{
  "id": 5363269,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Earl Carpenter, Plaintiff in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Carpenter",
  "decision_date": "1963-05-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 37185",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:04.677975+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Earl Carpenter, Plaintiff in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Underwood\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nEarl Carpenter contends his bench trial in the criminal court of Cook County upon a charge of unlawful sale of narcotic drugs to William R. Jackson resulted in his conviction and subsequent sentence to a term of 20 to 25 years imprisonment, because of the erroneous admission of evidence, and that reversible error was committed by the State in failing to call an informer who participated in the transaction. Defendant was jointly indicted with Prince Parson, but the latter is not included in this writ of error.\nAt the trial Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents Jackson, Dayle and Connolly testified. Jackson stated that on the evening of March 4, i960, he and a special employee left Dayle and Connolly in a government car near 43rd Street and St. Lawrence Avenue in Chicago and entered Joe\u2019s 600 Bar located at the intersection. He testified he had seen the special employee about once a week between March 4, i960, and the following October, but knew him only as \u201cSam\u201d. Prince Parson appeared at the bar about 6:00 P.M., and Sam, Jackson and Parson met in the men\u2019s room where Sam introduced Jackson as a friend named \u201cBenny\u201d. Parson told Jackson he had heroin for sale at $120 a spoon, and Jackson paid him $120 for one spoon. Jackson had received this money from Dayle. Parson then told Jackson and Sam to wait in the tavern and that someone would get in touch with them in about an hour. Parson left the tavern shortly after 6:00 o\u2019clock that evening and after driving a short distance parked, left his automobile on Champlain Avenue and disappeared from view in the 4200 block. Agents Dayle and Connolly, who had followed Parson in their unmarked car, returned to the 43 rd Street\u2014 St. Lawrence area and parked in the alley south of 43rd Street. They testified they saw Carpenter, Jackson and the special employee (Sam) leave the tavern, that Sam returned to the tavern and then Carpenter and Jackson walked south across 43rd Street and into the alley. Jackson\u2019s testimony was that defendant, Carpenter, entered the tavern about 7:00 o\u2019clock the same evening and nodded; then he and Sam followed Carpenter out to the sidewalk and Sam reentered the tavern; that he and Carpenter walked into the alley where defendant recovered a package from on top of the snow, gave it to Jackson and told him to be careful and to \u201csee Prince\u201d if he wanted \u201cmore stuff\u201d. Carpenter then continued down the alley. Jackson stated that he had never seen Carpenter before and did not see him again until January 18, 1961, shortly before the trial.\nDayle testified he observed Carpenter from across the intersection and from the car at the end of the alley, but had not previously known him, nor did he see him again until after his arrest on November 18, i960. Carpenter stated he knew none of the Federal agents. Dayle also said the informer\u2019s name was Sam Neal, but that he was sometimes known as Howard Hughes; that he (Dayle) had caused him to be hired as a special employee; that Neal worked only with Dayle and that Neal had testified in another case in the latter part of i960. He did not see Parson until his arrest on August 2, i960.\nThe defendant points out that his arrest occurred more than 8 months after the incident; that only William R. Jackson was named as a witness on the indictment and that neither Sam Neal nor Howard Hughes was named in the list of witnesses. Defendant claims he first learned at the trial of the informer\u2019s alleged participation in the transaction, and that his name was either Sam Neal or Howard Hughes. Sam Neal was then being held in the witness quarters of- the State\u2019s Attorney, and defendant contends he was not given an opportunity to interview this alleged eyewitness before a finding of guilty was entered, thereby depriving him of a fair trial.\nAllegations that reversible error existed as a result of the People\u2019s failure to call an informer as a witness have been frequently considered by this court, and we have there held the People are not so obligated. (People v. Green, 27 Ill.2d 39; People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill.2d 176.) Here the defendant was informed of the identity and readily accessible location of the witness in the early stages of the trial. In addition, the trial judge offered to call the informer as a court\u2019s witness, an offer not accepted by defense counsel. Following the finding of guilty, the judge directed the State to produce the informer in court so that defense counsel might interview him in order to present any material matters in a motion for a new trial. Defendant\u2019s attorney did so interview the witness, thereafter stating he had nothing new to present. In the light of this concern for defendant\u2019s protection manifested by a conscientious trial judge, it is difficult to perceive how the defendant could have been prejudiced. While defendant complains that the interview with the informer was conducted in the presence of a Federal attorney, the court had been told that the informer was being held for another matter not involving the case at issue. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the court did not abuse its discretion. In People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, we declared that we knew of no rule which would authorize the court to compel a witness to submit to examination in private by counsel for either side, especially in the absence of the consent of the witness.\nDefendant contends the receipt by the court of testimony concerning a conversation between the agent Jackson and Parson outside the defendant\u2019s presence was error. Jackson related that in this conversation the co-defendant, Parson, told him he had pure heroin for sale at a certain price, that Jackson paid him the required amount of money and was told by Parson to wait in the tavern and someone would get in touch with him in about an hour. The only basis assigned by counsel in his objection to this testimony on the trial was that the conversation occurred \u201coutside the presence of defendant\u201d. Seemingly, this type of objection, frequently appearing in the trial records before this court, arises from a misconception of the rules of evidence, and a belief that any statement or conversation occurring in the absence of defendant is inadmissible. Such is not the law.\nWhile we are not clear as to the origin of this notion, it apparently is connected in some way with the hearsay rule. An examination of the basis for this rule will clarify the situation. \u201cHearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.\u201d (McCormick, Law of Evidence, sec. 225; see also, Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, sec. 31.1 et seq.) The fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule was and is to test the real value of testimony by exposing the source of the assertion to cross-examination by the party against whom it is offered. While the administration of an oath and the right of confrontation are also spoken of as necessary elements, the essential feature, without which testimonial offerings must be rejected, is the opportunity for cross-examination of the party whose assertions are offered to prove the truth of the act asserted. (Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed. sec. 1361, et seq.; People v. Smuk, 12 Ill.2d 356.) If this requirement is met, with the exception of instances such as those where the silence of the defendant is claimed to constitute an implied admission, the presence or absence of the defendant is immaterial.\nThe distinction between admissible testimony and that which is barred by the hearsay rule is well illustrated by Wigmore\u2019s example of the witness A testifying that \u201cB told me that event X occurred\u201d. If A\u2019s testimony is offered for the purpose of establishing that B said this, it is clearly admissible \u2014 if offered to prove that event X occurred, it is clearly inadmissible, for the only probative value rests in B\u2019s knowledge \u2014 and B is not present to be cross-examined.\nHere the witness Jackson was present in court. He testified under oath as to only what he saw and heard, and was cross-examined with reference thereto. His testimony was relevant to the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt, and was clearly connected to the subsequent delivery of narcotics to the witness by the defendant. The objection to this testimony was properly overruled.\nFinally, the defendant attacks the credibility of the State\u2019s witnesses. This court has repeatedly declared a conviction will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that there is not sufficient credible evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the evidence on an issue is conflicting but legally sufficient. if the prosecution\u2019s witnesses are believed, the question is for the trier of fact. (People v. Guido, 25 Ill.2d 204; People v. Glass, 16 Ill.2d 595; People v. Sain, 384 Ill. 394.) The record here sustains the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt.\nNo error appearing, the judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Underwood"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James B. Moran, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for plaintiff in error.",
      "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and Edward J. Hladis and William J. Martin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 37185.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Earl Carpenter, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed May 27, 1963.\nJames B. Moran, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for plaintiff in error.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and Edward J. Hladis and William J. Martin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0116-01",
  "first_page_order": 158,
  "last_page_order": 164
}
