{ "id": 5361214, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Eddie Palmer, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Palmer", "decision_date": "1963-03-22", "docket_number": "No. 37205", "first_page": "311", "last_page": "315", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 311" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "347 Ill. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5270256 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/347/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320071 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 Ill. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314057 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5329364 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314095 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2695011 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2765380 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ill. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5245843 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/340/0250-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 388, "char_count": 6303, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1880036483285975e-06, "percentile": 0.9874650993166011 }, "sha256": "e7265d0727f6d068b0c52b4d52e53df7f0460bbae38dfb26cb9d95e2f4c0f68c", "simhash": "1:d62895c45468295e", "word_count": 1081 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:58:58.745336+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Eddie Palmer, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Chief Justice Solfisburg\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Eddie Palmer, was indicted in the criminal court of Cook County on charges of unlawful sale, possession and dispensing of narcotics. Pie was tried by the court upon waiver of jury, found guilty and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than ten years nor more than ten years and one day.\nThe defendant now brings this writ of error contending that his waiver of a jury trial was not expressly and understandingly made; that he was deprived of adequate representation by counsel; and that the actions of the trial court deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. Defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction.\nThe record discloses that the judge and counsel engaged in colloquy prior to the beginning of the trial, wherein defendant\u2019s counsel said: \u201cWe\u2019ll be ready for trial. I\u2019m not sure yet whether it will be bench or jury.\u201d The court said: \u201cYou better make up your mind\u201d, whereupon counsel rejoined, \u201cWell, as of now, jury, if I\u2019m compelled to make up my mind immediately. I was going to ask for a conference with the State\u2019s Attorney\u201d. Such a conference was held. Defense counsel initiated proceedings with a motion to exclude witnesses. The judge then said: \u201cMr. Palmer, no doubt counsel has explained it to you, you have a constitutional right to have a jury trial and it is a right you can waive, and if you do waive it, it is then the duty of the judge to hear the evidence and determine your guilt or innocence. Is that what you want to do?\u201d The defendant said, \u201cWell, I don\u2019t know about these things\u201d. His counsel then said, \u201cWe\u2019ll say yes for the record. I explained that to you, didn\u2019t I?\u201d Defendant Palmer answered, \u201cYes, you did\u201d.\nIt is true that it is the duty of the trial court to see that an accused person\u2019s election to forego a trial by jury is not only expressly, but also understandingly made. (People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250.) However, there is no precise formula to judge whether a waiver is understandingly made. It is apparent from the record that defendant\u2019s right to a jury trial was explained to him by his counsel, and the defendant through his counsel waived that right in defendant\u2019s presence. We feel that the trial court was correct in determining that defendant expressly and understandingly waived his right to trial by jury. People v. Surgeon, 15 Ill.2d 236; People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437.\nThe second point the defendant makes is that he was deprived of adequate representation by counsel, and he suggests three particulars in which his lawyer failed to represent him properly. He contends that his counsel failed to move to suppress evidence of money and narcotics; that his counsel failed to require identification of three material witnesses; and that his counsel failed to make proper objections or motions to preserve error in the record.\nIn this case, defendant was represented in the trial court by counsel of his own choice. We stated in People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, 444: \u201cWhere the defendant selects his own attorney the court has held, almost without exception, that the failure of such counsel to exercise care and skill in the trial of the case does not afford a basis for reversing a judgment of conviction.\u201d\nNevertheless we have examined the record and find defendant\u2019s claim of incompetence of counsel to be without merit. As to the motion to suppress evidence, it was defendant\u2019s theory that the evidence was \u201cplanted\u201d in his room. In this posture of the case, it was clearly a matter of judgment whether a motion to suppress should be made. A mere error of judgment does not amount to incompetence of counsel. People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615.\nThe defendant alone mentioned an unknown man and two girls known only as \u201cLil\u201d and \u201cJean\u201d, who he claimed to be material witnesses. We do not consider that the failure to find, call or further identify these witnesses can be cited as an example of incompetence of counsel. A defendant cannot obtain a reversal of his conviction for the reason that counsel of his own choice cannot find every witness conceived of by defendant. Even if the witnesses were found, there is nothing in the record to indicate their testimony would be favorable to the defendant.\nWe have further examined the record in relation to the alleged failure of counsel to properly preserve error, and find the contention to be without merit. Defense counsel\u2019s conduct of the trial was well within the area of the legitimate exercise of legal judgment. In addition, we have fully considered all errors alleged on this appeal.\nDefendant finally contends that the trial judge\u2019s interrogation of witnesses deprived the defendant of a fair trial. It is clear that a trial judge has the right to question witnesses in order to elicit the truth or to bring enlightenment on material issues which seem obscure. (People v. Wesley, 18 Ill.2d 138; People v. Marino, 414 Ill. 445.) The propriety of such examination must be determined by the circumstances of each case, and rests largely in the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Trefonas, 9 Ill.2d 92.) This is especially true where the cause is tried without a jury, and the danger of prejudice lessened.\nWe have carefully examined all the questions and comments of the trial judge as shown by the record, and find that they did not exceed the bounds of propriety. The trial judge\u2019s inquiries were appropriate to his role as a finder of fact. People v. Wesley, 18 Ill.2d 138; People v. Giacomino, 347 Ill. 523.\nThe evidence clearly proved the defendant guilty of the crime charged; he was represented by adequate counsel of his own choice; and his trial was free from prejudicial error. The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Chief Justice Solfisburg" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas D. Nyhan, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for plaintiff in error.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and Edward J. Hladis and Thomas A. Hett, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 37205.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Eddie Palmer, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed March 22, 1963.\nThomas D. Nyhan, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for plaintiff in error.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and Edward J. Hladis and Thomas A. Hett, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0311-01", "first_page_order": 311, "last_page_order": 315 }