{ "id": 5426382, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LYNN A. FARR et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Farr", "decision_date": "1976-03-18", "docket_number": "No. 47459, 47460, 47585; Nos. 47459, 47460; No. 47585", "first_page": "209", "last_page": "215", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 209" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "300 Ill. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2426018 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/300/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 Ill. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2502538 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/388/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390491 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 535", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11734271 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 Ill. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311250 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5406543 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0170-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 514, "char_count": 10566, "ocr_confidence": 0.86, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.2723707851869915e-07, "percentile": 0.8701599977450423 }, "sha256": "a9abb7ee6503a277a647ee566bb5a856dca3adc036306ac6c281fafa564373a9", "simhash": "1:4878bb9fec4ca4fd", "word_count": 1748 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:11.975359+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LYNN A. FARR et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe People appealed directly to this court (Rule 302(a)) from two judgments of the circuit court of Hancock County (Nos. 47459 and 47460) and the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County (No. 47585) holding unconstitutional section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (No. 47585. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 9514, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(d).\nIn separate and unrelated occurrences the defendants, Lynn A. Farr, Richard D. Jacob and George Andrew, were arrested and charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (No. 47585. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 9514, par. 11 \u2014 501). In pertinent part, section 11 \u2014 501.1(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a)) provided that under certain circumstances the driver of a motor vehicle impliedly consented to take a breath analysis test \u201cto determine the alcoholic content of his blood.\u201d It provided that the arresting officer was to advise the arrested person, both orally and by means of a printed notice, of his implied consent to take the test and the consequences of his refusal to do so. In the event of refusal to submit to the test, section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) (par. 11 \u2014 501.1(d)) provided that the arresting officer file with the clerk of the circuit court for the county in which the arrest was made a sworn statement setting forth certain prescribed information concerning the arrest and the refusal to take the test. It provided that the sworn statement should include:\n\u201c*** a statement that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the person was driving the motor vehicle within this State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and that such test was made as an incident to and following the lawful arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 of this Act or a similar provision of a municipal code, and that the person, after being arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while so driving refused to submit to and complete a test as requested orally and in writing as provided in paragraph (a) of this Section.\u201d\nSection 501.1(d) further provided that upon the filing of the sworn statement:\n\u201cThe Clerk shall thereupon notify such person in writing that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle will be suspended unless, within 28 days from the date of mailing of the notice, he shall request in writing a hearing thereon. If such person fails to request a hearing within such 28 day period, the Clerk shall so notify the Secretary of State who shall automatically suspend such person\u2019s driver\u2019s license *** as provided in Paragraph (a) of this Section.\nIf such person desires a hearing, he shall petition the Circuit Court for and in the county in which he was arrested for such hearing. Such hearing shall proceed in the Court in the same manner as other civil proceedings, except that the scope of such proceedings shall cover only the issues of whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 of this Act or a similar provision of a municipal ordinance, whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was informed orally and in writing as provided in paragraph (a) that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if he refused to submit to and complete the test and whether, after being so advised, he refused to submit to and complete the test upon request of the officer.\nImmediately upon the termination of the Court proceedings, the Clerk shall notify the Secretary of State of the Court\u2019s decision. The Secretary of State shall thereupon suspend the driver\u2019s license *** of the arrested person if that be the decision of the Court. If the Court recommends that such person be given a restricted driving permit to prevent undue hardship, the Clerk shall so report to the Secretary of State.\u201d\nIn each instance defendant filed a petition for hearing and subsequently a motion to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) was unconstitutional for the reason that it violated section 1 of article II of the Constitution of 1970, which provides:\n\u201cSECTION 1. SEPARATION OF POWERS\nThe legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.\u201d\nThe circuit courts allowed defendants\u2019 motions, entered judgments of dismissal and these appeals followed.\nDefendants contend: \u201cThe Secretary of State, as an executive officer, is vested with the power to suspend drivers\u2019 licenses, and the statute in question attempts to take that power from the Secretary and delegate it to the judiciary\u201d; \u201cSuspension of a driver\u2019s license is an administrative matter, civil in nature, and not an exercise of judicial power\u201d; \u201cThe statute requires the court to determine whether the license should be suspended, and to exercise discretion properly committed to the Secretary of State.\u201d\nThe People, of course, contend that the statute does not violate section 1 of article II of the Constitution.\nIn City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill.2d 170, 174-75, this court, after extensive examination of its earlier decisions and the proceedings of the 1970 Constitutional Convention said: \u201cIt has been generally recognized that separation of powers does not forbid every exercise of functions by one branch of government which conventionally are exercised by another branch. Professor Frank Cooper (1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 16 (1965)) observes: \u2018[T] he real thrust of the separation of powers philosophy is that each department of government must be kept free from the control or coercive influence of the other departments.\u2019 \u201d\nAssuming, arguendo, that the General Assembly could enact valid legislation authorizing the Secretary of State to decide the questions which, under section 11 \u2014 501.1(d), are to be determined by the circuit court, that fact would not per se render section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) invalid. \u201cIt has been held from the outset, however, that the doctrine of separation of powers does not inexorably preclude one of the three departments of government from exercising powers which could also be given to another department.\u201d Board of Education v. Nickell, 410 Ill. 98, 104.\nWe do not agree with defendants that the statute delegates to the judiciary either the power to suspend drivers\u2019 licenses or the discretion to determine whether such licenses should be suspended. The statute provides that in a hearing which \u201cshall proceed in the Court in the same manner as other civil proceedings,\u201d the court shall determine \u201cwhether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was informed orally and in writing as provided in paragraph (a) that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if he refused to submit to and complete the test and whether, after being so advised, he refused to submit to and complete the test upon request of the officer.\u201d The statute is explicit that if the court so finds, the Secretary of State \u201cshall thereupon suspend\u201d the license. We note parenthetically that sections 6 \u2014 306(d) and 7 \u2014 303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code also provide for mandatory suspension of a driver\u2019s license upon receipt by the Secretary of State of appropriate notice from a clerk of a circuit court. The fact that in this instance the clerk of the circuit court is directed to report to the Secretary of State that the court recommends that the affected driver \u201cbe given a restricted driving permit to prevent undue hardship\u201d is of no significance and serves neither to expand nor to restrict the discretionary powers conferred upon the Secretary of State under other sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code.\nWe find apposite here the following statement from Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90, 96, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 1591: \u201cWhile \u2018many controversies have raged about *** the Due Process Clause,\u2019 ibid,., it is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford \u2018notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case\u2019 before the termination becomes effective.\u201d The section under attack is part of a statutory scheme which requires the holder of a driver\u2019s license to impliedly consent to submit to a breath analysis test and provides sanctions in the event of his refusal to do so. The General Assembly apparently concluded that it was preferable that the determination \u201cwhether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was informed orally and in writing as provided in paragraph (a) that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if he refused to submit to and complete the test and whether, after being so advised, he refused to submit to and complete the test upon request of the officer\u201d be made in a judicial hearing rather than an administrative proceeding. This court has consistently held that whether the course chosen by the General Assembly is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry. Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill.2d 103; Schreiber v. County of Cook, 388 Ill. 297; Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425.\nWe hold that the statute is not violative of section 1 of article II of the Constitution. The judgments of the circuit courts of Hancock and Winnebago Counties are reversed, and the causes are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Patrick J. Corcoran, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carthage (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr, and Brian A. David, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.", "Stanley L. Tucker and John R. Glidden, of Hartzell, Glidden 8c Tucker, of Carthage, for appellees Lynn A. Farr and Richard D. Jacob.", "Pedderson, Menzimer, Conde, Stoner, Ferolie, Spelman & Killoren, of Rockford (Lawrence J. Ferolie, of counsel), for appellee George Andrew." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 47459, 47460, 47585 cons.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LYNN A. FARR et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed March 18, 1976.\nRehearing denied May 27, 1976.\nNos. 47459, 47460.\nNo. 47585.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Patrick J. Corcoran, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carthage (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr, and Brian A. David, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nStanley L. Tucker and John R. Glidden, of Hartzell, Glidden 8c Tucker, of Carthage, for appellees Lynn A. Farr and Richard D. Jacob.\nPedderson, Menzimer, Conde, Stoner, Ferolie, Spelman & Killoren, of Rockford (Lawrence J. Ferolie, of counsel), for appellee George Andrew." }, "file_name": "0209-01", "first_page_order": 221, "last_page_order": 227 }