{ "id": 5456353, "name": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. VIRGINIA DIFFERDING et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Differding", "decision_date": "1977-11-30", "docket_number": "No. 49365", "first_page": "103", "last_page": "108", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 103" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "86 A.L.R.2d 937", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426645 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1580233 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/123/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 835", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2782991 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0835-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 1040", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2529927 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/1040-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5787730 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/27/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4950546 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/325/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2972942 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0015-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 392, "char_count": 6498, "ocr_confidence": 0.894, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.694693217213404e-07, "percentile": 0.9285309684078107 }, "sha256": "14a3e9ffec631dbb3daed41caffee4cb3af669fec388c9dba26521fae88af561", "simhash": "1:d895f9d3e4ddc092", "word_count": 1078 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:19:07.826164+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. VIRGINIA DIFFERDING et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, filed this action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking a declaratory judgment that it was under no duty to defend defendant Virginia Differding in any action for personal injuries brought by defendant Eugene Panici. The circuit court found that plaintiff provided no coverage for the automobile driven by defendant Differ-ding at the time of the occurrence out of which defendant Panici\u2019s injuries arose, and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant Panici appealed, the appellate court reversed and remanded (46 Ill. App. 3d 15), and we allowed plaintiff\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nIn 1972, Miss Differding was attending Northern Illinois University, but maintained a permanent residence with her parents in Park Forest. That summer, intending to attend summer school, she sublet an apartment in De Kalb from Yip Lieng, a professor at Northern. The period of the subtenancy was to run from June 1, 1972, until the end of the summer school term in the first week in August. As part of the agreement to sublet, it was understood that Miss Differding and her roommate, Joan Luzbetak, would take care of certain items of personal property which Mr. Lieng left in the apartment. Since Mr. Lieng was going to be in Vietnam for the summer, he requested Miss Differding to maintain his automobile to prevent its deterioration. He specifically limited her usage of the automobile in two respects: (1) it was to be used only in the De Kalb area; and (2) it was only to be used for the summer. Since her roommate did not have a driver\u2019s license, Miss Differding was primarily entrusted with the auto. She had the only keys, and from June to August only she drove the car.\nMiss Differding found part-time employment in De Kalb and stayed on in the apartment beyond the end of the summer school term. She and her roommate paid no rent for the additional period of their occupancy of the apartment. On August 18, 1972, while Miss Differding was driving Mr. Lieng\u2019s automobile from De Kalb to her home in Park Forest, it collided with a motorcycle being driven by defendant Panici, and he was injured. This was the fourth time she had driven the car from De Kalb to Park Forest.\nAt that time there were in force and effect two policies of automobile liability insurance issued by plaintiff to Miss Differding\u2019s father and one to her brother, who also resided with his parents. Each of these policies contained the following provision:\n\u201cUSE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES\nIf the named insured *** owns a motor vehicle covered by this policy *** such insurance as is afforded by this policy with respect to the owned motor vehicle *** applies to the use of a non-owned automobile by:\n(a) the first person named in the declarations or,\n(b) if a resident of the same household, his spouse or the relatives of either ***.\u201d\nThe question whether Miss Differding qualified as a \u201cresident of the same household\u201d was decided by the appellate court adversely to plaintiff\u2019s contentions and is not in issue here.\nIn the policies a nonowned automobile is defined as:\n\u201c*** an automobile, trailer or detachable living quarters unit, not\n(1) owned by,\n(2) registered in the name of, or\n(3) furnished or available for the frequent or regular use of the named insured, his spouse, or any relative of either residing in the same household, other than a temporary substitute automobile.\u201d\nThe circuit court found that the Lieng automobile was furnished or available for Miss Differding\u2019s frequent and regular use and that it \u201cwas in fact used regularly and frequently by Miss Differding.\u201d\nThe appellate court, finding that the evidence showed that the automobile was available for Miss Differding\u2019s regular use only in the De Kalb area and that the trip to Park Forest was \u201can irregular and somewhat isolated use\u201d held that the circuit court\u2019s finding was contrary to the weight of the evidence and reversed. 46 Ill. App. 3d 15, 22.\nAlthough the appellate court has construed the terms \u201cregular use\u201d (Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 325 Ill. App. 421; Schoenknecht v. Prairie State Farmers Insurance Association, 27 Ill. App. 2d 83; Franey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1040; and Continental National American Group v. Vaicunas, 26 Ill. App. 3d 835) and \u201cfrequent or regular use\u201d [State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Berke, 123 Ill. App. 2d 455, 456) our only prior consideration of the clause here involved was in Econo Lease, Inc. v. Noffsinger, 63 Ill. 2d 390. There we held that a leased automobile was not covered as a \u201cnon-owned\u201d automobile for the reason that it was the intention of the lessee-insured to \u201cregularly or frequently use the [leased] automobile.\u201d (63 Ill. 2d 390, 394.) An examination of these cases and the many authorities collected in the annotation at 86 A.L.R.2d 937, 939 (1962), leads us to conclude that the terms are not subject to absolute definition and that each case is dependent upon its own facts and circumstances.\nOn this record the question whether the Lieng automobile was furnished or available to Miss Differding for her frequent or regular use was one of fact. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings made by the circuit court, and in holding that the findings were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court erred.\nWe have considered defendant\u2019s argument that the term \u201cfrequent or regular use\u201d is ambiguous and that any ambiguity in the policy must be construed in favor of the insured. This rule, however, applies only when the language of the policy is ambiguous, and while the determination of whether the nonowned automobile was available for the frequent or regular use of the insured presents a question of fact, that created no ambiguity requiring construction of the language of the policy.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" } ], "attorneys": [ "John T. Kennedy, Victor J. Piekarski, and John F. Skeffington, of Querry, Harrow, Gulanick 8c Kennedy, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Burton I. Weinstein, of Boehm and Weinstein, of Chicago, for appellee Eugene Panici." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 49365. \u2014\nSTATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. VIRGINIA DIFFERDING et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed November 30, 1977.\nJohn T. Kennedy, Victor J. Piekarski, and John F. Skeffington, of Querry, Harrow, Gulanick 8c Kennedy, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBurton I. Weinstein, of Boehm and Weinstein, of Chicago, for appellee Eugene Panici." }, "file_name": "0103-01", "first_page_order": 115, "last_page_order": 120 }