{ "id": 5405265, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RICHARD BROWN, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brown", "decision_date": "1974-01-31", "docket_number": "No. 43349", "first_page": "312", "last_page": "318", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 312" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "45 Ill.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2896464 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 481, "char_count": 8973, "ocr_confidence": 0.83, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6815030760578047e-07, "percentile": 0.891412588147031 }, "sha256": "c142ee60d2aaf210fc071ee70893c0f9bd94efae7569ab113189f4f816bba3b5", "simhash": "1:8329338e73ce8b9a", "word_count": 1459 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:58.808119+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RICHARD BROWN, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Richard Brown, was found guilty of murder by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County and sentenced to not less than 15 nor more than 30 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.\nDefendant and Jimmie Claggett were charged in a four-count indictment with the murder of Roger O. Corpus. At approximately 5:00 P.M. on May 6, 1968, Corpus\u2019s body, his ankles bound with white electric cords, was discovered lying on the floor of the living room in his apartment. The door to the apartment was open, lights were on, and music was playing, presumably on a radio. The deceased\u2019s wallet, credit cards and much of his clothing were missing.\nAs grounds for reversal defendant contends first that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress two statements, one made to the arresting police officers, and the other to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. He argues that his arrest was unlawful in that it was made in his home, at night, without a warrant, after forcible entry by the police and that there were no exigent circumstances shown which justified the failure to seek a warrant for his arrest. He contends further that the statements taken from him following his arrest were obtained prior to his being taken before a magistrate, that they are \u201cthe products of the unlawful custody\u201d and should have been suppressed and excluded from introduction into evidence.\nThe People contend that at the time of defendant\u2019s apprehension the arresting officers had reasonable grounds to believe that he was implicated in the murder and that the arrest without a warrant was, therefore, lawful.\nThe testimony adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that on May 13, a week after the murder, two detectives went to defendant\u2019s apartment, that one of them concealed himself within the apartment and the other concealed himself outside the apartment. The entry into the apartment was accomplished in defendant\u2019s absence and without a warrant. After they had waited for approximately three hours defendant appeared, and Detective Lenz greeted him with drawn revolver and placed him under arrest.\nIn support of their contention that the police officers had probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest, the People rely principally on the testimony of the deceased\u2019s sister, Constance DeLoach. The record, however, shows that Mrs. DeLoach testified, not at the hearing on the motion to suppress, but at the trial, and there is no evidence that the police, at the time of the arrest, were possessed of knowledge of the matters to which she testified. The deceased\u2019s brother testified that he had given defendant\u2019s name to the police on May 7, but made no suggestion that defendant was responsible for the death because \u201cnobody asked.\u201d Later, apparently on May 9, the police were told that on the day of the murder defendant had been seen in the building where the deceased lived.\nUpon review of the record, we conclude that the testimony fails to show that at the time of his apprehension there was probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest, that his arrest was, therefore, unlawful, and we consider next the question whether the statements were the product of the illegal arrest and, therefore, improperly admitted into evidence.\nThe People contend that even assuming that defendant\u2019s arrest was illegal, his statements were voluntarily made after he was fully and properly advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to have an attorney appointed to represent him and to have him present during questioning, and that the giving of the Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436) served to break the causal chain so as to sufficiently attenuate and dissipate the taint of the unlawful arrest. (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471.) They argue that his statements did not result from his arrest but rather from the defendant\u2019s realization that, even from the facts already known to police, he was implicated in the killing and that he wanted it known that he was merely a bystander and that Claggett was the actual killer.\nThe testimony adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress shows that following his arrest defendant was taken to an interrogation room at the Maxwell Street station. Officer William Lenz testified that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and stated that he understood them. Officers Lenz and William Nolan \u201chad a conversation with\u201d defendant relative to the slaying of Corpus after which defendant agreed to give them a statement. A two-page statement was taken and Officer Lenz testified that the statement \u201cbears the signature of Richard Brown.\u201d This statement, however, is not included in the record and no issue is raised concerning it in this appeal. After this statement was taken the officers took the defendant to the Madison and Homan area in an effort to find Claggett. They did not find Claggett and went to the identification section of the central police station to obtain a photograph of him. They returned to the area where they had sought Claggett and found and arrested him. Following a brief conversation with Claggett the police officers talked briefly with defendant and then called an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney arrived at 2:00 A.M. and talked with defendant for approximately 25 minutes. During this period a court reporter arrived and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney took a question-and-answer statement which was transcribed, but when it was presented to defendant at approximately 4:00 A.M. he refused to sign it. Over objection the circuit court permitted the statement to be read to the jury and it was then, again over objection, offered and admitted into evidence. Contained in this statement are explicit Miranda warnings given the defendant by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and defendant\u2019s responses indicating that he understood them. The second statement which defendant contends was erroneously admitted was introduced into evidence in the testimony of police officer Nolan who related to the jury what was told him by defendant during interrogation which preceded the taking of the question- and-answer statement. Both Officers Lenz and Nolan testified that defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights.\nFrom our examination of the record, in the light of the circumstances shown by the testimony, we conclude that the giving of the Miranda warnings, in the first instance by the police officer and in the second by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, served to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and that defendant\u2019s act in making the statements was \u201csufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.\u201d (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, at 486.) We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in admitting the statements into evidence.\nDefendant contends next that even if the statements were properly admitted into evidence, they were exculpatory and he was not proved guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. In the statements defendant admitted that he was present in the deceased\u2019s apartment, that at Claggett\u2019s direction he tied the deceased\u2019s hands and feet and although he stated Claggett fired the fatal shots, he had sold him the pistol earlier that evening. The evidence is clearly sufficient to sustain the conviction. People v. Nowak, 45 Ill.2d 158.\nDefendant contends next that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of an unrelated criminal offense. The evidence of which he complains was contained in his statement and was in explanation of why he had sold the gun to Claggett. This was admitted in the course of proving what defendant had said to the police and what he had told the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and under the circumstances shown its admission into evidence was not error.\nFinally defendant complains of the court\u2019s refusal to give a tendered instruction on circumstantial evidence (IPI Criminal No. 3.02). The People tendered, and the court gave, an instruction in the form of IPI Criminal No. 3.02 but without the second paragraph. Obviously the proof of guilt was, in part, defendant\u2019s own statements, and with direct evidence of his participation in the crime, the trial court correctly refused the tendered instruction.\nIn the absence of prejudicial error, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (John M. Kalnins, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, and Kenneth L. Gillis and Dennis J. O\u2019Hara, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 43349.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RICHARD BROWN, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 31, 1974.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (John M. Kalnins, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, and Kenneth L. Gillis and Dennis J. O\u2019Hara, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0312-01", "first_page_order": 370, "last_page_order": 376 }