{ "id": 2828193, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Eugene Tyner, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tyner", "decision_date": "1964-01-22", "docket_number": "No. 36636", "first_page": "101", "last_page": "106", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 101" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 Ill. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5168828 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/321/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5361205 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5314743 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334900 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334974 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3430106 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/250/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360433 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4855687 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/276/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 Ill. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314057 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0445-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 490, "char_count": 7622, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.496103784512932e-07, "percentile": 0.9227870041844138 }, "sha256": "bfa8ae1f2893ed6f0c727095307c1c848ff484740df09a82aba46a546182b01c", "simhash": "1:85638bf942b98571", "word_count": 1246 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:47:43.640933+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Eugene Tyner, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Daily\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County, the defendant, Eugene Tyner, and a cp-defendant, Herbert, Kelley, were convicted of murdering one James Toney and were each sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 199 years. In prosecuting this writ of error, Tyner (hereafter referred to as defendant) contends that the lower court made prejudicial remarks during the course of the trial and also erred in admitting into evidence the co-defendant\u2019s written statement.\nIt appears that the deceased lived in the front first floor apartment at 2326 West Monroe Street in Chicago. Willie Holman and his wife occupied the rear first floor apartment, and defendant lived on the second floor at the same address. Shortly after midnight on the morning of January 15, 1961, defendant and Kelley visited the Toney apartment where Toney, Holman, and others were playing cards but left within a few minutes only to return approximately one hour later. When Kelley then became abusive, both he and defendant were ordered to leave, and upon their refusal an altercation followed during which Toney struck both men about the head and face with the metal top of a pressure cooker. Defendant and Kelley then left the apartment house, but about thirty minutes later they returned and rang for admittance to the first floor. Willie Holman came to the door from his apartment, where he had retired shortly after midnight, and upon recognizing the callers refused to open the door until he observed the gun which Kelley was carrying in his hand. Holman then raised his hands, stepped back from the door, and permitted their entrance. Although Holman again returned to his apartment, defendant and Kelley walked to Toney\u2019s apartment and a few seconds later three shots were fired by Kelley after which Toney staggered from the building to the street and there collapsed. Although defendant and Kelley admitted the shooting, they claimed it was done in self-defense.\nWillie Holman testified for the State and upon cross-examination insisted that he did not know what caused the earlier\" altercation at the Toney apartment. Nevertheless, the court then proceeded to interrogate Holman concerning the same matter and when he repeated his answer the judge remarked that Holman had \u201ca terrible lapse of memory that he was \u201csick and tired of this kind of testimony;\u201d that Holman was in a position to give the jury a \u201clot more information, beneficial to the State even if he would;\u201d and that he was \u201clying like a goat.\u201d The court then concluded with this remark: \u201cVery typical of these people when a killing takes place. They slip away and they don\u2019t know what happened. It leaves it up to the jury to surmise and you have to decide the case on circumstantial evidence.\u201d\nKelley testified upon his own behalf, and following his cross-examination by the State concerning a discrepancy between the witness\u2019s testimony and a prior written statement he had given the police relative to defendant\u2019s participation in the crime, the court continued to interrogate concerning the discrepancy, particularly referring to the contradictory written statement. The court later questioned defendant as to this same matter, and after defendant had testified that he struck Toney only in self-defense, the trial judge by further interrogation caused him to admit that Toney\u2019s alleged attack upon him occurred after the shooting.\nAlthough a trial judge may question witnesses for purposes of clarification or to bring enlightment upon issues otherwise obscure, he should do so in a fair and impartial manner without showing bias or prejudice against either party and without impugning the credibility of any witness. Rarely, if ever, is a judge called upon to comment on the evidence during trial except where necessary in ruling upon its admissibility, and under no circumstances should he express an opinion as to its veracity, for this is the province of the jury, and any intimation of such nature, however slight, may carry great weight with the jury and could prove controlling. People v. Marino, 414 Ill. 445; People v. Lurie, 276 Ill. 630.\nIn the present case the trial judge openly accused Holman of lying and withholding information, and although he was a State\u2019s witness, the court indicated that not only was he concealing facts beneficial to the State but that such action was \u201ctypical of these people.\u201d Holman, Tyner, and Kelley were negroes and regardless of what the judge may have meant by such remark, it had the capacity to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors. The court\u2019s interrogation of Kelley and defendant further served to emphasize weaknesses in their defense and to cast doubt upon their veracity. Such action was clearly improper. Although defendants did not offer immediate objection thereto, which would ordinarily be a prerequisite to review, we have heretofore held that a less rigid application of this rule must prevail where misconduct of the trial judge is involved. People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill.2d 398; People v. Bernstein, 250 Ill. 63.\nFollowing his arrest, Kelley gave the police a written statement outside defendant\u2019s presence wherein he indicated that defendant had voluntarily joined in the earlier altercation at the Toney apartment and had later beaten the deceased upon the back of the head with the pressure cooker top as Toney lay in the street. However, at time of trial both defendant and Kelley repudiated this account. Nevertheless, the statement was admitted into evidence without restriction and in his argument to the jury the State\u2019s Atorney, over defendant\u2019s objection, repeatedly referred to this statement in contending that defendant had beaten the deceased while he lay in the street and in questioning the veracity of defendant\u2019s testimony. We have repeatedly held that the confession or admission of a co-defendant is not admissible against the accused unless made in his presence or assented to by him. (People v. Tunstall, 17 Ill.2d 160; People v. Clark, 17 Ill.2d 486; People v. Childress, 1 Ill.2d 431.) Where, however, the participants are jointly tried and there has been no motion for severance, the confession of a co-defendant may be admitted if its admissibility is clearly limited to the participant who made the statement. As to the other defendants it is pure hearsay. (People v. White, 28 Ill.2d 23; People v. Vickery, 321 Ill. 254.) Here the court made no attempt to limit the statement\u2019s applicability solely to Kelley but to the contrary the State was permitted, upon argument, to buttress its case against defendant with this hearsay statement. In our opinion the trial court erred in this respect. Although there was substantial evidence of guilt, the jury in the present case also fixed the penalty, and we cannot say under these circumstances that the above errors did not in some measure prejudice the defendant, particularly in view of the extreme severity of the sentence.\nThe judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is therefore reversed and the cause remanded to that court for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Daily" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard E. Powell, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for plaintiff in error.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and Elmer C. Kissane and Richard T. Buck, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 36636.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Eugene Tyner, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed January 22, 1964.\nRichard E. Powell, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for plaintiff in error.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and Elmer C. Kissane and Richard T. Buck, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0101-01", "first_page_order": 101, "last_page_order": 106 }