{ "id": 2826546, "name": "Philip H. Henderson, Appellant, vs. James Newland.- (Banner Mutual Insurance Company, Appellee.)", "name_abbreviation": "Henderson v. Newland", "decision_date": "1964-03-18", "docket_number": "No. 38002", "first_page": "462", "last_page": "465", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 462" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "276 S.W.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Tenn. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8530056 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/197/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Atl. 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.H. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4413223 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/86/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Va. 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2047499 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/203/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2451734 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/41/0263-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 296, "char_count": 5134, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.3078395690250667 }, "sha256": "141285c46cf6a9ecfd3780c6194061e048454f3cb605263c889d97067ae4f420", "simhash": "1:b6e140823cadcd5d", "word_count": 876 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:47:43.640933+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Philip H. Henderson, Appellant, vs. James Newland.\u2014 (Banner Mutual Insurance Company, Appellee.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice House\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn April 4, 1961, Philip H. Henderson recovered a judgment in the circuit court of Lake County against James Newland and Robert Supanich in the amount of $3500 for personal injuries and property damage resulting from a collision between an automobile driven by Henderson and an automobile driven by Newland who was towing a racing automobile being operated by Supanich. In a supplementary proceeding the court entered an order against Banner Mutual Insurance Company, Newland\u2019s insurance carrier, to pay the judgment. The Appellate Court, Second District, reversed the order against the insurance company, (Henderson v. Newland, 41 Ill. App. 2d 263) and we thereafter granted Henderson\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nThe insurance policy among other things provides, \u201cThis policy does not apply under coverages A and B while the automobile is used for the towing of any trailer owned or hired by the insured and not covered by like insurance in the company.\u201d Coverage \u201cA\u201d is bodily injury liability and coverage \u201cB\u201d is property damage liability. The parties stipulated that at the time of the accident the automobile covered by the policy was towing a racing automobile owned by the insured and not covered by like insurance in the company. The Appellate Court held that the racing car was being used as a trailer at the time of the accident within the meaning of the above-quoted exclusionary clause of the insurance policy.\nWhether a towed racing car constitutes a trailer within the meaning of the exclusionary clause has not heretofore been decided by this court. Two decisions from other States have been cited, however, which have decided this question.\nSafeguard Insurance Company v. Justice, 203 Va. 972, 128 S.E.2d 286, held that a towed racing car was not a trailer within the meaning of the exclusionary clause here in question. In reaching this result the Virginia court stated (p. 977) : \u201cThe policy covers the protection sought unless it is excluded by its terms. There is nothing in the policy that says a towed automobile is a \u2018trailer\u2019. The insurer, by the use of appropriate words in the policy, could have said so. A towed automobile is not considered a trailer in common parlance.\u201d See also Littlefield v. Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co. 86 N.H. 87, 163 Atl. 420.\nBlue Ridge Insurance Company v. Haun, 197 Tenn. 527, 276 S.W.2d 711 on the other hand, held that a towed racing car was a trailer within the meaning of this exclusionary clause. The Tennessee court stated (p. 535) : \u201cOf course the \u2018hot rod\u2019 set out by itself might be an automobile and not a trailer but the thing that determines whether or not it is a trailer is the manner in which it was being used under the facts of the instant case that is the determinative answer, not what it is alone when not attached to the automobile.\u201d\nThe insurance company argues that the exclusionary clause covers \u201cthe use of the insured vehicle for towing purposes unless an additional premium has been paid to the company for the vehicle or other contrivance being towed.\u201d If this language had been used in the policy, there is little doubt but that the company would be relieved of liability. But this is not the language which the company chose to use in drafting its policy. It chose rather to exclude coverage only where the insured automobile was towing \u201cany trailer owned or hired by the insured and not covered by like insurance in the company.\u201d The language the company used does not exclude all towing nor does it exclude towing all trailers.\n\u2022 The company makes much of the fact that there is an increased risk caused by using the automobile for towing. This may be true, but the fact remains that the language used did not \u201cprohibit the use of the insured vehicle for towing purposes\u201d as the company insists \u2014 it merely excluded coverage \u201cwhile the automobile is used for the towing of any trailer owned or hired by the insured.\u201d Nor does it matter that the company did not intend to cover \u201cthe use of the insured automobile as a towing vehicle\u201d in the absence of language expressing this intent.\nThe insurance company has -in its answer to the petition for leave to appeal -and answering brief expressed itself clearly, concisely and ably that it does not choose to cover the additional risk caused by the use of the insured vehicle while being used for towing purposes unless an additional premium is paid for this type of use. If the insurance company wants its policy to be given this effect it must use that type of language rather than ask this court to hold that an automobile is a trailer. We hold that the exclusion of liability for the towing of any trailer does not apply to the towing of an automobile.\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice House" } ], "attorneys": [ "Diver, Diver and Ridge, of Waukegan, (Robert M. Bollman and Louis W. Brydges, of counsel,) for appellant.", "Brody and Gore, and Robert B. Johnstone, both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 38002.\nPhilip H. Henderson, Appellant, vs. James Newland.\u2014 (Banner Mutual Insurance Company, Appellee.)\nOpinion filed March 18, 1964.\nDiver, Diver and Ridge, of Waukegan, (Robert M. Bollman and Louis W. Brydges, of counsel,) for appellant.\nBrody and Gore, and Robert B. Johnstone, both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0462-01", "first_page_order": 462, "last_page_order": 465 }