{
  "id": 2969934,
  "name": "FIRE KING OIL CO. et al., Appellants, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.-(Thomas A. Banas, Appellee.)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Fire King Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission",
  "decision_date": "1976-01-26",
  "docket_number": "No. 47582",
  "first_page": "293",
  "last_page": "295",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 293"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "56 Ill.2d 272",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5404985
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "58 Ill.2d 226",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2952836
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/58/0226-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:51.705881+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "FIRE KING OIL CO. et al., Appellants, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.\u2014(Thomas A. Banas, Appellee.)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. JUSTICE CREBS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from an award of compensation made pursuant to the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.).\nThe claimant, Thomas A. Ba\u00f1as, was employed by the respondent as the manager of a gasoline station. On November 8, 1972, the claimant and a co-employee were working at the station when two employees of a security company arrived to collect the station\u2019s cash receipts. While the claimant was counting the money in the station, his co-employee revealed a handgun to the other two men and began a conversation about the gun. As the claimant turned toward the men the gun discharged, and the bullet struck the claimant in his right knee. It is undisputed that the claimant\u2019s injury resulted from an accident.\nAn arbitrator awarded certain compensation to the claimant. That award was subsequently affirmed by the Industrial Commission and by the circuit court of Cook County.\nThe respondent contends in this appeal that an accidental shooting of an employee by a co-employee is not a compensable injury pursuant to the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. To be compensable under the Act, the injury must \u201carise out of\u201d and be \u201cin the course of\u201d the employment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.2.) The phrases \u201carise out of\u201d and \u201cin the course of\u201d are used conjunctively, thus requiring the existence of both elements to make the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act applicable. The phrase \u201cin the course of\u201d relates to the time, place and circumstances of the injury, while the phrase \u201carising out of\u201d refers to the requisite causal connection between the injury and the employment. (Technical Tape Corp. v. Industrial Com., 58 Ill.2d 226.) The injury in the case at bar clearly occurred in the course of the claimant\u2019s employment. It is undisputed that the claimant was performing his duties for the respondent on the respondent\u2019s premises when the accident occurred.\nA somewhat more difficult question is whether the Industrial Commission was justified in finding that the injury \u201carose out of\u201d the claimant\u2019s employment. For an injury to arise out of one\u2019s employment the injury must have an origin in some risk connected with or incidental to the employment so that there is a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. [Union Starch v. Industrial Com., 56 Ill.2d 272.) The respondent argues that the origin of the claimant\u2019s injury was a risk that some person would accidentally discharge a gun and thereby cause an injury. The respondent further argues that that risk cannot be said to be incidental to the claimant\u2019s employment. In light of the remedial nature of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, however, we believe that the respondent\u2019s narrow interpretation of the risk faced by the claimant must be rejected. The use of Brinks armored car service here, combined with the fact that robberies of service stations have become common, form a basis from which the Industrial Commission could properly find that the co-employee was motivated to have a gun on the premises because of the conditions of the' employment. This being the case, it follows that the risk of being accidentally shot is also incident to the employment.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. JUSTICE CREBS"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John R. Rafferty, of Chicago, for appellants.",
      "Asher, Greenfield, Goodstein, Pavalon & Segall, Ltd. (Irving M. Greenfield and Richard O. Greenfield, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 47582.\nFIRE KING OIL CO. et al., Appellants, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.\u2014(Thomas A. Banas, Appellee.)\nOpinion filed January 26, 1976.\nJohn R. Rafferty, of Chicago, for appellants.\nAsher, Greenfield, Goodstein, Pavalon & Segall, Ltd. (Irving M. Greenfield and Richard O. Greenfield, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0293-01",
  "first_page_order": 307,
  "last_page_order": 309
}