{ "id": 2880957, "name": "The Department of Revenue, Appellee, vs. National Bellas Hess, Inc., Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc.", "decision_date": "1966-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 39330", "first_page": "164", "last_page": "179", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 164" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "339 U.S. 643", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 362414 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/339/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 234", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251-252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 U.S. 714", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3383405 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/95/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162253 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1238-1239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 U.S. 220", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6164156 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/355/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2788413 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 U.S. 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Harv. L. Rev. 1086", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 U.S. 327", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6143167 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349, 354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/322/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 U.S. 340", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6143292 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/322/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 U.S. 373", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 359280 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/312/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 U.S. 359", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 359173 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/312/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 U.S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6143210 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/322/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 U.S. 340", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11300709 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-347" }, { "page": "540" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "540" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/347/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 U.S. 207", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163029 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210-211" }, { "page": "621" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 451", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525137 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ill.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2785174 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0161-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1109, "char_count": 28227, "ocr_confidence": 0.824, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4649153867463022e-07, "percentile": 0.6580777489343973 }, "sha256": "e021b44ea8927b4bd1de2fae070518f32d91f8669f4a07a8aa3694397d2fb479", "simhash": "1:cecf269ac3485f95", "word_count": 4733 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:21.499506+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The Department of Revenue, Appellee, vs. National Bellas Hess, Inc., Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice House\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant National Bellas Hess, Incorporated, a nonresident mail-order vendor, appeals from a summary judgment entered by the circuit court of Cook County against it for the sum of $93,242.18, representing taxes of $74,593.75 assessed under the Illinois Use Tax Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 120, pars. 439.1 et seq.,) for the period of July 17, 1961, through October 31, 1962, plus a 25% penalty of $18,648.43. Constitutional questions, as well as the public revenue, are involved.\nThere is no dispute about the following facts which are gathered from the pleadings. Defendant is a national mail order company. It issues annually two main catalogues, described as \u201cSpring and Summer\u201d and \u201cFall and Winter,\u201d and it also issues during the year a number of intermediate smaller \u201csales books\u201d or \u201cflyers.\u201d The catalogue contains approximately 4000 different items of merchandise for retail sale, and it is mailed to the company\u2019s own list of customers. This list, which contained 5,000,000 names when the company acquired it in 1932, is kept current with active and recent customers. The \u201cflyers,\u201d which are less costly to distribute,-are mailed to a less restricted list of customers or potential customers. They are occasionally mailed in bulk addressed to \u201coccupant\u201d or enclosed in the parcels sent to customers in filling orders from a prior \u201cflyer\u201d or catalogue.\nThe company\u2019s only plant is located in North Kansas City, Missouri, and all of its mail-order activities occur there, except for purchasing, which is done initially by a wholly owned subsidiary in New York. All of the catalogues and \u201cflyers\u201d are mailed from North Kansas City; orders from customers are received and accepted there; the goods are mailed or shipped by common carrier from there; and payment by the customer is mailed there.\nThe company is a Delaware corporation and is qualified to do business only in Delaware and Missouri. It does not maintain in Illinois any office, distribution house, sales house, warehouse or any other place of business; it does not have in Illinois any agent, salesman, canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell or take orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to service merchandise it sells; it does not own any tangible property, real or personal, in Illinois; it has no telephone listing in Illinois and it has not' advertised its merchandise for sale in newspapers, on billboards, or by radio or television in Illinois.\nSection 3 of the Use Tax Act, which became effective in July, 1955, imposes a tax \u201cupon the privilege of using in this State tangible personal property purchased at retail * * * from a retailer.\u201d It also provides that the tax \u201c* * * shall be collected from the purchaser by a retailer maintaining a place of business\" in this State * * *.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 120, par. 439.3.) The constitutionality of the act was adjudicated and a determination of its operating incidence was made by this court two years later. (Turner v. Wright, 11 Ill.2d 161.) Section 2 of the act, which defines various terms used in the act, was amended effective July 17, 1961, (the commencement date of the assessment here in question) by adding a new paragraph to the definition of a \u201cretailer maintaining a place of business in this State.\u201d The new paragraph, referred to as the \u201ccatalogue amendment\u201d, defines a \u201cretailer maintaining a place of business in this State\u201d as any retailer \u201cEngaging in soliciting orders within this State from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are received or accepted within or without this State.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 120, par. 439.2.\nThe Use Tax Act was also amended in July, 1961, by adding a new section, section 12a, which provides for substituted service of process on a nonresident falling within the definition of \u201cretailer maintaining a place of business in this State.\u201d It provides that, \u201cAny non-resident of this State who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this State to non-residents of acting as a retailer maintaining a place of business in the State within the meaning of Section 2 of this Act, * * * shall be deemed thereby to appoint the Secretary of State of Illinois his agent for the service of process or notice in any judicial or administrative proceeding under this Act. Such process or notice shall be served by the Department on the Secretary of State by leaving, at the office of the Secretary of State' at least 15 days before the return day of such process or notice, a true and certified copy thereof, and by sending to the taxpayer by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, a like and true certified copy, with an endorsement thereon of the service upon said Secretary of State, addressed to such taxpayer at his last known address.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 120, par. 439.12a.) The section provides that this substituted service of process or notice \u201cshall be of the same force and validity as if served upon the taxpayer personally within this State.\u201d\nWhile defendant has raised a number of grounds for reversing the judgment entered against it, its two principle arguments are: (1) that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction by the circuit court in this proceeding constitutes a denial of due process of law under the Federal and Illinois constitutions, (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, sec. 1; Ill. Const, art. II, sec. 2,) and (2) that the Use Tax Act in so far as it requires that defendant collect the use tax from Illinois taxpayers is a denial of due process of law under the Federal and Illinois constitutions and violative of the commerce clause of the Federal constitution. (U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.) We consider first the constitutionality of requiring defendant to collect the Illinois use tax.\nThe Supreme Court has held that a State\u2019s power to impose upon a nonresident vendor the burden of collecting its use tax depends upon the amount of activities conducted by the nonresident vendor in the taxing State. (American Oil Company v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 14 L:ed. 2d 1, 85 S. Ct. 1130; Scripto Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 4 L. ed. 2d 660, 80 S. Ct. 619; Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 98 L. ed. 744, 74 S. Ct. 535; General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335, 88 L. ed. 1309, 64 S. Ct. 1028.) \u201cThere must be * * * \u2018some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.\u2019\u201d Scripto Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-211, 4 L. ed. 2d 660, 80 S. Ct. 619, 621.\nNelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 312 U.S. 359, 85 L. ed. 888, 61 S. Ct. 586, involved the constitutionality of the Iowa use tax as applied to Sears mail order business conducted directly between customers in Iowa and Sears mail-order houses located outside Iowa. Sears was authorized to do business in Iowa and had retail stores there. The court upheld Iowa\u2019s power to impose this collector\u2019s liability against Sears on such mail orders against the attack that the exercise of such power denied Sears of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment and violated the commerce clause of section 8 of article I of the constitution.\nNelson v. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373, 85 L. ed. 897, 61 S. Ct. 593, a companion case to Sears Roebuck, raised the identical issue on almost the same facts as in Sears Roebuck and the court reached the same result. In the course of this opinion, however, the court stated: \u201cThere is a further fact in this record which makes a reversal of this judgment necessary. It was stipulated that \u2018advertisements have been caused to be printed by the retail stores of the petitioner [Montgomery Ward & Co.] in the State of Iowa, advertising not only retail merchandise, but the ability to complete service through the use of the catalog.\u2019 This stipulation clearly means that respondent has solicited mail order sales in Iowa. [Emphasis added.] The fact that that solicitation was done through local advertisements rather than directly by local agents * * * is immaterial. Nor is it material that the orders were filled by direct shipments from points outside the state to purchasers within the state.\u201d 312 U.S. 373, 376, 85 L. ed. 897, 899, 61 S. Ct. 593, 595.\nThe same issue was again raised in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335, 88 L. ed. 1309, 64 S. Ct. 1028. That case also involved the Iowa use tax, but this time the vendor had never qualified to do business as a foreign corporation in Iowa nor did it maintain any office, branch or warehouse there. Orders were solicited by traveling salesmen sent into Iowa from their Minnesota headquarters. Again, the court upheld Iowa\u2019s jurisdiction to impose liability on the nonresident vendor for collection of the use tax on property shipped by common carrier or the post into Iowa.\nThe question was again raised in Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 98 L. ed. 744, 74 S. Ct. 535. Miller Bros. Co. only made sales directly to its customers in Wilmington, Delaware, and did not take orders by mail or telephone. Maryland\u2019s Court of Appeals held Miller Bros. Co. liable for the Maryland use tax on all goods sold in the Delaware store to Maryland residents whether the goods were delivered into Maryland by common carrier, the vendor\u2019s truck or carried by the purchasers themselves. The U.S. Supreme Court held that advertising by Miller Bros. Co. with Delaware newspapers and radio stations which reached Maryland residents, its occasional sales circulars which were mailed to all former customers including customers in Maryland, and the occasional delivery of goods into Maryland did not constitute a jurisdictional basis for imposing the burden of collecting or paying the Maryland use tax on this Delaware vendor. In distinguishing the General Trading case the court said, \u201cThat was the case of an out-of-state merchant entering the taxing state through traveling sales agents to conduct continuous local solicitation followed by delivery of ordered goods to the customers * * *. But there is a wide gulf between this type of active and aggressive operation within a taxing state and the occasional delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than the incidental effects of general advertising.\u201d 347 U.S. 340, 346-347. 9\u00a7 L. ed. 744, 749, 74 S. Ct. 535, 540.\nThe issue again came before the court in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 4 L. ed. 2d 660, 80 S. Ct. 619. The court held that solicitation by advertising specialty brokers who were not employees or agents of Scripto, the Georgia vendor, constituted a jurisdictional basis for imposing the burden of collecting or paying the Florida use tax on orders solicited by the brokers and filled by shipping the merchandise into Florida. After stating that the case was controlled by General Trading Co. the court distinguished the Miller Bros. Co. case by saying: \u201cMiller had no solicitors in Maryland; there was no \u2018exploitation of the consumer market\u2019; no regular, systematic displaying of its products by catalogs, samples or the like. But, on the contrary, the goods on which Maryland sought to force Miller to collect its tax were sold to residents of Maryland when personally present at Miller\u2019s store in Delaware. * * * Marylanders went to Delaware to make purchases \u2014 Miller did not go to Maryland for sales. Moreover, it was impossible for Miller to determine that goods sold for cash to a customer over the counter at its store in Delaware were to be used and enjoyed in Maryland.\u201d 362 U.S. 207, 212, 4 L. ed. 2d 660, 664, 665, 80 S. Ct. 619.\nFrom the foregoing cases it would appear that Mr. Justice Rutledge has gotten to the heart of the \u201cwhat\u201d and \u201cwhy\u201d that constitutes a jurisdictional basis for imposing on a nonresident vendor the burden of collecting the use tax on merchandise sold and delivered to residents of the taxing State. He said: \u201cThe old notion that \u2018mere solicitation\u2019 is not \u2018doing business\u2019 when it is regular, continuous and persistent is fast losing its force. In the General Trading Co. case it loses force altogether, for the Iowa statute defines this process in terms as \u2018a retailer maintaining a place of business in this state.\u2019 The Iowa Supreme Court sustains the definition and this Court gives effect to its decision in upholding the tax. Fiction the definition may be; but it is fiction with substance because, for every relevant constitutional consideration affecting taxation of transactions, regular, continuous, persistent solicitation has the same economic, and should have the same legal, consequences as does maintaining an office for soliciting and even contracting purposes or maintaining a place of business, where the goods actually are shipped into the state from without for delivery to the particular buyer.\u201d (Separate opinion concurring with General Trading Company v. State Tax Commission and International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349, 88 L. ed. 1313, 1319, and dissenting to McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327, 349, 354, 88 L. ed. 1304, 1319, 1321.) In short, \u201ccontinuous local solicitation followed by delivery of ordered goods to the customers\u201d apparently forms a constitutional basis for a \u201cState\u2019s decision to regard such a rivalry with its local merchants as equivalent to being a local merchant.\u201d Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 346, 98 L. ed. 744, 749, 74 S. Ct. 535, 540.\nWe do not think it important that defendant in this case solicits orders by catalogue and flyers rather than by local advertising as in Montgomery Ward, or by salesmen as in General Trading Co. or by brokers as in Scripto, Inc. The important question is whether there is \u201cexploitation of the consumer market\u201d by continuous solicitation and not whether the company used local advertising, salesmen, brokers or catalogues since the vendor will use that type of solicitation which most effectively and economically exploits the consumer market.\nWe believe the record in this case shows that defendant has engaged in \u201csoliciting orders within this State from users by means of catalogues and other advertising\u201d and that it is, therefore, a \u201cretailer maintaining a place of business in this State\u201d under the Use Tax Act. Since the record also supports the conclusion that there was continuous local solicitation of mail orders followed by delivery of. the ordered goods to customers in Illinois, we hold that the Use Tax Act does not deprive defendant of due process of law under the Federal or Illinois constitutions nor does it violate the commerce clause of the Federal constitution.\nDefendant argues that the issue here is whether Illinois can impose its use tax on it and that this \u201cissue cannot be obfuscated by gratuitous and euphemistic statements that Illinois is attempting to impose upon defendant only the duty of such tax collection.\u201d Section 3 of the Use Tax Act provides that the tax imposed on the purchaser-user is to be collected by the retailer. Section 8 provides that \u201cthe tax herein required to be collected by any retailer pursuant to this Act, and any such tax collected by any retailer shall constitute a debt owed by the retailer to this State * * The effect of these two sections is that the tax is to be collected by the retailer; but if he fails to collect the tax, he himself is liable for its payment. The Florida statute under consideration in the Scripto, Inc., case also imposed on the vendor the burden of collecting or paying the use tax. The court stated, \u201cWe note that the appellant is charged with no tax \u2014 save when, as here, he fails or refuses to collect it from the Florida customer,\u201d and went on to affirm the tax liability levied against Scripto, Inc. 362 U.S. at 211.\nDefendant\u2019s other principle contention for reversing this judgment is that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction by the circuit court deprived it of due process of law. Defendant states that in none of the cases dealing with a State use tax and the imposition of collection liability has the issue been raised of whether substituted service of process on a nonresident vendor will give a court jurisdiction to enter an in personam judgment.\nThomas Reed Powell raised this issue in \u201cSales and Use Taxes: Collection from Absentee Vendors.\u201d (57 Harv. L. Rev. 1086 (1944).) He analyzed the problem of obtaining personal service on a nonresident vendor who does all his business by mail order or whose soliciting agents have left the State ahead of the process server and concluded that, \u201cSuch practical difficulties cannot as yet be minimized by applying to all foreign corporations engaged exclusively in interstate commerce the familiar statutes requiring the appointment of an agent or providing that the doing of business shall itself be a sufficient basis for service of process on a state official in causes of action arising out of business there done.\u201d' (57 Harv. L. Rev. 1086, 1088.) This conclusion was apparently correct when written, but we note that it was written a year before the land mark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L. ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154.\nIn Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. 22 Ill.2d 432, we stated, \u201cUnder modern doctrine the power of a State court to enter a binding judgment against one not served with process within the State depends upon two questions: first, whether he has certain minimum contacts with the State [citation], and second, whether there has been a reasonable method of notification.\u201d (22 Ill.2d 432, 437). We consider first the question of minimum contacts with the State.\nIn the use tax cases heretofore considered the court speaks of the State\u2019s \u201cjurisdiction or power to create this collector\u2019s liability,\u201d (See, e.g., Miller Bros Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344, 98 L. ed. 744, 748, 74 S. Ct. 535, 538,) and turns the question of such jurisdiction or power on whether the nonresident vendor has \u201cminimum connections\u201d with the taxing State. (Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345, 98 L. ed. 744, 748, 74 S. Ct. 535, 539.) Thus, the power to render an in personam judgment against one not served with process within the State and the power to impose a collector\u2019s liability for the use tax on a nonresident vendor both depend on \u201cminimum contacts\u201d or \u201cminimum connections\u201d with the State. Whether the \u201cminimum connections\u201d which form the basis of jurisdiction to impose the collector\u2019s liability are sufficient to form the basis of in personam jurisdiction to enforce this liability has not, to our knowledge, been decided by the Supreme Court. It would be an anomolous situation, however, if a State had jurisdiction to impose this collector\u2019s liability but did not have jurisdiction to enforce it.\nMcGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 355 U.S. 220, 2 L. ed. 2d 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, involved an action brought in California against a foreign insurance company on a policy issued to a resident of California. The insurance company did not have any office or agent in California and never solicited or did any insurance business in California apart from the policy involved in the case. The insurance company was not served with process in California, but was notified by registered mail at its place of business in Texas, pursuant to a statute permitting such service in actions on insurance contracts. After referring to the International Shoe case and the trend \u201ctoward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations,\u201d the court held that \u201cit is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection\u201d with California. 355 U.S. 220, 223, 2 L. ed. 2d 223, 226, 78 S. Ct. 199, 201.\nHanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 2 L. ed. 2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228, concerned the right to $400,000, part of the corpus of a trust established in Delaware by a settlor who later became domiciled in Florida. Delaware refused to accord full faith and credit to a Florida decree adjudicating the matter because the Florida court had not acquired jurisdiction over an indispensable party, the Delaware trustee. The trustee was not served with process in Florida, but was notified by ordinary mail and notice was published locally as required by the Florida statutes dealing with constructive service.\nThe court first noted that \u201cthe requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-residents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, go L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154.\u201d It then stated, \u201cBut it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. * * * a defendant may not be called upon to do so [defend himself in a foreign tribunal] unless he has had the \u2018minimal contacts\u2019 with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.\u201d The court proceeded to distinguish the \u201cminimal contacts\u201d present in the McGee case from the absence of \u201cminimal contacts\u201d in this Hanson case. \u201cNone of the trust assets has ever been held or administered in Florida, and the record discloses no solicitation of business in that State either in person or by mail. * * * In McGee, the nonresident defendant solicited a reinsurance agreement with a resident of California. * * * But the record discloses no instance in which the trustee performed any acts in Florida that bear the same relationship to the [trust] agreement as the solicitation in McGee.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 357 U.S. 234, 251-252, 2 L. ed. 2d 1283, 1296, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1238-1239.\nThus, solicitation which is of prime importance in satisfying the \u201cminimal connections\u201d requirement in the use tax cases is of equal importance in satisfying the \u201cminimal contacts\u201d requirement necessary for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction with substituted service of process. Also significant is the fact that the solicitation, which was so important in the McGee case, was by mail. (See also, Travelers Health Ass\u2019n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 94 L. ed. 1154, 70 S. Ct. 927.) We hold that defendant\u2019s continuous local solicitation for mail orders followed by delivery of the ordered goods to customers in Illinois constitute the \u201cminimal contacts\u201d between defendant and Illinois that are requisite to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over it.\nThis brings us to the question of whether section 12a provides a reasonable method of notification. The section states that a true and certified copy of the process or notice shall be sent to the taxpayer by registered or certified mail at his last known address. In the International Shoe Co. case the court said, \u201cNor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit.\u201d (326 U.S. 310, 320, 90 L. ed. 95, 104, 66 S. Ct. 154, 160.) We are of the opinion that section 12a gives the person to be served or notified \u201ca realistic opportunity to appear and be heard.\u201d See Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. 22 Ill.2d 432, 436.\nThe record shows that on January 21, 1963, a certified copy of the notice of proposed assessment was sent by registered mail addressed to defendant\u2019s North Kansas City office. On June 26, 1963, a certified copy of final assessment was sent by registered mail addressed to defendant\u2019s North Kansas City office and on January 23, 1964, a certified copy of alias summons, with a copy of the complaint attached, was sent by registered mail to defendant\u2019s North Kansas City office. Defendant did not respond to the notice of proposed assessment or final assessment, but it did make a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the circuit court. There is nothing in the record to show that defendant did not have adequate notice or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and appear.\nDefendant also argues that section 12a does not apply to it. To support this argument it first points out that the section states, \u201cAny non-resident of this State who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this State to non-residents of acting as a retailer maintaining a place of business in this State * * Defendant then contends that it receives no privilege from Illinois.\nThe plain intent and meaning of section 12a is to provide a method of substituted service on a nonresident \u201cacting as a retailer maintaining a place of business in this State within the meaning of Section 2.\u201d Whether Illinois extended the \u201cprivilege\u201d or defendant accepted the \u201cprivilege\u201d is academic, because, as we have pointd out, defendant is \u201cmaintaining a place of business in this State within the meaning of Section 2\u201d and the application of 12a to defendant did not deprive it of due process of law.\nAlso in support of its argument that section 12a is not applicable to it, defendant points out that the section provides for mailing a copy of the notice or process \u201cto the taxpayer * * * addressed to such taxpayer at his last known address.\u201d Since defendant is a collector of the tax rather than a \u201ctaxpayer\u201d it concludes that the section does not apply to it.\nAs we just pointed out, section 12a provides a method of substituted service on persons who have incurred a liability under the Use Tax Act. The section clearly provides in the first sentence that it is to apply to (1) nonresident vendors, (2) resident vendors who subsequently move from the State or conceal their whereabouts and (3) resident or nonresident users who move from the State or conceal their whereabouts. The section thereafter uses the word \u201ctaxpayer\u201d in a generic, and not in a technical, manner to cover all three categories of persons who may have incurred liability under the act and cannot be served with process in the State. The section clearly applies to defendant.\nThe constitutional issues argued by amici curiae are essentially the same as those argued by defendant. They do contend, however, that equal treatment has not been accorded resident and nonresident vendors with regard to their respective liabilities under the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act and the Use Tax Act on credit sales. Since there is nothing in the record concerning credit sales, we need not consider this question. Nor will we consider a memorandum of the Department of Revenue concerning sales for resale and its effect on manufacturers and wholesalers, since there are no sales for resale involved in this case.\nThe remaining questions raised by defendant can be disposed of summarily. Defendant argues that the complaint should have been dismissed because the verification was not personally signed by Harry L. Hulm\u00e1n, Director of the Department of Revenue. Verification of the complaint was not necessary. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap, no, par. 35.) It also argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact raised by the pleadings. Defendant does not state what those issues are and our examination of the pleadings does not reveal any such issues. It is also argued that summary judgment should not have been entered because two affidavits of Director Hulm\u00e1n were not personally signed by him and the affidavit of Attorney General William G. Clark consists only of argument and conclusions of law. As we just mentioned, the pleadings do not show any genuine issues of material fact.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice House" } ], "attorneys": [ "Leibman, Williams, Bennett and Baird, of Chicago, (Julian R. Wilheim, of counsel,) for appellant.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, (Richard A. Michael and Terence F. MacCarthy, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel,) for appellee.", "Halfpenny, Hahn and Ryan, of Chicago, (Harold T. Halfpenny, James F. Flanagan, and Mary M. Shaw, of counsel,) amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 39330.\nThe Department of Revenue, Appellee, vs. National Bellas Hess, Inc., Appellant.\nOpinion filed Jan. 25, 1966.\nRehearing denied March 23, 1966.\nLeibman, Williams, Bennett and Baird, of Chicago, (Julian R. Wilheim, of counsel,) for appellant.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, (Richard A. Michael and Terence F. MacCarthy, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel,) for appellee.\nHalfpenny, Hahn and Ryan, of Chicago, (Harold T. Halfpenny, James F. Flanagan, and Mary M. Shaw, of counsel,) amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0164-01", "first_page_order": 164, "last_page_order": 179 }