{ "id": 2842395, "name": "Donald J. Baran, Appellee, vs. The City of Chicago Heights, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Baran v. City of Chicago Heights", "decision_date": "1969-09-26", "docket_number": "No. 41743", "first_page": "177", "last_page": "182", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 177" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "16 Ill.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2762188 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3103367 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/165/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2660627 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/83/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5295113 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/42/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 Ill. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2627336 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/405/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 2d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5323619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/99/0221-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 535, "char_count": 8049, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.618205175700423e-07, "percentile": 0.9482597247947661 }, "sha256": "0883eb01b8f0c57e61b60a619aba16aa4a958192eb3f2a6838eb832672ac94ed", "simhash": "1:2f2afee20e0f7443", "word_count": 1390 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:11.222997+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Donald J. Baran, Appellee, vs. The City of Chicago Heights, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial Donald J. Baran recovered a $40,000 judgment against the City of Chicago Heights for personal injuries. The judgment was affirmed in the appellate court (99 Ill. App. 2d 221) and the city has been granted leave to appeal. To reverse the judgment it is contended that as a matter of law the city was not guilty of any negligence, that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, and that certain jury instructions tendered by the city were improperly refused.\nThe plaintiff, 29 years of age, incurred the injuries on December 8, i960, when he drove his car past the dead end of Ashland Avenue and crashed into a tree. It was shortly after midnight, and he was on his way to a restaurant after an evening of bowling. He was driving alone, at about 25 miles an hour, and had never been in the particular area before. Ashland Avenue is a preferential street running north and south. At the south end toward which the plaintiff was traveling, it terminates in a\u201cT\u201d intersection with Hickory Street, which extends in an east-west direction. A vacant lot extends from the southern' edge of Hickory Street some 150 feet to a railroad embankment 12 to i'5 feet high. The tree with which plaintiff collided was about 30 feet south of Hickory Street and 5 feet east of what would be the center line of Ashland Avenue extended.\nAt the third and fourth intersections to the north of the \u201cdead end\u201d four-way stop signs were in place, and at the sixth there were traffic signals. All the other intersections had stop signs for east-west traffic. At or near each intersection there was an incandescent street light suspended over the roadway upon an arm eight feet long affixed to a vertical pole twenty-five feet high. The lamp at Ashland and Hickory, the \u201cdead end,\u201d was erected on the northeast corner.\nOn the night in question the weather was cold and cloudy, and the streets were dry. The plaintiff was southbound alone in his 1955 model Buick convertible, driving about 25 miles per hour with his city driving lights on. According to his testimony, as his car entered the intersection the light from his headlights \u201ccame in contact with the beam of the overhead light and it sort of blended or melted in one glare of light, and as I passed through this light my front wheels went off the road of Hickory Street.\u201d When this happened he swerved to the left, saw the tree ahead of him and then unsuccessfully tried to avoid hitting it. There were no signs, barricades or reflectors to indicate that Ash-land Avenue terminated at that point.\nBoth parties introduced testimony concerning the lighting at the scene. Plaintiff called as an expert an electrical engineer who testified that in his opinion the intersection was improperly illuminated, that the light pole was placed on the wrong corner. There was testimony on defendant\u2019s behalf by a police officer and a member of the city council, both of whom lived in the vicinity, and by a neighbor whose home adjoined the vacant lot. Each stated that the street light cast sufficient illumination to see the lot, the tree and the embankment from a considerable distance away. There was no evidence of fault in the work of installation or maintenance. The conflict in testimony relates only to the location or \u201cplan\u201d of the lighting.\nThe city insists that the court should have directed a verdict, that the plaintiff, in driving too fast to stop within the range of his vision, was negligent as a matter of law, and that the evidence adduced to show negligence on defendants\u2019 part did not present a question for the jury. It is argued that as a matter of law a city is under no obligation to erect signs, barricades or reflectors warning of dangerous conditions, nor is its judgment in placing a street light subject to review unless the court can say it is so dangerous its construction would be negligence as a matter of law.\nWe cannot accept the argument. The court has long recognized that where a city undertakes to provide lights, it is liable for injuries which result from deficient or inadequate ones. (Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill. 460; City of Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169; City of Freeport v. Isbell, 83 Ill. 440.) In holding a city responsible for injuries thus caused the court is not reviewing the city\u2019s discretion in selecting a plan. It is not controlling or passing upon the city\u2019s estimate of public needs. Nor is it deciding what the \u201cbest\u201d kind of improvement may be. It is simply saying that when a city creates a hazardous condition and someone is injured as a consequence it must respond in damages, just as others are required to do. Such is in no sense usurping a legislative power, as suggested by defendant. A municipal corporation, like an individual or a private corporation, is required to exercise its rights and powers with such precautions as shall not subject others to injury. The rule which protects it in the exercise of its governmental functions should not be construed to relieve from liability when the plan devised, if put in operation, leaves the city\u2019s streets in a dangerous condition for public use. (City of Chicago v. Seben, 165 Ill. 371.) After a careful review of the record in the case at bar we think that the evidence of negligence was sufficient to justify the circuit court in refusing to direct a verdict.\nNor did the court err in refusing to find the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Conduct will be deemed contributory negligence as a matter of law only when all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary determination could ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria and Eastern Railroad Co., 37 Ill.2d 494.\nThe plaintiff had been traveling along a preferential street for some five miles, obeying all traffic signs. The weather was good, the streets were dry, and plaintiff\u2019s city driving lights were on, when the \u201cthrough\u201d street abruptly ended, without any warning sign, reflector or other device. There was testimony that plaintiff\u2019s speed at the time was well under the speed limit of 35 m.p.h. And there was testimony that the light standard was improperly located, causing the lights from his auto to \u201cmelt into\u201d the glare of the street light. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiff\u2019s conduct was negligence, and therefore the issue was properly submitted to the jury. In answer to a special interrogatory, the jury specifically stated that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and from the evidence in this record we would not be warranted in disturbing that finding.\nIt is finally contended that error was committed in refusing four instructions tendered on behalf of defendant. They referred to lighting conditions as part of a general plan, and to warning devices or signs, and sought to inform the jury that the city could not be held liable unless it failed to use care in adopting the general plan of lighting, and that the city had no duty to construct warning devices or signs near the scene. It is unnecessary to set forth the instructions verbatim. After examining the given instructions we think that the jury was adequately instructed on both the plaintiff\u2019s and the defendant\u2019s theory of the case, and that each of the refused ones was either misleading, inaccurate or inapplicable. Instructions should be considered as a series, and after doing so in this case we can see no prejudicial error in the manner in which the jury was instructed. Cf. Lau v. West Towns Bus Co., 16 Ill.2d 442, 452.\nIn our opinion both the circuit and the appellate courts were right in their decisions. The judgment will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski" } ], "attorneys": [ "Warren R. Ross and James East, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Harold A. Liebenson and Irving B. Mayer, both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 41743.\nDonald J. Baran, Appellee, vs. The City of Chicago Heights, Appellant.\nOpinion filed September 26, 1969.\nWarren R. Ross and James East, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nHarold A. Liebenson and Irving B. Mayer, both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0177-01", "first_page_order": 407, "last_page_order": 412 }