{
  "id": 2885058,
  "name": "Electrical Contractors Association of City of Chicago, Inc., et al., Appellees, vs. Illinois Building Authority et al., Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Electrical Contractors Ass'n of City of Chicago, Inc. v. Illinois Building Authority",
  "decision_date": "1966-01-19",
  "docket_number": "No. 39593",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:02:16.085089+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Electrical Contractors Association of City of Chicago, Inc., et al., Appellees, vs. Illinois Building Authority et al., Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Underwood\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from the circuit court of Cook County which, in an action for declaratory judgment, held defendant Illinois Building Authority, an appellant herein, subject to the provisions of the Illinois Purchasing Act and thereby required to solicit separate bids for specific mechanical subdivisions (plumbing, air conditioning, electrical wiring and heating) of building construction work as provided by section 6a \u2014 1 of the Illinois Purchasing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 127, par. 132.6a: \u2014 1). Jurisdiction on direct appeal lies here pursuant to our allowance of appellants\u2019 motion under our Rule 28 \u2014 iE, this cause being a matter of extraordinary importance requiring immediate decision here. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap, 110 par. 101.28 \u2014 1.\nThe 74th General Assembly declared the construction of certain building facilities at the site of the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Illinois to be in the public interest in accordance with the Illinois Building Authority Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 127, par. 213.1, et seq.). Subsequently, appellant Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois advertised for bids on projects including those in question here, the advertisements indicating the University might subsequently assign any or all bids to the Authority for award of contracts. Separate bids involving the four \u201cspecialty\u201d subdivisions of the work were received and later rejected as excessive since the total was 51.2 per cent above estimated costs.\nThereafter, the Board of Trustees did not re-advertise for bids as provided by the Purchasing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 127, par. 132.4), but apparently agreed that the Illinois Building Authority should advertise for bids on the projects in question. The Authority, in soliciting bids, did not comply with the procedures set forth in 6a \u2014 1 of the Purchasing Act, but employed instead the \u201csingle bid system\u201d under which general contractors were allowed to bid for all work on a particular project including plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical wiring \u2014 the four mechanical subdivisions which, under section 6a \u2014 1 of the Purchasing Act, must be the bases for separate bids.\nSuit for declaratory judgment as to the applicability of the Purchasing Act to bids solicited by the Illinois Building Authority was thereupon instituted by plaintiffs, appellees here, who are certain trade associations of Chicago and Cook County, and various specialty contractors.\nThe trial court, agreeing with plaintiffs, held that the bids solicited by the Illinois Building Authority must comply with the provisions of the Purchasing Act, that the \u201csingle bid system\u201d employed by the Authority did not so comply, that neither the Building Authority nor the University Board of Trustees could properly advertise for bids on the projects in question except as provided in section 6a \u2014 1 of the Illinois Purchasing Act, and that the advertisement for bids under the \u201csingle bid system\u201d was therefore illegal and void.\nThe Illinois Building Authority, created by the General Assembly in 1961, is a body politic and corporate of the State consisting of seven members appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.' Its functions are to build and otherwise provide for public institutional facilities throughout the State, to continuously study the need for such facilities, and to make recommendations to the General Assembly concerning the providing of such facilities. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 127, par. 213.1 et seq.). Since its creation, the Building Authority has rapidly assumed an important position in providing public institutional facilities, accounting in the 1965-67 biennium for more than, half of such building projects and having authorization for the expenditure of more than $206,500,000 for building projects.\nThe issue here is narrow: Is the Illinois Building Authority, in soliciting bids for this building project, subject to the provisions of the Illinois Purchasing Act, particularly section 6a \u2014 1 thereof ? Whether the authority should be so subject is a policy decision for legislative determination. It is our duty to examine existing legislation to ascertain the legislative intent.\nSection 2 of the Illinois Purchasing Act declares the public policy of the State of Illinois to be \u201cthat the principle of competitive bidding and economical procurement practices shall be applicable to all - purchases and contracts for which state funds are expended.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 127, par. 132.2; see Inskip v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 26 Ill.2d 501, 509.) Other sections provide that all \u201cState agencies\u201d must comply with the prescribed bidding procedures prior to awarding contracts.\nSection 3 provides in pertinent part: \u201ca. 'State agency\u2019 means and includes each officer, department, board, commission, institution, body politic and corporate of the State and any other person expending or encumbering state funds by virtue of an annual or biennial appropriation from the General Assembly.\u201d\nIt is conceded by appellants that the Authority is a \u201cbody politic and corporate of the State\u201d but they argue that the clause \u201cexpending or encumbering state funds by virtue of an annual or biennial appropriation from the General Assembly\u201d must be deemed to modify all of the antecedents enumerated in the definition set forth above. Therefore, it is urged, since the Authority here is not \u201cexpending or encumbering State funds by virtue of an annual or biennial appropriation from the General Assembly\u201d but rather does its financing through the issuance and sale of revenue bonds, it does not come within the ambit of the definition of \u201cState agency\u201d and is not required to follow the prescribed bidding procedures set forth in the Purchasing Act. Appellees maintain that it is the general canon of statutory construction that relative and qualifying words and phrases both grammatically and legally refer only to the immediately preceding antecedent unless a contrary intent clearly appears. (Stevens v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 306 Ill. 370; Franciscan Sisters v. County of Vermilion, 304 Ill. App. 243; I. L. P., Statutes, par. 120.) Under this rule the clause \u201cexpending or encumbering state funds by virtue of an annual or biennial appropriation from the General Assembly\u201d would refer only to the antecedent \u201cany other person\u201d and not to each of the other entities mentioned in the definition. Since the Building Authority admittedly is a \u201cbody politic and corporate of the State\u201d it would be included within the definition of \u201cState agency\u201d set forth in the section.\nIn our judgment, recourse to the \u201clast antecedent rule\u201d is uncalled for, since it is the intention of the lawmakers, as embodied in the statute, which governs. The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other .canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature in enacting the law. Board of Education v. Brittin, 11 Ill.2d 411, 414; 34 I. L. P., Statutes, par. 113 at pages 92-93; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d ed. vol. II, par. 4501.\nRelevant here in interpreting the definition in question is the case of Inskip v. Boatrd of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 26 Ill.2d 501, where in discussing the provisions of the Purchasing Act we said at pages 504-05: \u201cThe sole defendant is the University of Illinois * * * which we have heretofore held is a corporation, separate and distinct from the State and no part of the State or State government, (People ex rel. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 342), but which is included within the definition of a \u2018State agency\u2019 in the legislation here pertinent, since it expends or encumbers State funds \u2018by virtue of an annual or biennial appropriation from the General Assembly.\u2019 \u201d While that case did not involve the question here present, we believe the language quoted correctly interpreted the definition in question. We think it clear that the General Assembly sought only to include within this definition those State agencies which expend or encumber State funds by virtue of annual or biennial appropriations. To hold otherwise would require subjection to the provisions of the Purchasing Act of all of the other entities mentioned in the definition whether the funds expended by them are State funds or otherwise. Such interpretation was clearly not contemplated, for the declaration of public policy set forth in section 2 of the Purchasing Act, referred to earlier, seeks only to apply the principle of competitive bidding and economical procurement practices as embodied in the act to those contracts and purchases for which State funds are expended. We therefore hold that the phrase \u201cexpending or encumbering State funds by virtue of an annual or biennial appropriation from the General Assembly\u201d relates to and modifies each of the antecedents theretofore expressed within the definition of \u201cState agency\u201d.\nRemaining for consideration is the question whether the Authority, in connection with these projects, is in fact expending or encumbering State funds by virtue of annual or biennial legislative appropriations. We believe not, since the financing of the construction involved here is wholly derived from the sale of revenue bonds by the Building Authority. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 127, par. 213.5(d)). We have heretofore held that such bonds do not create a debt of the State, that the Building Authority Act is self-contained and complete in itself, that the Authority is a corporate entity separate and apart from the State, and that the act is thus not unconstitutional as allowing the creation of a debt of the State in excess of $250,000 without a referendum. (Berger v. Howlett, 25 Ill.2d 128). We believe the funds with which we are here concerned, i.e., the funds derived from public bond issues, may not fairly be said to be \u201cState funds\u201d within the purview of the Illinois Purchasing Act nor do they become such because held in trust by the State Treasurer for the use of the Authority. The statutory exemption of the property of the Authority from taxation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 127, par. 213.13) does not require a holding that the funds derived from public bond issues are State funds for the purposes of the Purchasing Act, for what are State funds for purposes of taxation is a question entirely apart from that posed here. See People ex rel. Trustees of U. of I. v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 340-43 (property of the University of Illinois held in'fact property of the State) ; People ex rel. Olmsted v. University of Illinois, 328 111. 377 (scholarship fund held by University of Illinois held not exempt from taxation).\nAppellees argue, however, that this whole scheme of fiancing depends for its existence upon appropriations from the Ge\u00f1eral Assembly, since the funds to retire the bonds are ultimately obtained in installments derived from leglslative appropriations to the lessee State agencies for rentals to be paid by the occupying lessee agency (here, the University of Illinois) to the Authority. (111. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 127, par. 213.5(c)). We agree that the probability of forthcoming legislative appropriations to the Authority\u2019s lessees constitutes the dominant factor relied upon by the public when purchasing the Authority\u2019s bonds, but it is clear that neither the bondholders nor the Authority can compel the General Assembly to appropriate such rental funds and it therefore cannot be said that the Authority is expending or encumbering such forthcoming appropriations. Nor when the appropriations reach the lessee can the Authority \u201cencumber\u201d the funds. The appropriations are to the lessee and their subsequent payment to the Authority is wholly attributable to the lessee\u2019s decision to lease, and not to any unilateral action of the Authority. The funds with which w\u00e9 are concerned here are for construction costs and derived from the issuance of bonds by a corporate entity which we have previously held to be entirely apart and separate from the State.\nAlso relevant to interpretation of the scope of the definition of \u201cexpend\u201d and \u201cencumber\u201d as used by the legislature in the definition of \u201cState agency\u201d is appellant\u2019s argument that, if the receipt of State funds appropriated to a State agency and by it paid to a third party constitutes the expenditure or encumbrance of State funds by the third party, the provisions of the Purchasing Act may well be extended, at least arguably, to a point never contemplated nor intended by the General Assembly. It seems to us clear that the legislative intent was not to subject such third party to the Purchasing Act requirements in that party\u2019s use of the funds so derived, but to apply the Purchasing Act to the use of the appropriated funds by those to whom the appropriation is made.\nWe therefore hold that the Building Authority is not a \u201cState agency\u201d as defined by the Purchasing Act in connection with the construction of the facilities in question here, since it is not \u201cexpending or encumbering State funds by-virtue of annual or biennial appropriations from the General Assembly.\u201d\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is accordingly reversed.\nJudgment reversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Underwood"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Cummings & Wyman, of Chicago, for appellants.",
      "Tenney, Bentley, Guthrie & Howell, Jonas & Jonas, and Katz & Friedman, all of Chicago, for appellees.",
      "Jeremiah Marsh, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Better Government Association."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 39593.\nElectrical Contractors Association of City of Chicago, Inc., et al., Appellees, vs. Illinois Building Authority et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed Jan. 19, 1966.\nRehearing denied Jan. 25, 1966.\nCummings & Wyman, of Chicago, for appellants.\nTenney, Bentley, Guthrie & Howell, Jonas & Jonas, and Katz & Friedman, all of Chicago, for appellees.\nJeremiah Marsh, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Better Government Association."
  },
  "file_name": "0587-01",
  "first_page_order": 591,
  "last_page_order": 599
}
