{ "id": 2890346, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Curtis Heaven, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Heaven", "decision_date": "1970-01-21", "docket_number": "No. 41789", "first_page": "249", "last_page": "252", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 249" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857264 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857333 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2847314 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5312521 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313866 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0181-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 414, "char_count": 6717, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.311464607650343e-07, "percentile": 0.7885231918926547 }, "sha256": "4f528d5c81fbf4d4e2e3187d530894d6b453f84372b83d3c1b143a1da64aa391", "simhash": "1:22262c5ed0af5bb8", "word_count": 1074 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:12.938767+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Curtis Heaven, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Chief Justice Underwood\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal questions the propriety of the Cook County circuit court\u2019s allowance of the State\u2019s motion to dismiss Curtis Heaven\u2019s post-conviction petition. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 1 etseq.\nPetitioner appeared in court with retained counsel September 12, 1963, and pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Three months later his counsel was granted leave to withdraw and the public defender was appointed. The following March petitioner appeared in court with the public defender and, after proper inquiry and admonishment, entered a plea of guilty. He was sentenced to a term of 14 to 25 years. On May 16, 1968, he filed a pro se petition- for post-conviction relief; counsel was appointed on June 20, and an amended petition filed August 19. The original pro se petition included his own affidavit; no others were filed.\nThe amended petition asserts Heaven was denied effective representation of counsel, and that his plea of guilty was coerced. The State maintains that the petition was properly dismissed since satisfactory affidavits were not attached, nor were there any reasons given for the absence of such affidavits; and further that the petition failed to state facts establishing a deprivation of constitutional rights.\nPetitioner\u2019s first contention is based upon the claim that the public defender consulted with' him only two times, and on neither occasion were the merits of his case or the circumstances surrounding the alleged murder discussed. The petition further states, \u201cthat in fact the circumstances surrounding said incident establish the fact that while petitioner may have been guilty of a lesser offense, he was not guilty of the crime of murder; * * *.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s affidavit states, in this connection, \u201cThat the information of the witnesses in this entitled cause could not truely [vie] supply matreial [vie] in this cause which would change the crime of volentary\" [vie] manslaughter to a charge of murder as in the indictment,\u201d\nPetitioner\u2019s pro se motion for leave to file in forma pauperis recites that \u201cUpon information supplied at this time as by the state\u2019s witnesses; One Gwendolyn Gray, Hattie Thomas and James Anderson along with information of and from \u2018the protocol and coroner\u2019s minutes\u2019 such record will show this cause to be one of not deliberant [a\u00ed'c] , intentional and knowingly killing but a killing in-cured [vie] because of a threat of the decendent [jfc] Wylie Jefferies to the petitioner herein.\u201d\nAs to the claim that the plea of guilty was coerced, the petition states, \u201cthat petitioner, being a layman and not cognizant of the subtle legal distinctions between murder and manslaughter, and being informed of the extreme consequences of a jury conviction of murder, changed his plea of not guilty to one of guilty; that said plea was not voluntary but was in fact coerced.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s affidavit relates that \u201cpetitioner was further coercered [aic] to a guilty plea by mention of \u2018the death penalty\u2019 by said plea. * * * That such coerced guilty plea was induced with such specific indictment and threat of \u2018the death penalty\u2019.\u201d The motion for leave to file in forma pauperis includes the claims that, \u201cThe petitioner can thriught [a\u00edc] full recorded matter in this cause show a intimidation and promise by the representing state\u2019s attorney in this for a specific sentence * * *. Petitioner was coercered [Tfc] by the judge in that on a plea of said indictment or lack of such plea the death sentence could be imposed.\u201d\nWe have related petitioner\u2019s allegations to this extent to illustrate that the most liberal evaluation nevertheless reveals a total absence of specific and substantial factual bases upon which the petition could be found sufficient. When a petition is dismissed for a failure to sufficiently allege facts constituting a denial of constitutional rights, we construe the petition\u2019s allegations liberally. (See People v. Bernatowicz, 413 Ill. 181, 184-85; People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 26.) But we have also consistently held that, \u201can evidentiary hearing under the Act should be granted only if defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition makes a \u2018substantial showing of violation of constitutional rights, and allegations which merely amount to conclusions are not sufficient to require a post-conviction hearing.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Arbuckle, 42 Ill. 2d 177, 179, and cases there cited.) In this case, the petition and other documents are devoid of specific factual allegations and subject to a motion to dismiss.\nPetitioner also contends that it was error for the judge to dismiss the petition with the statement that, \u201cI find there is no violation of any constitutional right * * thus indicating the judge\u2019s belief that the allegations made in the affidavit and elsewhere were false; that the judge\u2019s duty on a motion to dismiss is to assume the truth of the allegations and evaluate only their legal sufficiency, citing People v. Wegner, 40 Ill. 2d 28, and People v. Wilson, 39 Ill. 2d 275. We do not find that the judge dismissed the petition on the grounds that he disbelieved petitioner\u2019s allegations, but rather on the grounds urged by the State in its motion to dismiss \u2014 that the allegations were conclusional and therefore insufficient to show a violation of constitutional rights. Moreover, in the Wegner case we noted that \u201c* * * defendant\u2019s petition and affidavit standing alone raised a sufficient question to require a hearing.\u201d We further observed that \u201cTo peremptorily dismiss the petition would require a determination of the truth or falsity of the affidavits.\u201d (Wegner at 31 and 32.) In this case the situation is entirely different since the allegations in the affidavit and elsewhere are clearly insufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, if the judge\u2019s statement had raised some question as to the basis upon which he dismissed the petition, we could nevertheless have presumed, as we could not in Wegner, that the decision was based upon the available proper grounds.\nWe therefore find no error in the action of the Cook County circuit court and affirm its judgment.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMr. Justice Ward took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Chief Justice Underwood" } ], "attorneys": [ "S. Jack Micheletto, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, and Elmer C. Kissane and John R. McClory, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 41789.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Curtis Heaven, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 21, 1970.\nWard, J., took no part.\nS. Jack Micheletto, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, and Elmer C. Kissane and John R. McClory, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0249-01", "first_page_order": 289, "last_page_order": 292 }