{ "id": 5435770, "name": "THE CITY OF DECATUR, Appellee, v. JOHN T. CURRY, Circuit Clerk, et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "City of Decatur v. Curry", "decision_date": "1976-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 48711", "first_page": "350", "last_page": "359", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 350" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2791226 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5358530 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390430 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5220356 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440-41" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/29/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5379513 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" }, { "page": "803-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0799-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 668, "char_count": 17760, "ocr_confidence": 0.867, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7351879590039346e-07, "percentile": 0.7061805533836143 }, "sha256": "bb038e6f026a9504e0c5465585d4590312b05122cbe9e23eb664503b959e5525", "simhash": "1:8ef7acdd47d12d87", "word_count": 2932 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:48:37.889160+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE CITY OF DECATUR, Appellee, v. JOHN T. CURRY, Circuit Clerk, et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, the County of Macon, its county treasurer and the clerk of the circuit court, appealed from the judgment of the circuit court of Macon County entered in favor of plaintiff, the City of Decatur, in its action for declaratory judgment. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions (39 Ill. App. 3d 799) and thereafter granted a certificate of importance (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 3; Rule 316 (58 Ill. 2d R. 316)).\nThe plaintiff city filed a three-count complaint seeking an injunction (count I), a declaratory judgment (count II) and a money judgment (count III). In its decree the circuit court dismissed count I, entered judgment on count II, and found, pursuant to Rule 304 (58 Ill. 2d R. 304), that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. The decree also ordered an accounting as prayed in count III.\nThe controversy involved the interpretation of section 16 \u2014 105 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 16\u2014 105), which in pertinent part provided:\n\u201c(a) Fines and penalties recovered under the provisions of Chapters 11 through 16 inclusive of this Act shall be paid and used as follows:\n1. For offenses committed upon a highway within the limits of a city, *** to the treasurer of the particular city *** if the violator was arrested by the authorities of the city, *** provided the police officers and officials of cities *** shall seasonably prosecute for all fines and penalties under this Act. If the violation is prosecuted by the authorities of the county, any fines or penalties recovered shall be paid to the county treasurer.\u201d\nAlso relevant is section 16 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 16\u2014102), which was amended effective January 1, 1974 (Laws of 197 3, at 2787), by deleting the paragraph shown as stricken and adding the paragraph immediately following the deletion:\n\u201cSec. 16 \u2014 102. Arrests \u2014 Investigations\u2014Prosecutions. The State Police shall patrol the public highways and make arrests for violation of the provisions of this Act.\nThe Secretary of State, through the investigators provided for in this Act shall investigate and report violations of the provisions of this Act in relation to the equipment and operation of vehicles as provided for in Section 2 \u2014 115 and for such purposes these investigators have and may exercise throughout the State all of the powers of constables and police officers.\nThe-State-\u2019s \u2014 A-ttemey-ef\u2014the-K3eunty\u2014in-whieh-theviolatien-oe-eur-S'-sharH-presee-ute-the-vi-elater-.-\nThe State\u2019s Attorney of the county in which the violation occurs shall prosecute all violations except when the violation occurs within the corporate limits of a municipality, the municipal attorney may prosecute if written permission to do so is obtained from the State\u2019s A ttomey. \u201d\nThe facts are not in dispute. Prior to April 1, 1974, when offenses occurred within the limits of the plaintiff city and the city police made the arrest, charged the violator and appeared in court if requested, fines and forfeitures coming into the hands of the defendant clerk of the circuit court as a result of convictions, pleas of guilty or bond forfeitures involving offenses under chapters 11 through 16 of the Illinois Vehicle Code were paid over to the city treasurer. About 75% of the cases involving these offenses were terminated without a court appearance by the prosecution; but if a court appearance was necessary, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office appeared as prosecutor.\nIn a letter dated March 12, 1974, addressed to the plaintiff city\u2019s corporation counsel, the State\u2019s Attorney granted the city \u201cpermission to prosecute any traffic offenses set forth in Chapter 95J/2, sections 11 through 15, inclusive, Illinois Rev. Stat. 1973, which option should be exercised by entering the appearance of the municipal attorney at the first court date fixed in the traffic ticket.\u201d The State\u2019s Attorney advised the city attorney of the foregoing amendments to section 16 \u2014 102, and that:\n\u201cThe undersigned respectfully submits that in view of the authority for the municipalities with the permission of the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute these cases through their own attorney, failure to do so requires that fines collected pursuant to prosecution by the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office will be paid into the County Treasury rather than to the cities, villages, incorporated towns, etc.\n***\nIn order to put the matter in simple terms, the position of our office will be as follows: If the municipality desires to prosecute the cases and enters their appearance at a time prior to the first appearance of defendant in Court, they will be entitled to any fines collected. If they fail to do so, our office will enter its appearance upon the first court date and thereafter any fines collected will be paid into the County Treasury. In order to give you and the circuit clerk sufficient notice of the change, we will not implement this system until April 1, 1974.\u201d\nAfter April 1, 1974, the city police continued to arrest and charge persons who, within the city limits, committed offenses under chapters 11 through 16 of the Illinois Vehicle Code and if requested to do so, appeared in court. The State\u2019s Attorney continued to appear in those cases in which an appearance for the prosecution was required. The city attorney did not appear in any of the cases. Upon the advice of the State\u2019s Attorney, the clerk of the circuit court has paid to the county all fines and forfeitures received by him from offenses occurring within the city, and since April 1, 1974, the city has not received any of these funds. The fines and forfeitures for offenses occurring within the city for the months of April, May, June and July of 1974 were in excess of $50,000. In addition to the fines and forfeitures, the county received a $5 State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s fee for each conviction, taxed as costs pursuant to statute. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 53, par. 8.\nThe question presented both in the circuit court and on appeal is whether, as contemplated by section 16 \u2014 105, \u201cthe police officers and officials\u201d of the plaintiff \u201chave seasonably prosecute [d] for all fines and penalties\u201d under the Act. The circuit court held:\n\u201c27. That The City of Decatur is entitled to the fines, penalties and forfeitures which come into the hands of the Defendant, JOHN T. CURRY, as Circuit Clerk, resulting from convictions, pleas of guilty or forfeitures involving offenses committed by violators upon streets and highways within the corporate limits of The City of Decatur, where said violators were arrested and charged by the City Police of The City of Decatur, and where the said City Police appeared in Court when required, and which involve violations under Chapter 9514, Illinois Revised Statutes, Sections 11 through 15 inclusive (1973).\u201d\nThe appellate court said:\n\u201cWe hold that when the State\u2019s attorney of a county has tendered or granted to a municipality within the county and of the type listed in section 16 \u2014 105 permission for its attorney to prosecute offenses listed in that section, and the State\u2019s attorney is required, because of the failure of that municipal attorney to do so, to appear and prosecute such an offense in either the circuit or appellate court, any fines or penalties recovered in that case, which would otherwise be paid to the municipality shall be paid to the county. In all other cases, fines and penalties shall be distributed as heretofore.\u201d 39 Ill. App. 3d 799, 804.\nExcept that the phrase chapters \u201c11 through 16\u201d was added to subparagraph (a) in 1970 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 16\u2014 105), section 16\u2014105 and its predecessor sections first enacted in 1935 (Laws of 1935, at 1283-84) have contained the same language since 1943. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 235.) The term \u201cprosecute,\u201d as used in what was then section 138 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 9514, par. 235), was discussed in an opinion of then Attorney General Ivan A. Elliott, who stated:\n\u201cIt is my opinion that the term \u2018prosecute\u2019 as used in said Subdivision 1, contemplates the making of the arrest, the initiating of the complaint, and appearance as prosecuting witness rather than the formal conduct of the proceeding.\nThe fact that the State\u2019s Attorney might appear to conduct the proceedings would not, in the instance wherein the authorities of the city, village or incorporated town have made the arrest, signed the complaint and appeared as prosecuting witnesses, deprive the city, village or incorporated town of the right to receive the fine. The legislative intent was to encourage enforcement of the Uniform Traffic Act by providing that fines imposed for violations committed within the limits of a city, village or incorporated town be payable to the treasurer of such city, village or incorporated town.\nTherefore, when the officers or authorities of the city, village or incorporated town have taken all the steps within their authority in connection with the prosecution of an offense, that is, made the arrest, filed the complaint, and appeared as prosecuting witness, then a fine imposed for such offense should be paid to the treasurer of such city, village or incorporated town.\u201d 1949 Ill. Att\u2019y Gen. Op. 17, 18-19.\nIn an opinion rendered in 1953, then Attorney General Latham Castle said:\n\u201cIt is therefore my opinion, in answer to your first question, that the prosecution of an offense, within the meaning and scope of clause (1), does not include the formal conduct of the court proceedings, but includes arrest, signing of a complaint for warrant or signing of an information, and appearance of a witness in court. If these steps are taken by the police officers or officials of a municipality or park district for offenses committed within the limits of the municipality or jurisdiction of a park district, the municipality or park district is entitled to receive the fine collected irrespective of whether or not the State\u2019s Attorney appeared in court to conduct the proceedings.\nI am further of the opinion that it is not necessary, in order for a local municipality to qualify for collection of a particular fine, that no other authority, such as the State\u2019s Attorney, shall have any hand in the prosecution, if the violator was arrested by the municipal authorities and if the police officers or officials of such municipalities had a complaint or information signed and appeared as prosecuting witnesses.\u201d 1953 Ill. Att\u2019y Gen. Op. 237, 239.\nIn City of Champaign v. Hill, 29 Ill. App. 2d 429, the city sought a declaratory judgment construing section 138. In deciding what constituted prosecution by the city officials within the meaning of the statute the appellate court reviewed the history of the statute, the definitions of the word \u201cprosecution\u201d contained in dictionaries and judicial opinions, the duty of the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute misdemeanors where the maximum penalty exceeded $500, and the two Attorney General opinions on the subject and concluded:\n\u201cWe therefore hold, in accordance with the two opinions of the Attorney General of Illinois heretofore cited, that the word \u2018prosecute\u2019 does not include the formal conduct of the court proceeding, but does include the arrest, signing of a complaint for warrant or signing of an information and appearance as witness in court. We must further hold that if these things and acts are performed by the municipal authorities, and the offense is committed within the limits of the municipality, the municipality is entitled to receive the fine collected, irrespective of the actions of the State\u2019s Attorney. In so holding, this court believes that it is construing the word \u2018prosecute\u2019 in accordance with the spirit and intent of the legislature. This court has no right to legislate but only to interpret the laws as legislated.\u201d 29 Ill. App. 2d 429, 450.\nPlaintiff contends, and the circuit court held, that absent an amendment to section 16 \u2014 105 the rationale of Hill should control here. Defendants contend that the subsequent amendments to section 16 \u2014 102 compel the conclusion that the county is entitled to the fines and forfeitures and argue that,\n\u201cAt the time of the Hill decision, there was no specific provision stating who or what authority was to prosecute violations of the State traffic laws. Therefore, the Court quite correctly reasoned that only the State\u2019s Attorney possessed the power to conduct the actual court proceedings following the arrest or citation of a traffic violator. Further, the Court reasoned that since the municipality lacked authority to pursue the matter beyond arrest, the word \u2018prosecute\u2019 for purposes of the disposition of fines collected in traffic cases would have no meaning if construed to include in-court proceedings as the municipality could never qualify under these conditions. Naturally, the Court concluded that in this context the word \u2018prosecute\u2019 meant that the municipal \u2018officials\u2019 do all they could do, i.e. make the arrest, sign the complaint and testify in court.\u201d\nThey argue further that following the decision of Hill the General Assembly amended section 136 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 233) to direct that the State\u2019s Attorney prosecute all violations of the Act; that in 1973 it allowed municipal attorneys, with the written permission of the State\u2019s Attorney, to prosecute for violations of the Act occurring within the corporate limits and that \u201cSince the municipalities are now empowered to prosecute and these cases are within the normal customary meaning of that word, the need for a unique definition sought in Hill is no longer present.\u201d\nThe basis of the appellate court\u2019s decision is its reading of Hill as construing \u201cprosecute\u201d to mean that the city officials must \u201cpursue the offender\u201d as far as possible, which at that time required only that municipal officers arrest, sign charges and appear as witnesses at trial; and that the \u201crule of Hill today requires a municipal attorney, if so authorized, to engage in court proceedings in order to \u2018pursue the offender\u2019 as far as possible and thus \u2018seasonably prosecute\u2019 him.\u201d (39 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803-04.) It held, however, that the county was entitled to the fines and forfeitures only when the State\u2019s Attorney appeared, or in approximately 25% of the cases, and that the city was entitled to the fines and forfeitures in cases which were terminated without the appearance of a prosecutor, or about 75% of the cases.\nWe do not agree with the appellate court that Hill held that the General Assembly intended the term \u201cprosecute\u201d to mean to \u201cpursue the offender\u201d as far as possible. In Hill the city police arrested a traffic violator within the city limits and signed an information charging him with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. The violator pleaded guilty and was fined $100. It was contended in Hill that the provision that the \u201cofficials of cities *** shall seasonably prosecute for all fines and penalties under this Act\u201d gave the city the right to bring an action in the name of the city and conduct the prosecution without the State\u2019s Attorney. (See 29 Ill. App. 2d 429, 440.) The appellate court noted that the offense of driving while intoxicated, punishable by a fine of $100 to $1,000 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 144), was a misdemeanor justiciable only in a court which could impose the maximum penalty. It then examined the statute pertaining to the duty imposed on the State\u2019s Attorney, the statute governing the jurisdiction of police magistrates, and the provisions of article VI, section 33, of the Constitution of 1870, and concluded that the offense involved could be prosecuted only by the State\u2019s Attorney in the county or circuit court. 29 Ill. App. 2d 429, 440-41.\nHad the opinion in Hill interpreted \u201cprosecution\u201d to mean to \u201cpursue the offender\u201d as far as possible, the city could have prosecuted all offenses under the Act for which the maximum fine did not exceed $500. The court, however, after deciding that the city officials could not conduct the actual court proceedings for an offense with a maximum penalty of over $500 held that \u201cprosecute\u201d within the meaning of the statute \u201cdoes not include the formal conduct of the court proceeding\u201d and that this holding applied to all offenses under the Act. 29 Ill. App. 2d 429, 450.\nWe do not find it necessary to decide, and therefore do not further consider, whether the two Attorney General opinions and Hill correctly held that \u201cprosecute\u201d as used in the statute governing the disposition of fines and penalties \u201cdoes not include the formal conduct of the court proceeding.\u201d When construed by an appellate court the construction becomes, in effect, a part of the statute (Mitchell v. Mahin, 51 Ill. 2d 452, 456; Schwarz v. Schwarz, 27 Ill. 2d 140, 150; Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 80), and any change in interpretation can be effected by the General Assembly if it so desires.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the appellate court, insofar as it reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court, is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Basil G. Greanias, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur, for appellants.", "Hilmer C. Landholt, Corporation Counsel, and Vernon H. Ronchen, Special Counsel for the City of Decatur, both of Decatur, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 48711.\nTHE CITY OF DECATUR, Appellee, v. JOHN T. CURRY, Circuit Clerk, et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed December 3, 1976.\nBasil G. Greanias, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur, for appellants.\nHilmer C. Landholt, Corporation Counsel, and Vernon H. Ronchen, Special Counsel for the City of Decatur, both of Decatur, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0350-01", "first_page_order": 422, "last_page_order": 431 }