{ "id": 5408112, "name": "R. ADELE WIRTH, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.-(Lawlor Industries, Inc., Appellee.)", "name_abbreviation": "Wirth v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1974-05-29", "docket_number": "No. 45498", "first_page": "475", "last_page": "481", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 475" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "26 Ill.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5355871 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2885911 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2745497 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938945 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2545671 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/377/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12125948 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905677 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220-221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0215-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 523, "char_count": 10551, "ocr_confidence": 0.84, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.980691572839297e-07, "percentile": 0.9356020370299581 }, "sha256": "0ac0f61e7f204938ab56d10ed2641019756ad9213e93a2be5cfee0f86c71b5f8", "simhash": "1:81b3ee8128defdd8", "word_count": 1711 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:24:23.868882+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "R. ADELE WIRTH, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.\u2014(Lawlor Industries, Inc., Appellee.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE DAVIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal is from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County which confirmed a decision of the Industrial Commission denying a claim for death benefits because of the death of the claimant\u2019s husband. The case was appealed to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(2). 50 Ill.2d R. 302(a)(2).\nThe appellant presents three issues on this appeal: (1) whether the Industrial Commission erred in permitting the respondent, which had introduced no evidence whatsoever at the arbitration proceedings, to present evidence at the hearing on review before the Commission; (2) whether the Industrial Commission erred in permitting the respondent\u2019s medical experts to answer hypothetical questions which excluded allegedly undisputed and material facts, and (3) whether the decision of the Industrial Commission is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe deceased, Frank E. Wirth, at the time of his death, and for 2Vz years immediately preceding, had been employed by Lawlor Industries, Inc. (hereafter respondent), which had succeeded to the business of the S. C. Lawlor Company, a bankrupt. Wirth had worked for that company since 1965. There was testimony by officers and employees of respondent or its predecessor company that the deceased worked long hours, and was, as a practical matter, in charge of the company through this difficult business period, and that he was under much job-related mental stress in connection with production deadlines and financial difficulties. This testimony was presented before the arbitrator at hearings on May 20 and 21, 1970. At this time the claimant\u2019s medical expert, Dr. Albert G. Miller, testified briefly as to his background and in part as to his qualifications as an expert witness. The respondent did not present any witnesses at any hearing before the arbitrator.\nThe final hearing before an arbitrator took place on October 7, 1970. At that time the only witness to testify was Dr. Miller, who, after being qualified as an expert, answered a hypothetical question based on the testimony of previous witnesses as to the stress resultant from the deceased\u2019s occupation. Dr. Miller testified that in his opinion death was due to a myocardial infarction, and that there was a causal connection between that myocardial infarction and the deceased\u2019s occupation. Counsel for the respondent explained later that he offered no evidence at that time because he believed that the claimant had not put forth sufficient evidence to justify an arbitrator\u2019s award. However, the arbitrator entered an award for the claimant and the respondent sought review before the Industrial Commission.\nAt the hearing before the Commission, the respondent was allowed to present the testimony of two medical experts, over the objection of the claimant that the Commission was only empowered to hear \u201cadditional evidence\u201d by statute and that, since the respondent had put forth no evidence below, it was precluded from presenting evidence before the Commission. After the hearing, the Commission set aside the arbitrator\u2019s award in favor of the petitioner. The Commission\u2019s decision was confirmed by the circuit court.\nThe problem of statutory construction raised by the appellant involves section 19(e) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 48, par. 138.19(e)). The pertinent language is:\n\u201c(e) If a petition for review and agreed statement of facts or transcript of evidence is filed, as provided herein, the Commission shall promptly review the decision of the Arbitrator or committee of arbitration and all questions of law or fact which appear from the statement of facts or transcript of evidence and such additional evidence as the parties may submit. ***\nIf a reporter does not for any reason furnish a transcript of the proceedings before the Arbitrator in any case for use on a hearing for review before the Commission, within the limitations of time as fixed in this Section, the Commission may, in its discretion, order a trial de novo before the Commission in such case upon application of either party.\u201d (Emphasis ours.)\nWe believe that the appellant is correct in her contention that, since there is a record before the Commission in this case, the proceedings before the Commission may not be a trial de novo. This court further defined proceedings before the Commission in Meade v. Industrial Com. (1971), 48 Ill.2d 215, 220-221, as follows:\n\u201cThe jurisdiction of the Commission to review the evidence taken before the arbitrator and to consider any further evidence properly presented to it is original as opposed to appellate jurisdiction. Such a review is neither a trial de novo nor simply a review of the record, but is sui generis. The award of the arbitrator becomes final by its entry upon the records of the Commission if it is not contested. If it is contested before the Commission, the jurisdiction of the Commission to review is original jurisdiction.\u201d\nUnder the circumstances of this case, the jurisdiction of the Commission was not appellate but original, and we hold generally that whether or not the additional evidence should be heard by the Commission is a question within its sound discretion.\nThe procedure before the Commission was not a trial de novo, for such a trial takes place when the hearing at the review level \u201c*** is a trial had as if no action had been instituted in the court below.\u201d (Burstein v. Millikin Trust Co. (1954), 2 Ill.2d 243, 245; Bley v. Luebeck (1941), 377 Ill. 50, 60.) Here the Commission relied on the record below and the additional evidence offered by the respondent.\nA factual situation exists here in which, in effect, the respondent chose a particular trial strategy, that of not putting forth any evidence before the arbitrator to controvert that of the claimant on the ground that it believed that the claimant\u2019s proof was insufficient to prevail in and of itself.\nWe need not decide the question of whether the Commission abused its discretion in this case, for, on all of the evidence presented, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Commission is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIt is well settled that a court may not reverse a decision of the Industrial Commission unless that decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Com. (1973), 55 Ill.2d 538, 540.) This test, however, must be applied only as to competent evidence, and it is necessary therefore to address the question of whether or not the Commission erroneously admitted the testimony of the respondent\u2019s two medical experts.\nThe appellant\u2019s contention that the Commission allowed the respondent to ask improper hypothetical questions of its medical experts is not well taken. McCormick on Evidence (2d ed. 1972), at page 34, states the applicable rule as follows: \u201cThe more expedient and more widely prevailing view is that there is no rule requiring that all material facts be included. The safeguards are that the adversary may on cross-examination supply omitted facts and ask the expert if his opinion would be modified by them, and further that the trial judge if he deems the original question unfair may in his discretion require that the hypothesis be reframed to supply an adequate basis for a helpful answer.\u201d (Also see: Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Com. (1960), 19 Ill.2d 236.) In the light of this rule, we find the testimony of the respondent\u2019s experts to be competent.\nThe claimant\u2019s medical expert testified that emotional stress is a possible cause of myocardial infarction, and that, in his opinion, there was a causal relationship in this case between the deceased\u2019s occupation and his death. In answer to a hypothetical question which encompassed the deceased\u2019s work experience with the respondent, the expert answered that there was such a causal relationship.\nThe respondent\u2019s medical experts were asked a much shorter hypothetical question, concerning only that period of time surrounding the deceased\u2019s death. Both of respondent\u2019s experts were of the opinion that it was not possible to form an opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether or not there was a causal connection between the deceased\u2019s occupation and his death. The respondent\u2019s medical experts were unable to agree with the general proposition that emotional stress can cause a myocardial infarction. The hypothetical question asked of them was limited on that basis.\nWe believe the Industrial Commission has misapplied the law on the facts of this case. The court in Gus T. Handge & Son Painting Co. v. Industrial Com. (1965), 33 Ill.2d 201, 205, said, \u201cIf a workman\u2019s existing physical structure gives way under the stress of his usual labor, his death is an accident which arises out of his employment.\u201d It was established in Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1962), 26 Ill.2d 32, 45, that, \u201cTo come within the statute the employee must prove that some act or phase of the employment was a causative factor in the ensuing injury. He need not prove it was the sole causative factor nor even that it was the principal causative factor, but only that it was a causative factor in the resulting injury.\u201d\nThe claimant\u2019s medical expert testified that there was a causal connection between the deceased\u2019s death and his occupation. The respondent\u2019s medical experts, in effect, denied that emotional stress can cause changes in a person which may lead to myocardial infarction, yet one stated that \u201cIt is true that under stressful circumstances blood cholestrol has been shown to be elevated,\u201d and the other stated: \u201cThere is a relationship between cholestrol and acute myocardial infarction\u201d; and they did agree that emotional stress can trigger the malfunction. This triggering role is sufficient to support an award under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1962), 26 Ill.2d 32, 45.\nThe decision of the circuit court of Cook County confirming the decision of the Industrial Commission is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the entry of a judgment based on the arbitrator\u2019s award.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE DAVIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jack Ring, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Wiedner & McAuliffe, of Chicago (Frank J. Wiedner, John P. McAuliffe and William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 45498.\nR. ADELE WIRTH, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.\u2014(Lawlor Industries, Inc., Appellee.)\nOpinion filed May 29, 1974.\nRehearing denied June 28, 1974.\nJack Ring, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nWiedner & McAuliffe, of Chicago (Frank J. Wiedner, John P. McAuliffe and William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0475-01", "first_page_order": 485, "last_page_order": 491 }