{ "id": 2896994, "name": "In re Estate of Richard Barnes Stith.-(The University of Illinois et al., Appellants, vs. Signa Marie Stith, Appellee.)", "name_abbreviation": "University of Illinois v. Stith", "decision_date": "1970-03-24", "docket_number": "No. 42081", "first_page": "192", "last_page": "197", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 192" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "91 N.W.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10789617 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/91/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 Ia. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 4429600 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/240/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 So.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9834660 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/186/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 P.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Cal. App. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4384358 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/172/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 P.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10588876 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/416/0823-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 F. Supp. 799", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 674911 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/83/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 F. Supp. 709", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1513209 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/216/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2422487 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/38/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2927795 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/124/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3066941 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/146/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 Ill. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5310182 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/409/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2779558 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5196154 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/328/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1598880 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/105/0429-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 541, "char_count": 8769, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1358642325406529e-07, "percentile": 0.5772830771214846 }, "sha256": "a6f78b7b678b819739a6d818d8222f76331031b92abb299095261e66aca036b3", "simhash": "1:202ad77342c5ceeb", "word_count": 1430 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:46:26.452896+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re Estate of Richard Barnes Stith.\u2014(The University of Illinois et al., Appellants, vs. Signa Marie Stith, Appellee.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Chief Justice Underwood\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSigna Marie Stith, the widow of Richard Barnes Stith, obtained three extensions of time within which to renounce her deceased husband\u2019s will. The validity of those extensions was subsequently challenged by certain charities (appellants here) who are the residuary beneficiaries under the will. The circuit court of Marshall County vacated the second and third extensions, the Appellate Court for the Third Judicial District reversed the vacation order (105 Ill. App. 2d 429), and we granted leave to appeal.\nThe controlling statute is section 17 of the Probate Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 3, par. 17) and the pertinent portions specify the time for renunciation as follows: \u201c* * * (a) within ten months after the admission of the will to probate or (b) within such further time as may be allowed by the probate court if, within ten months after the admission of the will to probate or before the expiration of any extended period, the surviving spouse files a verified petition therefor setting forth that litigation is pending that affects the share of the surviving spouse in the estate.\u201d\nAll three verified petitions for extension alleged the existence of pending litigation in both Illinois and Nebraska affecting the widow\u2019s share of the estate. They were filed and allowed in ex parte proceedings consented to by the executor; the first extension order, entered August 30, 1965, extended the time for filing to February 5, 1966; the second such order was entered February 3, 1966, and extended the time to February 5, 1967; the third, entered January 5, 1967, extended the time until 90 days after termination of a pending will construction suit filed by the testator\u2019s son. Vacation of those orders was sought by a petition filed August 28, 1967, which alleged the extensions had been obtained by false and fraudulent allegations as to the pendency of litigation when in fact no litigation in either Illinois or Nebraska was then pending.\nIt is sufficient for our purposes, without extending this opinion by detailing the facts, to state that some of the allegations as to pending litigation contained in appellee\u2019s petitions for extensions were clearly false. It is equally clear, however, that there were undisposed of claims filed in the circuit court of Marshall County against testator\u2019s estate in the amount of some $29,000 and an undisposed-of claim in the Nebraska ancillary administration proceedings amounting to some $11,000 at the time the first petition for extension was filed and allowed. At the time the second petition for extension was filed, those claims had been allowed with the executor\u2019s consent. The period within which an appeal could be taken from allowance of the Illinois claims had not then expired.\nIn a comprehensive and well reasoned opinion the trial court held the claims constituted \u201cpending litigation\u201d within the meaning of the statute. We agree with that determination. The procedure established by the Act for disposition of claims suggests that claims are within the traditional concept of \u201clitigation\u201d, providing as it does for notice, pleadings, trial, and appeal. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 3, pars. 195, 196, 197, 329.) Moreover, the processing of claims is clearly a matter which \"affects the share of the surviving spouse in the estate,\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 3, par. 17) and thus fits squarely within the rationale of section 17, which was designed to provide sufficient time \u201cto enable [a widow] to determine the condition of the estate and which course would be more tdvantageous to her.\u201d (Canavan v. McNulty, 328 Ill. 388, 396; accord; First National Bank of Danville v. McMillan, 12 Ill.2d 61, 66; In re Estate of Donovan, 409 Ill. 195, 202; Stone v. Vandermark, 146 Ill. 312.) The provision allowing for an extension of the time for renunciation obviously furthers this policy. \u201cFor a number of reasons it may be impossible at the expiration of the ten-month period for the surviving spouse to make an intelligent choice between the provisions of the will and the statutory share granted by section 16. Claims filed at the proper time may still be undisposed of and the construction of language used in the will or a question of the abatement of legacies may be in litigation the outcome of which would affect the share of the surviving spouse under the will. The evident purpose of the provision for the alternative period is to enable the surviving spouse in these and similar situations to elect the course that is most advantageous.\u201d (1 James, Illinois Probate Law & Practice (1951), Comment, \u00a7 17, p. 268.) Thus, where substantial claims against an estate are undisposed of, and their disposition affects the surviving spouse\u2019s decision on the question of renunciation, it is clearly contemplated under secton 17 that an extension of time be permitted. This construction is particularly appropriate in view of the provision\u2019s basic purpose, which is \u201cto confer privileges and to prevent impositions upon the surviving spouse * * First National Bank of Danville v. McMillan, 12 Ill. 2d 61, 66.\nThe narrow issue before us, however, is whether the trial court was correct in its further holding that litigation was not \u201cpending\u201d during the 30-day period within which an appeal might be taken as a matter of right from the judgments allowing the claims. If the trial court was correct, these claims would have ceased, at the instant of entry of judgment, to be pending litigation affecting the widow\u2019s share of the estate. If this be true, and the second granted extension thus nullified, the otherwise admittedly valid third extension must also fail since the widow\u2019s petition would then not have been filed within the period for which a valid extension was granted.\nThere have been many instances in which the question of when litigation ceases to be \u201cpending\u201d has been considered. In each instance, the paramount consideration has been to achieve the most reasonable result in the particular context; frequently, it has been determined that litigation is \u201cpending\u201d until the time for appeal has passed. (See, e.g., Agnew v. Brall, 124 Ill. 312; City of Lewiston v. Hummel, 38 Ill. App. 326; United States v. United Air Lines, Inc. (E. D. Wash. & D. Nev. 1962), 216 F. Supp. 709; Kissell v. Creel (D. D. C. 1949), 83 F. Supp. 799; In re Mackay (Alaska 1965), 416 P.2d 823; Record Mach. & Tool Co. v. Pageman Holding Corp. (1959), 172 Cal. App. 2d 164, 342 P.2d 402; Southern Title Research Co. v. King (Fla. App. 1966), 186 So.2d 539; In re Lee\u2019s Estate (1949), 240 Ia. 691, 37 N.W.2d 296; State v. Jager (N. D. 1958), 91 N.W.2d 337.) It appears that in the context of section 17, the more reasonable construction of the term \u201cpending\u201d is that which encompasses the 30-day period during which any party feeling himself aggrieved by the allowance of claims may appeal. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 3, par. 329.) While appellant urges that the executor\u2019s consent to the claims dispelled the possibility of appeal, we note that the Probate Act provides for an appeal from any probate proceeding involving more than $3,000 \u201cby any person who considers himself aggrieved\u201d. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 3, par. 329.) Thus, the mere allowance of claims was not necessarily a conclusive action upon which the widow\u2019s decision on the matter of renunciation should be required to rest, since numerous persons might have appealed from the judgment notwithstanding the executor\u2019s consent. Therefore, we are of the opinion that appellee\u2019s verified petition, filed during the appeal period from the allowance of substantial claims, properly stated that litigation was pending which affected her share in the estate. For this reason, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court for the Third Judicial District.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMr. Justice Culbertson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Chief Justice Underwood" } ], "attorneys": [ "Davis, Morgan & Witherell, of Peoria, (Donan C. Kirley, of counsel,) for appellants University of Illinois and University of Nebraska.", "Richard H. Radley, of Peoria, for appellants University of Southern California and California Institute of Technology.", "Arthur B. Copeland, of Peoria, for appellant Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children.", "McDermott, Will & Emery, of Chicago, Belli, Ashe, Ellison, Choulos & Lieff, of San Francisco, California, and Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, (Melvin M. Belli, Hamilton Smith, William J. Voelker, Jr., Robert L. Lieff, and James E. Betke, of counsel,) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 42081.\nIn re Estate of Richard Barnes Stith.\u2014(The University of Illinois et al., Appellants, vs. Signa Marie Stith, Appellee.)\nOpinion filed March 24, 1970.\nRehearing denied May 26, 1970.\nCulbertson, J., took no part.\nDavis, Morgan & Witherell, of Peoria, (Donan C. Kirley, of counsel,) for appellants University of Illinois and University of Nebraska.\nRichard H. Radley, of Peoria, for appellants University of Southern California and California Institute of Technology.\nArthur B. Copeland, of Peoria, for appellant Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children.\nMcDermott, Will & Emery, of Chicago, Belli, Ashe, Ellison, Choulos & Lieff, of San Francisco, California, and Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, (Melvin M. Belli, Hamilton Smith, William J. Voelker, Jr., Robert L. Lieff, and James E. Betke, of counsel,) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0192-01", "first_page_order": 202, "last_page_order": 207 }