{ "id": 5805318, "name": "RONALD STEVENS v. SILVER MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al., Appellants.-(General Box Company, Appellee.)", "name_abbreviation": "Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing Co.", "decision_date": "1977-12-12", "docket_number": "No. 48974", "first_page": "41", "last_page": "46", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 41" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491915 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5805433 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/70/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2970165 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2895709 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2865152 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5805433 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/70/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5805433 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/70/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5805433 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 3, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/70/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 421, "char_count": 7268, "ocr_confidence": 0.882, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6586155182585567e-07, "percentile": 0.9275573595217327 }, "sha256": "684a3b33a7258b21fe7aa619e6bf4cf41c35c55387b7702e55f173f2037d96f5", "simhash": "1:9b271694acf53e4e", "word_count": 1151 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:17.719560+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RONALD STEVENS v. SILVER MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al., Appellants.\u2014(General Box Company, Appellee.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Ronald Stevens, filed this action in the circuit court of Kane County seeking to recover damages for personal injuries suffered while operating a shredding machine manufactured by defendant Silver Manufacturing Company, d/b/a Industrial Shredder and Cutter Company, and which had been assembled and installed by defendant Steelcraft Corporation upon the premises of General Box Company. Silver and Steelcraft filed third-party complaints against General Box, by whom plaintiff was employed at the time of his injury. The circuit court denied General Box\u2019s motion to dismiss the third-party complaints and pursuant to Rule 308 (58 Ill. 2d R. 308) certified four questions for appeal. The appellate court allowed General Box\u2019s application for leave to appeal and reversed without remandment (41 Ill. App. 3d 483), and we have allowed Silver and Steelcraft\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nThe pleadings are described in detail and the questions certified are set forth verbatim in the opinion of the appellate court and need not be repeated here. It suffices to say that the plaintiff sought to recover on the basis of strict liability in tort while the third-party complaints allege negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of General Box. In each instance the third-party plaintiff seeks indemnity from General Box \u201cof all or part\u201d of the sum that it was required to pay in settlement of plaintiff\u2019s claim, together with expenses and attorney\u2019s fees incurred in its defense. Silver and Steelcraft contend that the appellate court erred in holding that their third-party complaints did not state a cause of action and that, although total indemnity would be an appropriate result in this case, \u201cthe Illinois law of strict product liability has developed concepts of fault which invite equitable apportionment of the economic risk of loss among all responsible parties.\u201d They argue that indemnity \u201cthrough equitable apportionment is a workable and just solution to third-party practice in Illinois\u201d and that unjust and harsh results follow the application of the rules enunciated by the appellate court. General Box contends that the third-party complaints fail to state a cause of action, that where the original liability is based on strict liability in tort indemnity is limited to \u201cupstream\u201d actions, and that the \u201cqualitative distinctions in negligence do not serve as a basis for indemnity for strict liability in tort actions.\u201d They argue too that a manufacturer\u2019s liability arising in strict tort liability is qualitatively \u201cactive.\u201d\nIn Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, upon consideration of contentions similar to those made here, we concluded that on the facts there alleged and for purposes of the motion admitted, there was no sound reason for the application of the no-contribution rule. We held, therefore, that the governing equitable principles required that ultimate liability for plaintiff\u2019s injuries be apportioned on the basis of the relative degree to which the defective product and the employer\u2019s conduct proximately caused them.\nWe consider next General Box\u2019s contention that \u201cindemnity and product liability is limited to \u2018upstream\u2019 actions.\u201d Citing Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, it argues that the major purpose of strict liability is to place the loss caused by defective products on those who created the risk and reaped the profit from placing the product in the stream of commerce. It contends that indemnity should therefore be limited to those whose handling of the defective product was \u201cupstream\u201d or prior to that of the third-party plaintiff, and that no indemnity has been permitted nor should be permitted against \u201cdownstream\u201d or subsequent users or consumers. We do not agree. As we said in Skinner: \u201cMisuse of the product or assumption of the risk by a user will serve to bar his recovery (Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418), and indemnity is not available to one who misuses the product or assumes the risk of its use (Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77). We are of the opinion that if the manufacturer\u2019s third-party complaint alleges that the employer\u2019s misuse of the product or assumption of the risk of its use contributed to cause plaintiff\u2019s injuries, the manufacturer has stated a cause of action for contribution.\u201d 70 Ill. 2d 1, 15.\nCiting the majority view of the Study Committee (see Study Committee Report on Indemnity, Third Party Actions and Equitable Contributions, 1976 Report of the Illinois Judicial Conference), General Box argues that the increase in workmen\u2019s compensation benefits can be construed to indicate the legislative intent that employers not be subjected to actions for contribution. We do not agree. As we said in Skinner: \u201cThe fact that the employee\u2019s action against the employer is barred by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, pars. 138.5, 138.11) would not preclude the manufacturer\u2019s third-party action against the employer for indemnification (Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273) and should not serve to bar its action for contribution.\u201d\nAlthough the third-party complaints are couched in terms of negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct, they allege misuse of the product and assumption of risk. Although stated in terms of partial indemnity rather than contribution, the prayer for relief clearly seeks contribution based on the relative degree to which the employer\u2019s misuse of the product or assumption of the risk contributed to cause plaintiff\u2019s injuries. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Kane County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nOn the court\u2019s own motion, the decision in this cause will apply prospectively to causes of action arising out of occurrences on and after March 1, 1978. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" }, { "text": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARD,\ndissenting:\nI dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 17.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARD," }, { "text": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD,\ndissenting:\nFor the reasons set forth in my dissent in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 20, I cannot agree with the court here.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD," }, { "text": "MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY,\ndissenting:\nI dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 22.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY," } ], "attorneys": [ "John M. Lament and Timothy J. Reuland, of Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy & Hupp, of Aurora (James F. Whitfield, of Wheaton, of counsel), for appellants.", "Elliot R. Schiff (Marvin Riman, Richard Sawislak, and Francis J. Marasa, of Sweeney 8c Riman, Ltd., of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 48974.\nRONALD STEVENS v. SILVER MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al., Appellants.\u2014(General Box Company, Appellee.)\nOpinion filed December 12, 1977.\nModified on denial of rehearing January 26, 1978.\u2014Opinion modified March 1, 1978.\nWARD, C.J., and UNDERWOOD and DOOLEY, JJ., dissenting.\nJohn M. Lament and Timothy J. Reuland, of Reid, Ochsenschlager, Murphy & Hupp, of Aurora (James F. Whitfield, of Wheaton, of counsel), for appellants.\nElliot R. Schiff (Marvin Riman, Richard Sawislak, and Francis J. Marasa, of Sweeney 8c Riman, Ltd., of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0041-01", "first_page_order": 53, "last_page_order": 58 }