{
  "id": 2833424,
  "name": "The County of Peoria, Appellant, vs. The Industrial Commission et al. - (Kathleen L. Kuczynski, Appellee.)",
  "name_abbreviation": "County of Peoria v. Industrial Commission",
  "decision_date": "1964-11-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 38627",
  "first_page": "562",
  "last_page": "566",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 562"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
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    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:16:02.038436+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The County of Peoria, Appellant, vs. The Industrial Commission et al. \u2014 (Kathleen L. Kuczynski, Appellee.)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Underwood\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal from the circuit court of Peoria County which confirmed an award of the Industrial Commission of Illinois to Kathleen Li Kuczynski, widow of Walter Kuczynski, presents the sole question whether, as a matter of law, Walter Kuczynski met his death in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act under which the parties stipulated they were operating.\nDecedent was employed by the county of Peoria as a deputy sheriff. His regular duty was as juvenile officer and he was in charge of the county\u2019s juvenile office, working from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., Monday through Friday. The testimony established that all of the deputies as well as the sheriff were considered \u201con call\u201d 24 hours a day at any time the need arose although, generally, each worked an eight-hour day at his regular duty. Moreover, it was the duty of each deputy sheriff to assist in controlling traffic and in accidents or other situations involving motorists in distress, whether they were then performing their regular duty or not. When off duty the deputies were required to report their movements to the office so that they could be reached if needed.\nOn Saturday evening, October 7, 1961, decedent was ticket chairman for and present to assist at the annual fund-raising dance held by the Peoria County Sheriff\u2019s Association at a barn in Peoria County. The association is a nonprofit organization which solicits and raises funds which are used to provide uniforms and additional equipment not provided by the county for the sheriff\u2019s office.\nFollowing the dance Peoria County Sheriff Ray Trunk invited a number of persons, most of whom were employed by him, to join him for breakfast at his cottage which was located between the site of the dance and the city of Peoria. About midnight and thereafter, some 20 to 25 persons gathered at the sheriff\u2019s cottage. About 2:15 A.M., while Sheriff Trunk, deputies Chitwood, Clevenger, Unes, decedent and several others were eating bacon and eggs in the kitchen of the sheriff\u2019s cottage, someone entered and said that a car was in the ditch in front of the house. According to the testimony of those present, Sheriff Trunk said: \u201cLet\u2019s go out and give them a hand\u201d, or something to that effect.\nSheriff Trunk, a number of deputies, the sheriff\u2019s grown son, a man named Marks who was the husband of an office employee, and the decedent, all went out to assist. Apparently, one of the employees of the sheriff\u2019s office coming to the breakfast had missed the driveway, and her car had entered the ditch in a southerly direction with its tail end projecting partially into the inside northbound lane of Highway 29 which ran in a north-south direction past the cottage.\nThe sheriff directed deputy Chitwood to get into the car and drive it while he and the others attempted to push it out of the ditch. The testimony indicated that Sheriff Trunk informally took charge of the extrication attempt. While attempting to push the car from the rear, deputy Kuczynslci was struck and killed instantly by a northbound auto.\nAppellant contends that the decedent met his death in an accident which neither arose out of nor in the\u2018course of his employment, and that he was subjected t\u00f3 the accident by virture of risks to which the general public is exposed and not by reason of his employment. We cannot agree.\nHad decedent stopped to aid a distressed motorist in Peoria County when returning home with his wife from a movie in the early morning hours of October 8, 1961, and been killed, as here, while giving such aid, he would have been within the ambit of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. While there is no legal duty upon a member of the general public to stop and give aid, (38 Am. Jur., Negligence, sec. 16), the proof established the existence of such duty upon all deputies in the Peoria County sheriff\u2019s office. It is the presence of that duty here which, in our judgment, distinguishes decedent from a member of the general public in his assistance at the scene of this accident, and exposed him to a risk greater than that faced by the public generally.\nAppellant cites, in support of its contention that the death here did not \u201carise out of and in the course of\u201d decedent\u2019s employment, the cases of Klug v. Industrial Com. 381 Ill. 608; Loyola University v. Industrial Com., 408 Ill. 139, and Mills v. Industrial Com. 27 Ill.2d 441. Without undertaking a detailed review of these decisions, we believe each clearly distinguishable.\nNo incompatibility exists between Klug and our conclusion here. The claimant there was injured by a defective door on her personal car which she was leaving after having parked it on a public street preparatory to entering the school where she was employed. As the court there observed, the employer was exercising no control over her at the time of injury, and \u201cthe risk in which the accident had its origin was not connected with her employment in any manner\u201d.\nLoyola held an employee on 24-hour call and living on university property not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained on the grounds and while the employee was not performing any of the duties of his employment but simply walking around \u201ckilling time\u201d some four hours before his regular duties commenced. Here the decedent was not only on 24-hour call but actually performing a duty incidental to his employment \u2014 that of assisting in attempting to remove an incompletely ditched car which partially blocked the highway.\nIn Mills the claimant was injured on the employer\u2019s property, but on a day when his employment duties did not require him to work at all; it was neither \u201cwithin the time of his employment\u201d nor \u201cwas the activity being performed under the employer\u2019s control or supervision\u201d. Here not only was the activity an incidental employment duty, but the superior officer was present and in charge of the operation.\nIn our opinion the death here arose out of and in the course of decedent\u2019s employment as a deputy sheriff. He was responding to his superior\u2019s suggestion to \u201cgo out and give a hand\u201d; he was on call 24 hours a day; aiding distressed motorists and vehicles was one of the normal, incidental functions of all deputy sheriffs in that office regardless of decedent\u2019s more specialized duty; and, lastly, although we believe the result unchanged were decedent acting alone, he was here acting in concert with others similarly employed under the direction of his superior.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County conforms to the law and the evidence and is hereby affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Underwood"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Heyl, Royster, Voelicer & Allen, of Peoria, (Lyle W. Allen, of counsel,) for appellant.",
      "Kellstedt & Young, of Peoria, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 38627.\nThe County of Peoria, Appellant, vs. The Industrial Commission et al. \u2014 (Kathleen L. Kuczynski, Appellee.)\nOpinion filed November 24, 1964.\nHeyl, Royster, Voelicer & Allen, of Peoria, (Lyle W. Allen, of counsel,) for appellant.\nKellstedt & Young, of Peoria, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0562-01",
  "first_page_order": 566,
  "last_page_order": 570
}