{ "id": 5352878, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. James Naujokas, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Naujokas", "decision_date": "1962-05-25", "docket_number": "No. 36227", "first_page": "32", "last_page": "38", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 32" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "6 Ill.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2708980 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ill. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4739360 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/261/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2866420 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/196/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742770 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2797074 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2795966 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0605-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 532, "char_count": 9783, "ocr_confidence": 0.813, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.365816765397742e-07, "percentile": 0.9804087033645591 }, "sha256": "cc3906f193c050c4c60208b62758d5306359a26546e2c92b3516b2e2cca2f838", "simhash": "1:f6897925818454ff", "word_count": 1659 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:58:32.986200+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. James Naujokas, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Solfisburg\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant James Naujokas was indicted in the criminal court of Cook County on charges of robbery and armed robbery. He was tried before a jury, found guilty, and sentenced to confinement at hard labor in the penitentiary for the term of his natural life.\nDefendant brings this writ of error, contending that he was erroneously sentenced under the Habitual Criminal Act; that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial, in instructing the jury, in refusing cross-examination of a witness for the State, and in admitting into evidence a certain exhibit offered by the State; and further contending that the assistant State\u2019s Attorney who tried the case made prejudicial remarks during his closing argument.\nThe People confess error in that defendant was improperly sentenced under the Habitual Criminal Act, and for this reason alone, the case will be reversed and remanded for correction of the sentence. We will consider the other contentions of defendant separately.\nOn April 23, 1957, shortly after 4:00 P.M., Joseph Lukaszek, a route man, was confronted at the back of his delivery truck by a man armed with a gun, who took $169 from him, and then escaped. At a police line-up later the same day, Lukaszek identified the defendant as the man who had robbed him, and also identified the defendant in court. A witness, Lucien Sejud, jotted down the license number of the car in which the robber made his escape. The car was traced to the owner, from whom the defendant had borrowed it, and the defendant was arrested that night as he returned the car. As he was arrested he drew a gun which was taken from him by the police. A statement, admitted into evidence, was taken from the defendant in the early morning of April 24, 1957, in which he confessed to the armed robbery. The defendant produced witnesses who testified that he left the home of friends shortly before 4 :oo P.M. on the day in question and arrived at a tavern shortly after 4 :oo P.M. and stayed there until after 7 :oo P.M.\nDuring direct examination of officer Andrysiak, one of the arresting officers, he was asked what he did with relation to the defendant after the line-up. The witness answered that he went to defendant\u2019s home and searched it with defendant\u2019s permission and found a quantity of ladies\u2019 and children\u2019s clothing. The witness, continuing his answer, stated: \u201cI says to him, \u2018Who does this belong to ?\u2019 He says, \u2018Well, if you give me a break I will tell you who it belongs to.\u2019 I said, \u2018You are not getting any break from me. These clothes apparently must be stolen.\u2019 Then he told us who the clothes \u2014 .\u201d At this point counsel for the defendant objected to the statement and asked for a mistrial. The court immediately interrupted the witness, denied the motion for mistrial, sustained the objection, struck the answer and instructed the jury to disregard it.\nOn cross-examination of officer Devitt, another arresting officer, counsel for the defendant asked: \u201cBut at the show-up he said that he didn\u2019t do it, didn\u2019t he?\u201d Officer Devitt answered: \u201cWell, he . . . as . . . well, he was caught with the goods in the basement of his place and he was trying to weasel out. He was in bad shape at the time having been in prison. Just being out of prison a short time, he knew the . . .\u201d Upon objection and motion for a mistrial, the court again denied the motion, but sustained an objection to the answer, and directed the jury to disregard the answer. It is apparent that the quoted testimony of both police officers was incompetent and irrelevant. However, in the first incident the answer was not responsive and was not adduced by the question asked by the State\u2019s Attorney. In the second incident the testimony was likewise improper but was not the responsibility of the State, as it occurred during cross-examination by defense counsel. In addition the prompt action of the court in interrupting the testimony, striking the answer, and admonishing the jury served to cure any possible error.\" In view of the fact of the court\u2019s prompt action and the fact that the testimony was not adduced by action of the State, we feel that the court was not in error in denying the motions for a mistrial. People v. Crawford, 23 Ill.2d 605 People v. Burage, 23 Ill.2d 280.\nThe defendant next contends that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction to the jury, on the defendant\u2019s defense of an alibi: \u201cThe court instructs the jury that before a defendant can avail himself of the defense of an alibi, the proof must cover the whole of the time of the commission of the crime, so as to render it impossible or highly improbable, that the defendant could have committed the act; and unless the proof in a case covers the whole time, so as to render the commission of the crime by a defendant impossible or highly improbable, then' that defense is not available to such defendant.\u201d\nIn People v. Pearson, 19 Ill.2d 609, we severely criticized the identical instruction both as having undesirable overtones bearing upon the burden of proof and as being inapplicable to the facts of that case. We held, however, that the error contained in said instruction regarding the burden of proof was obviated by other alibi instructions identical to those given in the case at bar. In the present case, unlike the Pearson case, there is a gap in the time accounted for by alibi witnesses. In the Pearson case we also examined the entire record and held that the giving of this criticized instruction could not affect the ultimate outcome of the trial. In carefully considering the present record, the positive identification of the accused, his confession, and'the other facts and circumstances, we cannot find that the ultimate outcome of the trial could have been affected by giving the challenged instruction. Pursuant to Rule 25 of this court we have considered the question of the propriety of this instruction,even though no objection was made to it, but we: find that no prejudice to the defendant resulted from giving the disputed instruction.\nThe defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow counsel for the defendant to cross-examine a witness for the State, in order to show bias on the part of the witness. This witness was Officer Devitt, who had been recalled to testify concerning events at the police station after the defendant had been arrested. Defense counsel endeavored to question the officer to establish that he and the two occurrence witnesses for the State lived in the same neighborhood, and were friends.\nWe agree that generally the widest latitude should be allowed the defendant in cross-examination for the purpose of establishing bias, (People v. Goehringer, 196 Ill. App. 472; People v. Warfield, 261 Ill. 293,) but we cannot agree that there was error in limiting cross-examination of the witness when he had been called on rebuttal for a limited purpose. The defendant had been permitted wide latitude in his cross-examination when Devitt had first been called, and looking at the record as a whole we fail to see that defendant was prejudiced by the court\u2019s sustaining an objection to his proposed line of questioning.\nThe defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting People\u2019s exhibit 1, a page of a notebook, in evidence, on the ground that no proper foundation had been laid. Officer Andrysiak testified that he and his partner were listening to a police radio, and heard a broadcast of a license number. This witness stated that his partner wrote the license number in his notebook. The page of the notebook containing this jotting was admitted in evidence.\nIn his oral argument before us, counsel for the defendant conceded that the document was of little probative value, and we agree. There was ample testimony that a license number had been observed by the witness Sejud, that this number was transmitted by radio, that the auto to which it was assigned was traced, and that the defendant was apprehended while driving that car. We cannot discern any prejudicial error in admitting the exhibit.\nFinally, the defendant contends that remarks of the State\u2019s Attorney in his closing argument were prejudicial, and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The prosecutor referred to the defendant as a boy who was \u201calley-wise\u201d and one who \u201cknows this game from A to Z,\u201d and contended that the defendant \u201chas been proved a liar, a thief and a robber.\u201d While the remarks were improper, nevertheless, in view of the clear and convincing evidence of guilt of the crime charged, we are unable to say that the remarks may have influenced the result, or that the verdict could have been otherwise had the remarks not been made. People v. Stephens, 6 Ill.2d 257.\nFrom a review of the record we are of the opinion that the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery, and that the errors committed during the trial did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, except on the first point concerning the sentence, we must hold adversely to the defendant. The conviction is affirmed, but the cause is remanded with directions to correct the sentence.\nA ffirmed in part and remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Solfisburg" } ], "attorneys": [ "David J. Krupp, of Chicago, appointed by the court, (Laurance P. Nati-ian, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and John T. Gallagher and M. Robert Ostrow, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 36227\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. James Naujokas, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed, May 25, 1962.\nDavid J. Krupp, of Chicago, appointed by the court, (Laurance P. Nati-ian, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and John T. Gallagher and M. Robert Ostrow, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0032-01", "first_page_order": 42, "last_page_order": 48 }