{ "id": 5813727, "name": "In re JEFFERY HAGGINS, a Minor, Appellant.-(The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee.)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Haggins", "decision_date": "1977-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 48646", "first_page": "102", "last_page": "107", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 102" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427338 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966555 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771759 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5465012 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2804429 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0542-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 434, "char_count": 6731, "ocr_confidence": 0.877, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.2891899275929527e-07, "percentile": 0.8712222218360993 }, "sha256": "6969e0c61be45519447a4e3ae0991a5cc72fac4b0e3648a384387dc8c7ce0150", "simhash": "1:4ce97b2e673ded28", "word_count": 1117 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:08:31.746559+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re JEFFERY HAGGINS, a Minor, Appellant.\u2014(The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing the filing in the circuit court of Cook County of a two-count petition alleging him to be delinquent by reason of having committed the offenses of battery and intimidation, 16-year-old Jeffery Haggins, represented by the public defender, \u201centered an admission\u201d to the battery count of the petition. The intimidation charge was dismissed by the State, and respondent was subsequently recommitted to the Department of Corrections. He appealed, the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed (38 Ill. App. 3d 542), and we allowed respondent\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nThe issue here arises from the alleged inadequacy of the proceedings at the time of respondent\u2019s \u201cadmission\u201d (the functional equivalent, under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 701\u20141 et seq.) of a plea of guilty). Those proceedings included the following colloquy:\n\u201cMR. FISHMAN: [assistant public defender] Your Honor, we have advised him of his constitutional rights and the consequences of waiving those rights. We have also spoken to the State\u2019s Attorney and as the result of these negotiations and the further conversation with the minor respondent, he will enter an admission to Count I of the petition. The State is asking for a finding.\nMR. RAAB: Yes, we are, your Honor.\nPAROLE OFFICER: He is on authorized absence from Valley View Illinois Youth Center. He is allowed to come home from Monday to Friday. He is supposed to go back on Saturday. He is on authorized absence. He returns to Valley View on Friday night.\nTHE COURT: So, he is not on unauthorized absence?\nPAROLE OFFICER: No.\nTHE COURT: You understand, Mr. Higgins [sic] you admit.to the offense of battery?\nMINOR RESPONDENT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: You understand what battery is, you struck somebody?\nA. Yes.\nTHE COURT: Are you admitting it because it is true?\nMINOR RESPONDENT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: You understand even though I have made a finding of delinquency, you are entitled to appeal from my decision and you would be furnished with a lawyer and the expense of an appeal if you did not have one?\nMINOR RESPONDENT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Can you tell me why you did this?\nMINOR RESPONDENT: We were talking at first. I guess he was going to hit me. I turned and hit him back. I caught him before he had a chance to hit me.\nTHE COURT: He did not hit you?\nMINOR RESPONDENT: He tried.\nTHE COURT: You caught him?\nMINOR RESPONDENT: Yes.\u201d\nWhile counsel do not agree upon the phraseology of the issue presented, the basic concern is as to the standards to be applied by a trial court, acting under the Juvenile Court Act, in its acceptance of an admission by a minor that he engaged in the misconduct alleged.\nRespondent argues that our Rule 402 (58 Ill. 2d R. 402), which sets forth standards governing acceptance of guilty pleas in criminal proceedings, applies to juvenile court actions. We have quite recently held, however, that it does not. In re Beasley (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 385.\nRespondent also urges that either section 1 \u2014 2(3)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 701\u20142(3)(a)) or basic due process considerations require application of a similar if not identical rule. Consequently, it is argued, the court must determine that a factual basis for the admission exists and that it is voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature of the charge. That duty is said not to have been fully discharged here because respondent\u2019s answers to the court\u2019s questions indicated the possibility of an affirmative defense of self-defense which the trial court left unexplored. As a result, suggests respondent, the case must be remanded for further inquiry regarding the circumstances surrounding the offense.\nSimilar arguments were considered by us in Beasley, where we held that section 1 \u2014 2(3)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act does not require the use of Rule 402 in juvenile court proceedings but only requires that constitutionally mandated protections for guilty pleas be observed. Juveniles are entitled to due process (In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428), insuring that admissions be made intelligently and voluntarily. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709.) It is undisputed that Haggins\u2019 admission in this case was voluntary, but it is urged that the court\u2019s definition of battery as \u201cyou struck someone\u201d is inaccurate in that it omitted the requirement that the striking be without legal justification, and therefore respondent\u2019s admission was not made intelligently. This court has upheld guilty pleas, however, in circumstances indicating greater dubiety (People v. Cope (1973), 61 Ill. 2d 226), and where the only explanation by the court consisted of \u201c[y] ou are charged with rape\u201d (People v. Robinson (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 141, 144). Robinson and other opinions there cited hold the entire record may be considered in determining whether the plea is intelligently made, and the Supreme Court has called particular attention to the helpful role of counsel in juvenile cases. In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428.\nHere the public defender informed the court that he had negotiated with the State\u2019s Attorney and informed respondent of his constitutional rights, and that \u201cas the result of these negotiations and the further conversation with the minor respondent, he will enter an admission to Count I.\u201d Respondent was 16 years old, and had been before the court and committed to the Department of Corrections on prior occasions. There was, during the proceedings now before us, no intimation by counsel that respondent had acted in self-defense. In our judgment something more than respondent\u2019s self-serving response that he \u201cguessed\u201d he was going to be struck is necessary before his admission need be vacated and the cause remanded for further inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the offense.\nWe find in this juvenile proceeding no violation of due process, and the judgment of the appellate court is accordingly affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Judith A. Stewart, Assistant Public Defender and John Thomas Moran, Chief, Appeals Division, of counsel), for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Laurence J. Bolon and Iris E. Sholder, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 48646.\nIn re JEFFERY HAGGINS, a Minor, Appellant.\u2014(The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee.)\nOpinion filed June 1, 1977.\nCLARK, J., dissenting.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Judith A. Stewart, Assistant Public Defender and John Thomas Moran, Chief, Appeals Division, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Laurence J. Bolon and Iris E. Sholder, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0102-01", "first_page_order": 116, "last_page_order": 121 }