{ "id": 5464792, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JAMES W. WILSON, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wilson", "decision_date": "1977-04-05", "docket_number": "No. 47982", "first_page": "346", "last_page": "350", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 346" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "26 Ill. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5356962 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5282693 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/357/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927490 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5289000 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/67/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2635148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2596079 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/361/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937410 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2743856 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. 2d 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2704112 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/5/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2797896 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0057-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 429, "char_count": 6281, "ocr_confidence": 0.86, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.949617533682459e-07, "percentile": 0.973227975839518 }, "sha256": "90df6fd8e3e2b4734ee864bdef86454aa00efeb92a2786108d90606ec7fe43f8", "simhash": "1:df46f9b71aaa98d6", "word_count": 1047 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:05.233646+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JAMES W. WILSON, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe appellant, James Wilson, was indicted for armed robbery and found guilty of robbery by a jury in the circuit court of Lee County. His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court, Second District. People v. Wilson (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 57.\nThe issue is whether the testimony by an accomplice was sufficient here to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe complaining witness testified that on December 10, 1973, at 6:55 p.m., as she was preparing to leave her apartment, there was a knock on her door. The man at the door wore a jacket pulled up to just below eye level, carried a gun and demanded her purse. He then ran off with the purse. The victim failed to identify the accused at trial and admitted she identified another at a lineup which included the defendant and the accomplice, Eugene Bonnell, two months after the offense.\nA police officer testified that, upon arriving at the victim\u2019s apartment, he found her agitated. He also found and followed footprints in the snow leading from the apartment and through neighboring yards to another street which had been cleared of snow. The officer said the footsteps indicated the individual had been running.\nThe last witness was the accomplice, Bonnell, who admitted that he had initiated the plan by choosing the victim, from whom he had rented a room two years earlier. Bonnell also admitted that he had been given immunity from prosecution for the instant offense and that two other indictments for armed robbery were pending against him. According to Bonnell\u2019s testimony, the defendant went to the victim\u2019s house around 6:45 p.m. and returned with a purse, having run through residential lots to the waiting car which Bonnell was driving. The defendant was carrying a toy gun.\nAt the completion of the State\u2019s case, the court denied the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nThe defendant contends that where accomplice testimony remains essentially uncorroborated, but is the only basis for a conviction because the complainant failed to identify him, the standard of reasonable doubt has not been met.\nAlthough Wigmore was not satisfied with it (7 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 2056 (3d ed. 1940; see also Supp. 1975)), the rule that uncorroborated accomplice testimony is a sufficient ground on which the trier may base a conviction has found almost overwhelming favor in Illinois. (See, e.g., People v. Hermens (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 277; People v. Williams (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 171; and People v. Pittman (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 39.) This court has never questioned the wisdom of regarding such testimony with skepticism and suspicion, however. It is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused. (People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165.) Such testimony should be subject to careful scrutiny, \u201cacted upon with great caution\u201d (People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 313), and have the \u201cabsolute conviction of the truth\u201d (People v. Zaeske (2d Dist. 1966), 67 Ill. App. 2d 115, 121). It is also true that whether accomplice testimony, corroborated or uncorroborated, is a satisfactory basis for conviction goes to the weight of the evidence and is, therefore, in the province of the jury or the court. People v. Farnsley (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 537 People v. Palmer (1962), 26 Ill. 2d\nNevertheless, this court has held that where it is \u201cplainly apparent that the defendant was not proved guilty *** beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d we will set the conviction aside. People v. Jurek (1934), 357 Ill. 626, 632. See also People v. Palmer (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 464.\nWe do not intend to change our law allowing uncorroborated accomplice testimony as the basis for a conviction so long as the defendant is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, we do not believe that standard of proof was met here.\nFirst, there simply was not the absolute conviction of truth to Bonnell\u2019s testimony. (See People v. Hermens (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 277.) Bonn ell, who was incarcerated pending the outcome of the other indictments and who admitted instigating the instant criminal act, was promised immunity. Testimony under such circumstances must be regarded with skepticism and caution. People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165; People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303.\nFurthermore, we disagree with the appellate court\u2019s view that it was \u201cnot faced with uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.\u201d (32 Ill. App. 3d 57, 59.) Bonnell\u2019s testimony pointed to who did it, but the testimony of the complainant and the policeman simply helped determine what occurred. The degree of corroboration was tenuous at best. Their testimony did not aid in establishing who committed the robbery. Bonnell\u2019s identification of Wilson as the actor remains uncorroborated. At most, Bonnell\u2019s apparently extensive knowledge of the robbery was corroborated.\nSecond, the victim never identified the accused as the robber. It is clear from the record that not only did the complainant fail to identify the accused at a lineup, but she identified another man \u2014 the same man \u2014 three times. Those in the lineup repeated the words of the robber, but she was still unable to point to Wilson as the robber. Moreover, she described the criminal as 5 feet 6 inches, whereas the accused is 6 feet 1 inch, a height differential which is not adequately explained either by the fact that the assailant had his coat pulled up over part of his face or by the fact that the victim had put her hands over her face at the time of the offense.\nFor these reasons we are not satisfied the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed.\nJudgments reversed.\nMR. JUSTICE MORAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner, Deputy Defender, and Ira A. Moltz, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr and George C. Sorensen, Assistant Attorneys General, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 47982\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JAMES W. WILSON, Appellant.\nOpinion filed April 5, 1977.\nMORAN, J., took no part.\nRalph Ruebner, Deputy Defender, and Ira A. Moltz, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr and George C. Sorensen, Assistant Attorneys General, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0346-01", "first_page_order": 360, "last_page_order": 364 }