{
  "id": 2891486,
  "name": "Roy J. Smiley et al., Appellants, vs. The Estate of Charles Toney et al. - (Country Mutual Insurance Company, Appellee.)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Smiley v. Estate of Toney",
  "decision_date": "1969-11-26",
  "docket_number": "No. 41818",
  "first_page": "127",
  "last_page": "132",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 127"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "37 Cal. Rptr. 63",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "225 Cal. App. 2d 80",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2140666
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/cal-app-2d/225/0080-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "101 R.I. 350",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "R.I.",
      "case_ids": [
        5486313
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ri/101/0350-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "229 A. 2d 179",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "A.2d",
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "108 N.H. 131",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.H.",
      "case_ids": [
        4463285
      ],
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nh/108/0131-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "100 Ill. App. 2d 271",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2820289
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/100/0271-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 462,
    "char_count": 8370,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.797,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.901930720084309e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9528128860022341
    },
    "sha256": "8c0ea0eee72dc23cd97ef748bfe2e8d0d4afae0cc1238f6eecbe5de6c7f8dff4",
    "simhash": "1:cf8170bab008f434",
    "word_count": 1353
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:12.938767+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Roy J. Smiley et al., Appellants, vs. The Estate of Charles Toney et al. \u2014 (Country Mutual Insurance Company, Appellee.)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Schaefer\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue in this case, which is here on leave granted to appeal from a decision of the Appellate Court, Second District (100 Ill. App. 2d 271), involves the construction of the \u201cuninsured motorist\u201d, provision of the Illinois Insurance Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 73, par. 755a.\nThe issue, arose in this way. Roy Smiley was a passenger in Byron Emanuel\u2019s car when it was struck by a car negligently driven by Charles Toney. The plaintiffs in this action are Smiley and the administrator of Emanuel\u2019s estate, and the primary defendant was the administrator of Toney\u2019s estate. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Smiley in the sum of $25,000 and in favor of Emanuel\u2019s estate in the sum of $55,000, which was reduced by the trial court to $30,000. Judgments have now been entered for the plaintiffs in these amounts, and no appeal has been taken. At the time of the accident Toney carried a valid policy of liability insurance with limits of $10,000 for each person and $20,000 for each accident. Each plaintiff has been paid $10,000 by Toney\u2019s insurance carrier.\nEmanuel carried insurance with Country Mutual Insurance Company. His policy provided uninsured motorist coverage in the sum of $50,000 for each person and $100,000 for each accident. The present dispute is between the plaintiffs and Country Mutual. In a separate count of their complaint the plaintiffs joined Country Mutual as a defendant and sought a declaratory judgment that it is liable to them for any amounts they might recover in excess of the limits of Toney\u2019s liability insurance policy. This count was dismissed on motion before the liability issue was tried, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. We allowed leave to appeal.\nThe plaintiffs contend that Toney was uninsured to the extent that their damages exceed the proceeds of his liability insurance. They argue that they are therefore entitled to recover under the uninsured vehicle provision of Emanuel\u2019s policy and that the restrictive definition of an uninsured vehicle contained in that policy is invalid because it conflicts with the purpose of section 143a of the Insurance Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 73, par. 755a.) Country Mutual replies that since the statute fails to define an uninsured vehicle, the parties are free to draft their own definition and that the unambiguous definition contained in Emanuel\u2019s policy must control. Section 143a provided:\n\u201cOn and after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1963, no policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in Section 7 \u2014 203 of the \u2018Illinois Motor Vehicle Law\u2019, approved July 11, 1957, as heretofore and hereafter amended, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from \u25a0 owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit- and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom, except that the named insured shall have the right to reject such coverage, and except that, unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.\u201d\nThe uninsured vehicle coverage of the Country Mutual policy is as follows:\n\u201cCoverage U \u2014 Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by Uninsured Vehicles.\n\u201cTo pay all sums which the Insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an Uninsured Vehicle because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called \u2018bodily injury,\u2019 sustained by the Insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such Uninsured Vehicle; * * *.\n\u201cDefinitions: With Respect to this Section: * * * \u2018Uninsured Vehicle\u2019 means: (1) a vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is no bodily injury liability bond or bodily injury liability insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident, with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such vehicle, * * *.\u201d\nWe are not persuaded that the policy definition of an \u201cuninsured vehicle\u201d, if it is unambiguous, must always control the application of the statute. The statutory coverage is mandatory, and it may not be whittled away by an unduly restrictive definition. Indeed, the defendant concedes as much, pointing out that \u201cresearch of the case law\u201d indicates that before the uninsured motorist provisions of a policy come into operation it is necessary \u201cthat the tortfeasor does in fact constitute an uninsured motorist, either being insured for less than the Financial Responsibility Law of the state in which the accident occurred, or by his insurance company denying coverage due to a variety of reasons.\u201d And indeed, it is generally recognized, for example, that despite a contrary policy definition, the purpose of an uninsured vehicle statute requires that a motorist be considered uninsured if he carries liability insurance in an amount below the minimum required by the financial responsibility law. Carrignan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1967), 108 N.H. 131, 229 A. 2d 179; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fusco, 101 R.I. 350, 223 A.2d 447; Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. (1964), 225 Cal. App. 2d 80, 37 Cal. Rptr. 63.\nOn the other hand, we cannot agree with the contentions of the plaintiffs. The main thrust of their argument is that whether a vehicle is uninsured is to be determined not as of the date of the accident, but rather as of the time when it is ascertained that a tortfeasor, from whom a party is \u201clegally entitled\u201d to recover damages, has no insurance, or insurance that is inadequate to satisfy the liability. In this way, they say, the purpose of the statute is served and those decisions which have applied the statute when there was insurance below the amount required by the applicable financial responsibility law, or when the insurer denied coverage or became insolvent, are explained. The purpose of the statute, in their view is to allow \u201ccompensation of the injured party for his damages to the extent of the insurance available, including any insurance carried by the tortfeasor.\u201d\nThe difficulty with this argument is that it would expand the statute so that it would apply to every tortfeasor whose insurance coverage, no matter how large it may be, is still less than that of the plaintiff under the uninsured motorist provision of his own policy. We are aware of no case that has so held, and certainly the language of the statute does not suggest this result. Indeed, under the plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation the statutory reference to \u201cowners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit and run motorists\u201d would be meaningless or misleading. As we read the statute, mandatory coverage is required only up to the amounts required by the financial responsibility law. The cases that have permitted recovery under uninsured motorists clauses although the tortfeasor was actually insured, were cases in which the latter was insured in an amount less than that required by the applicable financial responsibility law. In such a situation, as pointed out by Chief Justice Kenison in the Carrignan case, policy restrictions that contravene the purpose and objective of the statute are superseded. Beyond the area of mandatory coverage, however, the parties are governed by their contract.\nThe judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.'\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Schaefer"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Reese, Schlueter & Ecklund, of Rockford, (Bernard P. Reese, Jr., of counsel,) for appellants.",
      "' Maynard & Brassfield, of Rockford, (Eugene E. Brassfield, of counsel,) for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 41818.\nRoy J. Smiley et al., Appellants, vs. The Estate of Charles Toney et al. \u2014 (Country Mutual Insurance Company, Appellee.)\nOpinion filed Nov. 26, 1969.\nRehearing denied Jan. 26, 1970.\nReese, Schlueter & Ecklund, of Rockford, (Bernard P. Reese, Jr., of counsel,) for appellants.\n' Maynard & Brassfield, of Rockford, (Eugene E. Brassfield, of counsel,) for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0127-01",
  "first_page_order": 167,
  "last_page_order": 172
}