{ "id": 2971786, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHARLES ROBINSON et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Robinson", "decision_date": "1976-01-26", "docket_number": "No. 47231", "first_page": "273", "last_page": "279", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 273" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "19 Ill.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2744036 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3650729 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/358/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937209 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2831162 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2864813 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852973 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2744599 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" }, { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 40", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167951 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67-68" }, { "page": "937" }, { "page": "1905" }, { "page": "66-67" }, { "page": "937" }, { "page": "1904" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 955", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2503525 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 40", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167951 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66-67" }, { "page": "937" }, { "page": "1904" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0040-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 10640, "ocr_confidence": 0.881, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1503694863021732e-06, "percentile": 0.9866824282033432 }, "sha256": "064e0f0b04607d853aef8067d8703825d3a5ef9179125260543855f03cb7c967", "simhash": "1:a6d12db2ed2ed1c4", "word_count": 1812 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:51.705881+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHARLES ROBINSON et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendants, Charles Robinson and Jesse Redwood, who had been indicted for burglary in the circuit court of Cook County on April 6, 1972, moved to quash the arrest which led to their indictment and to suppress evidence seized on the ground that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest. The trial court allowed the motion, and its order was affirmed by the appellate court (23 Ill. App. 3d 955). We granted the People\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nAt the hearing on the motion to suppress Edward Hobbs, a Chicago police officer, testified that on October 28, 1971, when he was off duty and in plain clothes, he observed the defendants walk from a gangway on Adams Street in Chicago. He testified the locality was a high-crime area. The defendant Robinson was walking in front of Redwood. Officer Hobbs testified that the two men stopped at the mouth of the gangway and Robinson looked up and down the street. The defendants then proceeded to cross the street at a \u201cvery fast, brisk gait\u201d and headed in the direction of an alley on the other side of the street. In his right hand Robinson carried a 12-gauge long-barrelled pump shotgun upside down with the trigger portion covered by a tan trench coat. About 16 to 17 inches of the barrel and butt of the weapon were protruding from the coat. In his left hand he carried a beige portable television set. Redwood followed him carrying a large white laundry bag filled with objects the officer could not identify protruding from the top of it. Hobbs approached the defendants from their rear holding his star in his left hand and his revolver in his right. He identified himself as a police officer and asked the defendants about the property they were carrying. Robinson replied that they were helping his sister to move and that they would take the officer to his sister\u2019s residence to prove it. At that the officer took the shotgun from Robinson and proceeded to follow them down the alley. On direct examination the officer testified he did not know exactly where they were going but assumed they were proceeding to Robinson\u2019s sister\u2019s home. On cross-examination the officer admitted he was walking down the alley to obtain assistance.\nAfter walking about one block down the alley the three men reached a building in a courtyard with an adjacent gangway and garage. The officer saw three men working in a nearby backyard and he ordered the defendants to put the property they were carrying on the ground and to place their hands against the garage door. He then called to the three and asked them to phone the police to assist him. The men refused, and Hobbs, continuing to watch the defendants, then began sidestepping down the alley to seek the assistance of an elderly man who was in the alley some distance away. As he did, the defendants turned away from the garage door and ran down the adjacent gangway.\nThe defendants were apprehended a short time later by other officers who had received a call about a suspicious appearing man carrying a shotgun and TV set. The property in the defendants\u2019 possession was later identified as taken in a burglary. The burglary had occurred only 15 minutes before Officer Hobbs first observed the defendants.\nAt the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court said it considered that an arrest took place when Officer Hobbs confronted the defendants on the street with his revolvei: drawn. The court observed that the officer had performed \u201cwonderful police work\u201d and that he \u201cshould [have been] fired if he didn\u2019t do what he did.\u201d But it concluded that probable cause to arrest was lacking.\nWe consider the arrests were based on probable cause. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67-68, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 937, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1905.\nThe constitutions (Ill. Const. (1970), art. I, sec. 6; U.S. Const., amend. IV) do not protect against all searches and seizures, but only those which are unreasonable. (People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 18.) A search without a warrant is reasonable if it is incident to a lawful arrest. (People v. Wright, 41 Ill.2d 170, 173.) There is probable cause when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer\u2019s knowledge . are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed the offense. (People v. McCrimmon, 37 Ill.2d 40, 43.) This court observed in People v. Jones, 31 Ill.2d 42, 47, that \u201c*** reasonable cause means something less than evidence which would result in a conviction, and it is also established that reasonable cause may be founded upon evidence that would not be admissible at trial.\u201d\nIn considering whether probable cause existed, we stated in People v. Clay, 55 Ill.2d 501, 504-05, \u201cWhether or not probable cause for an arrest exists in a particular case depends upon the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers when the arrest was made. [Citations.] In deciding the question of probable cause in a particular case the courts deal with probabilities and are not disposed to be unduly technical. These probabilities are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not legal technicians, act. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329; People v. Fiorito, 19 Ill.2d 246.\u201d Also it is proper to recognize in judging whether there was probable cause that \u201c[p] olice officers often must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them, and the reasonableness of their conduct must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to prevent crime and to catch criminals.\u201d People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 19.\nWhen Officer Hobbs approached the defendants there were sufficient circumstances within his knowledge to support the arrests. The location was a high-crime area of Chicago. He saw the defendants walking through the gangway carrying a television set, a laundry bag filled with materials, and a shotgun partially concealed by a trench coat. The men stopped at the mouth of the gangway and peered up and down the street before proceeding to cross the street and when they did they did so at a \u201cvery fast, brisk gait\u201d and in the direction of an alley on the other side. Considering all the circumstances, including the defendants\u2019 \u201cdeliberately furtive actions\u201d \u2014 the looking up and down as if making sure no police or police cars were in sight and then the hurried crossing \u2014 there was probable cause. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 937, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1904.\nFor the reasons given, the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARD" }, { "text": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH,\ndissenting:\nI dissent. The majority concludes that \u201cWhen Officer Hobbs approached the defendants there \u2022 were sufficient circumstances within his knowledge to support the arrests. The location was a high-crime area of Chicago. He saw the defendants walking through the gangway carrying a television set, a laundry bag filled with materials, and a shotgun partially concealed by a trench coat. The men stopped at the mouth of the gangway and peered up and down the street before proceeding to cross the street and when they did they did so at a \u2018very fast, brisk gait\u2019 and in the direction of an alley on the other side. Considering all the circumstances, including the defendants\u2019 \u2018deliberately furtive actions\u2019 \u2014 the looking up and down as if making sure no police or police cars were in sight and then the hurried crossing \u2014 there was probable cause. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 937, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1904.\u201d (62 Ill.2d at 277.) In Sibron, the search of Peters was approved while that of Sibron was disapproved, and it may therefore be assumed that the majority finds some similarity in the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Peters and those reflected by this record at the time of defendants\u2019 arrest.\nPeters was first observed on the sixth floor of an apartment building \u201ctiptoeing\u201d out of an alcove toward a stairway. The arresting officer, an off-duty New York policeman who had resided in the building for 12 years, did not recognize either him or his companion as tenants. When the officer slammed a door, Peters and his companion ran. When the police officer seized him, Peters said he was in the building to visit a \u201cgirl friend\u201d whose name he refused to reveal because she was married.\nIn contrast, defendants were arrested while walking in a public alley in broad daylight carrying an unconcealed shotgun, a bag, and a television set. The People have taken several positions as to when the arrest occurred, but it is simple \u201chornbook\u201d law that when Hobbs approached the defendants with gun in one hand and badge in the other, he was making not an \u201cinvestigatory stop\u201d but an arrest, and its validity must be judged by the probable cause extant at that time.\nAt that time Officer Hobbs did not know there had been a burglary. What the majority characterizes as \u201cdeliberately furtive actions,\u201d looking up and down the street and then crossing at a brisk pace, could as well have been the exercise of the degree of due care and caution required to avoid being struck by an automobile while crossing Monroe Street in Chicago. Nor does the description of the neighborhood as a \u201chigh-crime\u201d area warrant the conclusion reached by the majority. It is true that in a better neighborhood the shotgun might have been enclosed in a leather case and the other items carried in a container more elegant than a laundry bag. I submit, however, that the absence of these niceties did not serve to elevate Officer Hobbs\u2019 suspicions to the level of probable cause.\nThe evidence was ordered suppressed on the basis of findings made by an able circuit judge with many years of experience in the. trial of criminal cases. The appellate court correctly affirmed his order, and its judgment should be affirmed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH," } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Laurence J. Bolon, Edward J. Ozog, Douglas Cannon, and Robert J. Raab, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Gramenos, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 47231.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHARLES ROBINSON et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed January 26, 1976.\nGOLDENHERSH, J., dissenting.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Laurence J. Bolon, Edward J. Ozog, Douglas Cannon, and Robert J. Raab, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Gramenos, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0273-01", "first_page_order": 287, "last_page_order": 293 }