had abandoned that residency at any time during the one-year period before the February 22, 2011, election. Only when abandonment is proven is residence lost. Stein v. County Board of School Trustees, 40 Ill. 2d 477, 479 (1968). On the question of abandonment, a party\u2019s intention is controlling. Kreitz, 125 Ill. at 195. Intention is determined both by a person\u2019s declarations and his acts. Id. A person\u2019s declarations of intent are not conclusive and may be disproved by his acts. Id. Once a residence has been established the presumption is that it continues, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming that it has been changed. Estate of Moir, 207 Ill. at 186.\nAfter finding the facts as summarized at the outset of this opinion, the Board concluded that the objectors had failed to meet their burden of showing that the candidate had abandoned his residence. Specifically, the Board found that the preponderance of the evidence did not show the candidate had formed an intention to terminate his residence in Chicago or to establish his residence elsewhere. The candidate maintained significant contacts in and with the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois, including continuing ownership of real estate; continuing ownership of valuable personal property of kinds that a reasonable person would store at the place he deemed to be his permanent residence and to which he planned to return. The Board concluded that the candidate\u2019s absence from Chicago was solely for the purpose of permitting him to discharge what he perceived to be a duty to serve the United States in the capacity of Chief of Staff to the President of the United States. Moreover, the Board found that the fact that the ending dates of the lease terms for the Woodley House and the Hermitage House were identical, showed that the candidate intended to return to the Hermitage House as soon as his service to the President was over. None of these findings are clearly erroneous.\nThis is a situation in which, not only did the candidate testify that his intent was not to abandon his Chicago residence, his acts fully support and confirm that intent. The candidate told several friends that he intended to serve as Chief of Staff for no more than 18 months or two years before returning to Chicago. The candidate has continued to own and pay property taxes on the Chicago residence while only renting in Washington, D.C. As set forth above, the ending dates for the Woodley House lease and the Hermitage House lease were identical and coincided with the end of the school year of the candidate\u2019s children. This supports an inference that the candidate intended to move back into the Hermitage House when the Woodley House lease ended. The candidate has continuously maintained an Illinois driver\u2019s license setting forth the Hermitage House as his address and has never obtained a Washington, D.C., driver\u2019s license. The candidate has continued to register his car at the Hermitage House address. The candidate registered to vote from the Hermitage House address in 1999 and has continuously voted from that address in every election through February 2010. Up and through 2010, the candidate did his banking in Chicago and had the Hermitage House address printed on his personal checks. The candidate left many personal items in the Hermitage House, including his bed, two televisions, a stereo system, a piano, and over 100 boxes of personal possessions. Although the candidate paid income taxes to the government of the District of Columbia, the candidate continued to pay state income tax in Illinois.\nThe objectors claim that, once a person rents out a residence, he or she has abandoned it as a matter of law. This is obviously incorrect, as it is directly contrary to Smith. Indeed, Smith makes clear that rental is merely one factor to consider in determining abandonment (Smith, 44 Ill. at 24), and the terms of the rental and the circumstances surrounding it must be considered. For instance, if an Illinois resident accepts a permanent job with an out-of-state corporation, purchases a house in a new state, moves his or her family into the new house, moves all of his or her belongings out of the old house and into the new one, and then rents out the old house on a one-year lease with a right to renew, it clearly could be said that this was an abandonment of the Illinois residency. By contrast, the Board did not believe that this rental showed abandonment when the candidate took a position as Chief of Staff to the President of the United States (an inherently temporary position of national service), merely rented in Washington, D.C., left many personal belongings in the Chicago residence, and ensured that the lease term for the Chicago house ended at the same time as the lease on the Washington, D.C., house. The Board determined that, in this situation, the rental did not show abandonment of the residence. This conclusion was well supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous.\nGiven the record before us, it is simply not possible to find clearly erroneous the Board\u2019s determination that the objectors failed to prove that the candidate had abandoned his Chicago residence. We therefore reverse the decision of the appellate court and affirm the decision of the circuit court, which confirmed the Board\u2019s decision.\nSo there will be no mistake, let us be entirely clear. This court\u2019s decision is based on the following and only on the following: (1) what it means to be a resident for election purposes was clearly established long ago, and Illinois law has been consistent on the matter since at least the nineteenth century; (2) the novel standard adopted by the appellate court majority is without any foundation in Illinois law; (3) the Board\u2019s factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (4) the Board\u2019s decision was not clearly erroneous.\nAppellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.\nThe appellate court left it to the reader to discern how the standard of proof was in any way relevant to what standard the court used to determine the merits of the residency issue.\nBecause the election has yet to occur, there is, of course, no presumption that the candidate is entitled to the office he seeks. Nevertheless, there is a similar presumption applicable to the specific question before us, in that the candidate is presumed to be a Chicago resident. See People v. Estate of Moir, 207 Ill. 180, 186 (1904), in which this court explained that \u201cwhen a residence is once established the presumption is that it continues.\u201d\nThis court did so, however, only in the context of setting forth the different time limits for the respective residency requirements. See Moran, 20 Ill. 2d at 104.\nIn pertinent part, the relevant statutes for determining whether one is a qualified elector provide that:\n\u201c\u00a73 \u2014 1. Every person *** who has resided in this State and in the election district 30 days next preceding any election therein *** and who is a citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 or more years is entitled to vote at such election for all offices and on all propositions.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1 (West 2008).\n\u201c\u00a73 \u2014 2. (a) A permanent abode is necessary to constitute a residence within the meaning of Section 3 \u2014 1. No elector or spouse shall be deemed to have lost his or her residence in any precinct or election district in this State by reason of his or her absence on business of the United States, or of this State.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 2 (West 2008).\nFor purposes of clarity, and like the legislature, we will use terms such as \u201cresidency,\u201d \u201cresident,\u201d and \u201creside\u201d interchangeably. See Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1959) (\u201cwhere the same, or substantially the same, words or phrases appear in different parts of the same statute they will be given a generally accepted and consistent meaning\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1, 3 \u2014 2 (West 2008) (treating \u201cresides in\u201d and \u201cresidence\u201d synonymously).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" }, { "text": "JUSTICES FREEMAN and BURKE,\nspecially concurring:\nWe join in the majority\u2019s decision to reverse the judgment of the appellate court. We do not, however, agree with the majority\u2019s reasoning.\nThe result in this case is in no way as clear-cut as the majority makes it out to be. The majority states that, in Illinois, \u201cthe legal meaning of residence has been settled for well over 100 years, not only in the very context that section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) concerns (see Smith, 44 Ill. at 23-25), but in virtually every other setting in which this court has construed a legal residency requirement.\u201d Supra at 320. This is simply not true.\nAs this court has noted, the legal term \u201cresidence\u201d does not \u201chave a fixed and constant meaning\u201d Fagiano v. Police Board, 98 Ill. 2d 277, 282 (1983); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws \u00a711, cmt. k, at 45 (1971) (\u201cResidence is an ambiguous word whose meaning in a legal phrase must be determined in each case\u201d); Willis L.M. Reese & Robert S. Green, That Elusive Word, \u201cResidence\u201d, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 561, 580 (1953) (residence is \u201cone of the most nebulous terms in the legal dictionary\u201d); Willenbrock v. Rogers, 255 F.2d 236, 237 (3d Cir. 1958) (\u201cThe words \u2018resident\u2019 and \u2018residence\u2019 have no precise legal meaning although they are favorite words of legislators.\u201d).\nThe majority bases its decision entirely on Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867). As the appellate court correctly noted, the outcome in that decision turned solely on intent, a principle that is consistent with the legal concept of domicile. See Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 312 (1874). Unfortunately, Smith was not this court\u2019s last pronouncement on the issue. Later decisions, namely Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196 (1938), Park v. Hood, 374 Ill. 36 (1940), and Clark v. Quick, 377 Ill. 424 (1941), each define residence in terms of domicile plus a permanent abode. In other words, under these cases, intent alone is not enough to establish residency.\nSuffice it to say, therefore, that this court has not always spoken clearly on what is meant by residency, and the majority should acknowledge this fact. This is why both sides in this dispute can contend that their respective positions are supported by decades of precedent. Indeed, contrary to the majority\u2019s assertions, the only thing that is well established in this case is the confusion that has existed on this subject. The majority today now makes clear that residency for all purposes is the equivalent of domicile. The majority, therefore, should overrule those portions of Pope, Park, and Clark which hold to the contrary.\nIt is for this reason that the tone taken by the majority today is unfortunate. Because our own case law was, until today, unclear, it is unfair of the majority to state that the appellate court majority \u201ctoss[ed] out 150 years of settled residency law\u201d (supra at 316), adopted a \u201cpreviously unheard-of test for residency\u201d (supra at 324), or was engaged in a \u201cmysterious\u201d analysis (supra at 323). In order to properly address the parties\u2019 arguments, the appellate court had to reconcile this court\u2019s conflicting pronouncements on the question of residency. That court did the best it could without the benefit of a supreme court opinion which clarified the standards. By refusing to acknowledge the role our own case law has played in creating the dispute before us, the majority unwittingly adds credence to the inflammatory statements contained in the dissenting opinion below.\nThe dissenting justice below accused the appellate court majority of engaging in a \u201cpure flight of fancy\u201d (406 Ill. App. 3d at 28 (Lampkin, J., dissenting)), of \u201cconjur[ing]\u201d its result \u201cout of thin air\u201d (id. at 31), and of having a \u201ccareless disregard for the law\u201d (id. at 31). The dissenting justice also stated that the result was a \u201cfigment of the majority\u2019s imagination\u201d (id. at 31), based on the \u201cwhims of two judges\u201d (id. at 32). In other words, the dissenting justice accused the majority of basing its decision on something other than the law.\nWhen the appellate court\u2019s decision was announced, these accusations were repeatedly emphasized in the media (see, e.g., Judicial Arrogance, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 25, 2011, at 14; Rahm Ruling a Disservice to Voters, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 25, 2011, at 21), thereby fueling the perception that the appellate court\u2019s decision was, in fact, based on extrajudicial considerations. The tone taken by the majority today, and the refusal to acknowledge conflicting case law, unfairly perpetuates that notion.\nSpirited debate plays an essential role in legal discourse. But the majority opinion here and the appellate dissent cross the line. Inflammatory accusations serve only to damage the integrity of the judiciary and lessen the trust which the public places in judicial opinions. The present case, one of obvious public interest, raises difficult questions regarding the legal concept of residency about which reasonable minds may differ. Indeed, as noted above, the meaning of the term \u201cresidency\u201d has puzzled attorneys and judges since the term first appeared in the statute books. The majority and dissenting appellate court opinions illustrate the confusion that has long existed on this issue, which is the very reason for the difficulty in discerning what the General Assembly meant when it used the words \u201chas resided in\u201d in section 3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1 \u2014 10\u20145(a) (West 2008)). There is no reason for the majority here to cast aspersions on the appellate court\u2019s motivations.\nFormer Illinois Supreme Court Justice Ben Miller, one of the most esteemed jurists to have served on this court, stated it well:\n\u201cJudges often disagree about what result the law requires in a particular case. The existence of these disagreements, and the ability of our legal system to thrive on them, are virtues of the judicial process and of our system of government. The terms of the debate, however, must be framed by civility and respect, and not by suspicion and untruths. When rancor eclipses reason, the quality of the debate is diminished, the bonds of collegiality are strained, and the judicial process is demeaned. We cannot prescribe civility to members of the bar when our own opinions are disfigured by comments as offensive as those we have admonished lawyers for making. [Citation.] We should receive no less from our colleagues than we expect from lawyers who appear in our courts.\u201d People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 222 (1998) (Miller, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, C.J., and McMorrow, J.).\nFinally, it should be noted that today\u2019s decision will raise questions beyond the facts of this case. Because the court holds that residency has one settled meaning, and that meaning rests on a person\u2019s intent, today\u2019s decision will have implications for residency requirements for instate tuition, residency requirements for municipal employees such as police officers and firefighters, residency requirements for school districts and other similar situations. This court should be prepared to address those issues as firmly and expeditiously as we have done today.\nBecause of the breadth of today\u2019s decision, we do not join the majority\u2019s holding that residency is the equivalent of domicile and that intent, therefore determines residency, even in the absence of any physical presence. Rather, we would answer the narrow question that was actually raised by the objectors in this case: Does a person lose his permanent abode if the abode is rented during the relevant residency period? To that question we answer \u201cno.\u201d Smith\u2019s rule of intent was called into question by Park\u2019s holding requiring a permanent abode in addition to domicile to maintain residency. Thus, despite the similarity in facts between this case and Smith, it remains an open question, in the wake of Park, as to whether a permanent abode is lost by renting it out. In the absence of explicit guidance from the legislature on this question, and because a candidate\u2019s access to the ballot is favored by law (see, e.g., McGuire v. Nogaj, 146 Ill. App. 3d 280, 282 (1986) (access to the ballot \u201cis not to be prohibited or curtailed except by plain provisions of the law\u201d)), we join in the judgment of the majority.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICES FREEMAN and BURKE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Burton S. Odelson, Matthew M. Welch and Lauren M. Da Valle, of Odelson & Sterk, Ltd., of Evergreen Park, and Thomas A. Jaconetty and James E Nally, EC., both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Michael K. Forde and Michael J. Gill, of Mayer Brown, LLP, Michael J. Kasper, Kevin M. Forde and Richard J. Prendergast, all of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 111773.\nWALTER P. MAKSYM et al., Appellees, v. THE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed January 27, 2011.\nBurton S. Odelson, Matthew M. Welch and Lauren M. Da Valle, of Odelson & Sterk, Ltd., of Evergreen Park, and Thomas A. Jaconetty and James E Nally, EC., both of Chicago, for appellants.\nMichael K. Forde and Michael J. Gill, of Mayer Brown, LLP, Michael J. Kasper, Kevin M. Forde and Richard J. Prendergast, all of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0303-01", "first_page_order": 313, "last_page_order": 344 }