{
  "id": 5428510,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JERRY L. WILLIAMS, Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1976-05-28",
  "docket_number": "No. 47558",
  "first_page": "371",
  "last_page": "374",
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "46 Ill.2d 153",
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        2898190
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    {
      "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 858",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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        2865510
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:47:11.975359+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JERRY L. WILLIAMS, Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Henry County defendant, Jerry L. Williams, was found guilty of burglary and sentenced to the penitentiary. The circuit court also revoked his probation for a prior theft conviction and imposed a sentence to be served consecutively to the burglary sentence. The appellate court affirmed (27 111. App. 3d 858), and we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. The facts are adequately stated in the appellate court opinion and will be reviewed only to the extent necessary to discuss the issues.\nDefendant and Michael C. Rodak were indicted for the burglary of a physician\u2019s office. Rodak pleaded guilty to the charge and testified for the People at defendant\u2019s trial. Defendant, in his testimony at trial, admitted being with Rodak at the time of the burglary, admitted that he was on the roof of the burglarized building, but denied either entering the building or any participation in the crime.\nOn the day following defendant\u2019s conviction, while Rodak and defendant were both incarcerated in the county jail, defendant received two handwritten notes from Rodak. (See 27 Ill. App. 3d 858, 860-61.) In one of them Rodak wrote that he had signed a statement \u201cthat said I did it by myself.\u201d\nDefendant contends that because of appointed defense counsel\u2019s failure to move for pretrial discovery, the statement to which Rodak\u2019s note referred, presumably in the possession of the People and potentially favorable to his case, did not come to the attention of the defense until after trial. He argues that the failure to discover the note deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution.\nIt is defendant\u2019s position that \u201cfailure to file a pre-trial discovery motion in a criminal case constitutes incompetency,\u201d and that as the result of counsel\u2019s incompetency he suffered prejudice so substantial as to require a new trial.\nIn support of his contention defendant cites Standard 4.1 of Standards Relating to the Defense Function (ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice), which provides:\n\u201cIt is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused\u2019s admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty.\u201d\nWe are not persuaded that failure to file a motion for discovery is per se proof of either incompetency or ineffective assistance of counsel.\nAs stated in the Committee Comments to Rule 412, \u201cdiscovery is not intended to be \u2018automatic\u2019 \u201d and \u201cIt is recognized that in many cases discovery will be neither necessary nor wanted ***.\u201d (58 Ill.2d R. 412.) The manner and extent of investigation, of necessity, is to be determined within the discretion of counsel, and whether defendant received effective assistance of counsel must be determined from the record.\nDuring cross-examination of Rodak defense counsel showed that he had pleaded guilty to this same charge, that he was a drug addict, and that he expected to receive a lighter sentence because of his testimony. In response to the question whether he had told anyone that defendant was not involved in the burglary Rodak responded, \u201cNot that I can recall.\u201d The statement which presumably exonerated defendant, assuming, arguendo, that it existed, and was in the possession of the People, would have been admissible only to impeach Kodak on this last question.\nThis case is clearly distinguishable from People v. Stepheny, 46 Ill.2d 153, upon which defendant rests much of his argument that counsel was incompetent. Here the evidence allegedly undiscovered would have served only to further impeach Kodak\u2019s testimony. In Stepheny, in which defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, the undiscovered evidence related to the decedent\u2019s being armed and provoking the defendant and was contrary to evidence offered by the People. In view of defendant\u2019s testimony that he was with Kodak at the time of the burglary we are unpersuaded that any additional impeachment of Kodak\u2019s testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial.\nWe conclude that on this record defendant received the effective assistance of counsel, and we agree with the appellate court that the circuit court did not err in denying defendant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The judgment is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James Geis, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa (Mark W. Burkhalter, Assistant Defender, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and William K. O\u2019Connor, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr, and George C. Sorensen, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 47558.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JERRY L. WILLIAMS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed May 28, 1976.\nJames Geis, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa (Mark W. Burkhalter, Assistant Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and William K. O\u2019Connor, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr, and George C. Sorensen, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0371-01",
  "first_page_order": 383,
  "last_page_order": 386
}