{ "id": 2889646, "name": "The City of Chicago, Appellee, vs. Karl Meyer, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Meyer", "decision_date": "1969-11-26", "docket_number": "No. 41117", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "6", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "394 U.S. 111", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168803 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" }, { "page": "136" }, { "page": "950" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2849197 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2859039 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0047-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 512, "char_count": 8882, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5910081690567476e-07, "percentile": 0.8180646825355455 }, "sha256": "b05d953db27f00cc64466860937b72f2b1f0f205a6bdec90525faaa8d0f8a774", "simhash": "1:0566e39b31d4fc75", "word_count": 1494 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:12.938767+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The City of Chicago, Appellee, vs. Karl Meyer, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nKarl Meyer appeals from a conviction of disorderly conduct and interfering with an officer in the discharge of his duties under chapters 193 \u2014 1 and 11 \u2014 33, respectively, of the Municipal Code of Chicago. He was find $200 on the first charge and $100 on the second charge. A constitutional question gives us jurisdiction.\nAt his trial defendant, who had funds to retain counsel, chose to represent himself, refused appointed counsel, waived a jury and cross-examination of the City\u2019s witnesses and put in his own defense. He testified that he wanted to \u201ccommunicate to the public in Chicago some ideas about the Viet Nam war.\u201d He first selected as his site for his \u201cViet Nam Forum\u201d a school yard located in an area known as \u201cOld Town\u201d. However, the Chicago Board of Education denied his request to use the school yard on every Friday and Saturday evening in July and August because the light was inadequate and the yard was intended for playground purposes. When defendant and his associates arrived at the school yard on June 30 an attorney from the school board informed them that they could not use the school yard. They then moved their table, literature and banners on to the sidewalk. A police officer told them they could not erect a table and chairs on the sidewalk. Defendant testified: \u201cSo we took down the tables and chairs and proceeded to speak there, and we held the forum that night. And there wasn\u2019t any trouble, and there were a lot of officers protecting us and watching and keeping the sidewalk clear. And we held the forum on subsequent nights \u2014 July 1st and then the next weekend \u2014 Friday and Saturday of the next weekend. In each case there were police officers there and there was no disturbance, and we held the forum.\u201d In describing the meeting defendant said, \u201cA lot of people spoke and a lot of people \u2014 it\u2019s an open forum and we let anyone speak that wanted to speak\u201d.\nThere is no dispute as to the events preceding defendant\u2019s arrest on July 14, 1967. About 8:45 P.M. he stood on a 5-gallon can and began his talk. There was a large sign behind him and there was a shopping cart filled with pamphlets next to him. Four or five of his associates also spoke and distributed the pamphlets. A crowd of 100 to 200 persons gathered. The sidewalk was obstructed and pedestrians walked into the street to get around the crowd. About 11 :oo P.M. the gathering had become loud and boisterous. Several servicemen in uniform argued with defendant and his friends about the policy in Viet Nam. One of defendant\u2019s associates reported a fight in the crowd to officer O\u2019Malley. Two spectators tore down the sign and a person sympathetic to defendant picked it up. A fight was about to ensue over this incident when officer O\u2019Malley appeared and calmed the situation. Some spectators then set fire to some leaflets. The plain-clothed officers finally dispersed the crowd and officer Highland instructed defendant to move also. Defendant got back on the can and said: \u201cI will not move. You can arrest me if you please.\u201d When told he was under arrest, defendant walked to the squad car without protest or incident.\nOfficer O\u2019Malley testified he had witnessed about 500 demonstrations in the past two years and that in this demonstration the audience, in his opinion, had become agitated. Defendant admitted that the situation had become tense but he was willing to be attacked for the purpose of his cause.\nDefendant argues that both ordinances are unconstitutional on their face because they are vague and prohibit conduct protected by the first amendment. This same challenge was leveled at this disorderly conduct ordinance in City of Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill.2d 47, and at this \u201cresisting or interfering\u201d ordinance in City of Chicago v. Lawrence, 42 Ill.2d 461, and we rejected the challenge in each case.\nHe then argues that neither ordinance can constitutionally be applied to his conduct. The issue he raises is whether the police can prevent him from speaking simply because his audience might react with disorder or violence. This issue, in the context of a demonstration, was raised in Gregory. After reviewing and analyzing several Supreme Court decisions, we concluded that the police may not \u201c* * * stop a peaceful demonstration merely because a hostile crowd may not agree with the views of the demonstrators. It is only where there is an imminent threat of violence, the police have made all reasonable efforts to protect the demonstrators, the police have requested that the demonstration be stopped and explained the request, if there be time, and there is a refusal of the police request, that an arrest for an otherwise lawful demonstration may be made.\u201d (39 Ill.2d 47, 60.) Applying this rationale to the facts of the Gregory case we upheld the disorderly conduct convictions.\nThe Supreme Court reversed these convictions. (Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 22 L. Ed. 2d 134, 89 S. Ct. 946.) That court observed that a peaceful and orderly march falls within the sphere of conduct protected by the first amendment. It then noted, as did we, that there was no evidence that the march was disorderly. It then concluded, as did we, that the disorderly conduct convictions could not be based on the manner in which the march was conducted.\nThe court next properly observed that our opinion held the demonstrators \u201cwere convicted not for the manner in which they conducted their march but rather for their refusal to disperse when requested to do so by Chicago police.\u201d However, because \u201cThe trial judge charged solely in terms of the Chicago ordinance\u201d and \u201cNeither the ordinance nor the charge defined disorderly conduct as the refusal to obey a police order\u201d the court concluded that \u201c* * * petitioners were charged and convicted for holding a demonstration not for refusal to obey a police officer.\u201d 394 U.S. 111, 947, 22 L. Ed. 2d 134, 136, 89 S. Ct. 946.\nThe Supreme Court neither approved nor disapproved of our conclusion that the police may order the cessation of otherwise lawful conduct where they have made all reasonable efforts to maintain order, but the conduct is producing an imminent threat of uncontrollable violence or riot. We adhere to the view expressed in our Gregory opinion that they may make such an order and that the demonstrators or speakers may be arrested and prosecuted for failure to obey such order.\nThe interfering ordinance provides that \u201cAny person who shall resist any officer of the police department in the discharge of his duties, or shall in any way interfere with or hinder or prevent him from discharging his duty as such officer * * * shall be fined not less than Ten nor more than One Hundred Dollars for each offense.\u201d The police officers on duty during this \u201cViet Nam Forum\u201d had a duty both to maintain order and to safeguard first-amendment freedoms. As Justice Black observed, however, \u201c* * * when groups with diametrically opposed, deep-seated views are permitted to air their emotional grievances, side by side, on city streets, tranquility and order cannot be maintained even by the joint efforts of the finest and best officers and of those who desire to be the most law-abiding protestors of their grievances.\u201d People v. Gregory, 394 U.S. 111, 89 S. Ct. 946, 950, 22 L. Ed. 2d 134, 139 (concurring opinion).\nThe record shows that defendant held his \u201cforum\u201d on several weekends and that the police officers were able to maintain order and to protect the right of defendant and his associates to express their views. The record also shows that on July 14, 1967, there was some violence and a threat of greater violence, that the police had tried to maintain order, and that they ordered the crowd to disperse only after the debate was degenerating to one of physical battle. Defendant was arrested when he wilfully refused to obey the order to disperse and attempted to continue the conduct which was producing the disorder. We hold that defendant was properly convicted of interfering with the police in the discharge of their duty to maintain order.\nThe conviction for disorderly conduct is subject to the same criticism the Supreme Court made in Gregory. The record indicates to us that defendant was charged and convicted of disorderly conduct because of the manner in which he conducted his \u201cforum\u201d.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the conviction for interfering with the police in the discharge of. their duty is affirmed and the conviction for disorderly conduct is reversed.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul E. Goldstein and Marshall Patner, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Raymond F. Simon, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago, (Marvin E. Aspen and John J. George, Assistants Corporation Counsel, of counsel,) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 41117.\nThe City of Chicago, Appellee, vs. Karl Meyer, Appellant.\nOpinion filed November 26, 1969.\nPaul E. Goldstein and Marshall Patner, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRaymond F. Simon, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago, (Marvin E. Aspen and John J. George, Assistants Corporation Counsel, of counsel,) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 41, "last_page_order": 46 }