{
  "id": 2887789,
  "name": "Clarence H. Duley, Admr., Appellant, vs. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.",
  "decision_date": "1969-11-26",
  "docket_number": "No. 42061",
  "first_page": "15",
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    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:12.938767+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Clarence H. Duley, Admr., Appellant, vs. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nStella Duley was fatally injured in the course of her employment when she was struck by a fork-lift truck at defendant\u2019s plant in August, 1963. Clarence Duley, husband and sole surviving beneficiary of deceased, filed a claim for her death before the Industrial Commission wherein it was stipulated that both she and defendant were operating under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 48, pars. 138.1 etseq.) A$500 burial expense was paid to plaintiff by defendant pursuant to section 7(f) of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 48, par. 138.7(f).) No further compensation was paid because the arbitrator found that deceased left no persons entitled to compensation as provided in section 7.\nThereafter plaintiff, as administrator of his wife\u2019s estate, brought a wrongful death action to recover damages for the death of his wife. Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that decedent and defendant were operating under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act and the rights and remedies of plaintiff were exclusively provided therein was allowed and the suit was dismissed.\nPlaintiff has two contentions: (1) that section 5(a) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)) does not bar plaintiff\u2019s action for wrongful death, and (2) if section 5(a) does bar his action then sections 5(a) and 7 are unconstitutional. U.S. Const., 14th amend.; Ill. Const., art. II, sec. 2.\nUnder the circumstances of this case section 5(a) of the Act constitutes a bar to plaintiff\u2019s wrongful death action. This section provides: \u201cNo common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer or his employees for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.\u201d In addition, section 11 sets out the extent of liability of the employer. \u201cThe compensation herein provided * * * shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated in * * * this Act, * * Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 48, par. 138.11.\nPlaintiff argues that the foregoing is inapplicable because the Act does not provide compensation for the husband of a deceased employee where the husband is not totally dependent on deceased. This argument ignores both the fact that plaintiff\u2019s wife is still an employee who is covered by the provisions of the Act and the fact that some compensation was paid to the plaintiff under the Act as a result of the death.\nThe section 5 (a) prohibition of additional actions is consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute. \u201cThe act was designed as a substitute for previous rights of action of employees against employers and to cover the whole ground of the liabilities of the master, and it has been so regarded by all courts. * * * The act, in taking away existing rights of action of the employee and extending the liabilities of the employer, fixes limits to the amount to be recovered, and is sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power for the promotion of the general welfare by covering the entire subject with fixed rules.\u201d (Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Bd., 284 Ill. 378, 382 \u2014 3.) Also, this determination is consistent with Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill.2d 407, wherein the court held that section 5 (a) barred a common-law action for damages arising out of employment, even though no compensation for permanent injury was provided for in the Act.\nPlaintiff cites Miller v. Hotel Savoy Co., 228 Mo. App. 463, 68 S.W.2d 929 which interprets the Missouri Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. The court found that because no remedy was provided in the Act, the plaintiffs therein were not precluded from bringing an action outside of the Act. However, the \u201cexclusive liability\u201d clause of the Missouri Act includes an exception reading as follows: \u201cThe rights and remedies herein granted to an employee, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his wife, her husband, parents, heirs or next kin, at common law or otherwise on account of such accidental injury or death except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Mo. W.C.L. par. 3301.) The Illinois Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act contains no such exception in its \u201cexclusive liability\u201d clause. (Section 5(a).) Other cases cited by plaintiff involve different facts and statutes and are not analogous to the instant case.\nHaving determined that section 5 (a) bars the wrongful death action, we next consider whether sections 5 7 violate either the constitution of the United States or the Illinois constitution. In Moushon v. National Garages, Inc. this court considered the constitutionality of section 5(a) where no remedy for permanent injury was provided in the Act. \u201cBy the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, the legislature required the employer to give up certain defenses and required the employee to give up certain recoverable elements of damage of a common-law negligence action; and this we have held many times is a reasonable exercise of the legislature\u2019s police power for the promotion of the general welfare. [Citations.] This court has never considered one to have such a vested right in the common-law rules governing negligence actions as to preclude the legislature from substituting a statutory remedy of this type for the common-law remedy.\u201d (9 Ill.2d at 412.) We find this case determinative of the constitutional question concerning section 5(a).\nSection 7 of the Act provides compensation for all widows whose husbands were killed while covered by the Act. However, a widower can recover for the death of his wife under similar circumstances only if he was totally dependent upon her for support. It is plaintiff\u2019s contention that such classification unreasonably discriminates according to one\u2019s sex. \u201cA classification will suffice as a basis for legislation if such classification is based on a rational difference of situation or condition found to exist in the persons or objects upon which the classification rests.\u201d (Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 Ill. 146, 149.) Gruenwald v. Gardner (2d cir. 1968), 390 F.2d 591, upheld classifications based upon the disparate earning power of men and women and found that the classification was consistent with 14th amendment requirements. \u201cThe Equal Protection Clause does not ordinarily prevent a state from making a classification dependent upon one\u2019s sex.\u201d (Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp. (7th cir.) 399 F.2d 847.) It is not unreasonable to compensate according to one\u2019s sex, and we find it conforms most realistically to the economic situation present in our society today.\nFinally, plaintiff argues that he has not waived his right to sue for wrongful death by proceeding under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Consideration of this point is unnecessary because we have held that sections 5(a) and 7 are constitutional and bar the wrongful death action.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Elmo E. Koos, of Peoria, for appellant.",
      "David A. Nicoll and Ross E. Canterbury, both of Peoria, (Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, of counsel,) for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 42061.\nClarence H. Duley, Admr., Appellant, vs. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Appellee.\nOpinion filed November 26, 1969.\nElmo E. Koos, of Peoria, for appellant.\nDavid A. Nicoll and Ross E. Canterbury, both of Peoria, (Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, of counsel,) for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0015-01",
  "first_page_order": 55,
  "last_page_order": 60
}