{ "id": 2833459, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Robert Jackson, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jackson", "decision_date": "1964-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 35412", "first_page": "408", "last_page": "414", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 408" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "31 Ill.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833958 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2828355 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S. Ct. 1774", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6166505 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ill. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5220234 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/334/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ill.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2716136 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2526456 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/372/0422-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 580, "char_count": 12249, "ocr_confidence": 0.829, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.758274904458274e-07, "percentile": 0.8333499366179263 }, "sha256": "059d85f0f860a25505b7ca09bddb7d0d31d142cafb0030d603cfb05428660672", "simhash": "1:b67e68b9646cd99a", "word_count": 2148 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:16:02.038436+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Robert Jackson, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice House\ndelivered the opinion of the court :\nRobert Jackson, herein referred to as defendant, and DeSoto Allen were convicted of murder in a joint bench trial in the criminal court of Cook County. Jackson was sentenced to the pententiary for a term of 30 years and a writ of error has been issued to review his conviction.\nIsaac Berger was shot and killed during a robbery of his grocery store between 5 :oo and 6 :oo o\u2019clock P.M. on February 27, 1956. Ollie Brown, Jr., a customer, entered the store during the robbery and saw two robbers, one of whom had a gun. As he ran from the store to call the police, he heard a shot. He identified DeSoto Allen as the person who had the gun, but he could not identify the other man. John Anderson, who lived in an apartment above the grocery, testified that at the time in question he heard a shot and saw three men run out of the store. The only one he could identify was the defendant. A joint confession of defendant and Allen was admitted into evidence.\nDefendant testified that he was at his mother\u2019s home at the time of the robbery, which testimony was corroborated by that of his mother and his 12-year-old brother. He further testified that he made the confession because police officers Herring and Charles beat him until he confessed. Allen testified that he was at home at the time of the robbery and that he confessed because the same police officers had beaten him.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted the confession in evidence without a preliminary hearing. The People argue, on the other hand, that defendant did not request a preliminary hearing on the admissibility of the confession and the trial court properly admitted it. Defendant\u2019s counsel objected to the admission of the confession on the ground \"that it did not show that defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were explained to him, it was not signed, and that it is highly irregular and improper and without proper foundation. A confession to which no objection is made is properly admitted in evidence without the introduction of preliminary proof. (People v. Molin, 372 Ill. 422,) but if an objection is made, it is the duty of the court to hear such evidence as the parties may present concerning the circumstances under which the confession was made. (People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill.2d 188.) It was also said in the Wagner case and in People v. Frugoli, 334 Ill. 324, 334, that an objection that no foundation has been laid for the admission of the .confession is sufficient to call for a preliminary hearing on its admissibility.\nWe believe that under the circumstances of this case, defendant\u2019s objection to admission of the confession without a specific request for a hearing was sufficient to call for a hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. The failure to conduct a hearing on admissibility does not, however, require a reversal of the trial court\u2019s finding of guilty. See Jackson v. Denno, (U.S.) 12 L. ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774; People v. Wright, 30 Ill.2d 519; People v. Beattie, 31 Ill.2d 257.\nDefendant argues that the evidence does not support the conviction because the confession was not corroborated, and because Anderson\u2019s identification of defendant cannot be believed. The record does not support defendant\u2019s assertion that there is no evidence to corroborate his confession. There is sufficient testimony to show that Isaac Berger was killed during a robbery of his store, that defendant was in front of the store before the shooting and that he ran out of the store immediately after the shooting.\nThe testimony of DeSoto Allen, the accomplice, did not implicate defendant in the crime. Allen\u2019s confession implicated defendant, but Allen\u2019s confession was hot considered in determining defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that Anderson\u2019s identification cannot be believed because he said Jackson had a hat on his head, while Brown testified that Allen had a hat on his head. The record shows that Anderson said \u201cThis fellow here had on a cap.\u201d It is not clear whether he was referring to defendant or Allen. In any event the discrepancy, if any, is not such as to entirely discredit Anderson\u2019s identification.\nThe cause is remanded for a hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. If the confession is found to be involuntary, the trial court will vacate the judgment of conviction and grant defendant a new trial, otherwise the trial court will enter a new judgment of conviction.\nCause remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice House" }, { "text": "Mr. Justice Schaefer\ndissenting:\nI agree that it was error to admit the confessions of the two defendants into evidence without a hearing as to their voluntariness. But the record discloses circumstances which, in my opinion, make it inappropriate to remand the case solely for a determination of the voluntariness of Jackson\u2019s confession.\nThree defendants were indicted for this crime. All three pleaded not guilty and were tried together. One of them was discharged at the close of the prosecution\u2019s case and the trial continued as to the other two, Jackson, whose writ of error is presently before us, and De Soto Allen, whose case is not now before us. The confession admitted in evidence was a single court reporter\u2019s transcript showing the questioning first of one defendant and then of the other, in each other\u2019s presence and hearing. Allen\u2019s confession named Jackson, and Jackson\u2019s named Allen. No effort was made in the trial court to separate the two confessions. The statement of the trial judge that \u201cThere is no evidence that there was a gun in the hands of Jackson at that time except by the accomplice,\u201d can refer only to Allen\u2019s confession, and it at least suggests that Allen\u2019s confession was taken into account in determining Jackson\u2019s guilt. There is no contrary indication.\nThe circumstances attending the taking of the confession of the defendant, De Soto Allen, are such that in my opinion it was inadmissible. Allen became 17 years old on January 28, 1956. The murder was committed around 6 P.M. on February 27, 1956. Later that evening Allen was picked up on the street about two blocks from the store in which the murder was committed, and he and the two boys who were then with him were taken to the police station. At that time Ollie Brown, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, was brought in to look at the boys, but he did not identify any of them. At about 8:30 P.M. on the following night two police officers came to Allen\u2019s home and again took him to the police station. He was placed in a cell and questioned, and was held from Tuesday night until Thursday morning, when he was released. He testified that no one struck him on the occasion of these first two arrests.\nOn March 15.at 2 A.M. the police again arrested Allen at his home. His father accompanied him to the police station on this occasion but was told to go on home and that his son would be home in a little while. Allen testified that it was while he was held in custody on this occasion that he was beaten by the police. He was questioned during the balance of the night, and during the day of March 15 he was taken from the police station and was given a lie detector test. He was returned to the station about 3 :3o in the afternoon. He testified that he then went to sleep but was awakened by the police officers and was again beaten until he confessed and implicated the defendant Jackson. The Assistant State\u2019s Attorney who was summoned to question the defendants arrived at the police station at about 2125 A.M. on March 17 and the confession that was admitted in evidence was taken at that time. Both Jackson and Allen refused to sign the confession the following morning.\nEntirely apart from any question as to whether Allen was beaten by the police, I believe that his confession can not be regarded as voluntary. He was taken into custody three times, and detained overnight on two different occasions. The third arrest was in the middle of the night, and it was followed by a false statement by the police to his father, and deprivation of sleep during questioning that continued through the night hours on two successive nights. These circumstances were in my opinion inherently coercive, and they rendered Allen\u2019s confession inadmissible. There is no suggestion that Allen was cautioned, or advised of his right to counsel, at any time.\nMoreover, the evidence offered by the prosecution in addition to the confessions was, in my opinion, extraordinarily weak. The witness Ollie Brown testified that he entered the store while the robbery was in process. He saw one of the robbers, whom he identified at the trial as Allen, engaged in conversation with the deceased at about the center of the store, and a second robber, whom he was unable to identify, at the rear of the store. Brown testified that he heard the fatal shot fired as he ran out of the door of the store and that he ran across the street to his brother\u2019s tavern and got his brother to call the police. When the police come to the scene, however, Brown remained in his room, and did not then tell the police what he had seen and heard. Although Brown identified Allen at the trial, at the coroner\u2019s inquest he had been asked, \u201cDo you think you would recognize them again, if you saw them?\u201d, and he had answered, \u201cI could recognize the clothes but the faces I do not know.\u201d He also testified that he did not identify Allen from a line-up at the police station. His explanation was that he recognized Allen at the line-up but told the police that he did not because he was scared. \u201cWell I did not know whether there was a gang or what, and I did not want to be involved in it in any kind of way.\u201d His testimony at the coroner\u2019s inquest that he was able to recognize the robbers by their clothing, however, is only dubiously consistent with his explanation.\nThe testimony as to the defendant Jackson comes from a different witness, but it is equally weak. John Anderson testified that he lived above the store in which the murder was committed; that about five o\u2019clock on the evening of February 27, 1956, he opened a window to get some fresh air, looked down, and \u201cI seen a kid walk from around in front of Mr. Berger\u2019s store. He went right across and go back and come back a second time.\u201d He stood watching about ten minutes and then heard a noise like a pop gun and saw a \u201ckid come out of the store and run across the street and an older man come out of the store and run in the tavern.\u201d \u201cAnother young fellow came out of the store and he went around the corner. I could not get a glance of him.\u201d In court he identified the defendant Jackson, who was 23 years old, as the \u201ckid\u201d whom he saw walking up and down. He testified that Jackson was wearing a cap, pulled down, and that only one of the three persons who ran out of the store was wearing a cap. His statement, \u201cThis fellow here had on a cap,\u201d could only have referred to the defendant Jackson. He had previously identified Jackson as \u201cthis fellow,\u201d and he had testified that he could not identify the other two men who ran out of the store. The witness Brown, however, had testified that Allen was wearing a cap.\nOn cross-examination Anderson testified that while he and some friends had talked about' the matter, until the morning of the day that he testified in court he had never reported to anyone in authority what he saw on the evening of the murder. On that morning, he testified, a police officer \u201ccame around,\u201d asked him to come to court, and he did so.\nIn my opinion upon this record it is not appropriate to remand for a hearing limited to the voluntariness of the joint confession. The judgment of conviction should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a complete new trial.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. Justice Schaefer" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph M. Solon, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach and E: Michael . O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and Elmer C. Kissane and Matthew J. Moran, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 35412.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Robert Jackson, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed September 29, 1964.\nSchaefer, J., dissenting.\nJoseph M. Solon, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach and E: Michael . O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, and Elmer C. Kissane and Matthew J. Moran, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0408-01", "first_page_order": 412, "last_page_order": 418 }