{ "id": 2852365, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Harold Newell, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Newell", "decision_date": "1968-11-22", "docket_number": "No. 40390", "first_page": "329", "last_page": "334", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 329" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "37 Ill.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2864159 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2796348 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2884726 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2880852 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0219-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 439, "char_count": 7082, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.267463873033749e-07, "percentile": 0.915613226871528 }, "sha256": "c4eb79698f5e3c4153d2ba00a2502cf50d5f624acc8e1121fab47faac64b9add", "simhash": "1:8525b8aee9180e6d", "word_count": 1181 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:02:11.612060+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Harold Newell, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 1964, Harold Newell pleaded guilty to the charge of murder in the circuit court of Cook County and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 40 to 90 years. No direct appeal was taken but in 1966 he filed a pro se petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 38, par. 122 \u2014 1 et seq.), alleging a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. His petition charged, in substance, that a pretrial confession made by him \u201cwas the result of intimidation by a named member of the Chicago Police Department and a named official of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office and that these officials convinced him that his choice was electrocution or confession.\u201d Implicit in this allegation was the assertion that his guilty plea was induced or coerced by the knowledge that this confession would be used against him at trial. The State filed a pleading, designated as a \u201cMotion to Dismiss\u201d, challenging the sufficiency of the petition and detailing, by means of attached documents, including the transcript of the trial proceedings, the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea. On the basis of these pleadings and a further affidavit filed by petitioner\u2019s sister, the trial court, over argument by the assistant Public Defender representing petitioner, entered the order of dismissal from which this appeal is taken.\nIt is axiomatic that \u201cA constitutional right, like any other right of an accused, may be waived [citations] and a voluntary plea of guilty waives errors or irregularities that are not jurisdictional.\u201d (People v. Dennis, 34 Ill.2d 219, 221.) Therefore the petitioner cannot complain of any denial of constitutional rights unless there is some substance to his claim, implied in the petition, that his guilty plea was involuntary. Towards this end, petitioner\u2019s counsel, in the brief filed in this court, further articulates the argument that the guilty plea was prompted by the threatened admission into evidence of petitioner\u2019s allegedly involuntary confession.\nThe transcript of the proceedings, however, rebuts this contention, as it tends to establish affirmatively that petitioner\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated. It reveals that pursuant to an investigation into the murder of Henry O\u2019Connor, petitioner, a friend of the deceased, told the police that Percy Nelson had committed the crime. Subsequently, Nelson was indicted and petitioner was taken into custody as a material witness. On February 20, 1964, petitioner testified for the State in Nelson\u2019s trial to the effect that he saw Nelson and the deceased together just before the murder and that Nelson had a pistol with him at that time. The next morning he gave a hand-written confession to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Samuel Banks, stating that he had shot O\u2019Connor and that Nelson had paid him to do it. Later that day, he repeated this statement at Nelson\u2019s trial. (Details of his testimony may be found in People v. Nelson, 33 Ill.2d 48, 50.) Also, at some time on this day, February 21, Gerald Getty, the Public Defender of Cook County, was appointed to represent Newell who was indicted and entered a plea of not guilty upon' his arraignment. On his trial date, March 11, 1964, before the same judge who heard the Nelson case, petitioner appeared, represented by his appointed counsel, and the following statements were made:\n\u201cMr. Getty : This is Harold Newell who I have been appointed to represent on February 21st when he gave a certain statement that undoubtedly the State will put into evidence. He handed it to the State\u2019s Attorney during the course of the trial of Percy Nelson. I talked to him extensively on that date which he said that written statement was true, and I have talked to him on March 4, 1964, in which he said the statement was true. And, of course, I talked to him on today adjoining this courtroom in the presence of his sister, Mrs. Taylor. And I have advised him about all his constitutional rights. He still says he is guilty of this crime and that he wishes to enter a plea of guilty.\nSo I at this time I will \u2014 is that true, you want to enter a plea of guilty. ?\nThe Defendant : Yes.\nThe Court : State your name, Harold.\nThe Defendant : Harold Newell.\nThe Court: Now, your lawyer advises me you wish to plead guilty, is that correct ?\nThe Defendant : It is God\u2019s will.\nThe Court: Is that your statement?\nThe Defendant : It is God\u2019s will.\nThe Court : Well, you are pleading guilty yourself, is that right.\nThe Defendant : Yes, sir.\nThe Court: Now, before accepting your plea of guilty it is my duty to advise you that on a plea of guilty you could be sentenced to death or you could be sentenced to jail for a minimum of 14 years and a maximum of any number of years. Now, that would be the penalty. Now, knowing the penalty do you still say you are guilty?\nThe Defendant : Yes sir.\nThe Court : All right, let the record show, and you have conferred with Mr. Getty here, have you?\nThe Defendant : Yes, sir.\nThe Court : You are satisfied with Mr. Getty as your lawyer ?\nThe Defendant : Yes, sir.\u201d\nThe free and voluntary character of petitioner\u2019s plea, as disclosed above, was not contradicted by any factual allegations or material in the petition. The affidavit of petitioner\u2019s sister, Mrs. Taylor, merely stated that she had been informed by the police two days after petitioner had been taken into custody, that he was being held only as a material witness and, consequently, did not need a lawyer. We hold the trial court properly concluded that the plea was voluntary. See People v. Smith, 23 Ill.2d 512.\nThere is no merit to petitioner\u2019s other contentions that his post-conviction counsel was incompetent, and that the judge ruling on his petition, consistent with the holding in People v. Wilson, 37 Ill.2d 617, should have disqualified himself because he also had presided at petitioner\u2019s trial. Under the circumstances, petitioner\u2019s court-appointed counsel performed her services adequately. With respect to the disqualification of a post-conviction hearing judge, in Wilson we said at p. 621: \u201cWhile ordinarily the right to a change of venue in a Post-Conviction Proceeding is not absolute, we think that in certain circumstances a trial judge should recuse himself when it appears that he may be biased or may be a potential witness.\u201d No such circumstances were present in the instant case.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nr , . , Judgment affirmed.\nMr. Justice Ward took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski" } ], "attorneys": [ "Howard H. Hush, Jr., of Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Assistant Attorney General, and Elmer C. Kissane and Theodore A. Shapero, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 40390.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Harold Newell, Appellant.\nOpinion filed Nov. 22, 1968.\nRehearing denied Jan. 28, 1969.\nWard, J., took no part.\nHoward H. Hush, Jr., of Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Fred G. Leach, Assistant Attorney General, and Elmer C. Kissane and Theodore A. Shapero, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0329-01", "first_page_order": 339, "last_page_order": 344 }