{ "id": 5405525, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JERRY TIBBITTS, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tibbitts", "decision_date": "1973-10-01", "docket_number": "No. 45243", "first_page": "56", "last_page": "70", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 56" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "228 Ill. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5629257 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/228/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2537095 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/375/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 Ill. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2493743 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/386/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2924443 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2664399 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ill. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2419446 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/290/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 728", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058121 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861772 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856577 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2639205 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 Ill. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2504953 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/389/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314012 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2877831 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313697 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2586157 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365-66, 369" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/364/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5198141 ], "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/328/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4796058 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/268/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5471809 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/149/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2850101 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 728", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058121 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0728-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 982, "char_count": 26622, "ocr_confidence": 0.861, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.4127575884078646e-07, "percentile": 0.8781973389182149 }, "sha256": "cd15c5d370d7f24f1a745b2218416cc153271ce082f76556c8318a0b7201a647", "simhash": "1:ac8ecefc640b7ef9", "word_count": 4515 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:58.808119+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JERRY TIBBITTS, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE RYAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Jerry Tibbitts, was charged with soliciting John Kinnerk to sell his residential property after the defendant had received notice that John Kinnerk did not desire to do so. Following a hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the criminal complaint, the circuit court of Cook County held the statute which the defendant was charged with violating, section 70\u201451(d) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 70\u201451(d)), unconstitutional. The State appealed directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 603. 50 Ill.2d R. 603.\nSection 70 \u2014 51 of the Criminal Code provides:\n\u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person or corporation knowingly:\n* * *\n(d) To solicit any owner of residential property to sell or list such residential property at any time after such person or corporation has notice that such owner does not desire to sell such residential property or does not desire to be solicited to sell or list for sale such residential property. For the purpose of this paragraph, a person has such notice (1) when the Human Relations Commission has mailed to him pursuant to Section 4.1 of \u2018An Act to create a Commission on Human Relations and to define its powers and duties\u2019, approved August 8, 1947, as now or hereafter amended, a list containing the name and address of such owner, or (2) when he has been notified in writing that the owner does not desire to sell or list for sale such residential property.\u201d\nThe statutory notice provision referred to in the above section of the Criminal Code is found in section 4.1 of \u201cAn Act to create a Commission on Human Relations and to define its powers and duties\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 127, par. 214.4\u20141), which provides:\n\u201cThe Commission shall publish *** notice forms which may be executed by owners of residential property who do not desire to sell such residential property or by owners of residential property who do not desire to be solicited to sell or list for sale such residential property. The Commission shall receive, file and index all notices submitted to it on such forms ***, and shall compile suitable lists by area of the names and addresses of owners of residential property who submit such forms ***. The Commission shall cause copies of such lists to be mailed by certified mail to those real estate agents and brokers and other persons who are known or believed by the Commission to be soliciting owners of residential property for the sale or listing of such property in the area covered by such list.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe need not consider the defendant\u2019s contentions that the statute violates his constitutional right to freedom of speech or his right to contract because we consider the statute which provides for the giving of the notice upon which the prosecution is based constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the Human Relations Commission and is thus invalid.\nThe power to make the laws for this State is a sovereign power vested in the legislature. \u201cOn common-law principles, as well as by settled constitutional law, it is a power which cannot be delegated to another body, authority or person.\u201d (People ex rel. Chicago Dryer Co. v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 315, at 320.) In Hill v. Relyea, 34 Ill.2d 552, at 555, this court summarized its holdings on the subject of delegation of legislative authority as follows:\n\u201cThere is a distinction between the delegation of true legislative power and the delegation to a subordinate of authority to execute the law. [Citation.] The former involves a discretion as to what the law shall be; the latter is merely an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. [Citations.] It is an established rule that the General Assembly cannot delegate its general legislative power to determine what the law shall be. However, it may delegate to others the authority to do those things which the legislature might properly do, but cannot do as understanding^ or advantageously. [Citations.] Absolute criteria whereby every detail necessary in the enforcement of a law is anticipated need not be established by the General Assembly. The constitution merely requires that intelligible standards be set to guide the agency charged with enforcement, [citations] and the precision of the permissible standard must necessarily vary according to the nature of the ultimate objective and the problems involved. [Citations.] \u201d\nThis court has also stated that the legislature in delegating to an administrative agency the performance of certain functions may not invest that agency with arbitrary powers. (Department of Public Works and Bldgs. v. Lanter, 413 Ill. 581, 587; McDougall v. Lueder, 389 Ill. 141, 154.) The legislature cannot vest an administrative agency with the power in its absolute and unguided discretion to apply or withhold the application of the law or to say to whom a law shall or shall not be applicable. (1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, sec. 108.) \u201cShould a statute clothe an administrative officer with the discretion as to the administration of the statute and also clothe him with the right to determine what the law is, or give to him the opportunity to apply it to one and not apply it to another in like circumstances, either would constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.\u201d People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, at 581.\nAlso, due process of law requires that an act shall not be vague, indefinite or uncertain and must provide sufficient standards to guide the administrative body in the exercise of its functions. People ex rel. Stamos v. Public Building Com., 40 Ill.2d 164, 174.\nSummarizing the statutory provisions involved: section 70 \u2014 51(d) of the Criminal Code makes it unlawful to solicit an owner of residential property to sell or list his property for sale after the person soliciting has received notice as provided in section 4.1 of \u201cAn Act to create a Commission on Human Relations\u201d; section 4.1 authorizes the Human Relations Commission to receive forms executed by owners of residential property who do not desire to sell or be solicited to sell or list for sale their property; the Commission is required to compile suitable lists by area of the names and addresses of owners of residential property who submit such forms; the Commission is then required to cause copies of the lists to be mailed to those real estate agents and brokers and other persons who are known or believed by the Commission to be soliciting owners of residential property in the areas covered by such lists.\nThe statute does not define what constitutes an \u201carea\u201d and does not specifically state who has the authority to create them. We must assume that the statute vests in the Commission the absolute and arbitrary power to divide the State of Illinois or portions thereof into \u201careas.\u201d The statute establishes no guidelines or standards for the Commission to follow in designating an \u201carea,\u201d leaving it entirely to the whim of the Commission what part of the State shall be encompassed within an \u201carea\u201d and to a great extent who shall be prohibited from soliciting those who have executed the forms. For example, it is conceivable that a large number of such forms will be executed by people who reside in a particular neighborhood composed of a few square blocks in the city of Chicago. However, by defining the \u201carea\u201d as the entire city of Chicago a real estate broker who has never solicited the owners of residential property in that neighborhood but who has so solicited in other parts of the city would be barred from soliciting for the sale or listing of real estate in the neighborhood from which executed forms were received. Conversely, by defining a small geographic \u201carea\u201d a person who may have been soliciting owners of real estate up to the very boundaries of that neighborhood but not within it would not receive a notice from the Commission and would thus be free to solicit the owners who had executed the forms.\nIt is contended that section 70 \u2014 51(d) of the Criminal Code is a part of \u201cAn Act to prohibit the solicitation or inducement of sale or purchase of real estate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin or ancestry.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 70\u201451 et seq.) However, nothing in section 70\u201451(d) of the Criminal Code or in section 4.1 of the act creating the Commission on Human Relations establishes any guidelines or standards for the Commission to follow to effectuate this purpose. The Commission has the authority to arbitrarily establish \u201careas\u201d for the purpose of prohibiting the solicitation of the sale of real estate for any purpose, whether or not it is related to the purpose of the Act. In fact, by treating the State of Illinois as one \u201carea\u201d the Commission could effectively prohibit solicitation of those who had executed the forms by all real estate brokers or salesman by the simple practice of sending copies of the lists to all those who are licensed by the State of Illinois to engage in those occupations. The same could be true as to any city or county. Such a legislative intent is not discernible from the statute. We express no opinion as to whether or not the legislature itself could prohibit solicitation or whether such a prohibition would be violative of a person\u2019s right of freedom of speech. However, under the arbitrary power conferred by this statute the Commission may accomplish this result and thus is vested with the authority to determine what the law shall be and to whom it shall apply, contrary to the previous decisions of this court cited above.\nWe also consider as vague and indefinite the requirement that the Commission shall cause copies of the lists to be mailed to those who are known or believed by the Commission to be soliciting in the area covered by such lists. It is possible that each member of the Commission or succeeding members of the Commission may differently interpret the meaning of the words \u201cknown or believed.\u201d No guidelines are established for establishing the basis upon which such a \u201cbelief\u201d may be formed. It is a common practice for real estate brokers and salesmen to solicit the listing of property for sale either directly or through advertisement in the media. Would this practice constitute sufficient \u201cbelief\u201d to justify the Commission in sending copies of the lists to all real estate brokers or salesmen? The Commission as it is now composed may interpret these words in a manner that will preclude certain persons from soliciting in certain \u201careas\u201d whereas a later Commission may interpret the same words in such a manner as to permit the same persons to solicit in these \u201careas.\u201d Therefore, this vague and indefinite language likewise confers upon the Commission an arbitrary and unrestricted power to determine to whom the law will apply. (See McDougall v. Lueder, 389 Ill. 141, 154.) This court stated in Krol v. County of Will, 38 Ill.2d 587, at 593: \u201c[A] law vesting discretionary power in an administrative officer without properly defining the terms under which his discretion is to be exercised is void as an unlawful delegation of legislative power. [Citations.] \u201d\nWe thus hold that section 4.1 of \u201cAn Act to create a Commission on Human Relations\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 127, par. 214.4\u20141) and section 70\u201451(d)(1) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969. ch. 38, par. 70\u201451(d)(1)) are unconstitutional.\nThe State in its briefs has raised an issue which requires further comment. The State urges that the purpose of subparagraph (d) of section 70 \u2014 51 of the Criminal Code is to protect a person\u2019s right of privacy; that is, his right not to be solicited to sell or list for sale his real estate if he does not desire to be so solicited, citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 25 L. Ed. 2d 736, 90 S. Ct. 1484. If this be the purpose of subparagraph (d), then the amendment of 1969 which added subparagraph (d) added a dimension to the act of 1967 not expressed in the title thereof and did not in the process of the amendment amend the title to the Act. The Act as passed in 1967 by the General Assembly is entitled \u201cAn Act to prohibit the solicitation or inducement of sale or purchase of real estate on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry.\u201d Section 70 \u2014 51 was a part of that act and as originally enacted contained only subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), which were the same as subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the present section. All of these subparagraphs are directly related to the subject matter as stated in the title of the Act. However, subparagraph (d), added in 1969, prohibits solicitation by any person after he has had notice that the owner does not desire to sell or to be solicited to sell or list for sale his property. The prohibition of subparagraph (d) is not limited to prohibiting the solicitation or inducement of sale on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin or ancestry as stated in the title of the Act.\nSection 13 of article IV of the constitution of 1870, which was in effect at the time subparagraph (d) was added to section 70 \u2014 51, provided: \u201cNo act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title ***.\u201d The purpose of the requirement is to call the attention of interested parties to the provisions of the act or of the amendment and to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by inserting provisions into an act of which the title gives no intimation and which might therefore be unintentionally adopted. (People ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 290 Ill. 327, 332; Co-ordinated Transport, Inc. v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 321; 1A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1972), sec. 17.01\nThe legislature when entitling an act may choose to make the title general or specific. Should the legislature choose to make the title specific, as in the act now being considered, then provisions which are not within the scope of the specific subject chosen for the title may not be included in the act or added thereto by amendment unless the title is also amended. (Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen, 53 Ill.2d 1; Stolze Lumber Co. v. Stratton, 386 Ill. 334; People ex rel. Gage v. Village of Wilmette, 375 Ill. 420; Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522.) The body of the statute cannot encompass a broader subject than is stated in the title. 1A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1972), sec. 18.07; People ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 290 Ill. 327, 334.\nSection 8 of article IV of the constitution of 1970 retained the requirement of section 13 of article IV of the 1870 constitution that bills, with certain exceptions, must be limited to a single subject. However, the 1970 constitution eliminated the requirement of section 13 of article IV of the 1870 constitution that the subject of each bill must be expressed in the title. The defendant in this case is charged with having committed the offense on May 17, 1971, prior to the effective date of the 1970 constitution and the validity of the Act as it applies to this defendant must be judged by the requirements of the 1870 constitution.\nAlthough a holding on this point is not necessary to the decision of this case, we view the State\u2019s contention as raising a serious question as to whether section 70 \u2014 51(d) of the Criminal Code is violative of section 13 of article IV of the constitution of 1870.\nHaving decided this case on the basis of the unlawful delegation of authority to the Human Relations Commission, it is unnecessary for us to pass on the validity of section 70 \u2014 51(d)(2) of the Criminal Code. This section relates to solicitation following the receipt of written notice that the owner does not desire to sell or list for sale his property.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE RYAN" }, { "text": "MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, with whom MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD and MR. JUSTICE WARD join,\ndissenting:\nMr. Chief Justice Underwood, Mr. Justice Ward and I are unable to agree with the opinion of the majority. As the case was presented in the trial court and in this court, the primary attack upon the validity of the statute was based upon a supposed violation of the defendant\u2019s constitutional right of freedom of speech. The majority does not discuss that contention, which appears to have been laid to rest by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department (1970), 397 U.S. 728, 25 L. Ed. 2d 736, 90 S. Ct. 1484. Instead, the court invalidates the statute upon one State constitutional ground, and gratuitously reflects doubt on its validity on another.\nThe ground on which the statute is stricken down is based upon an obvious misreading of the statute. The opinion says: \u201c*** by defining the \u2018area\u2019 as the entire city of Chicago a real estate broker who has never solicited the owners of residential property in that neighborhood but who has so solicited in other parts of the city would be barred from soliciting for the sale or listing of real estate in the neighborhood from which executed forms were received.\u201d The statutory prohibition is not against soliciting in the area or the neighborhood from which the notices have been received; it is against soliciting those persons who have given notice to the solicitor, or have caused notice to be given to him through the Human Relations Commission, that they do not want to be solicited.\nThe majority\u2019s preoccupation with whatever ambiguity inheres in the words \u201carea,\u201d \u201cknown\u201d and \u201cbelieved\u201d seems most unusual. The Commission was authorized to establish areas in order to simplify its task of record-keeping and notice-giving, and not, as the majority implies, a means of deciding \u201cwhat the law shall be and to whom it shall apply.\u201d Without the power to designate areas in order to facilitate its task, the Commission would indeed have to resort, in the language of the court\u2019s opinion, to \u201cthe simple practice of sending copies of the lists to all those who are licensed by the State of Illinois to engage in those occupations [as brokers or salesmen]. \u201d The Rowan case makes it clear that the \u201csimple practice\u201d to which the majority refers would violate no one\u2019s constitutional rights, but we find nothing in the Constitution that compels the Commission to waste public money in sending notices to brokers or salesmen whom it knows or believes are no t soliciting in the area from which a notice or notices have come.\nWhile the legislature has used the term \u201carea\u201d in this statute as a means of assisting the Commission in discharging its clearinghouse duties under the statute, it has also used the term \u201carea\u201d in other contexts which involve much more significant delgations of authority. For example, the Forest Fire Protection District Act confers the following authority upon the Director of the Department of Conservation:\n\u201cWhenever, as ascertained from investigation, hearing or otherwise, the Director determines that certain geographic areas of contiguous territory in the State are in need of special protection from forest fires, the Director may designate and establish one or more intensive forest fire protection districts, consisting of one or more counties or portions thereof, in such area. The boundaries of \u00e9ach district so established shall be defined in the order of the Director ***.\u201d\nThat act authorizes the Director to require a burning permit in such areas and provides criminal penalties for burning without a required permit within the area designated as a district by the Director. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 57V2, pars. 72, 73, 78.\nIf we were to apply the reasoning of the majority to this simple legislative delegation, we would have to say, paraphrasing the language of the majority: \u201cWe must assume that the statute vests in the Director [Commission] the absolute and arbitrary power to divide the State of Illinois or portions thereof into \u2018areas. \u2019 The statute establishes no guidelines or standards for the Director [Commission] to follow in designating an \u2018area,\u2019 leaving it entirely to the whim of the Director [Commission] what part of the State shall be encompassed within an \u2018area,\u2019 and to a great extent who shall be prohibited\u201d from burning. This court has not heretofore adopted such a hostile attitude toward legislative enactments. Instead it has held that legislatively conferred discretion \u201cis not to be construed as being uncontrolled,\u201d but is to be exercised only within limits that are relevant to the legislative purpose. Brown v. City of Chicago (1969), 42 Ill.2d 501, 506.\nIn our opinion the majority\u2019s hostile attitude toward the legislature\u2019s use of the words \u201cknown\u201d and \u201cbelieved\u201d is unwarranted. Of course those words have a subjective content, but that has not been thought to bar their use in legislation. It is sufficient to say, we think, that if the concepts of \u201cknowledge\u201d and \u201cbelief\u201d are to be discarded because of their subjective quality, wholesale revisions of legal doctrines, both civil and criminal, will be required.\nWe are also unable to agree with the majority\u2019s dictum that the statute as amended in 1969 is invalid under section 13 of article IV of the Constitution of 1870. The statute is entitled: \u201cAn Act to prohibit the solicitation or inducement of sale or purchase of real estate on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry.\u201d It was enacted in 1967. Paragraph (a) of section 1 makes it unlawful to knowingly \u201csolicit for sale, lease, listing or purchase any residential real estate within the State of Illinois, on the grounds of loss of value due to the present or prospective entry into the vicinity of the property involved of any person or persons of any particular race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry.\u201d Paragraph (b) malees it unlawful to knowingly \u201cdistribute or cause to be distributed written material or statements designed to induce any owner of residential real estate in the State of Illinois to sell or lease his property because of any present or prospective changes in the race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry, of residents in the vicinity of the property involved.\u201d Paragraph (c) makes it unlawful to intentionally \u201ccreate alarm, among residents of any community by transmitting in any manner, including a telephone call whether or not conversation thereby ensues, with a design to induce any owner of residential real estate in the State of Illinois to sell or lease his property because of any present or prospective entry into the vicinity of the property involved of any person or persons of any particular race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 70\u201451.\nIn 1969 the General Assembly added paragraph (d), which is set forth in the majority opinion. At the same time it added section 4.1 also set forth in the majority opinion, to the Human Relations Commission Act. Although the entire act which the defendant is charged with violating is aimed at solicitation based upon considerations of race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry, the majority engages in a lengthy discussion of the validity of the Act on the hypothetical assumption that the added paragraph was intended to introduce into the Act an entirely different purpose: the protection of \u201ca person\u2019s right of privacy; that is, his right not to be solicited to sell or list for sale his real estate if he does not desire to be so solicited.\u201d The majority treats this assumed purpose as though it existed entirely apart from the considerations of race, color, religion or national origin or ancestry that permeate the statute. We do not agree that it is appropriate to discuss the validity of the provision as if it were designed to protect privacy for its own sake. No such issue was briefed or argued. In any event, to assume a construction which would render a statute invalid as beyond the scope of its title runs counter to our earlier decisions, which have held that:\n\u201cIt is a principle of construction often announced, that the intention of the law-makers is to be found and given effect, and where the language of the act is obscure or its meaning doubtful, resort may be had to the title thereof to enable the court to discover the intent and make certain what is otherwise uncertain or ambiguous. (Cohn v. People, 149 Ill. 486; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. [16 U.S. at] 631. The legislative intent must be gathered from the entire act rather than from one clause, sentence or section thereof, and courts may not confine their attention to the one part or section to be construed. (People v. Giles, 268 Ill. 406; Warner v. King, 267 id. 82.)\n* * *\n*** Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would render it unconstitutional and the other protect its validity, the latter construction is to be adopted if such can reasonably be done. (People v. James, 328 Ill. 262; People v. Shader, 326 id. 145.)\u201d Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Ames (1936), 364 Ill. 362, 365-66, 369.\nThe primary fault that we see in the majority\u2019s reasoning lies in its fixation upon certain of the statutory terms \u2014 \u201carea,\u201d \u201cknown,\u201d \u201cbelieved\u201d \u2014 in isolation, without reference to the statutory context as a whole or to the evil at which the statute is directed. Such a narrow and intense focus upon almost any word or phrase will eventually reveal layer upon layer of ambiguity. Only if courts examine statutes from a broader perspective can the General Assembly legislate effectively. As we have indicated, we think the First Amendment arguments advanced by the appellant were answered by Rowan v. United States Post Office Department (1970), 397 U.S. 728, 25 L. Ed. 2d 736, 90 S. Ct. 1484. Finally, the court\u2019s analysis of the question whether the title of the statute accurately reflects its content seems to us unnecessary, and its conclusion, that it does not, wrong.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, with whom MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD and MR. JUSTICE WARD join," } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield (James B. Zagel and E. James Gildea, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.", "Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk & Cohen, of Springfield (James M. Winning and Grady E. Holley, of counsel), for appellee.", "Thomas E. Brannigan and John S. Meany, both of Chicago, for amicus curiae Beverly Area Planning Association." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 45243.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JERRY TIBBITTS, Appellee.\nOpinion filed October 1, 1973.\nSCHAEFER, J., UNDERWOOD, C.J., and WARD, J\u201e dissenting.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield (James B. Zagel and E. James Gildea, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.\nGiffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk & Cohen, of Springfield (James M. Winning and Grady E. Holley, of counsel), for appellee.\nThomas E. Brannigan and John S. Meany, both of Chicago, for amicus curiae Beverly Area Planning Association." }, "file_name": "0056-01", "first_page_order": 114, "last_page_order": 128 }