{ "id": 2912076, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DANIEL H. REDMOND, JR., Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Redmond", "decision_date": "1972-01-28", "docket_number": "No. 42628", "first_page": "313", "last_page": "317", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 313" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "400 Ill. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5306566 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/400/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5315050 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2704112 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286-7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/5/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ill.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2770583 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ill. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2426550 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/300/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5351726 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2664850 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562-563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320238 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378454 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852288 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2713209 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/7/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2846427 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" }, { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 463, "char_count": 6738, "ocr_confidence": 0.865, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.8523807627221774e-07, "percentile": 0.8997003300192405 }, "sha256": "5d628e4ac76c24b92481dbc8cc8ce01bcdbc2ae74cb0b8bfa72bf6a479299917", "simhash": "1:e39abb80510a19e8", "word_count": 1135 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:10.480630+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DANIEL H. REDMOND, JR., Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury in the circuit court of Cook County found the defendant, Daniel H. Redmond, Jr., guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 20 nor more than 30 years.\nOn the evening of March 12, 1967, Richard Morris was working as an attendant in a gas station where the defendant was also employed. At approximately 7:00 P.M. that evening, the defendant drove into the station in a convertible car, accompanied by Miss Janice Gottschalk. Morris filled the tank with gasoline, and the defendant, Morris, and Miss Gottschalk had a friendly conversation. The defendant paid for the gasoline and returned to the car. At that time he pointed a pistol over the top of the car in the direction of Morris. The gun fired and a bullet struck and killed Morris.\nAt trial the defendant testified that he pointed the gun in the direction of Morris for no reason, and that the gun discharged accidentally when his hand struck a metal bar in the top of the convertible as he pointed the gun at Morris. The State argued that the defendant intentionally fired at Morris.\nThe defendant contends that his conviction should be reversed and he should be granted a new trial because of the incompetent manner in which his attorney represented him at trial. This attorney was retained by the defendant. While it appears that the attorney consulted one or two other attorneys during the course of the trial, the record does not show that they participated in the trial. The question presented is whether the defendant was deprived of due process of law because of the incompetence of this privately retained attorney. The standard for determining that question is a strict one. An error in judgment or trial strategy will not establish incompetence. (People v. Somerville (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 1, 5; People v. Clark (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 163.) But \u201cwhere representation by counsel of defendant\u2019s choice is of such low calibre as to amount to no representation at all, or reduces the court proceedings to a farce or a sham, defendant is denied the fair trial contemplated by the due process guarantees of the Federal and State constitutions. People v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 22; People v. Green, 36 Ill.2d 349, 351; People v. De Simone, 9 Ill.2d 522, 531; People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 562-563.\u201d People v. Somerville (1969), 42 Ill.2d 1, 5.\nThe record shows that defense counsel in this case acted throughout the trial in a manner that is fairly characterized as a complete failure to represent the defendant. We will here set out only two of the many incidents that lead to this conclusion.\nThe defendant\u2019s attorney did not object, either during or after trial, to groundless attacks on his client\u2019s character by the prosecution. One example of this occurred during the cross-examination of the defendant\u2019s mother when the prosecutor asked her the following questions:\n\u201cDo you have personal knowledge that he struck a teacher at that school?\u201d\n\u201cWas he, in fact, expelled from that school?\u201d\n\u201cNow, as a matter of fact this boy has always been rather lazy around the house, has he not?\u201d \u201cAnd, as a matter of fact, this boy was sort of shiftless, was he not?\u201d\n\u201cNow are you going to tell the jury that you did not know about your son\u2019s conduct in school?\u201d\nThe prosecutor\u2019s questions concerning whether the defendant was \u201clazy\u201d or \u201cshiftless\u201d were clearly objectionable because they concerned character traits that were not relevant to the crime charged. (People v. Lewis (1962), 25 Ill.2d 442, 445; People v. Redola (1921), 300 Ill. 392, 397; Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence (2 ed. 1963), sec. 12.8 at 212; McCormick, Law of Evidence, sec. 158 at 334.) The questions concerning whether the defendant had struck a teacher or been expelled from school were objectionable because the prosecution may not cross-examine a defendant\u2019s character witness concerning specific acts of misconduct by the defendant. (People v. Greeley (1958), 14 Ill.2d 428, 432; People v. Hermens (1955), 5 Ill.2d 277, 286-7; People v. Stanton (1953), 1 Ill.2d 444; People v. Wilson (1948), 400 Ill. 461, 479-80.) Despite these valid grounds for objection, defense counsel remained silent and allowed the character of the defendant to be improperly discredited by the prosecutor. And while the State argues that the defendant\u2019s attorney was competent, it would also justify many groundless assertions and innuendos about the defendant\u2019s character on the ground that all objection was waived by that attorney\u2019s failure to object.\nDefense counsel\u2019s closing argument to the jury could at best be deemed to be meaningless. In a totally confusing and incoherent statement counsel intermittently referred to his law practice, the strain on him that resulted from trial, the facts of the case and the defense. In the argument he seems to have abdicated his client\u2019s position and admitted his guilt, even though the defendant had never stated or implied such an admission during his testimony. Among the statements made by defense counsel in the closing argument were:\n\u201cWell, am I selling someone the defendant\u2019s guilt? I think so. Guilty, yes. Sure, guilty. He wasn\u2019t faking when he - - when he wouldn\u2019t aim that weapon at - - well, Parrish [an assistant State\u2019s Attorney]. He wasn\u2019t kidding. That wasn\u2019t - - that was inside out.\n* * *\nI am crying for myself. I like being in a one man office, but I am getting off the point.\n* * *\nYou have no idea how much a win, this win, means to me because I don\u2019t think it was murder. I will tell you what murder is. Actually, I am not real sure. I don\u2019t think anybody is a murderer.\n* * *\nThey asked me a hundred times what was the defense. I don\u2019t know ....\n* * *\nSome of this is just to save a boy from whatever they have in store for him. And I am not crying, he is on a murder indictment. They won\u2019t talk anything else, murder or nothing, because that is the kind of a case we got.\u201d\nWithout more, these illustrations are sufficient to show that because of the incompetent manner in which his attorney represented him, the defendant was denied due process of law. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER" } ], "attorneys": [ "BLACKER, BUCKUN, NELLIS & FAGEL, of Chicago, (WILLIAM J. NELLIS, of counsel,) for appellant.", "WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General, of Springfield, and EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (JAMES B. ZAGEL, Assistant Attorney General, and ROBERT A. NOVELEE and HENRY A. HAUSER, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 42628.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DANIEL H. REDMOND, JR., Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 28, 1972.\nBLACKER, BUCKUN, NELLIS & FAGEL, of Chicago, (WILLIAM J. NELLIS, of counsel,) for appellant.\nWILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General, of Springfield, and EDWARD V. HANRAHAN, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (JAMES B. ZAGEL, Assistant Attorney General, and ROBERT A. NOVELEE and HENRY A. HAUSER, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0313-01", "first_page_order": 323, "last_page_order": 327 }