{ "id": 5427298, "name": "BARBARA KOBYLANSKI, a minor, Appellant, v. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION et al, Appellees; SUZANNE CHILTON, Appellee, v. COOK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 207, MAINE TOWNSHIP, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education", "decision_date": "1976-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 47084; No. 47084; No. 47454", "first_page": "165", "last_page": "179", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 165" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "48 Ill.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2908162 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2839064 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5393061 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926894 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5391966 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953805 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 910", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2761352 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0910-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2524790 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2533848 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/102/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2902487 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/101/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2712058 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "610" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/7/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill.2d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2880270 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" }, { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2788343 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2946935 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0551-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 952, "char_count": 24085, "ocr_confidence": 0.89, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1028058329463696e-06, "percentile": 0.9953879550506612 }, "sha256": "d6b3d3451c1d349d1567691f9eb441d521b83f5e56b96f86ac9ac11000645dcb", "simhash": "1:b32fc0041c095668", "word_count": 3873 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:11.975359+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BARBARA KOBYLANSKI, a minor, Appellant, v. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION et al, Appellees. SUZANNE CHILTON, Appellee, v. COOK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 207, MAINE TOWNSHIP, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal involves two consolidated cases presenting the common issue of whether teachers and school districts can be held liable for injuries to students resulting from their allegedly negligent conduct, or whether the greater burden of wilful and wanton misconduct must be proved in order to impose liability. Subsidiary issues raised by the various parties will be considered where they are necessary for a resolution of these cases.\nIn cause No. 47084, plaintiff, the father of Barbara Kobylanski, brought suit on her behalf against the Chicago Board of Education and James Leeos, a physical education instructor at Mark Twain Elementary School, for injuries she sustained during her seventh grade gymnasium class. Kobylanski, who was 13 years old at the time of the accident on November 18, 1968, suffered spinal injuries when she fell while attempting to perform a \u201cknee hang\u201d on steel rings suspended from the ceiling of the gymnasium. Prior to the accident, Leeos had instructed the students on the performance of this exercise. Kobylanski\u2019s amended complaint, which was filed under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 85, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.), alleged, inter alia, that the defendants negligently failed to provide proper instruction and supervision. The defendants answered the complaint, denying the allegations of \u2022 negligence and setting forth as an affirmative defense section 34 \u2014 84a of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, par. 34 \u2014 84a), which, they maintained, required a plaintiff to prove wilful and wanton misconduct in order to recover. Following the presentation of plaintiff\u2019s case, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, and subsequently denied the plaintiff\u2019s post-trial motion for a new trial. The trial court found that Kobylanski had failed to prove the defendants were guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct. On appeal to the appellate court, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed (Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 22 Ill. App. 3d 551), and we granted plaintiff\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. There is no contention made that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish wilful and wanton misconduct.\nCause No. 47454 involves a suit initially filed by the father of the then minor Suzanne Chilton against Cook County School District 207 and Linda Walton, a physical education instructor, for injuries she sustained on April 25, 1968. Chilton was a 15-year-old freshman at Maine Township High School East and was injured during her physical education class while performing a trampoline maneuver known as a \u201cfront drop.\u201d As in the Kobylanski case, Chilton suffered spinal injuries. Prior to the accident, Chilton received personal instructions from Walton on the performance of this maneuver, since she had previously experienced difficulty in performing it. The second amended complaint, which was predicated upon negligence, was filed by plaintiff, Suzanne Chilton, at the close of the evidence at trial in October 1972. Count I alleged, basically, that District 207 failed to provide proper supervision, failed to require increased supervision as trampoline accidents occurred more frequently, and failed to test beginners in order to determine who was capable of taking a trampoline course. Count II charged that Walton failed to properly supervise the class, and forced Chilton to perform the maneuver after it became obvious that she lacked confidence and had considerable difficulty in performing it. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Chilton only against District 207. Following the entry of judgment on the verdict, the District filed a post-trial motion, but this motion was denied as were two previous motions for directed verdicts. These motions had attacked the sufficiency of plaintiff\u2019s complaint, arguing that it failed to allege that District 207 and Walton were guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct as required by section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 24). The trial court refused to instruct the jury that a wilful and wanton standard was applicable rather than a negligence standard, and expressed the belief that section 24 \u2014 24 applied only to teacher-student disciplinary situations. On appeal to the appellate court, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed (Chilton v. Cook County School District No. 207, 26 Ill. App. 3d 459), and we granted the District\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. Chilton does not contend that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find wilful and wanton misconduct had it been instructed as to the applicability of that standard.\nThe statutes relevant to these appeals are sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a of the School Code. The former section applies to cities with a population of less than 500,000 and the latter, to cities with a population greater than 500,000. The pertinent parts of the two statutes are identical, and they provide:\n\u201cTeachers and other certificated educational employees shall maintain discipline in the schools. In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the school program and may be exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the pupils in the absence of their parents or guardians.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 24-24 and 34-84a.\nThese statutes confer upon educators the status of parent or guardian to the students. None of the parties to these appeals disputes the fact that a parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent wilful and wanton misconduct. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill.2d 451, 455; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 619.\nKobylanski and Chilton concede that the statutes confer the status of parent or guardian upon teachers, but they maintain that they apply solely in disciplinary situations and not to the facts of the present appeals, which arose from nondisciplinary matters. In support of this position, they point out that the pertinent statutes are found in those portions of the School Code which deal with the employment and duties of teachers, and that the statutes are titled \u201cMaintenance of discipline\u201d (section 24 \u2014 24) and \u201cTeachers shall maintain discipline\u201d (section 34 \u2014 84a). Defendants, Chicago Board of Education, Leeos and District 207, contest this interpretation of the statutes and argue that the statutes clearly apply to the present situations, as illustrated by the third sentence of sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a, which provide that \u201c[t]his relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the school program.\u201d\nWhile the issue before this court is one of first impression, it has previously been considered in four appellate court cases involving suits against teachers, schools or school boards. In each, the appellate court held that section 24 \u2014 24 requires a plaintiff to prove wilful and wanton misconduct in order to impose liability on educators. (See Fustin v. Board of Education, 101 Ill. App. 2d 113 (student player injured by an opposing player during basketball game); Woodman v. Litchfield Community School District No. 12, 102 Ill. App. 2d 330 (student kicked by fellow student while class was in session); Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural History, 5 Ill. App. 3d 699 (student assaulted by youths unaffiliated with his school while on an excursion to the Field Museum in Chicago); and Merrill v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 8 Ill. App. 3d 910 (student injured while cutting lengths of wire for art class as directed by teacher).) In Merrill, the plaintiff attempted to distinguish the applicability of section 24 \u2014 24 by arguing that the statute did not relate to nondisciplinary situations and private schools. The appellate court briefly dismissed this argument by concluding that the activity in which the student was engaged was part of the school program and fell within the purview of the statute. We note that while Kobylanski and Chilton attempt to distinguish Fustin, Woodman and Mancha from the present factual situations, contending that the prior three cases involved disciplinary matters, a review of these cases discloses that they involved allegations of improper supervision and failure to supervise school activities.\nReviewing the language of the statutes, we find that they were intended to confer the status in loco parentis in nondisciplinary as well as disciplinary matters. The second sentence in each of the two statutes provides that \u201c [i] n all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, [teachers] stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The statutes further indicate that this relationship applies to all activities in the school program. Since physical education is a required part of the academic curriculum (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 27 \u2014 5 to 27 \u2014 7), the classes in which Kobylanski and Chilton were injured are clearly \u201cactivities connected with the school program.\u201d\nMoreover, \u201cwhere a statute has been judicially construed and the construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in the court\u2019s exposition of legislative intent.\u201d (People v. Hairston, 46 Ill.2d 348, 353.) In August 1975, the legislature amended sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a by Public Act 79 \u2014 507 (effective October 1, 1975), by including within the first sentence of each section the requirement that teachers maintain discipline not only in the schools but on school grounds owned or leased by the school board and used for school activities. At the time the legislature passed this amendment, the present appeals had already been decided by the appellate courts, as well as the four appellate decisions previously mentioned. It is presumed, therefore, that since the legislature offered no further explanation of its intent regarding the scope of the parental relationship conferred by these statutes, it agreed with the interpretation given by the majority of appellate court decisions.\nFurthermore, we note that in People v. Ball, 58 Ill.2d 36, this court held that, in situations involving the imposition of corporal punishment, teachers enjoy no greater rights nor are they entitled to any greater protection than parents. Conversely, it logically follows that teachers, standing in loco parentis, should not be subjected to any greater liability than parents, who are liable to their children for wilful and wanton misconduct, but not for mere negligence.\nWe conclude, therefore, that sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a confer upon teachers and other certificated educational employees immunity from suits for negligence arising out of \u201cmatters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children.\u201d In order to impose liability against such educators, a plaintiff must prove wilful and wanton misconduct.\nKobylanski and Chilton have argued, alternatively, that should sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a immunize educators from liability for negligence, then such immunity is waived by section 9 \u2014 103(b) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (hereafter Tort Immunity Act). It provides:\nEvery policy for insurance coverage issued to a local public entity shall provide or be endorsed to provide that the company issuing such policy waives any right to refuse payment or to deny liability thereto within the limits of said policy by reason of the non-liability of the insured public entity for the wrongful or negligent acts of itself or its employees and its immunity from suit by reason of the defenses and immunities provided in this Act.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 85, par. 9 \u2014 103(b).\nIt is undisputed that the Chicago Board of Education and District 207 had liability insurance policies in effect at the time of the accidents in question. Moreoever, the defendants do not contest the plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation that section 9 \u2014 103(b) is a waiver of defenses and immunities if the local public entity has secured insurance coverage. They point out, however, and correctly so, that this waiver provision applies only to those defenses and immunities \u201cprovided in this Act.\u201d (See Housewright v. City of LaHarpe, 51 Ill.2d 357, 362-63.) The legislature\u2019s obvious intent to so limit the waiver provisions of section 9 \u2014 103(b) is supported by section 2 \u2014 111, which states: \u201cNothing contained herein shall operate to deprive any public entity of any defense heretofore existing and not described herein.,, (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 85, par. 2 \u2014 111.) Plaintiffs concede that the pertinent sections of the School Code were passed prior to the date of the Tort Immunity Act.\nThe Tort Immunity Act, in pertinent part, provides a local public entity with immunity from liability for injuries occurring in the use of public property. Examples of such immunity are illustrated by the following: A local public entity is not liable for injuries caused by the adoption of a plan or design of construction or improvement to public property (par. 3 \u2014 103); for injuries caused by the failure to initially provide regulatory traffic control devices such as stop signs and speed restriction signs (par. 3 \u2014 104); for injuries caused by the effect of weather conditions on the use of streets and highways (par. 3 \u2014 105); for injuries where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended to be used as a park, unless such local entity is guilty of wilful and wanton negligence proximately causing the injury (par. 3 \u2014 106); for injuries caused by a condition of any hiking, hunting or fishing trail (par. 3 \u2014 107); and for injuries caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property (par. 3 \u2014 108). The immunity conferred upon educators by sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a, however, is not derived from the Tort Immunity Act, but is the result of a legislative determination that educators should stand in the place of a parent or guardian in matters relating to discipline, the conduct of the schools and the school children. It is this status as parent or guardian which requires a plaintiff to prove wilful and wanton misconduct in order to impose liability upon educators. Accordingly, the waiver provision of section 9 \u2014 103(b) is inapplicable to the present factual situations.\nKobylanski and Chilton intimate in their briefs that to accept an interpretation different from theirs as to the applicability of section 9 \u2014 103(b) would subject sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a to \u201cgrave constitutional prohibitions.\u201d While they have not developed this contention to any depth, they apparently maintain that a contrary interpretation would make sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a special legislation in derogation of the constitutional prohibition of section 13 of article IV of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Presumably this is based on the fact that teachers and school districts would be treated differently than other insured public entities or that a teacher would be treated differently than a school district employee who drives a bus.\nA statute classifying persons or objects is not unconstitutional because it affects one class and not another, provided that it affects all members of the same class alike and provided that the classification is not arbitrary, but based upon some substantial difference in circumstances properly related to the classification. (Hamilton Corp. v. Alexander, 53 Ill.2d 175, 179; see also People v. Palkes, 52 Ill.2d 472.) While school districts may be in a class with other insured public entities and teachers may be in a class with other school employees, school districts and teachers are also in a class by themselves, because of the unique role they play in the educational development of the school age children of this State. Since all school districts and teachers are similarly treated, there is no violation of the constitutional prohibition against special legislation.\nThe resolution of these issues makes unnecessary a consideration of the other issues raised by the parties. The judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 47084 is affirmed, and the judgment in cause No. 47454 is reversed.\n47084 \u2014 Judgment affirmed.\n47454 \u2014 Judgment reversed.\nMR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, with whom MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARD and MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER join, dissenting:\nMr. Chief Justice Ward, Mr. Justice Schaefer and I dissent and would reverse the judgment in 47084 (Kobylanski) and affirm the judgment in 47454 (Chilton).\nSection 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code in pertinent part provides:\n\u201cSec. 24 \u2014 24. Maintenance of discipline. Teachers and other certificated educational employees shall maintain discipline in the schools. In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to activities connected with the school program and may be exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the pupils in the absence of their parents or guardians.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 24.)\nSection 34 \u2014 84a (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, par. 34 \u2014 84a), which applies to cities with a population greater than 500,000 (see III. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, par. 34 \u2014 1), is headed \u201cTeachers shall maintain discipline,\u201d and contains the same language as section 24 \u2014 24.\nIt seems clear that the statutes apply only to discipline. To reach a contrary interpretation requires a distortion of the language of the second sentence of these sections. Properly construed, that sentence refers to \u201call matters related to the discipline in the schools and the conduct of the school children.\u201d The phrase \u201cand conduct of the schools,\u201d which is emphasized by the majority opinion, does not stand alone. The words \u201cdiscipline in\u201d can not refer to \u201cschool children\u201d; those words refer to the \u201cschools.\u201d Similarly, the words \u201cconduct of\u201d do not relate to \u201cthe schools\u201d; they refer to \u201cthe school children.\u201d If the phrase \u201cconduct of the schools\u201d is to be torn from its context and given independent significance, the following sentence, which provides that \u201c[tjhis relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the school program,\u201d is rendered redundant.\nHouse Bill 691, which added sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a to the School Code, and House Bill 1863, enacting the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, were passed and approved at approximately the same time (H.B. 691, passed June 28, 1965, approved July 13, 1965; H.B. 1863, passed June 30, 1965, approved August 13, 1965.) School districts were included within the term \u201clocal public entity\u201d contained in the Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 85, par. 1 \u2014 206), and the Tort Immunity Act and the amendments to the School Code must be read in pari materia. As stated in the majority opinion (63 Ill.2d at 173) the Tort Immunity Act contains provisions which grant immunity to local public entities in some situations and limit liability to wilful and wanton conduct in others. Had the General Assembly intended to immunize a school district or its \u201cteachers and other certificated educational employees\u201d from liability for negligence in \u201cnondisciplinary as well as disciplinary matters\u201d it could have so provided.\nThe majority expresses the opinion that because, when it amended the statutes in August 1975, the General Assembly \u201coffered no further explanation of its intent regarding the scope of the parental relationship conferred by these statutes\u201d it \u201cagreed with the interpretation given by the majority of the appellate court decisions.\u201d (63 Ill.2d at 172.) This newly discovered method for determining legislative intent is quaint, intriguing, but legally unsound. A much more sensible interpretation of legislative inaction, and one far more flattering to the General Assembly, is that being reasonable individuals they waited to see whether this court would resolve the conflict.\nNor do we agree that there was a \u201cmajority of appellate court decisions\u201d which held that sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a applied to all activities connected with the school program. The rationale of Fustin v. Board of Education, 101 Ill. App. 2d 113, was that the action of the defendant\u2019s employees and agents had involved the exercise of discretion, that under section 2 \u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provided:\n\u201cExcept as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 85, par. 2 \u2014 201),\nthey were not liable for acts of negligence, and that by reason of section 2 \u2014 109 of the Act, which provided:\n\u201cA local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 85, par. 2 \u2014 109),\nthe defendant district was not liable. In Woodman v. Litchfield Community School District No. 12, 102 Ill. App. 2d 330, the appellate court specifically stated that the action complained of was done in the course of maintaining discipline. Neither opinion decided the question presented in these cases.\nAlthough, in the decision of these cases, it should not be necessary to reach the question of the constitutionality of sections 24 \u2014 24 and 34 \u2014 84a of the School Code, as interpreted by the majority, their validity is, at best, doubtful. The principle is firmly established that classifications designed to confer immunity on a local governmental entity must be based, not on the nature of the entity, but on the type of activity or function involved. (Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill.2d 60; Stubblefield v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill.2d 267.) As construed by the majority, defendants would not be liable for negligent conduct which would subject other local governmental units to liability.\nAlthough not made an issue in these appeals, we consider it appropriate to comment upon one additional matter. The majority, and apparently the parties, appear to accept as settled law \u201cthat a parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent wilful and wanton misconduct. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill.2d 451, 455; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 619.\u201d (63 Ill.2d at 170.) On the contrary, this court has never decided that question. In Nudd, wilful and wanton misconduct was alleged (7 Ill.2d at 610), and the language to which the majority opinion refers (7 Ill.2d at 619) does not hold that parental immunity bars an action based on negligence. Mroczynski explains what was said in Nudd but does not decide the question.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jerome E. Cihak, Winkler & Fornelli, Ltd. and William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (Donald J. Kerwin, of counsel), for appellant.", "Morrill, Koutsky, Chuhak and Upton, of Chicago (Roland C. Upton and Philip J. McGuire, of counsel), for appellee Chicago Board of Education.", "Lord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (Stephen A. Milwid, Richard E. Mueller, and John J. Berwanger, of counsel), for appellee J ames Lecos.", "Baker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, John W. Dondanville, Daniel J. Cheely, and Norman J. Barry, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.", "Albert F. Hofeld, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte, Ltd., and Vincent Getzendanner, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 47084.\n(No. 47454.\nBARBARA KOBYLANSKI, a minor, Appellant, v. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION et al, Appellees. SUZANNE CHILTON, Appellee, v. COOK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 207, MAINE TOWNSHIP, Appellant.\nOpinion filed March 29, 1976.\nRehearing denied May 27, 1976.\nGOLDENHERSH, J., WARD, C.J., and SCHAEFER, J., dissenting.\nNo. 47084.\nJerome E. Cihak, Winkler & Fornelli, Ltd. and William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (Donald J. Kerwin, of counsel), for appellant.\nMorrill, Koutsky, Chuhak and Upton, of Chicago (Roland C. Upton and Philip J. McGuire, of counsel), for appellee Chicago Board of Education.\nLord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (Stephen A. Milwid, Richard E. Mueller, and John J. Berwanger, of counsel), for appellee J ames Lecos.\nNo. 47454.\nBaker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, John W. Dondanville, Daniel J. Cheely, and Norman J. Barry, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.\nAlbert F. Hofeld, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte, Ltd., and Vincent Getzendanner, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0165-01", "first_page_order": 177, "last_page_order": 191 }