{ "id": 2907350, "name": "Phyllis J. Ullman, Appellant, vs. Wolverine Insurance Company, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance", "decision_date": "1970-10-07", "docket_number": "No. 42107", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "11", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "251 N.E. 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2430343 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/305/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1589981 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/113/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 So.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9853857 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/188/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Cal. App. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2151657 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/232/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 N.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.Y.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2282519 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/21/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 F. Supp. 920", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 2826015 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/285/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 So.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9827934 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/184/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 N.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 N.Y.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2271521 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/15/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ore. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 5775362 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/238/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 2d 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1598872 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/105/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2702038 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/4/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360146 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0245-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 704, "char_count": 18962, "ocr_confidence": 0.811, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.475831613836002e-06, "percentile": 0.9915203550477267 }, "sha256": "6cefb98456a113591676c27816f423e425bfd11ddee71cba27b64b72a590044e", "simhash": "1:716b16d1386a9607", "word_count": 3020 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:49.671921+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Phyllis J. Ullman, Appellant, vs. Wolverine Insurance Company, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Per curiam :\nOn May 23, 1967, the plaintiff and appellant, Phyllis J. Ullman, the executrix of the estate of Maurice Ullman, brought an action for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Rock Island against Wolverine Insurance Company, the appellee (Wolverine, hereafter). It sought to determine whether Wolverine could properly deduct workmen\u2019s compensation payments made to an insured by his employer in determining Wolverine\u2019s liability to the insured under an insurance policy providing for uninsured motorists coverage. This coverage is required by Illinois law to be provided in all automobile insurance policies issued in this State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 73, par. 755a.) The circuit court, after hearing evidence, supported the plaintiff\u2019s view and held that the provision in Wolverine\u2019s policy which permitted the deduction of workmen\u2019s compensation payments from Wolverine\u2019s uninsured motorist liability reduced the minimum coverage below $10,000, which is required by statute (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 73, par. 755a and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 95^, par. 7 \u2014 203, now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95 y2, par. 7A \u2014 203), and was consequently void. The Appellate Court for the Third District reversed the judgment of the circuit court (105 Ill. App. 2d 408) and we granted the plaintiff leave to appeal to this court.\nThe facts which form the basis of this controversy are not in question. Maurice Ullman, the plaintiff\u2019s husband, was fatally injured on January 23, 1967, in a collision between the automobile he ivas driving and one owned and operated by an uninsured motorist. At the time of the collision, Ullman was employed by the Swan Engineering Company and was acting within the scope of his employment. The employer became liable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) and paid benefits totaling $14,000.\nThe decedent maintained an automobile liability policy issued by Wolverine, which provided for uninsured motorist\u2019s coverage of $10,000 per person. The policy specified that any liability under this coverage would be reduced by any amounts paid or payable under a workmen\u2019s compensation law. Wolverine rejected the plaintiff\u2019s claim under the uninsured motorist\u2019s clause, contending that as the workmen\u2019s compensation benefits here exceeded the policy limits of $10,000, there was no liability on its part.\nIt is the position of Ullman\u2019s executor, the plaintiff, that the statute requiring insurance companies to issue uninsured motorists coverage was intended to provide the same protection for an individual injured or killed by an uninsured motorist as the Financial Responsibility Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 95^, par. 7 \u2014 203) would provide for one injured or killed by a driver insured in compliance with that law. Therefore, any reduction in an insurer\u2019s liability below the minimum required by the Financial Responsibility Law, i.e., $10,000, would violate public policy as expressed in the statute requiring uninsured coverage. The plaintiff concludes that to allow Wolverine to set off any benefits to an insured under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act against the minimum liability coverage Wolverine was required by law to provide as uninsured motorist coverage violates public policy.\nWolverine, in defense, says that the provision in its policy permitting the deduction of workmen\u2019s compensation benefits does not reduce the amount of protection, financially considered, that would have been provided had the decedent been killed by an insured motorist who had met the minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility Law by having $10,000 liability coverage. This results because any recovery the plaintiff would have received because of the negligence of an insured motorist would have been subject to the subrogation claims of the employer of the decedent for workmen\u2019s compensation benefits paid. Therefore, here, Wolverine points out, a full recovery of $10,000 from a motorist would have been more than offset by the subrogation claims of the employer in the amount of $14,000. That is, if the negligent motorist who caused the plaintiff\u2019s husband\u2019s death had had the minimum insurance liability coverage required by the Financial Responsibility Law, that $10,000 would have been subject to the employer\u2019s claim for workmen\u2019s compensation benefits paid. Thus, if the tortfeasor had had the minimal insurance coverage, the proceeds from it could not have been added to what had been recovered as a workmen\u2019s compensation benefit.\nIt would appear that the purpose of the provision in our Insurance Code requiring that every automobile liability policy shall contain uninsured motorist vehicle coverage in an amount not less than the limits described in the Financial Responsibility Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95^, par. 7 A \u2014 101 et seq.) was intended to place the policyholder in substantially the same position he would occupy, so far as his being injured or killed is concerned, if the wrongful driver had had the minimum liability insurance required by the Financial Responsibility Act. See Peterson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. 238 Ore. 106, (1964), 393 P.2d 651, 653; Durant v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 15 N.Y.2d 408, 207 N.E.2d 600, 601, dissenting opinion; Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, sec. 24.03.\nAs the appellate court observed, there is no language in the uninsured motorist\u2019s statute (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 73, par. 755a) either prohibiting or authorizing the insurer to deduct workmen\u2019s compensation benefits paid or payable to the insured. Prior to this, there have not been any cases in which a court of review has considered whether a policy\u2019s provision allowing the deduction of these benefits offends public policy. The language of the statute is:\n\u201c(1) On or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1963, no policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be renewed or delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in Section 7 \u2014 203 of the \u2018Illinois Motor Vehicle Law\u2019, approved July 11, 1957, as heretofore and hereafter amended [Financial Responsibility Law], for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit- and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom, except that the named insured shall have the right to reject such coverage only on policies delivered, renewed or issued for delivery prior to July 1, 1967.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 73, par. 755a.\nThe pertinent provisions of the Financial Responsibility Law provide: \u201c* * * every such policy or bond is subject, if the accident has resulted in bodily injury or death, to a limit, exclusive of interest and costs, of not less than $10,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death of any one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, to a limit of not less than $20,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, * * Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 95^, par. 7 \u2014 203, now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95^4, par 7A \u2014 203. The automobile liability policy issued by Wolverine included a \u201cLimits of Liability\u201d provision, challenged here by the plaintiff as offensive to public policy, which declared that \u201cany amount payable under the terms of this Endorsement [uninsured motorist coverage] because of bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this coverage shall be reduced by * * * (2) the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account of such bodily injury under any workmen\u2019s compensation law, disability benefits law or any similar law.\u201d\nThe parties have invited attention to cases from other jurisdictions which have considered whether the deduction of workmen\u2019s compensation benefits from a minimum required uninsured motorists coverage is contrary to public policy. There are holdings that it offends: Peterson v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin (Fla. 1966), 184 So.2d 229; Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (D.C. Neb. 1968) 285 F. Supp. 920; other cases have viewed it as not repugnant to public policy, e.g. Napolitano v. Motor Vehicle Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 281, 234 N.E.2d 438; Grunfeld v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 4, 42 Cal. Reptr. 516, and Allen v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (La.), 188 So.2d 741. It must be observed that in all of the cases cited by the plaintiff, with the exception of Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (D.C. Neb. 1968) 285 F. Supp. 920, holding that policy provisions providing for the deduction of workmen\u2019s compensation benefits were contrary to public policy, the workmen\u2019s compensation statutes concerned did not require the employee to reimburse the employer in full for compensation benefits. The employer was not subrogated to the employee\u2019s claim against the wrongdoer to the full extent of his payment to the employee. To illustrate, in Peterson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651, the Oregon statute required an injured employee to reimburse the employer only to the extent of sixty percent of benefits received. Thus, an uninsured motorists\u2019 provision calling for the deduction in full of workmen\u2019s compensation benefits would cause an employee to receive less protection under the policy than he would had the tortfeasor been insured.\nIn Illinois, the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act provides in substance that an employee who has received compensation under the Act is required to reimburse the employer from any recovery the employee receives from a third party legally responsible for the employee\u2019s injuries. The obligation is to reimburse for the full amount of benefits paid or payable by the employer and a lien in favor of the employer is provided upon any recovery by the employee for the amount of the benefits. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.5(b).) The employee is entitled to retain only that portion of a recovery from the tortfeasor which exceeds the benefits received under the Act from the employer. (See Continental Casualty Co. v. Sweda, 113 Ill. App. 2d 423, 251 N.E.2d 65; O\u2019Brien v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 305 Ill. 244.) In Illinois, if the deduction challenged here is permitted, the employee\u2019s position is the same under the uninsured motorist\u2019s coverage as it would be had the tortfeasor carried the minimum insurance. Where the tortfeasor is insured, the employee reimburses his employer in full from the recovery from the tortfeasor. Where the tortfeasor is uninsured, the benefits paid by the employer are deducted from the recovery. If the benefits paid by the employer exceed the amount payable under the coverage, as here, the insurance carrier is without liability. In neither instance does the employee retain both compensation from the employer and identical damages from the tortfeasor. The deduction provision does not cause the employee with uninsured motorist\u2019s coverage to have less financial protection than he would have had if the tortfeasor had carried insurance in the minimal amount. Were we to hold it is contrary to public policy, it would mean that an injured employee\u2019s extent of recovery, under circumstances such as exist here, would hinge on the fortuitous circumstance that the tortfeasor was uninsured and was not otherwise financially responsible. We do not consider that a policy limitation which precludes this result is offensive to public policy.\nAn argument of the plaintiff is that the provable damages sustained through the decedent\u2019s death far exceeded $10,000. If this were a case involving an insured tortfeasor, reimbursement of the employer would not be required, she contends, as the claim against the tortfeasor was not satisfied in full. Therefore, the protection available under the uninsured motorist coverage provides less protection than would have been afforded had the tortfeasor been insured. However, the plaintiff errs. Our workmen\u2019s compensation statute does not make the employee\u2019s obligation to reimburse his employer dependent on the employee\u2019s recovering his full measure of damages from the tortfeasor. The appellate court correctly observed: \u201cTo the extent that workmen\u2019s compensation benefits have been received, the obligation of reimbursement exists regardless of the amount recovered or the total damages sustained by the injured employee.\u201d 105 Ill. App. 2d 408, 413; also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Sweda, 113 Ill. App. 2d 423, 251 N.E. 65.\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court for the Third District, for the reasons given, is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMr. Justice Culbertson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "Per curiam :" }, { "text": "Mr. Justice Ward,\ndissenting:\nI would declare that the provision drawn by Wolverine to avoid or reduce its liability to policyholders is contrary to the legislative purpose and to public policy.\nThe opinion of the majority is founded on the mistaken conclusion, or better, I consider, the mistaken assumption that the statute requiring uninsured motorists coverage has the purpose of providing the same character of protection, and no more, for the policyholder that he would have had if the tortfeasor had had insurance in the minimum amounts of $io,ooo/$20,ooo required by the Financial Responsibility Law. The legislative intention was that the uninsured motorist should have protection through insurance in an amount not less than the limits prescribed for persons governed by the Financial Responsibility Law. There is nothing else in the uninsured motorist statute to suggest that the legislature intended to equate the protection to be provided and the rights of the assured with rights and limitations of rights under the Financial Responsibility Law. The assumption that the uninsured motorist\u2019s statute was intended to place a policyholder only in the position he would occupy had the tortfeasor had the minimum liability insurance required by the Financial Responsibility Law, is, apart from the question of minimal limits, basically gratuitous. The legislature knew the driving public would be paying premiums for the coverage the legislature was making mandatory. It is plainly reasonable to say the legislature anticipated that motorists thus insured might acquire benefits that would not otherwise have been available to them.\nThe opinion of the majority stresses the obligation of an employee in Illinois who recovers damages from a tortfeasor to reimburse his employer for compensation which has been paid to the employee under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Because of this duty the majority concludes that the policy provision here is not contrary to the legislative intendment underlying the statutory requirement of uninsured motorists coverage. It was intended, in the view of the majority, that one insured under an uninsured motorists provision might recover to the extent, and only to that extent, that he would recover had the tortfeasor had the minimum liability insurance required by the Financial Responsibility Law.\nTo me, this view is misguided. The basis for the obligation of an employee to reimburse his employer compensation benefits paid is to prevent an unjust enrichment, that is, to prevent the employee from retaining compensation paid by the employer and also damages from the tortfeasor. In Reno v. Maryland Casualty Co., 27 Ill. 2d 245, at 248, we said: \u201cThe underlying basis of the employer\u2019s right to subrogation is the prevention of an unjust enrichment on the part of the employee in the form of a double recovery for the same injury,\u201d and in Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transportation Co., 4 Ill. 2d 273, at 284, it was said: \u201cIf the non-negligent employer is deprived of his right of subrogation, it woud result in the unjust enrichment of the employee, who could retain both compensation and damages, thereby violating a basic tenet of the common law that there may not be a double satisfaction for the same wrong. In fact, that common-law principle has been deemed to be the basis for the enactment of the various statutory subrogation provisions.\u201d\nThis rationale has no pertinency here. There is no reason to prohibit a so-called double recovery when one of the recoveries by the employee, i.e., the one against an insurance company, is founded in contract and has been made possible by the employee\u2019s payment of premiums. An employee\u2019s recovery against an insured motorist is founded in tort. However, his recovery in the case of an uninsured tortfeasor is based on a contract the employee has had with a third person, i.e., the insurance company, which for a premium provided him with uninsured motorist\u2019s coverage. There can be no well-founded objection to a so-called double recovery under these circumstances. To deny the employee full recovery is to cause, as I see it, an unjust enrichment of the insurance company to which premiums have been paid.\nThe majority is concerned by the possibility that if the provision is held contrary to public policy it would mean that the injured employee\u2019s extent of recovery would hinge on the fortuitous circumstance that the tortfeasor was uninsured. If this is really a cause for concern this concern should be dissipated by a recognition that the employee\u2019s recovery against the uninsured driver would be based on this insurance contract for which the employee would have paid a premium to cover the fortuity that he might sustain damage by the conduct of an uninsured driver. What concerns me is the implicit construction by the majority that the legislature intended to permit an insurance carrier, by restricting its liability, as here, to financially advantage itself by the fortuitous circumstance that its insured when killed or injured was within the protection of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\nI would hold that the restricting provision frustrates the legislative purpose to provide insurance for those \u201cwho are legally entitled to recover damages from owners and operators of uninsured motor vehicles\u201d and is contrary to public policy.\nMr. Justice Schaefer joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. Justice Ward," } ], "attorneys": [ "Eagle & Eagle, of Rock Island, for appellant.", "Katz, McAndrews, Duricee & Telleen, of Rock Island, (Stuart R. Lefstein, of counsel,) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 42107.\nPhyllis J. Ullman, Appellant, vs. Wolverine Insurance Company, Appellee.\nOpinion filed Oct. 7, 1970.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied Dec. 3, 1970.\nCulbertson, J., took no part.\nWard and Schaefer, JJ., dissenting.\nEagle & Eagle, of Rock Island, for appellant.\nKatz, McAndrews, Duricee & Telleen, of Rock Island, (Stuart R. Lefstein, of counsel,) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 11, "last_page_order": 21 }