{ "id": 5464889, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LORENZO P. COOPER, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cooper", "decision_date": "1977-05-20", "docket_number": "No. 48533", "first_page": "509", "last_page": "515", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 509" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2863576 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927159 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12123628 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S. Ct. 2001", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 L. Ed. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 994", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541385, 541916, 541501 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0994-02", "/us/421/0994-03", "/us/421/0994-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953404 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2715439 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0365-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 517, "char_count": 8238, "ocr_confidence": 0.829, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.147069997275326e-07, "percentile": 0.9562354793657855 }, "sha256": "fd492fdf69a8a0b5251bce2b538d20c4804c962bb055ded7d24271fad8be1721", "simhash": "1:ea2ef9915f06547b", "word_count": 1365 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:05.233646+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LORENZO P. COOPER, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 1971, defendant, Lorenzo Cooper, pleaded guilty to a charge of arson and was sentenced by the circuit court of Vermilion County to a three-year period of probation, the first six months of which were served at the Illinois State Penal Farm. On July 18, 1974, a petition was filed seeking to revoke his probation. It alleged that defendant violated his probation in that he committed the offenses of unlawful use of weapons, criminal damage to property, aggravated battery, and armed violence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 24-1 (a)(2), 21-l(a), 12 \u2014 4(b)(1), and 33A \u2014 2.) Upon hearing, the trial court dismissed the charge of criminal damage to property, but held against defendant on the three remaining counts. Defendant\u2019s probation was revoked and he was sentenced on his earlier arson conviction to a term of two to six years in the penitentiary without credit for time served on probation.\nThe appellate court, in a two-to-one decision, reversed the trial court\u2019s judgment on the grounds that the State failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense charged. (37 Ill. App. 3d 365.) We granted the State leave to appeal.\nOn the evening of July 13, 1974, the defendant and his wife were seated, waiting for a pizza order, in a restaurant in Danville, Illinois. Several feet away from the defendant stood a man, Leamon Covington, who was also waiting for an order. A restaurant employee testified that he observed defendant and Covington exchange glances, that the defendant had smiled a couple of times at Covington, and that Covington was staring and frowning at the defendant. This course of \\ conduct lasted several minutes. Covington then picked up his pizza order and, while facing the defendant, began backing out through the doorway to the parking lot. He then stopped, came back inside, set his pizza down, turned toward the defendant, muttered a few words, and struck his fist into the palm of his hand. Defendant\u2019s wife testified that Covington said to the defendant, \u201cYou make me sick.\u201d\nAfter Covington left, the defendant went outside to the trunk of his car and obtained an unloaded revolver. He placed the revolver inside his belt, pulled his shirt over it, and reentered the restaurant. Defendant testified that he obtained the revolver for protection because he and his wife were the only blacks in the restaurant and he was nervous.\nA short time later, Covington reentered the restaurant. Defendant and his wife testified that, as they stood at the counter, Covington struck defendant from behind. A fight ensued. The restaurant employee did not see who landed the first blow, but stated, \u201cEverything happened so quick that both [Covington\u2019s and defendant\u2019s] reactions seemed like they went off at the same time.\u201d Defendant testified that he fell forward, with his face to the floor, and that Covington was on top, hitting him. (Defendant, who stood 5 feet, 9 inches, estimated Covington\u2019s height at 6 feet, 7 inches, or 6 feet, 8 inches; the restaurant employee estimated it to be approximately 6 feet, 3 inches. Evidence indicated that Covington weighed at least 80 pounds more than the defendant.) Shortly after he fell, defendant turned over, drew his revolver from beneath his shirt, and began to beat Covington with the gun on the side of the head \u201cas many times as [he] could.\u201d The restaurant employee stated that when Covington saw the gun, he immediately attempted to disarm the defendant. When asked how he managed to turn over and draw his revolver with Covington on top of him, defendant stated.that he taught wrestling and boxing. During the course of the fight, the defendant\u2019s wife picked up a tray and also struck Covington.\nA summoned Danville police officer testified that upon arrival at the parking lot he encountered Covington, who had blood streaming from his face. A short time thereafter, the defendant, who had apparently left the restaurant, pulled into the parking lot, got out of his car, and started screaming at the police officer. Defendant testified that he was shouting, \u201cI want that man arrested.\u201d Defendant, however, was placed under arrest and taken into custody. A search of the defendant\u2019s car, which was owned by a friend, revealed an M-l carbine rifle, some .30-caliber shells, plus .38- and .357-caliber shell casings.\nCovington was taken to the hospital for treatment, and, while there, photographs were taken of his injuries. One of the photos was introduced into evidence and it revealed Covington had received at least two large gashes on the side of his head. Further evidence of Covington\u2019s injuries came from the restaurant employee who testified that, after the fight, he noticed blood on Covington\u2019s head, redness around his eyes, and a cut above one eye. There is no evidence in the record regarding any injuries to the defendant.\nThe State argues that the evidence clearly supports the trial court\u2019s findifig that the defendant committed aggravated battery in that he used a deadly weapon in a manner and to an extent which, under the circumstances, was unreasonable, excessive, and unjustified. It contends such finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree.\nCriminal offenses which serve as a basis for probation revocation need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and not beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Grayson (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 260, 264, cert, denied (1975), 421 U.S. 994, 44 L. Ed. 2d 484, 95 S. Ct. 2001; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20144(c).) The trial judge, who is in a superior position to weigh the evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, was entitled to draw reasonable inferences and reach conclusions to which the evidence lent itself. It was for the trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, to determine whether the defendant was reasonable in his apprehension of harm and in the amount of force used. (People v. Johnson (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 165, 171-72.) Although the finding in a probation revocation proceeding is subject to review, a reviewing court will not and should not disturb that finding unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (People v. Crowell (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451-52.) The mere fact that a reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion had it been the trier of fact is insufficient to serve as a basis for reversal. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 352, 356.\nThe extent of Covington\u2019s injuries, the fact that Covington apparently did not use a weapon but, in fact, appeared to be trying to disarm the defendant during the initial stages of the fight, the defendant\u2019s admitted knowledge of boxing and wrestling skills, his use of a deadly weapon, and his admission that he struck the alleged aggressor as many times as he could, support the trial court\u2019s finding that the defendant was unreasonable in his apprehension and that he employed an excessive amount of force. We hold that such finding was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nHaving found the evidence sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the defendant used a deadly weapon in an unlawful manner, it follows that the evidence also supported the court\u2019s finding that the defendant committed the offenses of armed violence and unlawful use of weapons. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 33A-2, 24 \u2014 1(a)(2).\nAccordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court of Vermilion County is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard J. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and G. Michael Prall, Principal Attorney, and Stephen M. Deitsch, Staff Attorney, Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association Statewide Appellate Assistance Service, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.", "Theodore A. Gottfried, State Appellate Defender, and Richard J. Wilson, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 48533\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LORENZO P. COOPER, Appellee.\nOpinion filed May 20, 1977.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard J. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (James B. Zagel, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and G. Michael Prall, Principal Attorney, and Stephen M. Deitsch, Staff Attorney, Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association Statewide Appellate Assistance Service, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.\nTheodore A. Gottfried, State Appellate Defender, and Richard J. Wilson, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0509-01", "first_page_order": 523, "last_page_order": 529 }