{ "id": 2899055, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Aubrey Lee Holloman, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Holloman", "decision_date": "1970-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 42899", "first_page": "311", "last_page": "319", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 311" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 Ill.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852703 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2854150 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 42", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168334 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832416 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "1880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Cal. Rptr. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 A. 2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8091175 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/252/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 S.W.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1604034 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/246/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ark. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Cal. Rptr. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2862080 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2890960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0222-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 725, "char_count": 13910, "ocr_confidence": 0.805, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.585676776549662e-07, "percentile": 0.9476921241354226 }, "sha256": "a778d3882d608b828043e32b39d518c59416cdc0febfd38775978ecb2079da88", "simhash": "1:ad6dfc94601c2ca9", "word_count": 2279 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:05.512109+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Aubrey Lee Holloman, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt the conclusion of a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Aubrey Lee Holloman, was found guilty of the crimes of possession of narcotic drugs (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, par. 22 \u2014 3), and possession of hypodermic needles and syringes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, par. 22 \u2014 50). He was sentenced to concurrent terms in the Illinois State Penitentiary of from two to eight years on the former charge and to six months on the latter.\nIn this direct appeal, Holloman claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence; that the trial court, in denying the motion to suppress ignored its statutory obligation to make findings of fact (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 12(e)); and that the evidence relating to the crime of possession of hypodermic needles and syringes was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAt the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer John Walsh of the Chicago Police Department testified that at about 9:00 P.M. on November 14, 1965, he and his partner, Officer Daniel Nagle, observed a vehicle, driven by defendant, make a turn from Princeton Avenue into 72nd Street in the city of Chicago, without first giving a signal of intention to turn \u2014 a municipal ordinance violation. The officers pursued and stopped the vehicle a short distance away. Defendant exited from his automobile and joined Officer Walsh between the two parked cars where he was then informed of the reason for the detention and requested to produce his driver\u2019s license and motor vehicle registration certificate. Walsh stated that when defendant was unable to produce the items requested he placed him under arrest for failure to have in his possession a valid driver\u2019s license. Walsh then made a search of defendant\u2019s person \u201cfor weapons for my own protection.\u201d\nIt was adduced that, before the grand jury, Walsh stated that he arrested and searched defendant \u201cbecause he was backing away from me, while we were talking, while he was looking for his driver\u2019s license * * *.\u201d In conducting the search Walsh discovered a three-by-five-inch brown manila envelope approximately one inch thick, \u201ctucked inside * * * [defendant\u2019s] belt at the center of his body in the back.\u201d At first Walsh testified that he believed the envelope was sealed when he discovered it, however, he later stated that he could \u201cnot recall if it was sealed or it wasn\u2019t.\u201d Officer Nagle testified that the envelope was not sealed but merely folded over. In any event, Walsh looked into the envelope and \u201cfound some loose white powder.\u201d Subsequent laboratory analysis of the substance disclosed that it was heroin, however, at the time of its discovery on defendant, Officer Walsh did not know what the substance was.\nDefendant was then transported and his car was taken to the 7th District Police Station where a search of his automobile produced two tin covers, four syringes and four needles which had been hidden in the trunk.\nOfficer Nagle\u2019s testimony amounted to a reiteration of the facts as testified to by Walsh.\nDefendant\u2019s testimony consisted of a denial of the commission of the traffic violation for which he was stopped and further, he asserted that on the night in question he had in his possession a valid Illinois driver\u2019s license. The trial court denied the motion to suppress without making any finding of fact.\nHolloman claims that his motion to suppress was improperly denied. Apparently conceding the validity of the police officer\u2019s actions in searching him for weapons, defendant contends that the search became unlawful when Officer Walsh opened the envelope found on defendant\u2019s person and examined its contents. He reasons that the envelope was discovered pursuant to a summary search for weapons and because the officer patently conceded that he knew the envelope did not contain a weapon, the examination of the contents thereof was improper. In support of his position defendant cites People v. Machroli (1969), 44 Ill.2d 222; People v. Tate (1967), 38 Ill.2d 184; Amacher v. Superior Court (1969), 1 Cal. App. 3rd 150, 81 Cal. Rptr. 558; Bailey v. State, 246 Ark. 355, 438 S.W.2d 321; Backstrom v. United States, (D.C. Ct. of App. 1969), 252 A. 2d 909; and People v. Adam (1969), 1 Cal. App. 3rd 486, 81 Cal. Rptr. 738.\nMachroli involved an arrest pursuant to a domestic disturbance. The police had been summoned to the apartment where defendant was living. When they arrived, they found defendant in a T-shirt and shorts, and after some questioning placed him under arrest and ordered him to get dressed. As defendant was putting on his trousers, the police officer noticed him remove a small white box from his pants pocket and place it on a dresser. After defendant left the bedroom the officer went back to the dresser, picked up the box, opened it and found some white tablets which subsequently proved to be narcotics. Under those facts, we held there was \u201cno justification other than curiosity for the officer\u2019s conduct in entering the bedroom after defendant had left it and taking possession of the box.\u201d 44 Ill.2d at 225.\nIn Tate, defendant was stopped in the early evening by two police officers for making an improper turn. Defendant was asked to produce a valid driver\u2019s license, which he did. In conversing with the defendant, the police noticed a paper envelope with a glassine window sticking out of defendant\u2019s shirt pocket. Through the window, one of the officers saw a tissue-weight paper with bluish lettering inscribed on it. One of the arresting officers testified that he then asked defendant where he worked; that defendant replied with the name of a well known policy wheel; and that defendant was then arrested and the envelope seized. (The envelope was found to contain policy slips.) However, testimony from the other arresting officer obscured the true sequence of events surrounding the arrest. In reversing and remanding for further proceedings, we held that in order for the policy slips to be admissible, they had to be obtained pursuant to a lawful search and that it was necessary that circumstances exist which would reasonably indicate that the police were not dealing with the ordinary traffic violator .but with a criminal. Essential to a determination of that issue was whether defendant informed the police of his employment before or after the search.\nAmacher involved a protective search of defendant for concealed weapons. Defendant had a reputation for being hostile to police officers and was also a known narcotics user and \u201cpusher.\u201d While searching defendant, the police officer felt a hard object in defendant\u2019s front jacket pocket which turned out to be a flip-top cigarette container. The police officer examined the contents and found marijuana. In suppressing this evidence the court held that by opening the package of cigarettes the scope of the search became unduly explained and was no longer reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the frisk.\nIn Bailey, police officers went to defendant\u2019s home to execute a search warrant (subsequently held invalid). Not finding defendant present, the officers went to one of his known hang-outs where they located him and took him into custody for the purpose of having defendant present at the execution of the warrant. Prior to placing defendant in the police car, however, the officers searched him for weapons. One of the officers took defendant\u2019s billfold from his pocket and while passing it to his fellow officer, a tightly rolled cigarette fell out. The billfold was then thoroughly inspected and three small brown envelopes were discovered\u2014 all contained marijuana. In finding the search of defendant\u2019s billfold unlawful, the court held that the taking of the billfold had no reasonable relation to the object of the search\u2014 weapons.\nReversals under similar factual situations were obtained in both Backstrom and Adam.\nAfter thorough consideration, we believe that the facts of the case at bar are factually distinguishable from the cases which defendant relies upon.\nHolloman was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. When he could not locate his driver\u2019s license and motor vehicle registration certificate, he started \u201cbacking away\u201d from the investigating officers. Apprehensive as to his own safety and that of his fellow officer, patrolman Walsh placed defendant under arrest. In making a cursory pat-down of the defendant\u2019s person for offensive weapons, Walsh touched upon a hard object hidden in the small of Holloman\u2019s back. Not knowing its exact nature he removed the object which turned out to be a small brown manilla envelope. Coupling defendant\u2019s furtive behavior with the envelope\u2019s secretive location, we believe that the officers acted properly in examining its contents to determine if criminal activity was involved. Unlike either Machroli, Amacher or Bailey, the evidence seized was not discovered in an apparently innocuous place. And, unlike Tate, the police here had justification to believe that criminal activities had occurred. After examining the totality of circumstances surrounding the search we find that they would \u201c \u2018warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief\u2019 that the action taken was appropriate [citations].\u201d Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880; see also People v. Thomas, 31 Ill. 2d 212.\nTurning next to the search of Holloman\u2019s automobile and the refusal of the court to suppress the evidence found therein, we find no error. The search of the automobile occurred shortly after the defendant had been taken to the police station. At that time, the police had either definitely determined that the substance found on defendant\u2019s person was narcotics or they had a strong suspicion, for in expressing his reasons for conducting the search, Officer Walsh stated: \u201cAny car that has possibly contraband is always held for the State Narcotics Agent.\u201d Under the circumstances, the search was proper. See Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975.\nHolloman claims that the trial court in denying his motion to suppress ignored its statutory duty to make findings of fact. Section 114 \u2014 12(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 12(e)) provides : \u201cThe order or judgment granting or denying the motion [to suppress evidence illegally seized] shall state the findings of facts and conclusions of law upon which the order or judgment is based.\u201d However, in People v. Haskell, 41 Ill.2d 25, where the trial judge also made no express findings of fact, we held that \u201chis denial of the motion to suppress implies that he must have discredited the testimony of the defense witnesses since that testimony demands a contrary ruling on the motion. [Citation.] It follows that we are bound to accept the testimony given by the police detectives as true because it cannot be said that it is clearly unreasonable.\u201d (41 Ill.2d at 30.) Accordingly, in the present case we are not confronted with the question of the credibility of the officers but rather whether their testimony, \u201ctaken at full value, meets the required standards\u201d (41 Ill.2d at 31) of a reasonable search. Applying this standard, we hold there was no reversible error.\nFinally, defendant argues that the evidence relating to the crime of possession of hypodermic needles and syringes was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In essence, however, defendant is actually claiming that the chain-of-custody was not proved.\nAt the hearing on the motion to suppress the arresting officers testified that the hypodermic needles and syringes were discovered in the trunk of the vehicle which Holloman had been driving. The discovery occurred approximately thirty minutes after defendant\u2019s arrest on the street. However, while defendant was being transported to the police station, the exclusive control of his vehicle was transferred to some unnamed police officer, who drove the automobile to the police station. It was established that this unnamed officer also took possession of the key to the trunk which later yielded the needles and syringes.\nAt the trial, which consisted of a stipulation of the evidence heard on the motion, defense counsel stated: \u201cAt this time, your Honor, the defendant will enter a plea of not guilty and we will stipulate to the evidence already heard as well as to the chain of evidence and the chemist\u2019s report now in possession of the state.\u201d\nDefendant now contends that because the unnamed officer who transported his (Holloman\u2019s) vehicle to the police station was not called to testify, the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge of possession of hypodermic needles and syringes. We do not agree. Defendant is, for the first time interposing this objection to the evidence after explicitly stipulating to the chain of evidence in the trial court. The failure to present a proper and timely objection constituted a waiver of error, if any, and defendant may not now complain, especially in light of the fact that he stipulated to the evidence to which he now objects. See People v. Adams, 41 Ill.2d 98.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMr. Justice Ward took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Kluczynski" } ], "attorneys": [ "James B. Haddad, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrai-ian, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, and Elmer C. Kissane and James W. Reilley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 42899.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, vs. Aubrey Lee Holloman, Appellant.\nOpinion filed September 29, 1970.\nWard, J., took no part.\nJames B. Haddad, of Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrai-ian, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, and Elmer C. Kissane and James W. Reilley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0311-01", "first_page_order": 321, "last_page_order": 329 }