{
  "id": 2958536,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CHARLES WILLIAMS, Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1974-11-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 46464",
  "first_page": "243",
  "last_page": "246",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 243"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "54 Ill.2d 25",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2933660
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/54/0025-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 111",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2524456
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/16/0111-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 316,
    "char_count": 5428,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.867,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 3.547470993474344e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8850965828509693
    },
    "sha256": "f616b40ccce9c31f276f74cc8fc5ef4ae677b45612d6c7d9636d5226dcc14a3f",
    "simhash": "1:e881ba96518cdd19",
    "word_count": 918
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:25.417704+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CHARLES WILLIAMS, Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Charles Williams, represented by appointed counsel, was convicted on September 17, 1969, in a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County of the murder of Arthur Pearson, and sentenced to a term of 50 to 75 years\u2019 imprisonment. By motion dated December 5, 1969, and filed February 16, 1970, the indigent defendant, pro se, sought a transcript of his trial, and on the latter date the public defender was appointed to represent him. On May 27, 1970, a notice of appeal was filed by counsel in the trial court. In late 1972 the public defender filed a brief on behalf of defendant, and in early 1973 the State filed an answering brief. Thereafter, oral argument was heard in the First District Appellate Court. On November 30, 1973, that court dismissed defendant\u2019s appeal for failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 606 (50 Ill.2d R. 606) governing the timeliness of criminal appeals. (People v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 3d 111.) We allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. Defendant contends the dismissal by the appellate court of his appeal some 314 years after the filing of the notice of appeal, and after the case had been briefed and argued, was an abuse of discretion and a denial of his opportunity for appellate review.\nDefendant also urges that he did not receive assistance of counsel immediately following his conviction in that he was not advised by anyone of the manner and time in which to appeal. The trial court did advise defendant that he had the right to appeal, but the record contains no mention of the 30-day time limit, and defendant contends his trial attorney did not assist or advise him after his conviction. The record indicates that defendant\u2019s counsel, in opposing the State\u2019s request for imposition of the death penalty, stated: \u201c*** We both [the trial court and defendant\u2019s counsel] know another lawyer is going to be appointed to take this matter up on appeal ***,\u201d apparently indicating that trial counsel did not intend to represent defendant on appeal. Federal court records, filed here by defendant\u2019s present counsel at our request, reveal that defendant\u2019s trial counsel had been indicted in February, 1969, by a Federal grand jury and that during defendant\u2019s trial the attorney was awaiting his own trial on charges of mail fraud. That lawyer was also charged by information on October 6, 1969, in four counts, with failure to file income tax returns. He was convicted on February 3, 1970, on the charges of mail fraud, and later pleaded guilty to the income tax charges. Defendant suggests, as a possible explanation of trial counsel\u2019s failure to advise him of the time limits for an appeal, the latter\u2019s preoccupation with his own difficulties. In addition to the Federal court documents, the affidavit of counsel for the indicted attorney in Federal court states, in substance, that at the time Williams was convicted his attorney\u2019s \u201cpsychological state was not conducive to complying with the Illinois Supreme Court Rules regarding Notice of Appeal, as [he] was involved in defending himself in Federal Court.\u201d\nIn People v. Brown, 54 Ill.2d 25, this court, with one dissent, reversed an appellate court dismissal of an indigent defendant\u2019s appeal in which no petition for leave to file a late notice of appeal was ever filed. The defendant in Brown, convicted pursuant to a negotiated plea of guilty, filed a pro se notice of appeal 16 days after the 30-day time limit had expired. He had not, however, filed a petition for leave to file a late notice of appeal, nor did he offer any reasonable excuse for his failure to file within the 30 days allotted. This court held in Brown that the dismissal of the appeal on the appellate court\u2019s own motion, more than 2 years after the notice of appeal was filed and after the case had been briefed and argued, was an abuse of discretion.\nWe regard Brown as dispositive of the issue here. There, as in this case, defendant had not been advised of the time within which a notice of appeal should be filed. His pro se motion indicating an intent to appeal was filed after the expiration of the 30-day period prescribed by our Rule 606 (50 Ill.2d R. 606), but, as in Brown, within the 6-month period within which delayed appeals may be permitted under 606(c). No motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal was filed here, but neither was such motion filed in Brown. In both cases the appeal had been briefed and orally argued in the appellate court prior to its dismissal by that court. We accordingly conclude, as we did in Brown, that dismissal by the appellate court constituted an abuse of discretion.\nSince the only issue before us is the propriety of the dismissal, we remand the cause to the Appellate Court for the First Judicial District with directions to consider the appeal on its merits.\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Oramenos and John T. Moran, Jr., Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., and James S. Veldman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 46464.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CHARLES WILLIAMS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed November 27, 1974.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Oramenos and John T. Moran, Jr., Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., and James S. Veldman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0243-01",
  "first_page_order": 253,
  "last_page_order": 256
}