{ "id": 2953805, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOHN BALL, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ball", "decision_date": "1974-09-17", "docket_number": "No. 46384", "first_page": "36", "last_page": "40", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 36" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "89 A.L.R.2d 396", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1601088 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/104/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ill. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3375960 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/310/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5259313 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/84/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 933", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822709 ], "year": 1899, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0933-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2821315 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/100/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5013013 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/36/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5299592 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/52/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2460886 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0143-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 567, "char_count": 9205, "ocr_confidence": 0.835, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9166082440727994e-07, "percentile": 0.8462026164459782 }, "sha256": "22afdf091d423e5649c7158670da7a33a4c93dab15f2e630ee8e33da7920bb96", "simhash": "1:0f4a151a700bd86e", "word_count": 1504 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:53.437074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOHN BALL, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJohn Ball, a school teacher, was found guilty in a bench trial of battery involving one of his students in violation of section 12 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 3) and was fined $100 and costs. On appeal, the Appellate Court, Fifth District, reversed and remanded for further proceedings (15 Ill. App. 3d 143), and we have allowed leave to appeal.\nThe facts are not in dispute. The prosecuting witness, age 11, was a student in defendant\u2019s sixth-grade class at the Henry Robb School in Belleville. On the day of the incident in question, the sixth-grade class was on the playground practicing unison exercises for the school\u2019s annual \u201cField Day\u201d performance. During the practice session, the boy disrupted the class by doing the calisthenics in a direction opposite that of the rest of the class. Defendant sent him to a nearby bench and told him to remain there until he was given permission to get up. Contrary to defendant\u2019s instructions, the boy left the bench to talk to a friend of his who was walking by. Defendant determined that disciplinary action was in order, and he took the boy into the school building where he asked another teacher to step outside her classroom into the hallway to be an observer to the punishment about to be rendered. After instructing the boy to bend over with his hands on his knees, defendant struck him on the buttocks 10 times with a wooden paddle approximately 3 inches wide, 20 inches long and !4 inch thick. It is undisputed that the student had been disciplined on several prior occasions for misconduct, and that defendant had previously paddled him but, apparently, to a lesser degree. Nor is it disputed that while administering the punishment, defendant was calm, rational and not angry. Defendant thereafter took the boy into his vacant classroom where he told him that he had been disciplined for his own best interests.\nWhen school was dismissed a short time later, the boy went directly home and told his parents about the paddling he had received. His father took him to the police station where the incident was reported. Thereafter they went to the home of their family doctor, who, not having medical supplies at home, sent the boy to a hospital emergency room for further treatment. The examining doctor at the hospital testified that it was one of the most severe paddling cases he had ever observed. The injured area, which was hot to touch, was treated like a bum with medicated ointments and bandages. After several weeks the area healed without complications. The family physician testified that he ordered tranquilizers for the boy, who was emotionally distraught from the paddling. His mother also stated that the boy was very upset immediately after the incident and continued to become so whenever he saw the defendant. As a consequence of this incident the boy was transferred to a sixth-grade class in another school.\nThe offense of battery is defined in section 12 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code in the following language: \u201cA person commits battery if he intentionally or knowingly without legal justification and by any means, (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 3(a).) The primary question before the trial court was whether the corporal punishment administered by defendant was \u201cwithout legal justification\u201d within the meaning of the foregoing statutory provision. In finding the defendant guilty, the trial judge stated that while a teacher may administer \u201cjust and reasonable punishment \u2014 corporal punishment included\u201d\u2014 in maintaining discipline in his classroom, the defendant in this case inflicted corporal punishment more severe than the boy\u2019s parents would have had a right to administer \u2014 it was more than just a spanking, it was in fact a beating. The court further indicated that it did not intend to take the right of discipline away from a teacher who stands in loco parentis but rather to insure that such discipline is \u201cjust and reasonable.\u201d In reversing the decision of the trial court, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying a test of \u201creasonableness\u201d to the discipline administered by the defendant. Relying on previous appellate court decisions which will be referred to hereafter, the appellate court was of the opinion that the proper question should have been \u201cwhether the teacher was actuated by malice, or inflicted the punishment wantonly.\u201d The cause was remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the evidence and a determination of guilt under that criteria.\nThe reported decisions in this State indicate that different standards have sometimes been applied for parents on the one hand and teachers on the other. This court recognized in Fletcher v. People (1869), 52 Ill. 395, 397, that a parent\u2019s disciplinary authority over his children \u201cmust be exercised within the bounds of reason and humanity.\u201d Subsequent appellate court decisions have reiterated the view that parental rights of discipline are limited by a standard of reasonableness. (Wegener v. People (1890), 36 Ill. App. 164, 165 \u2014 \u201creasonable corporal punishment\u201d; People v. Machroli (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 227, 232\u2014\u201creasonable force\u201d; People v. Parris (1971), 130 Ill. App. 2d 933, 937\u2014\u201creasonable discipline\u201d.) The reasonableness standard was departed from in Fox v. People (1899), 84 Ill. App. 270, where a conviction of a teacher for assault and battery on a nine-year-old student was set aside. The court there relied upon the following language appearing in 21 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 769: \u201cThe authority of a teacher over his pupil being regarded as a delegation of at least a portion of the parental authority, the presumption is in favor of the correctness of the teacher\u2019s action in inflicting corporal punishment upon the pupil. The teacher must not have been activated by malice, nor have inflicted the punishment wantonly. For an error in judgment, although the punishment is unnecessarily excessive, if it is not of a nature to cause lasting injury and he acts in good faith, the teacher is not liable.\u201d The foregoing rationale has been followed in subsequent appellate court decisions concerned with the extent of a teacher\u2019s right to discipline his pupils (Drake v. Thomas (1941), 310 Ill. App. 57; City of Macomb v. Gould (1969), 104 Ill. App. 2d 361), and of course constitutes the underlying basis for the decision of the appellate court in the case at bar.\nIt is apparent that the standards for measuring the conduct of parents are more strict than those applicable to teachers with the result that teachers would seem to have greater latitude in disciplining a child than the child\u2019s own parents have. In our opinion this constitutes an anomaly\nfor which there is no sound basis. We fully recognize the desirability and indeed the absolute necessity that teachers be able to maintain discipline in the schools, including reasonable use of corporal punishment. The legislature has recognized the right and duty of teachers in this regard in the following language: \u201cTeachers and other certified educational employees shall maintain discipline in the schools. In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the school program and may be exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the pupils in the absence of their parents or guardians.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 24.) It is clear, however, that there is nothing in the foregoing statutory provision which suggests that teachers should have any greater rights or be entitled to any greater protections than parents. To the contrary, since teachers by statute stand in loco parentis in matters of discipline of students within their charge in the schools, we think it follows that teachers should be subject to the same standard of reasonableness which has long been applicable to parents in disciplining their children. We note, too, that the substantial majority of other jurisdictions apply the reasonableness test. (Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 396 (1963).) Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the trial court properly applied a reasonableness standard in determining that the corporal punishment administered by defendant was \u201cwithout legal justification\u201d within the meaning of section 12 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code. It is not argued that the evidence, under a \u201creasonableness\u201d standard, is insufficient to establish defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert H. Rice, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville, for the People.", "Michael B. Constance, of Brady, Donovan & Hatch, of Belleville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 46384.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOHN BALL, Appellee.\nOpinion filed September 17, 1974.\nRobert H. Rice, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville, for the People.\nMichael B. Constance, of Brady, Donovan & Hatch, of Belleville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0036-01", "first_page_order": 44, "last_page_order": 48 }