{ "id": 2863374, "name": "The Village of Park Forest, Appellant, vs. Jay D. Bragg, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Park Forest v. Bragg", "decision_date": "1967-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 40193", "first_page": "225", "last_page": "230", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 225" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "139 Colo. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 78697 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/139/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.W.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Tenn. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8530331 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/191/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.Y. Supp. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "case_ids": [ 7691275 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nys/86/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.W.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ark. 1131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1418481 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/191/1131-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 847170 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/202/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5010857 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/302/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.W.2d 916", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 Wis. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8679986 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/262/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2557470 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/83/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2582268 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/73/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5300611 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/61/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 U.S. 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6140617 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/302/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ill.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2724740 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2580262 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/74/0087-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 525, "char_count": 8681, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.868245401839604e-07, "percentile": 0.9522968327497086 }, "sha256": "263d0f36a810ab1d0008df5fb49db79b9610b796a1db376a7664d8f0b377b5e7", "simhash": "1:c7eadd41414461d9", "word_count": 1426 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:14.192691+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The Village of Park Forest, Appellant, vs. Jay D. Bragg, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Underwood\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case raises a question of first impression in this court \u2014 whether a judge has the power to suspend a penalty he has assessed for the violation of a municipal ordinance. A magistrate of the circuit court of Cook County found the defendant, Jay D. Bragg, guilty of violating two traffic ordinances of the village of Park Forest, one involving driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and the other relating to careless driving. Fines were assessed in accordance with the ordinances, and five dollars costs were added for each offense. The magistrate then suspended the penalties, making no provision for the duration of the suspension; the village appealed. The First 'District Appellate Court upheld the suspension (74 Ill. App. 2d 87), and we granted leave to appeal. Defendant has not participated in any of the appellate proceedings herein, and amici curiae appointed by the appellate court and this court have presented the arguments in opposition to the appeal and in favor of the magistrate\u2019s action before both that court and us.\nBefore reaching the merits of the appellate court\u2019s ruling, it must first be determined whether the village could properly seek review of the magistrate\u2019s decision. If violation of a municipal ordinance is subject to Supreme Court Rule 604 (formerly Rule 27(4)), no appeal from the order of suspension could properly be taken. In Village of Maywood v. Houston, 10 Ill.2d 117, we passed on this precise question and also on the question of whether a double jeopardy problem is created if municipalities may appeal adverse decisions in ordinance cases as in ordinary civil suits. We there held that the village, without violating the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, could properly appeal from a judgment acquitting him, adhering to the classification of an ordinance violation prosecution as being quasi-criminal in character, but civil in form. In passing on the constitutional question, we held that double jeopardy does not bar an appeal by the municipality. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 82 L. Ed. 288.\nSubsequent to this decision, the definition of \u201coffense\u201d in the Code of Criminal Procedure was expanded to include \u201ca violation of * * * any penal ordinance of [the] political subdivisions\u201d of this State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 38, par. 102 \u2014 15.) In light of this broadened definition, and without even citing Maywood, the Fourth District Appellate Court recently held that a municipality could not appeal from a decision to which Rule 27(4) (the present Rule 604) did not apply. (City of Gibson City v. McClellan, 61 Ill. App. 2d 218. See, also, Town of Bloomington v. Murphy, 73 Ill. App. 2d 417, 419.) In considering these decisions, we express no opinion as to .the applicability to ordinance cases of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure other than that which deals with appealability. Compare City of Highland Park v. Curtis, 83 Ill. App. 2d 218.\nSupreme Court Rule 604 enumerates the decisions from which \u201cthe State\u201d may appeal in \u201ccriminal cases\u201d and was adopted pursuant to section 120 \u2014 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 38, par. 120 \u2014 1), which also speaks in terms of appeals by \u201cthe State\u201d in \u201ca criminal case\u201d. The second of the quoted phrases is also employed in section 7 of article VI of the Illinois constitution, which provides that \u201cafter a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal.\u201d In our opinion, the correctness of the appellate court\u2019s decision in Gibson City depends on the meaning of these phrases. Only if \u201ca criminal case\u201d was intended to be synonymous with \u201coffense\u201d and \u201cState\u201d was intended to include the political subdivisions thereof did the appellate court reach the right result; and we do not believe this can fairly be said to represent the legislative intent. Included as \u201coffenses\u201d in the present Code of Criminal Procedure are both what would ordinarily be thought of as \u201ca criminal case\u201d \u2014 a case involving violation of \u201cany penal statute of this State\u201d \u2014 and what had, prior to the expansion of the definition of \u201coffense\u201d been referred to as quasi-criminal cases \u2014 those involving violation of \u201cany penal ordinance of its political subdivisions.\u201d Thus the term \u201coffense\u201d, as presently defined, is clearly intended to be broader in scope than the phrase \u201ca criminal case\u201d. Consequently, the statute delimiting the areas of appeal in \u201ca criminal case\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 28, par. 120 \u2014 1) and our Rule 604, which uses the same phraseology, necessarily encompass a substantially smaller category of cases \u2014 only those which involve violations of the general criminal laws \u2014 than would be true had the term \u201coffense\u201d been used in the statute and rule. We therefore conclude that expansion of the definition of \u201coffense\u201d in section 102 \u2014 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in no way detracted from the continued viability of the Maywood rule. Moreover, the term \u201cState\u201d would not ordinarily be considered as applying both to the State itself and to its political subdivisions, and our conclusion that Maywood is still the law finds additional support in the continued use of this term.\nSince we hold the village may appeal, we reach the merits of the suspension issue. It is undisputed that there is no statutory authority for the magistrate\u2019s action herein, so its propriety depends on his inherent power. In order to avoid application of the civil rule that the magistrate had no inherent power to prevent Park Forest from collecting its money judgment, (see City of Milwaukee v. Stanki, 262 Wis. 607, 55 N.W.2d 916,) the appellate court emphasized the criminal aspects of ordinance violation cases. By so doing, it runs afoul of the rule which prevails in criminal cases: absent statutory authority a trial court has no inherent power to indefinitely suspend sentences. (People v. Penn, 302 Ill. 488, 494; People ex rel. Boenert v. Barrett, 202 Ill. 287, 290.) Thus, if the civil nature of ordinance violation cases is deemed controlling, we are confronted with the rule that the trial court cannot prevent a municipality from collecting a money judgment in its favor without its consent, and, if we emphasize the criminal nature of such a proceeding, the rule prohibiting indefinite suspensions of sentences applies. Consequently, the decision of the appellate court must be reversed unless there exists in the hybrid nature of an ordinance violation case some feature necessitating a departure from existing rules. No such special feature has been disclosed in any of the cases which our research indicates have considered the precise question raised herein; and these cases generally stand for the proposition that, in ordinance violation cases, the power to indefinitely suspend a sentence' is wholly dependent on statute. (Stanki; Freeman v. City of Benton, 191 Ark. 1131, 89 S.W.2d 738; City of New York v. Newitt, 86 N.Y. Supp. 832; 62 Corpus Juris Secundum 703. See, also, Thompson v. State. 191 Tenn. 221, 232 S.W.2d 42. But, cf., Zerobnick v. City and County of Denver, 139 Colo. 139, 337 P.2d 11). Nor have the opinion of the appellate court or the briefs of the amici curiae pointed out any reasons we consider compelling. We accordingly conclude that the magistrate acted without authority in suspending the sentence he imposed.\nIn emphasizing the criminal nature of an ordinance violation proceeding, the appellate court implicitly confirmed the power of a municipality to provide for imprisonment as a direct penalty for an ordinance violation. In its petition for leave to appeal, the village has asked us to decide whether such power in fact exists. Such decision, however, is unnecessary to resolution of the problem before us and we express no opinion as to the soundness of this dictum in the appellate court\u2019s opinion.\nThe decision of the First District Appellate Court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to expunge the order of suspension.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.\nKluczynski and Ward, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Underwood" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard W. Hall, Village Prosecutor, and Henry X. Dietch, Village Attorney, both of Park Forest, (Richard W. Hall, of counsel,) for appellant.", "Sydney R. Drebin and Marvin E. Aspen, both of Chicago, amici curiae.", "Harry G. .Fins, Mathew L. Salita, and Sidney Z. Karasik, all of Chicago, other amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 40193.\nThe Village of Park Forest, Appellant, vs. Jay D. Bragg, Appellee.\nOpinion filed Sept. 29, 1967.\nRehearing denied Nov. 27, 1967.\nKluczynski and Ward, JJ., took no part.\nRichard W. Hall, Village Prosecutor, and Henry X. Dietch, Village Attorney, both of Park Forest, (Richard W. Hall, of counsel,) for appellant.\nSydney R. Drebin and Marvin E. Aspen, both of Chicago, amici curiae.\nHarry G. .Fins, Mathew L. Salita, and Sidney Z. Karasik, all of Chicago, other amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0225-01", "first_page_order": 229, "last_page_order": 234 }