{ "id": 5415909, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. ILLINOIS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFT, AFL-CIO et al., Appellants, v. GEORGE W. LINDBERG, Comptroller, et al., Appellees; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS et al., Appellants, v. DANIEL WALKER, Governor, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Lindberg", "decision_date": "1975-03-24", "docket_number": "Nos. 46753, 46763 cons.", "first_page": "266", "last_page": "277", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 266" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "311 Ill. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5114417 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/311/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2904766 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 N.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Mass. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 481294 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/294/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5721236 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/299/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 F.2d 886", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3697767 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/141/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 So. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 10068162 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/15/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Mont. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 4802957 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/69/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 Ill. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4806211 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/270/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2831851 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5361566 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 A.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.J. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1902913 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/41/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5406640 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 U.S. 245", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 189376 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/253/0245-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 929, "char_count": 20651, "ocr_confidence": 0.884, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.392892989144912e-07, "percentile": 0.9196541960554457 }, "sha256": "65fcc11fab228ddc582ac831930043d7362a9b7d168f7d34f35b8cd5cf67a5b0", "simhash": "1:666e430d0886d62e", "word_count": 3207 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:03:54.846971+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. ILLINOIS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFT, AFL-CIO et al., Appellants, v. GEORGE W. LINDBERG, Comptroller, et al., Appellees.-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS et al., Appellants, v. DANIEL WALKER, Governor, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThese consolidated appeals from the circuit court of Cook County involve class actions by members of several teachers\u2019 pension funds and others generally challenging the constitutional and statutory legality of Governor Daniel Walker\u2019s item reduction of certain appropriations made to these pension funds for the fiscal year 1974. The respective trial courts dismissed the complaints, and we granted direct appeal. 50 Ill.2d R. 302(b).\nIn cause No. 46753 plaintiffs, the Illinois Federation of Teachers, and certain retired teachers and active teachers, filed a multicount complaint against George W. Lindberg (State Comptroller) and Alan J. Dixon (State Treasurer) seeking a writ of mandamus to compel payment of certain amounts to the respective teacher pension funds. The complaint further sought declaratory relief against Governor Walker\u2019s item appropriation reductions. The only matter appealed is the dismissal of the action seeking the declaratory relief.\nThe complaint in substance involved three teachers\u2019 pension plans which are described by plaintiffs as compulsory in nature. The first pension program was designated in the complaint as the \u201cDownstate System.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. IO8V2, par. 16 \u2014 101 et seq.) Plaintiffs alleged that the requisite statutory pension provisions required the State to make contributions to the \u201cDownstate System\u201d of $205,600,000 for the fiscal year 1974 as was determined in a prior action before the Illinois Court of Claims. That court had concluded that a contract existed between the teachers. and the State as evidenced by constitutional and statutory provisions hereinafter enumerated. The complaint further alleged that the State was indebted to the \u201cDownstate System\u201d for a total amount of nearly 2.15 billion dollars which had developed from past years of inadequate funding. Plaintiffs averred that in an effort to discharge this obligation the General Assembly appropriated the fiscal amount designated by the Court of Claims. However, the Governor, in the exercise of his constitutionally delegated authority, reduced the amount to $96,000,000, and the General Assembly did not restore the original amount by a majority vote of each house of the legislature as constitutionally permitted. Ill. Const. (1970), art. IV, sec. 9(d).\nThe second pension plan herein involved was termed the \u201cUniversities Systems\u201d plan. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 10814, par. 15 \u2014 101 et seq.) The complaint alleged the Court of Claims had certified that the State\u2019s indebtedness to this pension fund for the 1974 fiscal year was $55,882,691 and that the past overall State indebtedness is .51 billion dollars. The General Assembly appropriated $66,908,000 for the \u201cUniversities Systems\u201d fund, but this amount was reduced by the Governor to $20,190,000. The General Assembly failed to restore the amount by which the appropriation had been reduced.\nThe third pension plan, which was not involved before the Court of Claims, was described in the complaint as the \u201cChicago Fund.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 10814, par. 17 \u2014 101 et seq.) The complaint alleged that the State debt to this plan for fiscal year 1974 was $23,666,799 and the past indebtedness totalled .84 billion dollars. The General Assembly, to meet the current obligations and to amortize past debt, appropriated $57,707,000 for the fiscal year, which the Governor reduced to $27,000,000. The General Assembly failed to restore the reduced amount.\nCause No. 46763 was a separate class action filed on behalf of various university teaching associations and certain members and beneficiaries of the \u201cUniversities Systems\u201d pension plan. These plaintiffs sought the same declaratory relief as requested in cause No. 46753. This complaint, however,, with greater specificity set forth the General Assembly appropriations to this pension fund. The complaint alleged the appropriation for current expenditures was $54,759,100 and this was reduced to $20,190,000 by the Governor. A separate appropriation bill for $12,138,599 was designed to amortize accrued unfunded liability, but this bill was vetoed.\nIt was averred that the Governor\u2019s reason for reducing the pension appropriation \u201cwas consistent with the historically sound system of the Federal Social Security System.\u201d No allegation was advanced in either complaint that those presently entitled to receive pension benefits were not receiving the necessary monies.\nThe possibility exists that criticism could arise due to the fact that members of this court might be affected by the decision due to our participation in the judicial retirement pension provisions of the Pension Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. \u00cdOSM\u00bb, par. 18 \u2014 101 et seq.) But in an analogous case the United States Supreme Court stated:\n\u201c*** Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question *** we cannot but regret that its solution falls to us; and this although each member has been paying the tax in respect of his salary voluntarily and in regular course. But jurisdiction of the present case cannot be declined or renounced. The plaintiff was entitled by law to invoke our decision on the question as respects his own compensation, in which no other judge can have any direct personal interest; and there was no other appellate tribunal to which under the law he could go.\u201d Evans v. Gore (1920), 253 U.S. 245, 247-48, 64 L. Ed. 887, 40 S. Ct. 550.\nIn asserting that the Governor\u2019s action exceeded his constitutional authority all plaintiffs rely on section 5 of article XIII of the 1970 Constitution, which they contend was adopted precisely to forestall the possible insolvency of the pension system. This provision reads:\n\u201cMembership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.\u201d\nThey argue this provision creates a contractual relationship between the State and participants in the pension systems which the Governor may not infringe by use of his power to reduce or veto appropriations.\nIn Peters v. City of Springfield (1974), 57 Ill.2d 142, we had occasion to consider this provision. There a home-rule municipality lowered the retirement age for its firemen, which, under the appropriate section of the Pension Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. IO8V2, par. 4 \u2014 109), would probably decrease the pension amount to be received. In upholding the action of the municipality we examined the constitutional convention debates pertaining to this provision and concluded \u201cthat the purpose and intent of the constitutional provision was to insure that pension rights of public employees which had been earned should not be \u2018diminished or impaired\u2019 but that it was not intended, and did not serve, to prevent the defendant City from reducing the maximum retirement age, even though the reduction might affect the pensions which plaintiffs would ultimately have received.\u201d 57 Ill.2d 142, 152.\nWe have again examined the debates concerning the application of this provision to the necessity of providing certain funding to the various pension plans during a particular fiscal period. As recognized in Peters, the tenor of the debates was primarily concerned with assuring members of pension plans that they would receive the money due them at the time of their retirement. The question of the specific funding of compulsory pension programs was discussed, and Delegate Kinney, a cosponsor of the provision, stated: \u201cIt was not intended to require 100 per cent funding or 50 per cent or 30 per cent funding or get into any of those problems, aside from the very slim area where a court might judicially determine that imminent bankruptcy would really be impairment.\u201d (4 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2929; also see 4 Proceedings 2926.) Comparable interpretations of the provision\u2019s effect as applied to these appeals were echoed by Delegates Lyons, Whalen (4 Proceedings 2929) and President Witwer (4 Proceedings 2932). While Delegate Green expressed the opinion that the legislature should adequately fund the pension systems in accordance with the actuarial principles (4 Proceedings 2925, 2931), the convention debates do not establish the intent to constitutionally require a specific level of pension appropriations during a fiscal period. There is also no basis from' which it might be argued that the provision was intended to restrict the Governor\u2019s constitutional authority to reduce or veto a pension appropriation measure. And it cannot be said that under the circumstances this constitutional provision affords plaintiffs the right to judicially circumvent the Governor\u2019s actions taken herein.\nPlaintiffs also argue that these actions were commenced in order to secure the performance of the State\u2019s statutory funding obligations. It is the plaintiffs\u2019 position that the pertinent provisions of the Pension Code establish and define a contractual relationship between themselves and the State which obligates the State to fulfill its funding commitments. Plaintiffs argue that the respective pension statutes do not contain provisions that make the amount of State contributions subject to the political or fiscal exigencies of the Governor\u2019s budgetary priorities. They maintain that the clear intent of the statutes is to place the funding of the pension trusts upon a solid actuarial basis. Moreover, they conclude that the State\u2019s obligations were established by prior legislative action and the Governor\u2019s conduct, in effect, improperly operated to nullify pre-existing law.\nPlaintiffs have strongly argued that this court adopt the \u201ccontract view\u201d relating to this form of public-employee pension plan and have cited numerous cases from other jurisdictions in support of their position. As noted in the Opinion of the Justices (Mass. 1973), 303 N.E.2d 320, 326, the character of public-employee pension programs has not been definitely established (see also Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans \u2014 The Nature of Employees\u2019 Rights, 1968 U. Ill. L.F. 32) and an attempt to precisely define the nature of the relationship has been rejected (Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund Com. (1964), 41 N.J. 391, 197 A.2d 169).\nWe must determine whether the participants or their beneficiaries under the respective sections of the Pension Code now at issue enjoy a present contractual right to enforce a specific level of funding to the plans. As previously noted, the pension systems involved in these consolidated appeals are compulsory in nature. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 108%, pars. 15-134, 16-123(1), 17-130; see also Gorham v. Board of Trustees of Teachers\u2019 Retirement System (1963), 27 Ill.2d 593, 596.) In Bergin v. Board of Trustees of Teachers\u2019 Retirement System (1964), 31 Ill.2d 566, 574, we stated: \u201cIt has long been settled that compulsory participation in a statutory pension plan confers no vested rights, thus permitting amendment, change or repeal as the legislature sees fit.\u201d\nEach teacher pension plan involved in this appeal is funded from teachers\u2019 compulsory contributions, State monies and investment income earned from these funds. The respective statutes each set forth the contributions requirements of their respective members. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 108%, pars.-15-157, 16-152, 17-130.) To complement these funds the respective statutes contain provisions for employer contributions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 108%, pars. 15-155, 16-158, 17-127 and 17 \u2014 128.) The complaint in cause No. 46753 alleges, and defendants do not dispute, that State contributions to these pension plans are obligations of the State (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 108%, pars. 15 \u2014 156, 16 \u2014 162).\nIn asserting their claim of a presently enforceable contractual right to a financially sound retirement system plaintiffs in cause No. 46753 claim that the statutory provisions require State contributions for the pension systems to be made on an actuarial basis. In particular they direct our attention to the \u201cDownstate System\u201d providing that the amount of State contributions \u201cshall be no less than 1.2 multiplied by members\u2019 contributions ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 108%, par. 16-158.\nPlaintiffs in cause No. 46763 involving the \u201cUniversities Systems\u201d argue that section 15 \u2014 155 reflects the contractual concept and mandates certain appropriations to be made. In support of their position they cite a 1967 amendment to section 15 \u2014 155 which reads as follows:\n\u201cThe contributions of employers from State appropriations for any fiscal year shall not be less than an amount which is required to fund fully the current service costs in accordance with actuarial reserve requirements as prescribed in paragraph (1) of this Section, plus interest at the prescribed rate on the unfunded accrued liabilities.\u201d Laws of 1967, at 4216-4217.\nThey construe the term \u201ccurrent service costs\u201d to mean the actuarial requirements for contributions for the fiscal year necessary to enable the \u201cUniversities Systems\u201d to pay the pensions of current employees as they retire.\nWe must reject the statutory basis upon which plaintiffs seek to establish a contractual relationship. Prior to the enactment of the Pension Code in 1963 and during a period of time when the decisions of this court clearly established no vested right in compulsory statutory pension plans for public employees, the predecessor provisions of the respective pension statutes were similarly drafted. Prior statutes reflected that State contributions were an obligation of the State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 122, par. 25 \u2014 77; ch. 144, par. 104.) Before the adoption of the present Pension Code, the \u201cDownstate System\u201d also contained the provision relating to State contributions being set in an amount of 1.2 in excess of those contributed by the employees. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 122, par. 25 \u2014 67.) In addition, the statutory basis for estimating the amount of State contributions needed for a fiscal year in the \u201cDownstate System\u201d has remained the same. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. IO8V2, par. 16 \u2014 159, with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 122, par. 25 \u2014 68.\nThe 1967 amendment to section 15 \u2014 155 in the \u201cUniversities Systems\u201d does not evidence the legislative intent ascribed to that revision by certain plaintiffs. We perceive no attempt to establish a vested contractual relationship by this revision, and there would appear to be no significant change in this regard from the predecessor to section 15 \u2014 155. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 144, par. 86.\nIn summary, had the legislature intended to establish a present contractual relationship when the Pension Code was enacted in 1963, thereby affording plaintiffs the possible statutory basis to challenge necessary appropriations, it would have been a simple matter to so state. (E.g see Opinion of the Justices (Mass. 1973), 303 N.E.2d 320, 324.) Rather we are of the opinion that the provisions upon which plaintiffs rely to establish the contractual relationship were merely engrafted from prior pension laws which had been construed as not conferring a vested right.\nHaving found no presently existing contractual right created by statute upon which to base a challenge to appropriations reductions or item veto, we need not consider the implication of whether the Governor\u2019s action infringed the Federal or State constitutional guarantees against the impairment of contracts. U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 10; Ill. Const. (1970), art. I, sec. 16.\nWith regard to plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the Governor\u2019s action in effect resulted in the nullification of existing pension statutes, it is to be noted that section 9(d) of article IV of the 1970 Constitution plainly provides that \u201cThe Governor may reduce or veto any item of appropriations in a bill presented to him.\u201d (Emphasis added.) If an item is vetoed, the General Assembly, by the three-fifths vote of each house, may override the veto. (Ill. Const. (1970), art. IV, sec. 9(c).) If an appropriation is reduced in amount, the amount may be restored by a majority vote of each house of the General Assembly. Ill. Const. (1970), art. IV, sec. 9(d).\nWhile plaintiffs have cited numerous cases to the effect that a court may declare an executive veto void, the vast majority of those decisions involve situations where a governor reduced an appropriation item rather than vetoing it, thereby exceeding his authority delegated under the respective constitutional provisions which in most instances granted the authority only to veto an item. (E.g., Fergus v. Russel (1915), 270 Ill. 304; Mills v. Porter (1924), 69 Mont. 325, 222 P. 428.) This result would not occur under our present State Constitution.\nAnother case relied upon is State ex rel. Nunez v. Baynard (La. App. 1943), 15 So. 2d 649. The decision is inapplicable, for the amount of the appropriation vetoed by the Governor was specifically mandated by that State\u2019s constitution.\nThe only resembling case cited by plaintiffs is Fitzsimmons v. Leon (1st Cir. 1944), 141 F.2d 886. There a governmental official\u2019s salary had been previously established by statute. In subsequent appropriation bills the Governor lessened the statutorily specified amount by utilization of his authority to reduce appropriations^ The court\u2019s rationale, as relevant to these appeals, seems to have been resolved on its determination that the Governor\u2019s action was not the mere reduction of an appropriation bill, as here, but rather an attempt to modify general legislation.\nWe do not find Leon to be persuasive for the proposition advanced by plaintiffs. As related to these appeals, the court in Leon premised its constitutional basis upon authorities which do not support its conclusion. In Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (1936), 299 U.S. 410, 81 L. Ed. 312, 57 S. Ct. 252, the item which was vetoed was not even construed as an appropriation measure. In the Opinion of the Justices (1936), 294 Mass. 616, 2 N.E.2d 789, the court was presented with a situation wherein the Governor transferred an appropriation to a separate fund, thereby transgressing his constitutional authority.\nBut even if Leon is to be considered as affording a Federal constitutional basis for plaintiffs\u2019 challenge, this court is not bound by that case. (People v. Stansberry (1971), 47 Ill.2d 541, 544.) Rather we adhere to this court\u2019s prior decision in People ex rel. Millner v. Russel (1924), 311 Ill. 96. In Millner the relator was appointed an assistant Attorney General. A previously enacted statute fixed his salary at a certain amount, and the necessary funds were appropriated by the General Assembly. The Governor vetoed this salary appropriation, and the relator filed an original action for mandamus to compel payment of his statutorily set salary. The 1870 Constitution (art. V, sec. 16) empowered the Governor to veto an appropriation item. The court sustained the Governor\u2019s action, stating that the Constitution made no distinction in the type of salary appropriation bill presented and that the Governor could therefore exercise his constitutionally delegated veto power. Similarly, under the circumstances presented in these appeals, we conclude that the Governor could properly utilize his veto or item-reduction authority over the pension appropriation bills.\nPlaintiffs have asserted that the respective pension systems are inadequately funded. The question of the specific fiscal appropriations necessary to meet these deficiencies is one which, at this time, should be directed to the legislature.\nAccordingly, the judgments of the circuit court of Cook County are affirmed.\nJudgments affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Dale Berry, of Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, of Chicago, for appellants.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Herbert L. Caplan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.", "Lawrence Jay Weiner, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Education Association.", "Robert Plotkin and H. Douglas Laycock, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Herbert L. Caplan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee.", "Lawrence Jay Weiner, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Education Association." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 46753, 46763 cons.\nTHE PEOPLE ex rel. ILLINOIS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFT, AFL-CIO et al., Appellants, v. GEORGE W. LINDBERG, Comptroller, et al., Appellees.-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS et al., Appellants, v. DANIEL WALKER, Governor, Appellee.\nOpinion filed March 24, 1975.\nJ. Dale Berry, of Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, of Chicago, for appellants.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Herbert L. Caplan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.\nLawrence Jay Weiner, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Education Association.\nRobert Plotkin and H. Douglas Laycock, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Herbert L. Caplan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee.\nLawrence Jay Weiner, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Education Association." }, "file_name": "0266-01", "first_page_order": 288, "last_page_order": 299 }