{ "id": 5425878, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ENICH CHANEY, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Chaney", "decision_date": "1976-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 47583", "first_page": "216", "last_page": "229", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 216" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "105 Ariz. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 4210963 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/105/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 1233", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 L. Ed. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 994", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11761857, 11761575, 11762280, 11761674, 11761418, 11761484, 11762061, 11761770, 11762007, 11761917, 11762206, 11762143 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0994-06", "/us/401/0994-03", "/us/401/0994-12", "/us/401/0994-04", "/us/401/0994-01", "/us/401/0994-02", "/us/401/0994-09", "/us/401/0994-05", "/us/401/0994-08", "/us/401/0994-07", "/us/401/0994-11", "/us/401/0994-10" ] }, { "cite": "435 F.2d 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2216929 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/435/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 F.2d 736", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1171009 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/499/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 F.2d 475", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 719548, 3587109 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/466/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833958 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 F.2d 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 238261 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/484/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 F.2d 309", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2165957 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/418/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5408291 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 U.S. 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159521 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" }, { "page": "645" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "60-62" }, { "page": "645-46" }, { "page": "628-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/353/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 786", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782921 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794-95" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "2568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2862963 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360669 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 300", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174244 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2883887 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1042, "char_count": 24473, "ocr_confidence": 0.891, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1179344849756595e-07, "percentile": 0.7641123092504621 }, "sha256": "55c949d6f353716636f9610d32cf6527bcde93b1364d766bf074fd00cc9fca5c", "simhash": "1:aaba1815f3e15ffa", "word_count": 4087 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:11.975359+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ENICH CHANEY, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 6, 1971, defendant, Enich Chaney, was indicted on charges of burglary, aggravated assault and attempt murder. F oil owing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, he was convicted of these offenses. The common law record recites that defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 8 to 24 years for burglary, 8 to 20 years for aggravated assault and 8 to 20 years for attempt murder. The sentences were to run concurrently. While the transcript of the sentencing proceedings is in accord with the burglary and attempt murder sentences, it discloses that the trial court did not impose a sentence for aggravated assault. The appellate court reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial or for other appropriate proceedings. It held that the invocation of the informer privilege by the State and the trial court\u2019s action in sustaining State objections to defense questions designed to elicit the identity of a police informant created prejudicial error which deprived defendant of a fair trial. (People v. Chaney, 27 Ill. App. 3d 366.) We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nThe facts of this case are greatly disputed. The principal evidence of the defendant\u2019s involvement in the crimes was supplied by several police officers. The defendant contended that he had been \u201cset up\u201d by the police, and to support his testimony to this effect he called his mother and Charles Holt.\nSergeant William Higgins testified that late in the evening of January 3, 1971, he received a telephone call from an informant he apparently had not previously known. Higgins and another officer met the informant at a restaurant located near Division and Clark Streets in Chicago, where they had a conversation; then they proceeded to a building located at 1300 Lake Shore Drive. There they entered the apartment of Ralph Applegate and inspected the premises.\nThe next morning Higgins and seven other officers returned to the building. Two officers remained outside and officers Vollick and Marino positioned themselves near the lobby in the manager\u2019s office. Sergeant Higgins and officers Erickson, Collins and Muscalino accompanied the manager to the Applegate apartment. The manager apparently admitted the police and then departed.\nIn summary the testimony of Higgins, Collins and Erickson basically indicated that they received a message by radio from the officers stationed outside the building that the suspects\u2019 vehicle was in the area. The officers near the building lobby then indicated that the suspects had entered an elevator. The officers in the apartment positioned themselves so as to conceal their presence. Shortly thereafter they heard a scraping noise of metal on metal at the doorway of the apartment. The door was opened, and defendant entered followed by an unidentified individual. The police announced their office and defendant stated that he lived there. Higgins rushed toward defendant, who turned to face Higgins with a gun in his hand. A scuffle ensued to wrest the weapon from defendant. Collins was knocked to the floor with defendant during the struggle, and, he said, he then kicked defendant in an effort to extricate himself. Erickson testified that he struck defendant on the head several times with his pistol in order to subdue him, and after the fight he noted defendant was bleeding from his forehead. The accomplice may have escaped by means of a stairway as the two officers stationed near the lobby were using the elevator to reach the apartment. Collins admitted that after the arrest he learned that defendant was under investigation for murder.\nIt was during the testimony of Officer Collins that the question of the informant\u2019s identity was initially raised. The State\u2019s objection to disclosure of the identity was sustained. Thereafter, during cross-examination of Sergeant Higgins, the defense probed the circumstances surrounding Higgins\u2019 encounter with the informant. Higgins was asked if the informant told police who might accompany defendant the next morning during the burglary. Both Higgins and the prosecution expressed the view that to answer the question would reveal the informant\u2019s identity. The trial court sustained the objection but then permitted the witness to answer the question after it became apparent that the answer did not pose a danger of revealing the identity.\nFollowing his arrest defendant was taken to a hospital where he was treated for his injuries. He was then taken to the police station where he said Charles Holt was the man who was with him that morning. Holt was brought to the station. When defendant saw Holt, the former asked Holt to tell the police that both had gone to the building to visit several girls. At this time Holt denied being with defendant.\nOfficer Marino knew Holt before the incident in question. Marino had viewed defendant and the other man in the lobby during the police \u201cstake-out.\u201d He said Holt was not the unidentified individual with defendant.\nA screwdriver was found near the front door of the apartment which bore particles similar to those taken from the doorway of the apartment. Photographs of the apartment door show substantial damage near the lock mechanism. The automatic pistol purportedly taken from defendant contained several bullets.\nDefendant\u2019s mother testified that about one week before the incident in question Sergeant Higgins and seven other officers burst into her apartment in the early morning hours looking for weapons. She identified officers Bendis, Collins and Vollick as several of these participants in the raid. As a result of this incident she complained to the Internal Affairs Division of the police department. She further recounted that the previous summer Higgins was present when other police officers told her to have her son leave town or he was going to be killed.\nDefendant denied any participation in the crimes charged. He testified that the day before the alleged burglary he met Holt, whom he had known for two years, at Holt\u2019s place of employment, where they had a conversation about visiting some girls. The next morning Holt met defendant at his mother\u2019s apartment and they proceeded in defendant\u2019s car to 1300 Lake Shore Drive. They entered the elevator to go to the 34th floor, but the elevator stopped at the 28th floor. As the doors opened defendant was confronted by police officers who ordered him off the elevator and pushed him into a room where Higgins was said to have told defendant, \u201cSee, Chaney, I can kill you right now if I wanted.\u201d Another officer purportedly threatened defendant with a sword which had been taken from a box in the apartment. Defendant also saw a gun taken from the box, which apparently was the weapon introduced against him at trial. Defendant said Higgins began to beat him with a large blackjack and the other officers kicked and beat him for 30 minutes until Officer Marino urged them to stop. As he left the building in police custody, defendant said that Higgins threatened to kill him if he \u201cbeat\u201d the charge or when he was released from the penitentiary. Defendant said he was beaten on the legs and required hospitalization for his injuries for several months until his release on bail in May 1971.\nPursuant to the State\u2019s motion for pretrial discovery the name of Charles Holt was contained on a list of possible defense witnesses given to the State in November 1971, seven months before trial. After defendant had testified, Holt was called as a defense witness. Holt testified that he had been acquainted with defendant for nine years. On January 4, 1971, he and defendant went to 1300 Lake Shore Drive and they got off the elevator on the 28th floor. They went to the door of the Applegate apartment only to discover they were not at the right apartment. As they reentered the elevator, they were confronted by police. Holt said he fled down the stairs and returned to work. He was later placed in custody by police and taken to the police station where he signed a statement.\nOn cross-examination the State laid the foundation to impeach Holt by means of his prior inconsistent signed statement given to police on the afternoon of January 4, 1971. Holt admitted he had signed the statement but denied he had contacted Sergeant Higgins the night before the burglary to reveal defendant\u2019s plan or informed anyone of the plan. The State produced the three-page statement and, after the defense examined it, defense motions for a mistrial or to treat Holt as a hostile witness were denied. Holt was then examined concerning the contents of the statement. He denied he had made that portion of the statement which indicated he had informed Sergeant Higgins of defendant\u2019s plan, but he did concede that he had said he would accompany defendant \u201con the burglary *** but only to get information out of him.\u201d He denied having stated that if he did take part in the burglary that he \u201cwas to duck out some way.\u201d And he further denied the contents of the statement wherein he purportedly said that defendant met him the morning of the burglary and he refused to go with defendant to the building. But Holt did concede that he had told police he was not with defendant that morning and that defendant said that he was present because defendant \u201cmay have figured that I was the one who gave out the information that got. him arrested.\u201d When queried on that part of the statement which stated he knew defendant was carrying a gun, Holt denied the matter.\nHolt admitted he had been convicted of burglary and theft. It is to be gathered from the record that at the time he testified he was being tried before another court on an unrelated robbery charge.\nIn rebuttal the State recalled several police officers who disputed defendant\u2019s testimony relating to the source of the weapon. Sergeant Higgins further testified that Holt had made the statements attributed to him. And Officer Bendis testified that none of the officers who testified against defendant participated in the occurrence at the home of defendant\u2019s mother. Prisoner records were also introduced which indicated that defendant, in fact, had been hospitalized from January 4 through January 8, 1971, at the county jail hospital but then released upon his own request and placed on a tier in the jail where prisoners would be normally assigned. Finally, at defendant\u2019s request, Holt\u2019s written statement was admitted into evidence.\nDuring arguments on post-trial motions defense counsel informed the court that he had spoken to Holt prior to trial and the latter had lied to counsel about his participation with the police. Counsel further said that the defense believed Holt to be the informer but this could not be proven. Finally, counsel expressed surprise that Holt had given such a detailed statement to the police concerning his activities and asserted that, had the defense initially been aware of the statement\u2019s substance, it could have asked the trial court to immediately declare that Holt was a hostile witness.\nThe State raises a multi-faceted argument to support its position that its nondisclosure of Holt as the informant was not prejudicial error. The State maintains that it properly answered defendant\u2019s motion for pretrial discovery relating to the latter\u2019s request for \u201ca list of witnesses that the State may or may not call upon trial of this cause\u201d and \u201cproduction *** [of] *** documents *** which are relevant or material to the case for the defense, or for the State in this cause.\u201d It predicates this argument on the assertions that it never contemplated calling Holt as a State witness; and that Holt\u2019s signed statement \u201cserved to inculpate the defendant and that this statement, therefore, was not relevant or material to the defense.\u201d Furthermore, the State takes the position that Holt\u2019s statement was offered to impeach Holt and not as substantive evidence against defendant.\nSecondly, the State argues that it did not transcend the dictates of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194. The State characterizes the information regarding Holt\u2019s statement and his identity as the informer as evidence which would not tend to exculpate the defendant or reduce his punishment and argues therefore that the State\u2019s failure to disclose was not violative of Brady.\nFinally, the State suggests that Holt\u2019s identity was validly withheld under the informer\u2019s privilege. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 412(j)(ii).) And, even if the defendant had a right to disclosure, the State says that defendant knew prior to trial that Holt was the informant and that he had given a statement to the police.\nIn Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706, 92 S. Ct. 2562, the United States Supreme Court explained its holding in Brady v. Maryland. It said:\n\u201cThe heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution\u2019s suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence\u2019s favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.\u201d (408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706, 713, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 2568.)\nWhile the defendant could be said to have requested the information which was material to his position, we do not believe that Holt\u2019s statement was of a \u201cfavorable character for the defense.\u201d Under the circumstances we do not believe that the State\u2019s failure to proffer the statement was contrary to the dictates of Brady v. Maryland.\nThe next question pertains to the extent to which the State may invoke the informer\u2019s privilege within the factual context of this case. Our discussion must begin with consideration of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 77 S. Ct. 623. In that case the informant\u2019s identity was successfully concealed by the prosecution both before and during trial. The evidence disclosed that the informant had actively participated in the drug purchase. In reversing the conviction the Supreme Court recognized the government\u2019s interest in utilizing a method whereby information on criminal activities might be proffered by a citizen without disclosing his identity and subjecting himself to risk of harm. But the court recognized that this privilege was not absolute. The court noted that, if the contents of a communication would not disclose the informant\u2019s identity, then a privilege of withholding the contents of the communication is not applicable. And, if the identity has already been disclosed \u201cto those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.\u201d (353 U.S. 53, 60, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 645, 77 S. Ct. 623, 627.) The court further limited the scope of the privilege in the fundamental interest of fairness stating:\n\u201c*** Where the disclosure of an informer\u2019s identity, or the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.\n* * *\nWe believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual\u2019s right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer\u2019s testimony, and other . relevant factors.\u201d 353 U.S. 53, 60-62, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 645-46, 77 S. Ct. 623, 628-29.\nCases following Roviaro have required disclosure of the informant when he also participated in the commission of the offense for which a defendant is charged and the testimony of the key prosecution witness remains otherwise uncorroborated. (People v. Lewis, 57 Ill.2d 232; United States v. Barnett (6th Cir. 1969), 418 F.2d 309.) Other decisions have suggested disclosure of an informant\u2019s identity when the informant helps to set up the criminal occurrence or is a witness thereto (McLawhorn v. State (4th Cir. 1973), 484 F.2d 1; see People v. Beattie, 31 Ill.2d 257), and not merely a tipster who gives information to the police (United States v. James (D.C. Cir. 1972), 466 F.2d 475; see United States v. Miller (10th Cir. 1974), 499 F.2d 736; United States v. Gibbs (9th Cir. 1970), 435 F.2d 621, cert, denied, 401 U.S. 994, 28 L. Ed. 2d 532, 91 S. Ct. 1233).\nIt has been held that no error occurred where the prosecution asserted the informer\u2019s privilege to prevent disclosure of the identity of an informant who is an eyewitness to the arrest and participated in the commission of the offense, and who is called as a defense witness. (State v. Tisnado (1969), 105 Ariz. 23, 458 P.2d 957; cf. United States v. Miller (6th Cir. 1974), 499 F.2d 736.) However, Supreme Court Rule 412(j)(ii) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 412(j)(ii)) provides that \u201cDisclosure shall not be denied hereunder of the identity of witnesses to be produced at a hearing or trial.\u201d\nThe present case involves a balancing of the interest of the State in protecting an informant\u2019s identity with that of the defendant to a fair trial. We do not believe that the State\u2019s failure to comply with defendant\u2019s general request for discovery filed many months before trial was violative of defendant\u2019s rights. At that juncture and up to the time of trial, the State was under the impression that Holt was not a participant in the crime as evidenced by the substance of his oral and signed statements as well as Officer Marino\u2019s testimony that Holt was not the unidentified individual who entered the elevator with defendant. Under these circumstances and in view of the fact defense counsel made no pretrial motion directed specifically toward information concerning an informant, the mere listing of Holt as a possible defense witness did not give rise to a duty of disclosure upon the State. To hold otherwise would require the State to disclose the informant or to strongly suggest his identity by objecting to a general defense motion for pretrial discovery, thereby possibly endangering the informant\u2019s safety, particularly when only two defense witnesses have been listed.\nIn striking the proper balance under the facts of this case between the informer\u2019s privilege and defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial, we believe when it became apparent that Holt was actually going to be called by the defense, it was incumbent upon the State to inform the court prior to Holt\u2019s direct examination of the fact he was the informant and to disclose the existence of his prior signed statement. It is unreasonable to assume that the defendant, whose testimony would have otherwise remained uncorroborated, contemplated calling Holt as his witness unless Holt had previously indicated that he would testify favorably for the defense. The State was in the position of allowing Holt to testify as a defense witness with the realization that it possessed his prior signed statement which cast serious doubt on the veracity of his testimony. The State utilized this advantage to full potential during cross-examination of Holt and in closing argument to the jury when it told the jury that Holt was called as a witness by defendant, who therefore vouched for his credibility.\nWe further are of the opinion that the State\u2019s failure to inform the defense of Holt\u2019s status prior to his direct testimony constituted prejudicial error under the facts of this case. And, while the State has maintained that the defense previously knew Holt was the informant, this conclusion is not convincingly established by the record.\nThis case does not present a situation whereby the activity of the State may be categorized as misconduct giving rise to the possibility that the charges should be dismissed as defendant has suggested. Rather, this cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.\nAccordingly the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI" }, { "text": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD,\ndissenting:\nI cannot agree with the majority for several reasons. First, its opinion is predicated upon the assumption that defendant was not aware that Holt was the informer. To me, the clear import of the record before us is to the contrary and that the defendant knew before trial that Charles Holt had been cooperating with the police and was the informant. That conclusion seems to me inescapable from the opening statement of defense counsel, which is in part:\n\u201cWe expect the evidence to show that the police believe that Enich Chaney committed that crime, that he was the trigger man in a murder case.\nWe expect the evidence to show further that the police officers, having no evidence with respect to this murder case, elected thereafter to frame Mr. Chaney, to \u2018set him up.\u2019\nWe expect the evidence to show that on the date of this alleged offense, January 4, 1971, that Enich Chaney was lured to a building in the City of Chicago located at 1300 North Lake Shore Drive by a person he knows by the name of Charles Holt.\nWe expect the evidence to show that Charles Holt and Enich Chaney, together with one Frank Trabeau, went to this building at 1300 North Lake Shore Drive, where Charles Holt worked as a car-hop picking up cars and bringing them back to the tenants.\nWe expect the evidence to show that Charles Holt told Enich Chaney, T know some nice girls up on 34, and I will take you up there. They want a party.\u2019\nI expect the evidence to show that Enich Chaney did indeed fall for the lure, did indeed go to 1300 North Lake Shore Drive, and that when the elevator stopped at 28, not at 34, as he had been led to believe, the doors opened and Chaney was greeted at that point by the police; that the police officers had indeed staked out the 28th floor of 1300 North Lake Shore Drive, but that the police officers had told Charles Holt to bring Enich Chaney to these premises ***.\u201d\nIf, as I believe, the defense was aware before trial of Holt\u2019s status, it is scarcely realistic to believe that any real prejudice to defendant resulted from the State\u2019s refusal to verify that fact.\nSecondly, the value of informants to law enforcement officers and the importance of not revealing their identity except under compelling circumstances has been repeatedly emphasized by this court. (See 58 Ill.2d R. 412(j)(ii), Committee Comments; People v. McCray (1965), 33 Ill.2d 66, aff\u2019d, McCray v. Illinois (1967), 386 U.S. 300, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62, 87 S. Ct. 1056; People v. Durr (1963), 28 Ill.2d 308.) In the circumstances here, where the strong probability, if not virtual certainty, is that defendant already knew the informant\u2019s identity, and where it is not entirely clear that the informer was even at the scene of the crime, the argument for disclosure of his identity in my opinion is not at all persuasive.\nThirdly, the majority conclusion that not only is disclosure of identity required but that the informer\u2019s statement to the police should also have been furnished defendant is, as I view it, simply not supportable. That statement was decidedly unfavorable to defendant, and nothing in Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194, requires that it be given defendant. Our criminal discovery rules require only that the State deliver requested statements of witnesses whom it intends to call (58 Ill.2d R. 412(a)(1)), and the State had no intention of calling Holt as its witness. Thus, in my judgment, even were disclosure of Holt\u2019s identity to be required, disclosure of his statement was not.\nI would reverse the appellate court and affirm the conviction.\nWARD, C.J., and RYAN, J., join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD," } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Laurence J. Bolon, Donald M. Devlin, and Linda Ann Miller, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Allan A. Ackerman and George C. Howard, both of Chicago (Ackerman, Durkin & Egan, and Steven M. Levin (law student), of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 47583.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ENICH CHANEY, Appellee.\nOpinion filed March 29, 1976.\nRehearing denied May 27, 1976.\nUNDERWOOD, J., WARD, C.J., and RYAN, J., dissenting.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Laurence J. Bolon, Donald M. Devlin, and Linda Ann Miller, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nAllan A. Ackerman and George C. Howard, both of Chicago (Ackerman, Durkin & Egan, and Steven M. Levin (law student), of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0216-01", "first_page_order": 228, "last_page_order": 241 }