{ "id": 2889895, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Orville McCoy, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McCoy", "decision_date": "1970-01-28", "docket_number": "No. 41877", "first_page": "458", "last_page": "463", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 458" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2901149 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/101/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 A.L.R. 2d 897", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "404 Ill. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5308647 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/404/0487-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 453, "char_count": 7562, "ocr_confidence": 0.804, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4662725385548e-07, "percentile": 0.8060346375406443 }, "sha256": "29cd40a5ba89cbb3894803e00fa7e2c3e5de501ff58e2cf793138c5e3b3bfb89", "simhash": "1:8d67606851471060", "word_count": 1221 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:12.938767+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Orville McCoy, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Crebs\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in a bench trial by the circuit court of Piatt County. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the conviction (101 Ill. App. 2d 69) and we granted leave to appeal.\nThe circumstances of the trial are, to say the least, unusual. The State\u2019s Attorney prosecuting the case was the only witness for the State. He testified that he attended an inquest at which he heard testimony about an automobile accident in which the defendant was involved and which resulted in the death of a woman. The State\u2019s Attorney gave the names of the witnesses at the inquest, related their testimony, and said that their testimony was not based on hearsay. He also stated that he had made some independent investigation of the accident. Defendant\u2019s counsel made no objection to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s testimony. As soon as the State\u2019s Attorney left the stand both sides rested. Oral argument was waived. The court found the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant moved for probation.\nAt the probation hearing neither side presented evidence. Both sides argued for probation. The probation officer\u2019s report was filed that morning with a recommendation for probation \u201cwith the special condition that he serve short sentence in a penal institution.\u201d The court instead felt that it should \u201cimpose as a condition of this probation a very decisive jail sentence or a state farm sentence.\u201d The court admitted the defendant to probation provided that a term of one year be served at the Illinois State Farm at Vandalia.\nThe defendant appeals on the ground that the only evidence heard by the court was hearsay evidence and that such evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. Without passing on the question of whether or not uncontradicted hearsay evidence standing alone could ever be sufficient in a felony case, we find this evidence insufficient.\nIt was improper for the State\u2019s Attorney to appear as a witness under the circumstances of this case. Also, there is no showing that any of the witnesses who testified at the coroner\u2019s inquest were cross-examined or their testimony checked in any way. Thus, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s testimony is subject to the inherent vice of hearsay, i.e., the hearsay statements might be true without the related facts being correct.\nFor these reasons we must reverse. Since the tried placed defendant in jeopardy and the error is the failure of the evidence to support the charge, there is no basis to order a new trial.\nJudgment reversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Crebs" }, { "text": "Mr. Chief Justice Underwood,\ndissenting:\nIn my opinion this court\u2019s judgment is neither legally sound nor realistically defensible.\nThe defendant presents only two questions: Whether a conviction based solely on hearsay evidence may stand, and whether the sentence of 1 year\u2019s imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation was justified.\nA somewhat more detailed factual statement than that contained in the majority opinion is necessary to clearly understand the trial proceedings. On May 11, 1967, the involuntary manslaughter charge against defendant came on for hearing. A jury was waived, the court inquired whether both sides were ready to proceed, and defense counsel then stated:\n\u201cI might say to the Court, off the record * * The off-the-record colloquy does not, of course, appear, but the State\u2019s Attorney immediately thereafter stated: \u201cBoth sides are ready and I would like to be sworn.\u201d He then related his attendance at the inquest into decedent\u2019s death; that he heard named witnesses there describe defendant\u2019s conduct in driving his southbound car at 10:00 A.M. in the northbound lane of the highway, forcing one witness\u2019s car off the highway in order to avoid a head-on collisilon, and then colliding head-on with the northbound car in which decedent was a passenger; that the State\u2019s Attorney had made an independent investigation and learned that shortly before the collision defendant had left a Monticello tavern where he drank two shots of whiskey with beer chasers. No objection was made to this testimony and at its conclusion defense counsel stated: \u201cThe defense rests, Your Honor.\u201d Argument was waived, the trial court found defendant guilty, defense counsel moved to be admitted to probation and a hearing on that motion was set for May 26.\nOn that date the motion was heard. Neither the State nor defendant offered any evidence. The probation officer\u2019s report recommended probation with a short jail sentence. Defense counsel urged defendant be granted probation with no imprisonment. The State\u2019s Attorney did not oppose probation with \u201ca short time in jail\u201d if the court so concluded. When the court\u2019s comments indicated a belief that more substantial punishment was called for, defense counsel again requested a conference, the content of which is unreported. At its conclusion probation was granted with a year\u2019s imprisonment at the Illinois State Farm. This appeal followed.\nWhat occurred is perfectly obvious. Defendant would have entered a plea of guilty except that it would have been admissible against him in a later wrongful death action; that this is true is substantiated by the recitation in the appellate court opinion of defense counsel\u2019s statements in oral argument as to the wrongful death action and that the trial court proceedings should be viewed as a \u201ctacit\u201d plea of guilty. Defendant was quite willing to have the court informed of the facts by the State\u2019s Attorney, made no objection thereto and has never questioned their accuracy. It seems virtually a certainty that defendant, in the first off-the-record conference, specifically agreed to that method of placing the facts before the court.\nIt is in the context of the above-related circumstances that this court holds the \u201chearsay\u201d testimony insufficient to establish guilt and discharges an obviously guilty defendant who has yet to question the truth or accuracy of the facts related in the statement which this court refuses to accept.\nOf course it is undesirable for counsel to testify as to the merits of the cause in which he is counsel. But it is at least equally undesirable to permit defendant to encourage such conduct in the trial court and attack it on appeal. Unobjected-to hearsay testimony is not without probative value (Town of Cicero v. Industrial Com., 404 Ill. 487; Anno. 79 A.L.R. 2d 897, II, \u00a7 3) and particularly is that true in the context of the circumstances in which it was here received.\nI find no greater merit in defendant\u2019s contention that his sentence was excessive. It is neither contended nor remotely suggested that defendant had been in any way misled as to the attitude of the trial judge or the disposition which the court might make of the case. The probation officer\u2019s report indicates he used \u201calcoholic beverages quite freely\u201d, he had a prior conviction for reckless driving, and his conduct in this case resulted in the death of another.\nI would affirm. I would also again call attention to the undesirability of disposing of crucial questions in \"off-the-record\u201d conferences, for, had this record affirmatively demonstrated what there occurred, I suspect there would be no problem.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. Chief Justice Underwood," } ], "attorneys": [ "Hagin Harper, of Champaign, for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, (Fred G. Leach, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 41877.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Orville McCoy, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 28, 1970.\nUnderwood, C. J., dissenting.\nHagin Harper, of Champaign, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, (Fred G. Leach, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0458-01", "first_page_order": 498, "last_page_order": 503 }